JPS59501388A - safety system - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.

Description

[Detailed description of the invention] This application was filed on June 22, 1981, and was named a document system that cannot be forged. This is a continuation in part of Application No. 276.282.

Background and summary of the invention A wide variety of special applications are possible for distinguishing genuine provisions from fake and disinformation. There is an increasing demand for practical systems of identification. increase included in it The request verifies the identification card or other device used to approach the computing system. It is a special ability to do. From remote computer terminal to central processing unit A large amount of demand exists for systems to match, limit, and control calls in There is.

The total number of computer terminals distributed throughout the United States has increased abnormally in recent years. I've been doing it. Along with word processors, windows, and other automated office equipment, The central process is recognized as a central process in any environment. Submit a great deal of threat of no call usage. Not recognized by central combinator Calls may occur intentionally or accidentally with very serious consequences. stomach. For example, unauthorized calls can be used as a prank on the central combinator, or as valuable information. Piracy of information, or even theft of money by illegally ordering the transfer of funds. Achieve some of a wide variety of consequences.

The most common method for controlling user access to a computer system is authentication. The purpose of this is to provide a secret not password to users who have accepted the password. Unfortunately, such It is difficult to keep secure passwords secret.

Therefore, they are particularly effective for controlling computer access That's not to say.

Cryptographic encoding techniques were developed with the aim of achieving greater security for central processors. It was. One form of such a device is the so-called 6-trapdoor-1 encoder and It is a decoder. Such components may be designed differently depending on the task to be accomplished. It works on data keys (which are sets of numbers). Especially relatively A well-known (public) key is used by a trapdoor to cryptographically encode messages. Can be used to drive encoders. However, a very safe 6 Private "keys" work because a decoder works to convert the encrypted information into a usable form. required. Although such systems are quite effective, they In terms of this, it is relatively slow. A special form of trapdoor system is It was developed at the University of California, and details of its configuration are publicly available.

Another form of keystroke encoding system is the National Bureau Ottostan Developed by Microsoft and IBM, it is a 'data encryption system'. It is named (DBS). Its configuration uses a key of 56 binary bits. It has been realized and can be used commercially.

A potential problem with the above DES systems is that the encryption key is compromised or otherwise Possibility of a person obtaining keys for unauthorized use to establish legal calls It depends on your gender. Unfortunately, knowledge of even the above keys is limited to a very few people. However, attempts to locate the source of the key for unauthorized use are elusive. It may be. Therefore, reliable and effective private methods and remote There is a Kanashi request for a secure call between the Minal and the Central Combita.

This invention is uniquely digitized for use only during special pauses in calls. It is based on the concept of automatically emitting a key into an electronic circuit. Sunawa The above system is based on numerical keys for achieving special pauses in transmission. utilize secure identification as a basis for the control of the occurrence of At the end of that hiatus, The above keys are abandoned to be fundamentally lost without being recorded in hard copy. Ru. Therefore, in use of the above system, persistence keys are accessories that may have been broken or left untouched for no use; It doesn't exist because there is concern. Rather, fundamental safety can be maintained relatively safely. Identification as a form of card or other device that can be used. It's in 2. use of such cards Applications can also be easily located.

Generally, in the system of the invention, two sets of encoders are randomly It is used in conjunction with a program digit generator and safety verification device. Before as an exemplary behavior The location data signal is emitted by the remote station and is transmitted from the identification card. Contains protected data.

The security information is encoded by a first encoding system along with random numbers and control information. All of them are sent to the Koo computer as the prefix data signal. sent to. The random number above is the key for encrypting the message information sent. to a second encryption system of the remote station, which acts as a cipher. the above The combination compiles the above security data, establishes the level of access and and said random number serves as an encoding key for said second encoding system. be provided. The message information is driven by a common key in the form of random numbers mentioned above. A call can be made immediately through the second encoding system. The above street At the end of the story, the key is removed from the system along with its non-permanent records. .

As will be shown in detail below, the above system can be used in different media and It can be implemented in a variety of ways using different techniques. For example, different All systems can be used, and different forms of encoding systems can also be used. can be Therefore, it is understood that the disclosed embodiments are purely exemplary. can be done.

