JPS58144967A - Wrong transaction preventing method - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To prevent the wrong use due to forgery, by updating and recording check data, which indicates the number of times of transaction, on an identification card at every transaction and recording the same data on a customer file to collate this data when transactions are performed with the identification card. CONSTITUTION:On an identification card 4 used for transactions, a branch code, an account number, a key number, a payment limit amount of money, etc. are recorded magnetically in a magnetic stripe MS, and a transaction number D1 is recorded also magnetically. This number D1 is updated at every transaction, and simultaneously, the transaction number D1 or check data having a certain relation to this number is updated and recorded in the customer file, which is provided in a calculating center, each time. Transactions are permitted only when the key number and the key number of check data coincide with each other; but if they do not coincide, an alarm is issued or the card is confiscated. Thus, the wrong use due to forgery is prevented.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to a method for preventing fraudulent transactions using an authentication card (ID card) to verify the validity of a counterparty in a transaction.

In automatic teller machines currently operated by banks, etc., in order to prevent fraudulent transactions, there is a correspondence between the reading data of the authentication card presented by the user and the PIN number input by the user from the keypad. transactions are not permitted unless there is a specific relationship such as agreement between the two parties. Therefore, even if the authentication card is illegally obtained or a counterfeit card is made by copying it, it will not be possible to make a payment transaction unless the user knows the password. However, the above-mentioned PIN number is generally selected from a number that is difficult for the user to forget, such as a birthday or a telephone number. Although such a PIN number is convenient for the person in question to remember, there is also a high risk that a third party will find out the PIN number. It is also possible to learn the PIN number from the authentication card itself, especially if special drugs or devices are used. Furthermore, if an unauthorized transactor makes a copy of a counterfeit card, even if he or she rewrites only the PIN data and informs the user of the true PIN number, it is not at all unlikely that he or she will be able to make a transaction using the counterfeit card. Although users may notice that their card is lost or stolen, it is impossible for them to notice that their card has been copied, and therefore, as mentioned above, it is easy for a third party to know their PIN number. Even if an unauthorized third party who has knowledge of the transaction makes a payment transaction using a copy card, there is a risk that the transaction cannot be prevented until the legitimate user notices the abnormality in the balance of the deposit in his or her account.

The purpose of the present invention is to prevent fraudulent transactions using counterfeit cards as described above as much as possible, and to enable the existence of counterfeit cards to be known at an early stage. record inspection data representing the number of transactions using the card, and record continuous transaction confirmation data having a specific relationship with the number of transactions as part of the customer data of the account corresponding to the authentication card in the customer data file. The correspondence between the read data of the authentication guard and the PIN entered by the customer is checked, and the correspondence between the inspection data and the continuous transaction confirmation data is checked. Transactions are permitted only if there is a relationship.

The present invention will be explained below with reference to Examples.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram schematically showing the overall configuration of an embodiment of the present invention. Reference numeral 1 denotes an automatic cash dispensing device that dispenses cash according to a customer's operation. They are communicably connected to each other via 3. This automatic cash dispensing device 1 includes a card reader 5 that reads the magnetic stripe of an authentication card 4 inserted by a customer, a keyboard 6 for the customer to enter data such as a PIN number, amount, confirmation or cancellation, and a banknote count of a specified amount. The payment machine 7, the card reader 5, the keyboard 6, the payment machine 7, and an input/output control unit 8 that organically controls the functions of the operation instruction display section and the amount display section (not shown), and a minicomputer or microcomputer. A common control unit 11, which is composed of a computer, etc., controls the input/output unit according to a program stored in advance in the memory 9, and causes the communication control device 10 to exchange transaction data with the center 2. Equipped with On the other hand, the center 2 includes a computer 14 connected to a storage device 13 that stores customer data files 12, and a communication control device 15 that controls the transmission and reception of transaction data between the computer 14 and the automated teller machine 1. We are prepared.

In the above configuration, the authentication card 4 read by the card reader 5 is inspected as shown in FIG. Data D1 is recorded. This inspection data D may be a numerical code that directly indicates the number of transactions, or may be another code that indirectly indicates the number of transactions. File 1
2, as shown in Figure 3, holds account numbers, PIN numbers, deposit balances, and past transaction data that has not yet been recorded in the passbook, that is, unrecorded transaction data, as well as transactions that have a specific relationship with the number of transactions mentioned above. Holds continuous confirmation data D2. This transaction continuity confirmation data D2 is for confirming the continuity of transactions using the same authentication card 4, and is, for example, the same as the above-mentioned inspection data D1, or a value larger than this by rlJ, etc. It has a predetermined specific relationship with the inspection data DI.

Next, the cash payment withdrawal 1 using the authentication card 4 will be explained according to the flowcharts shown in FIGS. 4 and 5.

The automatic cash dispensing device 1 displays a card insertion instruction on an operation instruction display section (not shown) while waiting for a customer. When the customer sees this message, the first thing they do is check the authentication card 4 they own.
into the card insertion slot of the card reader 5. Should the customer follow the instructions on the operating instructions display section? keyboard 6
etc.

