JPS58140683A - Reactor protection system with bypass - Google Patents

Abstract

(57) [Summary] This bulletin contains application data before electronic filing, so abstract data is not recorded.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates to bypass management of a multiple reactor system that allows bypass.

It is well known that in a multiplex reactor protection system, a no-type pass is performed under bypass management.

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the operating state of the bypass management logic in the case of a four-channel configuration.

1.1. The case where bypass is performed in the order of IV is shown. The symbol ax in the figure indicates the reactor trip state, N indicates the normal state, B indicates the bypass state, and T indicates the trip state.

That is, the trip logic when all channels are normal is 8/4. Next, when channel ■ is bypassed, the trip logic due to the remaining plate, seal, and channel ■ becomes "A".

Furthermore, when Teiyadenel (2) is bypassed, since Teiyadenel (1) has already been bypassed, channel I becomes the second bypass and is forcibly tripped. In this case, if either of the remaining (2) or (2) is tripped, the reactor is tripped, so the trip logic is 1/2.

In order to perform such bypass management, each channel needs to check its own bypass command with the bypass pattern 6 of other channels.

Figure s2 shows an example of a conventionally used transmission system for bypass status signals for bypass management.

+lI, t21. +a1. (41 is the protection channel, and for convenience of explanation, channels i and it
, Rin, ■.

Channel ■ receives bypass state signals from channels 1.1.iV through signal lines tzn, L3υ, and
) to set their own bias states to channels I and I, respectively.

■ Send to “ru.

Similarly, channel ■ is channel 1. IV.

■ Channel I is channel IV, 1. I
With I.

Channel (2) mutually performs bypass reception and transmission with channels t, n, and i.

In this way, the bypass management described in 111 was performed while checking the bypass status of other channels and the bypass command of the own channel.

Since the conventional bypass system is configured as described above, it is necessary to communicate in a bypass state between channels, and it is necessary to use three sets of transmitters and receivers for each channel. If more than 12 transmission lines are required, the protection system becomes complicated and expensive.

This invention has been made to eliminate the drawbacks of the conventional ones as described above, and each channel is provided with a key-operated bypass switch and a trip switch. It is an object of the present invention to provide a nuclear reactor protection system with a bypass that can perform bypass management that allows bypass of only one channel by using a trip operation switch.

An embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. s3
In the figure, (50) is the protection channel, (51) is the plant process amount input to the protection channel (50), and (52) is the alarm output relay that is the protection channel (
50) is controlled to be energized or de-energized. For example, if the process lk (51) is below the alarm value, it is energized.

If the alarm value is exceeded, it is de-energized.

When (e) is a bypass switch and is set to position a, the alarm output relay (52) is maintained in a state equal to or less than the alarm value (bypass state) regardless of the process amount.

The bypass switch (53) can be operated only with a dedicated key, and this key can be attached and detached only in position b.

(54) is a trip switch, and when it is in position a,
The alarm output relay (52) is in the same state as when the alarm value is exceeded (tri-tube state) regardless of the process amount.
will be maintained. Tori Sopsui Sochi (54) It can be operated only with the key dedicated to kA, and this key can be attached and detached only in position b.

An example of a method for operating the bypass switch (53) and trip switch (54) will be explained using FIG.

If the protection system is configured with 4 channels, then! (Install one pass key and three trip keys.)

These keys are centrally managed, for example, in a central control room.

When the protection system is normal, all keys are present because none of the keys are in use. The normal column in FIG. 4 shows this state. When the ltth channel is bypassed, the key is held in that channel, resulting in the state shown in the 1st bypass column of FIG. 4. The second channel does not have a bypass key, so the only way to trip the channel is to use the trip key. After that, the only way to do the same for the third and fourth channels is to put them in the trip state. In this way, bypass management is executed according to the bypass management logic in diagram s1.

In the above embodiment, one bypass key and three trip keys are provided, but one bypass key and one trip key may be provided. In this case, the third and fourth bypasses shown in Figure 1 cannot be performed, so
These operations have the advantage of not causing the reactor to trip.

As described above, according to the present invention, since the bias tube of the protection system is configured to be executed by the key switch C,
This has the effect of making the device inexpensive and having a low probability of failure.

[Brief explanation of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the operating state of the path management logic.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of conventional bypass management, FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing bypass management according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing bypass management according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a key control chart. In the figure, (50) is a reactor protection device with bypass (
53) is a bypass operation key, and (54) is a trip operation key. Note that the same line numbers in each figure indicate the same or corresponding parts. Agent Makoto Kuzuno - Figure 1 Boat → Figure 2 Figure 3

Claims (1)

[Claims] In addition to detecting the process amount and protecting the reactor,
In a protection system in which multiple bypass-equipped reactor protection devices are equipped with a bypass function for selectively canceling the protection function and a trip function for forcibly placing the protection function in a trip state, there is one key for bypass and the rest for trip. A nuclear reactor protection system with a bypass, characterized in that by using a key, bypass management is performed that allows bypass of only one channel in a multiplexed protection system.