Brief description of the drawing '　In the drawings forming a part of this specification, exemplary embodiments of the present invention are shown as follows. Notooshi is shown.

Figure 1 is a block diagram explaining the basic data flow of a system configured according to the present invention. This is a diagram.

FIG. 2 is a detailed block diagram of a system constructed in accordance with the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a top view of an identification card for use with the system of FIG. 2;

FIG. 4 is an f-lock diagram of the components used in the system of FIG.

Description of actual tail example As mentioned above, detailed embodiments of the invention are presented herein. However identification device, data format, encoding format, and this system. All equipment used or adapted for use in You can change it. The shape of the components used in the system according to the invention Kuraka, as shown here, can be completely different from them. Therefore , the specific configuration and functional details presented herein are for illustration only. In that regard, they are deemed to provide the best embodiment for purposes of disclosure. , and provide a basis for the claims herein that define the scope of this invention. It is regarded.

Referring first to Figure 1, the configuration consists of a far station and a central station. Represented for message data and replay data between calls.

In particular, the line IQ at the far station (on the left in the figure) is through the call line (roughly indicated by the number 12) and then Carries message data to be sent. The above message data is stored in the above central station. It is then decoded and provided in a usable form on line 14.

At the central station the replay data is encoded and sent to the remote station. Through the communication line 12 a line 16 is supplied for traffic. At that place, , the above-mentioned resolution data is decoded and provided on line 18 by a sample signal. too Of course, the display of message data and replay data is just a sample. It is understood that can include any of a wide variety of special patterns. Should.

Continuation of telephone calls between the above-mentioned distant stage evening and the above-mentioned central station 1 is guaranteed to ensure security. It can be started after all data has been verified. In particular, the safety data said remote stage target for transmission to said central station where the data is verified. as part of the pre-signal on line 20. If the above safety data is verified, If not, the call will be rejected.

Considering the system shown in Figure 1 in somewhat more detail, we can see that the above-mentioned lines carrying safety data are The input 20 is connected to an encoder 22 at the remote stage. The above The encoder 22 is connected to a random number generator 24 for two-way transmission. Ru. Once activated by the safety data, the generator 24 A random number is supplied to a register 26 which is connected in sequence to supply a key to a register 28. supply. Functionally, the register 26 has a number for operation of the code unit 28. Provides a literal key.

The encoder 22 and the code unit 28 (both partners are remote stations) is connected to the central station through the communication line 12. especially, The encoder 22 is connected to the code unit 28 at the central station. decoding at said central station while being coupled to the decoding unit 32. 30.

The decoder 30 (of the central nutation) also receives the signal from the decoder 30. It is also connected to a verification machine 34 connected to a receiving gate 36. Gate 3 above 6 is the random number which is the key for the operation of the code unit 32; A signal is provided to a register 38 representing .

In the operation of the system shown in Figure 1, the safety data reduces the portion of the prefix data signal. It is supplied to the above-mentioned line 20 including both. The above received through line 20 above. The secure data is converted into encrypted form (by the encoder 22). Encoder above 22 also inputs a random number into both the register 26 and the encoder 22. The random number generator 24 is activated to provide a signal representing the random number. Random numbers above also becomes part of the prefix data signal. Run the random number generator 24 above. Verifying the security data, i.e. confirming the identity expressed, It may depend on the encoder 22.

After the first stage of operation described above, the encoder 22 receives the safety data and the A prefix data signal representing a random number is sent. Such a signal (in cryptography With the central nut 3 which is returned to an operational form, the decoder 30 It is well received. The safety data is the data for controlling the gate 36. The data is supplied from the decoder 32 to the collation machine 34 for collating the data and supplied signals. be provided. Under control, the gate 36 stores the decoded lander in the register 38. supply program digits. As a result, the register 38 (of the central station) and the register 38 (of the central station) Both registers 26 (of the remote station) are connected to the interconnected code unit. Put the same random numbers that now work as keys for knits 28 and 32. Ru. Therefore, the message data in line 10 is stored in code unit 28. is encrypted, transmitted through the communication line 12, and transmitted to the line 14. The above code unit in its original form, i.e. to be supplied with message data. The code is decoded by the code 32. In response to the message data, in line 16 above. The play data is encrypted by the code unit 32 and sent to the communication line 1. 2 and appear in operational form on line 18 above. The data can be decoded by the code unit 28.

