JPH11262170A - Electric power system accident zone determination - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To increase precision of accident zone determination, by setting a main protective flag for indicating presence of a main protective relay and a back-up protective flag for indicating presence of a back-up protective relay for determining the relays by these information in verifying relay operation. SOLUTION: An inflow channel of accident current into an accident potential zone is extracted (S12). A difference in the protective range of a set relay and the set time of an accident elimination relay are compared per channel for verifying relay operation, thus verifying the operation of a mounted relay (S15). If the relay does not operate at the terminal in the accident potential zone, and a short circuit relay (S) or a ground fault relay (G) on which a main protective flag is set by the terminal exists, the (S) relay or (G) relay is judged as a malfunction or non-operation (S17). If the (S) relay or (G) relay which protects the accident potential zone in the direction of a transmission line exists, and a back-up protective flag is set, the (S) relay or (G) relay is judged as the malfunction or non-operation (S18). It is thus possible to eliminate accident potential zones involving two or more the invalid operational relays to determine the accident potential zone (S19).

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a system for automatically controlling an accident section on a computer system such as an electronic computer for system control or a general-purpose computer at a central power supply command center, a local power supply command center, and a system control station of various power systems. The present invention relates to an electric power system accident section determination method. In particular, the present invention relates to a method for determining an accident section by localizing an accident candidate section generated from a power failure section.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art When an accident such as a one-wire ground fault, a two-wire ground fault, a two-wire short circuit, a three-wire ground fault, or a disconnection occurs in a power system, a protection device such as a relay or a circuit breaker for protecting the system. Operates to cut off the accident section. Specifically, the protection relay detects an accident, outputs a trip (open) command to the circuit breaker, and opens the circuit breaker to cut off the accident section. As a result, the accident point is separated from the healthy section to prevent the accident from spreading.

However, there may be cases where a protection relay having an insufficient selective cutoff function is used, or a selective cutoff function in setting the relay cannot be sufficiently exhibited due to factors such as a system configuration state. In such a case, the section separated from the healthy section by the tripped breaker is often widened, and it may be difficult to determine the accident section. It is also conceivable that the protection relay may cause an improper operation such as a malfunction or a malfunction due to a setting problem or a device failure.

[0004] Although various factors as described above make determination of an accident section difficult, determination of an accident section is a very important task for performing restoration work of a section that has been powered down due to an accident. Conventionally, this type of accident section determination is often performed by operators using their experience and intuitive knowledge.However, due to the decrease in experienced skilled operators and the scale and complexity of systems, , Is becoming a difficult task every year.

[0005] On the other hand, in recent years, an accident section judgment method applying a technique of knowledge engineering represented by an expert system has been developed. This determination method can be roughly classified into two types. The first method is to determine the operation pattern of the protection device in various accidents and the accident section at that time.
It is expressed by IF-THEN format rules. In this method, since a system can be constructed in a format similar to the knowledge of an operator, many application examples have been announced from a relatively early stage.

However, in this method, the number of rules and the degree of fulfillment of the types directly affect the judgment performance of the accident section. In order to demonstrate sufficient judgment performance, it is essential to enhance the rules, but this work is generally difficult,
Also, when there is a change in the system configuration or the introduction of a new protection device, it is difficult to add or change the knowledge corresponding to these.

On the other hand, Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No.
Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 222457/1990, Japanese Patent Application No. 8-268534, "Method of Determining Power System Fault Zone", and Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 4-50671, "Method of Determining Power System Fault Zone" require knowledge of protection relays for protecting the system. Expressed in terms of time limit and reach (protection range), an accident candidate section (a section where there is a possibility of an accident, equipment) is generated from the reach of the operation relay at the time of the accident. For each route to the end, the validity of actual relay operation and non-operation is verified from the relationship of timed coordination between the reach of the relay in the route and the settling time, and an accident candidate section with a large number of incorrect relay operations (generally, According to the empirical judgment of the operator, if the number of illegal operations of the relay cannot exceed a certain number (usually two or more), a judgment method of inferring that there is no accident is adopted.