When the automated teller machine 1 detects the insertion of the authentication card 4, it pulls it into the card reader 5 and reads the magnetic stripe MS.
have them read. This read data is taken into the common control unit 1 via the input/output control unit 8, and is temporarily stored in the memory 9.
is stored in Subsequently, when the customer inputs a personal identification number from the keypad, the common control unit 11 determines whether there is a specific relationship such as a match between this and the personal identification number read from the authentication card 4. If it is determined that the two parties do not have a specific relationship, the user is instructed to re-enter the password. When it is determined that there is a specific relationship between the two parties, an instruction is given to input the payment request amount,
When the amount is input from the keyboard 6, it is displayed and the customer's confirmation is requested. When the customer presses the confirmation key on the key & drawer, the automatic cash dispensing device 1 transmits transaction data including part of the card reading data such as the account number and inspection data D1 and the requested payment amount from the communication control device 10 to the center 2.
Send to.

When the center 2 receives the above transaction data via the communication control device 15, the electronic computer 14 reads the corresponding customer data file 12 based on the account number and store code, and stores the continuous transaction confirmation data D2 therein and the above transaction data. Verify the inspection data D1. As a result of this verification, if there is a specific relationship such as a match between the two, it is determined whether the requested payment amount is within the deposit balance, and if it is within the balance, a transaction permission signal is sent to the automated teller machine 1 along with updated transaction data. Send. Then, the customer data file 12 is checked for deposit balance and continuous transactions, and D2 is updated, and unrecorded data is added.

On the other hand, if the verification result shows that there is no specific relationship, the authentication card 4 used in this transaction is different from the card used in the previous transaction, and the same authentication card is used continuously in payment transactions. It is assumed that the transaction is not possible, and a signal indicating that the transaction is not possible is sent to the automatic cash dispensing device 1.

When the automated teller machine 1 receives a signal indicating that the transaction is possible, it operates the payment machine 2 to count the bills to be paid, prints a receipt and journal with a printer (not shown), and also prints the payment limit and inspection data of the authentication card 4. D1 to card reader 5
Updates will be recorded at. The inspection data D! If this is expressed as a numerical code, for example, it is rewritten as a numerical code of "+1#" in order to continue to match or have a specific relationship with the transaction confirmation data D2 of the customer data file 12. After completing the update recording of the authentication card 4, the automatic cash dispensing device 1 returns the authentication card 4 to the entrance of the card reader 50, and when the customer pulls out the card, the payment banknotes are ejected together with the receipt.

On the other hand, if a signal indicating that transactions are not allowed is received, either the authentication card at that time is loaded into the device, a message indicating that transactions cannot be made with this card is displayed on the operation instruction display section, or a notification indicating that transactions are not allowed is displayed on the monitor panel for staff monitoring. Notify you that your card has been used. This causes the customer or the staff member to realize that the authentication card is not normal, or at least question whether the transaction is not allowed, even if the PIN number is correct.

In this way, in the above configuration, if the legitimate holder uses the original card before the duplicate counterfeit card is used for the first time, the continuous transaction confirmation data D in the customer data file 12
2 is updated to different data, even if a transaction is subsequently attempted using a copied counterfeit card, there is no specific relationship between the inspection data D1 of the card and the data D2,
Transactions are not allowed. Therefore, in this case, fraudulent transactions using counterfeit copies of cards can be completely prevented. In addition, if a counterfeit copy card is used after a counterfeit copy is made from the original card, even if the legitimate holder attempts to make a transaction using the original card, the transaction will not be permitted in the same way as above, but if the card is captured. If the customer becomes confident about his or her authentication card by doing so or by seeing the display indicating that the transaction is not possible, he or she will report such transaction abnormality to a staff member or the like. Therefore, at this point, financial institutions such as banks become aware of the existence of the counterfeit card and can take necessary measures to prevent the counterfeit card from being used in the future. Furthermore, regardless of which card is used first, if the above-mentioned transaction failure occurs, the clerk will be notified of this, and the existence of a counterfeit card will be known at an early stage. only fraudulent transactions are prevented.

As explained above with reference to the embodiments, according to the present invention, even if an authentication card is forged and the authenticity check using a PIN number is passed, fraudulent transactions using the forged copy can be carried out without limit. This also has the effect of speeding up the discovery of such duplicated counterfeit cards.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a schematic configuration of an embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of an authentication card used in the present invention, and FIG. 3 is a diagram of a customer data file in an embodiment of the present invention. Content explanatory diagram, Figure 4. FIG. 5 is an operational flowchart of an embodiment of the present invention. 1... Automatic cash dispensing device, 2... Center, 4...
Authentication card, 5... Card league, 12... Customer data file, D! ...Inspection data, D2...Continuous transaction confirmation data. Figure 5

Claims (1)

[Claims] 1. In a method for preventing fraudulent transactions in which the authenticity of a transaction partner is verified using an authentication card presented by a user, inspection data representing the number of transactions using this card is recorded on the authentication card, while Continuous transaction confirmation data having a specific relationship with the number of transactions is stored as part of the customer data of the account corresponding to the authentication card, and the reading of the authentication card, the correspondence between the data and the customer-input PIN number, and the A method for preventing fraudulent transactions, characterized in that the correspondence between inspection data and the transaction continuity confirmation data is checked, and the transaction is deemed legitimate and permitted only when the two correspondences are both in a specific relationship.