It can occur between the switch and the central station. However, the call relay At the end of the sequence, registers 26 and 28 are set to the values indicated by the keys (upper). The values from the random number generator 24) are added to those keys (numbers) along with the lost results. set) are both removed. Therefore, the above common key has special security Coupled with the results being of questionable and even doubtful value in some cases, the simple It can be seen that it works for one use. Of course, the above operation recognizes the importance of the above safety data supplied to the above line 20 in terms of its effectiveness. However, specific techniques are required to supply such data. are presented and discussed in detail below.

A reference diagram showing a system constructed according to this invention in a clearer and clearer representation is as follows: It is shown in Figure 2. The majority of far stations are 1st to Nth far stations. It is expressed specifically including dicarbonate. The above is connected to the remote location. Up The first to Nth flexible special devices are, for example, is the terminal for the conbeater or central processor of the central station above. can be viewed as some of a wide variety of terminal forms such as . Application, connection , and station identification structures and methods are well known for such systems. It is. In accordance with this, the operation of the remote station is limited to the supply of safety data. requires the presentation of an identification card with a magnetic stripe. of such a card One form appears approximately in full elaboration in the parent case to which this is a partial continuation. ing. A special exemplary form of the card appears herein with reference to Figure 3. There is.

The card used in the system of Figure 2 is the convoter of the central station. It is issued to trustworthy people as a sign of authority to handle the transaction. Individually The cards shown indicate the individual level of the holder's calls. Of course, on Special shapes for memory cards or other special devices adapted for special systems can be made to do so. Figure 3, which takes into account the details of the illustrated cards, A card 52 is shown having printing 54 indicating the name of the owner who has purchased the card. photo portrait 5 6 is also displayed. The printing 54 and the portrait 56 can be placed in various ways. Or a single gondopeno? - Can be printed on 5g.

Generally, the translucency value at a preset position of the card 52 is determined by an inherent characteristic, i.e. detected to provide a record authenticating said card according to the translucent . The data thus detected is then used as the basis for matching the card 52 with the real one. compared with recorded data showing the same characteristics.

Of course, the print 54 and the portrait 56 are printed on the bond paper in specially darkened areas. -58, it changes smoothly to the above-mentioned semi-transparent state. In general, the above print 54 or portrait 56 may be There is a tendency to change the translucency of the super 58.

A magnetic stripe f60 is provided on the card 52 and the stripe feo index of other magnetic tracks on the card 52 for feature observation. This is an index of the area. Recorded with clock track. In particular, the card 52 is scanned along the magnetic stripe 60 and translucent tracks 62 and 64. . Said magnetic stripe f60 is in particular a translucent detector in front of said tracks 62 and 64. Supplying data according to well-known techniques of the prior art, including pattern data from knowledge do. At the same time, said card 52 is used to check for a match using the same scanning as described above. scanned along panes 62 and 64 for feature data (semi-transparent reading). It will be done.

Data from the magnetic stripe feo is transferred to the track 62 for translucent observation. and 64. On top of that, the above strife.

The above data from the above central compiler may be allowed to the above card bearer. along with various other information, including control information indicating special levels of access to the computer. shows the results of the previous translucent observation.

Considering the special example of a card former, (denoted by the symbol l'X'') If data positions D1 and D2 are assigned to the semi-transparent track 62, , positions D3 and DJ (also shown) are located relative to the translucent track 64. It is being used.

To match the exemplary card 52, the positions DJ, D, ? , D3. as well as The DJ is optically detected by sensing the tracks 62 and 64 described above. At the same time, on The magnetic stripe 60 is located at the position DJ, I)2. Indicates the DJ and the detection beyond the DJ. detected to provide data. The results of the latest detection (signal S2) are shown below. The previous detection ( signal SJ). Therefore, a relatively certain judgment is that the card 52 is With any suitable device for use as a basis for establishing a call with a central processor. You can get whether there is or not. Additional and alternate safety data can also be used. Wear. For example, the bearer or user who gave the card 52 may also Required for entry at the stage keypad and is part of the safety check. It can also have a built-in personal identification number. The above compilation Data may also record data such as records of access by users. Ru. The system of FIG. 2 will now be considered for use in conjunction with card 52 above. be done.