[0008]

According to the above-mentioned conventional method for determining an accident section by the present applicant, the operation relay information obtained online at a power supply station or a control station is short-circuited (S).
In the case of aggregated information that cannot specify the type of relay that has actually operated, such as a relay operation and a ground fault (G) relay operation, a relay in which the aggregate information itself such as S and G has a protection range (aggregate information relay) S relay, G as
Relay). However, aggregated information such as S and G is not available for OCs including transmission line main protection relays.
(Overcurrent) relay, OVG (ground fault overvoltage) relay is displayed by the operation of any of the protection relays, such as relays, so the relay information based on the protection range and time limit is strictly defined in the aggregate information S and G itself It was difficult to do.

That is, in the prior art, the relay operation is verified with respect to the fault candidate section, and the fault candidate section is localized based on the number of illegally operated relays. In the verification of the relay operation, the equipment that became the fault candidate section was assumed to be the faulty equipment, and the settling time of the installed relay was coordinated for each fault current inflow path to the equipment (hereinafter referred to as the relay operation verification target path). The normal operation and incorrect operation of the relay were determined based on the relationship and the protection range. However, S
Or, if there is a relay having aggregate information such as G, it may not be possible to accurately perform the operation verification of the relay based on the cooperative relationship of the settling time and the protection range, and it may be difficult to limit the accident candidate section. .

Accordingly, the present invention provides a power system fault section in which the accuracy of relay operation verification and the fault section determination accuracy are improved by using predetermined additional information set for an integrated information relay to determine the validity of the relay operation. It is intended to provide a determination method.

[0011]

In order to solve the above-mentioned problems, the invention according to claim 1 provides a system for controlling a power supply system and a control station on a computer system before and after an accident when an accident occurs in the power system. A fault candidate section is generated in the power failure section based on the protection range of the activated protection relay, and the fault current is generated from the path from the fault candidate section to the terminal of the power failure section, using the state of the accident, such as state change information, as input information. The inflow path of the relay is extracted as a relay operation verification target path, and for each relay operation verification target path, an accident elimination relay is obtained by focusing on a settling time or an operation time of the operation relay on the path. The validity of the operation of the installation relay is verified by comparing the protection range of the installation relay and the settling time with the accident elimination relay, and the improper operation of the installation relay (malfunction,
A power system accident section determination method for detecting an accident section by detecting an accident candidate section in which the number of erroneous operations is equal to or more than a predetermined number and deleting the accident candidate section to localize the accident candidate section. The integrated information indicating the short-circuit relay operation or the ground fault relay operation, which cannot identify the type of the actual operation relay, is input online to the power supply station and control station as the operation relay information, and the relay that gives this aggregate information has a protection range. In the method of recognizing as an aggregated information relay,
On the relay database, as additional information of the integrated information relay, a main protection flag indicating the presence or absence of the main protection relay at the terminal of interest, and a protection protection flag indicating the presence or absence of the protection protection relay whose protection direction is only the transmission line direction. Is set, and at the time of relay operation verification, a relay to be operated is determined using the additional information. If the relay is not operated, it is determined that the relay has malfunctioned.

The present invention comprises the following steps (see FIG. 1). A. Setting of additional information of aggregate information relay (S11)
When an accident occurs in the power system, the accident is interrupted by the relay that has the shortest settling time among the relays that protect the accident point. If the settling time is the same, the fault should be interrupted by the relay at the terminal closer to the fault point. In consideration of such a protection cooperative relationship between relays, the following information is defined on the relay database as additional information of the short-circuit (S) relay and the ground fault (G) relay as the aggregate information relay. Then, when verifying the operation of the relay, the relay to be operated using these additional information, which is more specific to the attribute of the aggregated information relay, is reliably determined,
If the relay is not operating, the relay is determined to be malfunctioning. A main protection flag: a flag indicating whether or not a main protection relay is present at a terminal of interest; a rear protection flag: a rear protection relay whose protection direction is only the + direction (transmission line direction) at the terminal of interest. For example, a flag indicating whether a DZ (direction distance) relay, a DG (ground fault direction) relay, or the like is present (a back-up protection flag is set when a back-up protection relay whose protection direction is only the + direction exists at the site) )

FIG. 2 shows a definition example of additional information on a relay database. CB is a circuit breaker installed on a transmission line, and CT is a current transformer. Now, there are eight distance relays and overcurrent relays having various protection ranges and settling time as on-site relays, and when the integrated information S and G are given as the operation relay information, the fault section is displayed on the relay database. As a relay used for judgment,
About S relay and G relay as aggregate information relay,
A main protection flag and a backup protection flag are defined as additional information.