The card reader 70 (upper left in Figure 2) receives the card 52 (Figure 3). and detect. One form of card reader 70 is described in detail below; However, the unit is configured for sensing data as described above from the card 52. It is possible to change the shape of the formation. In particular, the card reader 70 is and 64 for sensing translucency, and as is well known in the art above. This is incorporated into a device to read the magnetic stripe f60. Transmittance In addition, the reflective form of the detection device is also detailed in the earlier parent application, of which this is a continuation in part. It is shown in detail. The method for detecting the magnetic stripe 60 takes the form of Cr ocker et al. as disclosed in detail in U.S. Pat. No. 3,914,789. ing.

The card reader 70 receives data from the card 52 containing three different data signals. supply data. In particular, the above signal has the following characteristics: (1) the observed pattern of semitransparency (signal S2); (2) data representing a translucent pattern from the previous observation (signal S1), and and (3) the level at which the holder of the above card is permitted to use the above combination. Contains control digit signals to indicate. The first two sets of signals above are designed with safety data S. , and is supplied to the data bus 72 together with the control signal C. represent data , but rather another signal indicating that the card is being detected. G is also supplied from the reader 70 described above. The above card reader 70 is It can be decided to supply signal G for pre-inspection of all data, and the above signal is safe. The function of the reader 70, which depends on consideration, can be briefly shown.

The signal G may take the form of any of a wide variety of well-known number generators. and represents a random number (of a set of numbers) depending on the received signal G. The card reader is connected to a random number generator 74 which can simply be supplied with a signal R. It is supplied from the da 70.

The above random numbers assigned to the above signal R are coded as described below. Works as a key for the unit. In particular, random digits multiplied by signal R is a key register for cooperating with code unit 78 through data bus 80. It is set to 76. The signal R (key) is also transmitted through the data bus 72. Supply to trapdoor encoder 82 which also receives safety signal S and control signal C has been done. The trapdoor encoder 82 is connected to the central office via the communication line 50. Encrypt those signals as a prelude to being transmitted. Encoder 8 above 2 is relatively slow in operation compared to the encoding unit 78, and the known key, but the decryption operation requires a very private key. It takes the form of an encoder like the one developed at Hardwood University. Trapdoor encoder above The code for the 82 is encoded, for example as a form of lead-on, 9 internal memory. is supplied by internal circuitry within the carder. The key code 84 is the trap door encoder mentioned above. transmits a personal identification number to the reader and provides a message signal to the code unit 78. It also has an output of data bus 86 for supplying data. The encoder 82 above The central station connected to the first remote station has e.g. the same normal tail signal as the first remote station. Note that it can be supplied.

In operation, an element as described above located at the first remote station is connected to a timing unit. 88. Reliable inter-block timing signals are detailed below. However, at the display level in Figure 2, the two resting periods are tied. The timing signals T1 and T2 are shown in FIG. In particular, as indicated by the signal T1 above, The timing rest period is determined by the encoder 82 and the register 76. Contains actions. During the rest period of signal T1 the safety data are checked and the above A key is set for the code unit. Next, the timing signal T2 is paused. Throughout the period, the code unit 78 serves to adjust the current call.

Therefore, the initial preparatory action indicated by T1 is the trapdoor encoder 8 2 collates the safety data at the central station and sets a random number like a key. The communication line 50 is used for communication.

Then, during period T2, code unit 78 uses the above-described Serves telephone calls through line 50.

At the central station, data buses 90 and 92 (from encoder 82 above) are , are combined in a trapdoor decoder 94. Functionally, the decoder 94 is It not only deciphers the received signals S, C, and R, but also separate and different supply such a signal to the output end. The trap door decoder 94 is a leading It consists of a unit compatible with encoders 82 well known in the art and is A private key received from terminal device 96 through data bus 98 be exposed. Such devices must be equipped with signals S (safety data), C (level of access control). ), and R (key number) to function as a signal distributor. ing.

At the central station, the signal R (key) is sent to the code unit of the first far stage. Key register 100 working in conjunction with code unit 102 adapted to unit 78 supplied to Structurally, the code units 78 and 102 refer to above. This is the explanatory form of KS, that is, the data entry standard. and those available from IBM - p6. There are 19 such units Technology published in April 1982 Consider the signal from the trapdoor decoder 94 above. The safety signal S returned for inspection is sent to the safety confirmation unit connected in turn to the terminal 96. is supplied to the cut 104.

The terminal 96 transmits operational and control signals to the trap door decoder 94, A central processor also supplies a key register 100 and a data code unit 102. It has a two-way communication capability with the processor 106.

In the scene shown in Figure 2, which depicts the preconfiguration of the system, a broad understanding of the operation can be seen. The solution is to assume a special continuation of the action and to explain what can happen during such action. This can best be accomplished now by explaining everything. Therefore , for the identification card 52 to begin continued operation and for the covert call pause period to begin. Speculate that it is placed in the card reader 70 for the purpose of accomplishing this. of course, The first far stage stage is a very familiar shape and form including telephone coupling. A communication line including some of the various types of mats or some of the various types of data transmission lines. 50 to the central station.

An exemplary form of device for use as the card reader 70 above appears below. However, fundamentally, the card reader 7o is and a card 52 (FIG. 3) for providing special signals (indicated by C).

The start signal G is also supplied from the card reader 7o and randomly Applied to number generator 74 and used as encoding key for said unit 88 Encourages the unit to supply a signal R representing a set of digits to be displayed. Above signal R is applied to the key register 76 and is connected to the safety data signal S and the control signal C. Both also apply to the trapdoor encoder 82.

The above trapdoor encoder is a trapdoor decoder 9 with a central nute/g. The signal S received as a pre-data signal to be transmitted to 4 via speech line 5o.

Make C1 and R a cipher. The above trapdoor decoder 94 has different functions. Reconfigure the signals R, S, and C obtained by separating the above signals (into a decoding format) .

In particular, the signal S is a safety check in which testing is accomplished to determine the suitability of the signal. Applies to unit 1o4. In the illustrated embodiment (seen in FIG. 4) , the signal s2 detected from the card 52 indicates the degree of matching indicating the authenticity of the card. , and is compared with the recorded data signal S1 read from the card 52. If the above car If the call is recognized as genuine, i.e. if the security data indicates a genuine call, The unit 104 then supplies the authorization number to the terminal 96. Result Terminal 96 provides access to central processor 106 during special secrets. A signal C is received from a decoder 94 to control the level of the signal.

The trap door decoder 94 is also used for the DES coat unit 102. A decoding signal R is supplied to the key register 100. Therefore, this stage of operation Both key registers 76 and 100 each contain a DBS code unit. 78 and 102 as a common key. Ma Also, at this stage of operation, a good check of the safety data S is performed by the central processor 10. This terminal 96 operates the terminal 96 for controlling the It is set for a particular speech level of processor 106.

On the other hand, if the safety data does not test well, then terminal 96 is not run with the result that the call is not received at the central station.

In particular, Chuo Zorose, S106, easily rejects calls from the above-mentioned Uni,) J02. , and reject the above key.

After a suitable rest period for the central stage eye device to be activated, the first remote stage The timing unit 88 of the station is The signal T2 is supplied high with the result to be determined.

Therefore, the system is in a transmitting state and the message is sent to the data bus 86 and 78 and then via the central station communication line 5o for transmission. Key to? 84 can be clearly stated.

At that location, such messages are decoded by DBS code unit 102. and is provided to central processor 106 through terminal 96. Risoleime The message is encoded in code unit 1o2 by terminal 96. from the central processor 106 through the central processor 106. In cryptographic form, such a Raymessage is sent to unit 78 for decoding at a remote station. 50 from the unit 1o2 to the display unit of the remote station. It is supplied to the knit 105.