B. Verification of Relay Operation Hereinafter, the procedure of relay operation verification will be described with reference to FIG. (1) Extraction of Relay Operation Verification Target Path (S12) A relay operation verification path (a fault current inflow path) is extracted. That is, the equipment in the protection range of the operation relay is extracted as equipment having a possibility of an accident (accident candidate section), and an inflow path of an accident current into this accident candidate section is extracted.

(2) Extraction of an accident removal relay (S13) A relay from which an accident has been removed (an accident removal relay) is extracted from operation relays on a relay operation verification target path. The extraction of the fault removal relay is performed on the relay operation verification target route for each fault candidate section. If it is not possible to specify the accident elimination relay (S14: YES), the above A
The malfunction / non-operation determination (S17, S18) is performed using the additional information (main protection flag, backup protection flag) described in (1).

(3) Relay operation verification based on protection range and settling time of installed relay (S15) This processing relates to the determination of the validity of the relay operation, and the protection range of the installed relay is determined for each relay operation verification target path. Operation, correct / incorrect operation, and improper operation (malfunction / malfunction) of the installed relay are determined by comparing the magnitude of the setting relay with the settling time of the accident removal relay. When the relay operation verification cannot be performed because the S relay or the G relay that is the aggregated information relay exists on the relay operation verification target route (S16Y
ES), a malfunction / non-operation determination (S17, S18) using the additional information (main protection flag, back-up protection flag) is performed.

(4) Judgment of malfunction / non-operation based on main protection flag (S17) The relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section on the relay operation verification target path, and the main protection flag is set at that terminal. If there is an S relay or a G relay,
For the accident candidate section, the S relay or the G relay is determined to be malfunctioning. That is, it is determined that the main protection relay malfunctions at the terminal.

(5) Judgment of malfunction / non-operation based on the back-up protection flag (S18) In the terminal where the relay on the side of the accident candidate section is not operating with respect to the terminal where the relay is operating on the relay operation verification target path, If there is an S relay or G relay that protects the candidate section in the + direction (the direction of the transmission line), and if the S-relay or G relay has the back-up protection flag set, the S candidate for that accident candidate section The relay or G relay is determined to be malfunctioning. That is, it is determined that the back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at the terminal.

(6) Limitation of Accident Candidate Sections (S19) As a result of the above-described relay operation verification, accident candidate sections in which, for example, there are two or more malfunctioning relays are deleted, thereby limiting accident candidate sections.

Next, according to the second aspect of the present invention, when an accident occurs in an electric power system, an accident situation such as system status before and after the accident, various state change information, and the like is displayed on a computer system of a power supply station and a control station. As input information, an accident candidate section is generated in the power failure section based on the protection range of the activated protection relay, and an inflow path of the accident current from the path from this accident candidate section to the end of the power failure section as a relay operation verification path. Extract, and for each relay operation verification target path, calculate the accident removal relay by focusing on the settling time or operation time of the operation relay on the path,
The validity of the installed relay operation is verified by comparing the protection range of the installed relay on each relay operation verification target path and the settling time with the accident elimination relay, and the installed relay is incorrectly operated (malfunction or malfunction). A power system accident section determination method for detecting an accident section by detecting the number of accident sections and localizing the accident candidate section by deleting the accident candidate section in which the number of illegal operations is equal to or more than a certain number. Aggregated information indicating short-circuit relay operation or ground-fault relay operation in which the type of relay cannot be specified is input online to the power station and control station as operation relay information, and the relay that gives this aggregated information has a protection range with a protection range. In the method of recognizing as, the additional information of the integrated information relay is actually set on the relay database on the site at a terminal having the integrated information relay. Relays are classified according to the protection range and settling time, the number of relays of the corresponding type is set as additional information at the corresponding terminal, and when relay operation is verified, the relay that should operate using this additional information is determined. If the relay does not operate, it is determined that the relay has malfunctioned.