The call is terminated at such time that the central processor 106 issues a tail signal. It lasts until In particular, signal E is provided at the end of a call. With the generation of the above signal E, the above To clear key register 100, the central processor 106 Applicable from Similarly, the signal E is encoded by the unit 202 and D communication line 5 to be decoded at a remote station by ES code unit) 78. 0. From that unit, the signal E is transmitted to the key register 76. applied to clear. Therefore, the above call is terminated and the message The above key-ins, which work to make the page's code more suitable, are removed from the system. li(-ノ recorded and not recorded in hard copy. Therefore, as shown above, the DES code Units 78 and 102 are operated with a high degree of safety.

(set of numbers) whereas the absence of a hardcopy key gives security as shown above. As shown above, the system is represented by card 52 of the illustrated embodiment system. impose relatively high security requirements for user identification such as Therefore, the above card Card 70 (Figure 2) and card 52 (Figure 3) are part continuations of the parent case. work in accordance with the disclosures of However, the exemplary configuration of the card reader 70 described above Details of the construction are discussed in detail below with respect to FIG.

The above card 52 (Figure 4) is shown in the upper right part of the figure, and is a transport and generator. It is placed between the pair of rollers 101 for operation by 103. In particular, the above generator 103 moves the card 52 from right to left with respect to the device for dynamically sensing the card. It is connected to roller pairs 101 and 108 as shown. The generator 103 is It controls the movement of the card and provides control signals tl-t6 and G. Above roller pair 1 Card 52, proceeding from 01, passes under four sensors or readers. Especially card 5 2 is the safety data represented by S1 above and the control data changed by signal C. first under a magnetic transducer 110 which specifically reads the card for signals containing data. Pass.

In order to keep the card 52 moving along its path, the sensor 109 is equipped with an optical analyzer. 111 receives light from card 52 to provide a signal applied to card 111.

The analyzer 111 is used to detect substances contained in the genuine card and external to it. The card 52 is inspected graphically.

Upon further movement, the card 52 will come under the edge sensor 112 that detects the edge of the card. Ru. Functionally, the edge detector 112 detects when the clock pulses are on the tracks 62 and 64. (Fig. 3) and can be counted to detect its position. Above end sensor 1 The output from 12 is connected to the transport and generator 103 described above.

In the course of the card 52, the card 52 that has passed the end sensor 112 is on the opposite side. Features incorporating a small photocell nozzle illuminated by a matched light source 118 It passes under the sensor 114. Cards passing between the bank 116 and the light source 118 52, which includes parallel tracks 62 and 64 (FIG. 3). scanned along the rack. Therefore, the characteristic sensor 114 is connected to the selector gate 1. signal to amplify and refine each analog signal before application of the 24 columns. An analog translucent signal is provided on an output line 120 connected to a processor 122. , t+-4 The gate 124 selects the selected positions DI, D'2° DJ, and DJ (FIG. 3). Pass through separate samples of the analog signal observed above to represent it. The above gate 124 is controlled by address information and clock signal C as described in more detail below. be controlled. The card transport and pulse generator 103 has the characteristic senna 114. A timing control is applied to the gate 124, which represents the instantaneous position of the card 52 as it moves downward. It should be noted that the signals and clock signals are provided.

The first data detected from the car ysz by the magnetic transducer 110 is The above positions DJ, DJ, DJ and DJ are shown on the card 52 (FIG. 3). In particular, the above The signal from the magnetic transducer 110 is a signal indicating the position from the above signals s1 and C. It is applied to the signal separator 125 that separates the clock signal CL. Indicates the above position The signal, address signal A, can be accurately detected at the above positions DI, D2° DJ and DJ. The selected sample representing the knowledge is set in the register 126 for later use. .

Above signals S1 and C (safety data and control data) - Code table 1986-50138 8 (8) is supplied from the signal separator 125 to the decoder 130 related to encryption. It will be done. These signals are then sent to the trapdoor encoder 82 shown in FIG. (Yoshi) Even though it is encrypted again, it can be decoded from the form read from the card 52 above. be done. Although such a structure is not expressed in detail here, it is possible to decipher it. The safety signal S1 further adjusts the operation of the remote stage, and It can be compared with the detected safety signal S2. In other words, distant nutrition The safety inspection is performed using the safety data represented by the signal S1 and the signal S2. Represented position D1. D.? , DJ, and DJ both display the light transmittance of the card. This may include a comparison of the sensed data with the recorded data. Up A good comparison between the security signals S1 and S2 indicates the card 52 is genuine.