The present invention comprises the following steps (see FIG. 3). A. Setting of additional information of integrated information relay (S21) In the terminal from which the integrated information is obtained, the relays actually installed on the site are classified as follows according to the protection range and the settling time, and the corresponding type of relay is set. The number is defined on the relay database as additional information of the S relay and the G relay.

For example, as shown in FIG. 4, there are eight distance relays and overcurrent relays having various protection ranges and settling times as on-site relays, and S, G as operation relay information (aggregated information). Is given. In this case, ・ Type: Main protection relay ・ Type, Type: Back-up protection relay ・ Eight relays are divided into types, such as type <type <type, with respect to protection range, and type <type <type, with respect to settling time. ,
The number of relays belonging to each type is defined as additional information.
As a result, in the example of FIG. 4, additional information such as two types, one type and two types for the S relay and one type, zero type and two types for the G relay are provided. Defined.

B. Verification of Relay Operation The procedure of relay operation verification will be described below with reference to FIG. (1) Extraction of Relay Operation Verification Target Path (S22) A relay operation verification path (a fault current inflow path) is extracted. That is, the equipment in the protection range of the operation relay is extracted as a fault candidate section, and the path of the fault current flowing into this fault candidate section is extracted.

(2) Extraction of a fault removal relay (S23) A fault removal relay is extracted from the operation relays on the relay operation verification target path. The extraction of the fault removal relay is performed on the relay operation verification target route for each fault candidate section. In addition, when it is impossible to specify the accident removal relay (S
24 YES), the malfunction / non-operation determination using the additional information (the number of each type of relay) described in A above (S27,
S28) is performed.

(3) Verification of relay operation based on protection range and settling time of installed relay (S25) This processing is for determining the validity of the relay operation. And the setting time of the accident elimination relay
Judge the normal operation, normal non-operation, malfunction and malfunction of the installed relay. If the relay operation verification cannot be performed because an S relay or a G relay that is an aggregate information relay exists on the relay operation verification target path (S26 YES), the additional information (the number of each relay type) Is performed (S27, S28).

(4) Malfunction / non-operation determination using additional information (type) (S27) If a relay is not operating at a terminal in an accident candidate section on a relay operation verification target path, an S relay or G is connected to that terminal. If a relay is present, it is determined that the main protection relay is malfunctioning at its terminal by the number of relays of the type set as the S relay or the G relay.

(5) Malfunction / non-operation determination using additional information (type) (S28) When the relay is not operating on all terminals within the protection range of the type from the fault candidate section on the relay operation verification target path In other words, when the distance from the fault candidate section to the operating relay is in the relationship of “distance to the operating relay> type protection range”, the terminal within the protection range of the type from the fault candidate section and the fault candidate section If there are S relays or G relays that protect the relay in the + direction (the direction of the transmission line), the number of relays in the back protection relay will be incorrect at that terminal by the number of relays of the type set for that S relay or G relay. Judge that it is not working.

(6) Limitation of Accident Candidate Section (S29) As a result of the above-described relay operation verification, the accident candidate section in which the number of incorrectly operated relays is, for example, two or more is deleted, thereby limiting the accident candidate section.

[0029]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS An embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. First, an embodiment of the invention described in claim 1 will be described with reference to FIGS. First, FIG.
Is the model of the power system to be determined in the accident section,
A (variable), B (variable), C (variable) bus is a transmission line (section AB-1).
L, AB-2L, BC-1L, and BC-2L). At both ends of each section, a circuit breaker CB1 tripped by an S relay or a G relay is provided.
To CB8. FIGS. 5 and 6 show sections AB-1L and AB-2L of the A (variable) bus, and four sections on the transmission line side and the bus side (the unit of the transmission line, bus, and transformer is one section). This is an example in which the S relay having the protection range of FIG. 1 operates, and the circuit breakers CB1 and CB3 are open. The protection range of the operation relay is shown by a dashed line in each figure.

In this embodiment, the accident candidate section is limited by the following procedure. (1) Generation of an accident candidate section The equipment in the protection range of the operation relay is extracted as the equipment with a possibility of an accident (accident candidate section). In the examples of FIGS. 5 and 6, the sections AB-1L, AB-2L, and B (variable) bus, and the sections BC-1L, BC-2L, and C (variable) bus are the accident candidate sections. Hereinafter, taking the accident candidate section BC-1L and the C (variable) bus as an example (FIG. 5 shows a case where the section BC-1L is an accident candidate section, and FIG. 6 shows a case where the C (variable) bus is an accident candidate section),
The verification method of the relay operation will be described.

(2) Extraction of Relay Operation Verification Target Path In FIG. 5, paths 01, 02, 03, and 04 are extracted as paths through which the fault current flows into the fault candidate section BC-1L. In FIG. 6, a path 05 and a path 06 are extracted as inflow paths of the fault current into the C (variable) bus.

(3) Extraction of fault removal relay In the fault candidate section BC-1L of FIG. 5, A (variable) AB-1LS for route 01 and route 02, A (variable) for route 03 and route 04 F) AB-2LS becomes an accident clearing relay. In addition, accident candidate section C in FIG.
In the (variable) bus, A (variable) AB-1LS is on path 06, and A (variable) AB-2LS is an accident elimination relay on path 06.

(4) Verification of Relay Operation The protection range of the relay installed on the path to be verified for relay operation (including or not including the accident candidate section in the protection range) and the settling time (or operation time) and installation of the relay for eliminating the accident are set. Based on a comparison with the settling time (or operating time) of the relay (larger or smaller than the settling time of the accident elimination relay), the normal operation, normal non-operation, malfunction, and malfunction of the installed relay are determined. The relay operation verification result for each path in this embodiment is as follows.

A. Candidate accident section: BC-1L Route 01 Since the accident eliminating relay is an S relay (it is impossible to specify the type of relay that actually operated), it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section, and the S relay (B (variable) BC-
1LS). Therefore, it is determined that the main protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal. -Route 02 Since the relay for eliminating accidents is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, the relay is not operating at the terminal in the accident candidate section, and the S relay (C (variable)) in which the main protection flag is set at that terminal.
BC-1LS). Therefore, it is determined that the main protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal. Also, an S-relay that has a back-up protection flag set on the terminal where the relay is operating, on the side of the accident candidate section, where the terminal where the relay is not operating protects the accident candidate section only in the + direction (transmission line direction). (C (variant) BC-1LS and B (variant) B
C-2LS). Therefore, it is determined that the back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal. -Route 03 Since the accident elimination relay is the S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section, and the S relay (B (variable)) in which the main protection flag is set at that terminal.
BC-1LS). Therefore, it is determined that the main protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal. -Route 04 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, the relay is not operating at the terminal in the accident candidate section, and the S relay (C (variable)) in which the main protection flag is set at that terminal.
BC-1LS). Therefore, it is determined that the main protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal. In addition, an S relay (C) in which a post-protection protection flag that protects the accident candidate section only in the + direction at the terminal where the relay is not operating and is located on the side of the accident candidate section of the terminal where the relay operates is set.
(Mod) BC-1L S and B (Mod) BC-2L
S) exists. Therefore, it is determined that the back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal.

B. Candidate accident section: C (variable) bus ・ Route 05 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, an S-relay (B) in which a post-protection protection flag is set at the terminal on which the relay is operating and on the side of the accident candidate section, which protects the accident candidate section only in the + direction at the terminal where the relay is not operating.
(Variant) BC-1LS) exists. Therefore, it is determined that the back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal.・ Route 06 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, an S-relay (B) in which a post-protection protection flag is set at the terminal on which the relay is operating and on the side of the accident candidate section, which protects the accident candidate section only in the + direction at the terminal where the relay is not operating.
(Variant) BC-2LS) exists. Therefore, it is determined that the back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at this terminal.

(5) Limitation of accident candidate section As a result of the above-mentioned relay operation verification, equipment in which the total number of malfunctioning relays and malfunctioning relays is 2 or more is deleted from the accident candidate section, and the accident candidate section is limited. I do. That is,
As for the accident candidate section BC-1L, as a result of the relay operation verification, B (variant) BC-1LS (main protection relay) B (variant) BC-2LS (relay protection relay) C (variant) BC-1LS ( The main protection relay and the back-up protection relay) can be determined to be malfunction relays, and this section BC-1L can be deleted from the accident candidate section. As for the accident candidate section C (variable) bus, as a result of relay operation verification, B (variable) BC-1LS (relay protection relay) and B (variant) BC-2LS (replacement protection relay) are erroneously disabled. Thus, the C (variable) bus can be deleted from the accident candidate section. In addition, the accident candidate section BC-2L is excluded from the accident candidate section by the relay operation verification similar to the section BC-1L.