The decoded signals S1 and C are sent to a card reader 2o as shown in FIG. is supplied to the terminal from the decoder 130. Of course, I explained it above. The above signal S1 is a part of the safety signal S, and it is based on the latest light transmittance concept. It also includes a signal s2 representing the measurement.

Taking into account the generation of the signal S2, (a single run of the tracks 62 and 64) The analog signals (representing the respective and signal processor 122 from the feature sensor 114 . Above system The control signals (black, red, and gating) are the same as above during the four separate periods of rest. The gate 124 is provided for passing selected samples of the analog signal. So An analog/4G signal sample such as is selected based on the contents of register 126.

Originally, the values in register 126 described above would correspond to the two tracks 62 and 64, the interval and time. We simply indicate their specific position along the track on the basis of the scanning relationship between them.

Thus, in the example shown, the selector gate 124 is connected to one of the pair of lines 142. A signal representing translucency at positions D1 and D2 and a position D3 at the other of the lines 142. and sample the analog signal to provide a similar representation of the DJ.

The sampled signal carried on line 142 is an analog-to-digital converter. applied to converter 144. Therefore, the sample supplied to the transducer 144 is The signal S2 is converted into a digital former signal S2 and recorded in the buffer storage device 148. It will be done. Therefore, the above translucency with features at four selected positions is related to the above cryptography. With the recorded safety signal S1 supplied from the decoder 130 that This is evident from the detected characteristic safety signal S2. as shown above , the operations are performed at a central station and alternated locally. Can be done.

Observation of the above description shows that the above system as presented has a high level of safety. It will be easy to see that a secret story can be provided with the following. The above system is taken However, it is important to note that many modifications and deviations within the framework of the basic concepts are allowed. The same will be understood from the illustrative examples. Therefore, the range for this is , as stated in the claims below.

Engraving (no changes to the content) N Procedural amendment May 22, 1980 1.Display of the incident PCT/US83100567 2. Name of the invention Safety system 3. Person who makes corrections Address: 17th Mori Building 5, Toranomon 1-26i1>5, Minato-ku, Tokyo, date of amendment order With May 8, 1980 International investigation\report

Claims (1)

[Claims] (1) A random number generator at the first station and the random number generator prefix data of said first station including a key indicator that crosses a value from signal supply means and means for transmitting said pre-data signal to a second station; connectable for transmitting signals between the first and second stations including a stage; means for receiving the pre-data signal for supplying the key indicator; means of said second station for inputting a key to said key indicator; an encoded message for calling and communicating with said second station; encoding means of said first station connected for data; and said key. The indicator allows key input and communication with the first station. said second station connected to encoded message data for speech; a means for encoding message data between said first and second stations; safety system for the transmission of. (2) The system further includes a source of safety data at the first station; means for verifying the safety data with the second station. The system described in Scope 1. (3) The prefix data signal supply means includes encoding means, and the prefix data signal supply means includes an encoding means, and The means for receiving a position data signal is compatible with the encoding means. A register for a siccator according to claim 1, comprising decoding means for 2. The system according to claim 1, comprising: a data storage system; (5) The prefix data signal supply means includes an identification card detection means. The system according to item 2 of the box. (6) Claim 5, wherein the detection means for the identification card includes magnetic transducer means. The system described. (7) The detection means of the identification card shall include a means for supplying a no or turn signal. Claim 5 further comprising means for detecting opacity of said card at a first selected location. System described in section. (8) The detection means of the identification card further provides a recorded pattern signal. detecting the pre-sensed opacity of said card at said pre-selected position; 7. A system according to claim 6, including means for displaying. (9) said second station for supplying said key indicator; The means includes means for comparing the pattern signal and the recorded pattern signal. The system according to claim 7. αq The system further comprises displaying the key indicator throughout the call exchange. Claim 1 comprising register means in said first nutation system 1 for a holding signal. The system described in Section 1. α ■ The system also has one second nutation ν and a plurality of the first 2. The system of claim 1, comprising two stations. (2) The system further comprises representing and displaying the message. Claims including keyboard means and display means of the first stage for The system described in item 1 below.