As a result, in the examples of FIGS. 5 and 6, the result remains that one of the accidents is in any of the sections AB-1L, AB-2L, and B (variable) bus. On the other hand, in the related art, since an accurate relay verification operation based on the protection range and the settling time cannot be performed, it is concluded that the sections AB-1L, AB-2L,
The result of any of the B (variable) bus, the section BC-1L, the BC-2L, and the C (variable) bus remains, and the limitation of the accident candidate section is insufficient.

Next, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. These figures also
This is an example in which the S-relay having four sections of protection range on the transmission line side and the bus side is operated at terminals AB-1L and AB-2L of the section A (variable) bus, and the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 are opened. ing. The protection range of the operation relay is indicated by a chain line in each figure.
In the terminal from which the aggregated information can be obtained, the relays installed on site at the terminal are classified as follows, and the number of relays of the corresponding type is set as additional information of the aggregated information relay on the relay database.・ Type: Main protection relay (protection range is 1 section) ・ Type: Back protection relay (protection range is 3 sections or less) ・ Type: Back protection relay (protection range is 4 sections or more) If classified in this way, it is generally settled The following relationship holds for the time period. Settling time: type <type <type The relationship of type <type <type also holds for the protection range.

In the example of FIG. 7, at the AB-1L terminal of the A (variable) bus, the operation relay information is summarized in S. The relays corresponding to the type are: two relays corresponding to the type; Individual • Indicates that there are two relays corresponding to the type.

In this embodiment, the accident candidate section is limited by the following procedure. (1) Generation of an accident candidate section The equipment in the protection range of the relay is extracted as an accident candidate section. In the examples of FIGS. 7 and 8, similarly to the examples of FIGS. 5 and 6, the sections AB-1L, AB-2L, the B (variable) bus, the section B
The C-1L, BC-2L, and C (variable) buses are accident candidate sections. Hereinafter, taking the accident candidate section BC-1L and the C (variable) bus as an example (FIG. 7 shows a case where the section BC-1L is an accident candidate section, and FIG. 8 shows a case where the C (variable) bus is an accident candidate section), The verification method of the relay operation will be described.

(2) Extraction of Relay Operation Verification Target Route Like FIG. 5 and FIG. 6, in FIG.
As the inflow path of the fault current into 1L, path 01, path 0
2, path 03 and path 04 are extracted. Also, in FIG. 8, as a path of the fault current flowing into the C (variable) bus,
5, the path 06 is extracted.

(3) Extraction of fault removal relay As in the case of the examples of FIGS. 5 and 6, the fault candidate section BC-1 of FIG.
In L, A (variable) AB-1LS for the route 01 and route 02, and A (variable) AB-2LS for the route 03 and route 04 are the accident elimination relays. In addition, accident candidate section C in FIG.
In the (variable) bus, the route 05, the A (variable) AB-1L S, and the route 06, the A (variable) AB-2LS serve as an accident elimination relay.

(4) Verification of Relay Operation The protection range of the relay installed on the route to be verified for relay operation (including or not including the accident candidate section in the protection range) and the settling time (or operation time) of the relay for eliminating the accident and installation. Based on a comparison with the settling time (or operating time) of the relay (larger or smaller than the settling time of the accident elimination relay), the normal operation, normal non-operation, malfunction, and malfunction of the installed relay are determined. The relay operation verification result for each path in this embodiment is as follows.

A. Candidate accident section: BC-1L Route 01 Since the accident eliminating relay is an S relay (it is impossible to specify the type of relay that actually operated), it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section, and the S relay (B (variable)) in which two type relays are set at the terminal.
BC-1LS). Therefore, it is determined that the two main protection relays are malfunctioning at this terminal. -Route 02 Since the relay for eliminating accidents is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, there is an S relay (C (variable) BC-1LS) in which the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section and two type relays are set at the terminal. Therefore, it is determined that the two main protection relays are malfunctioning at this terminal. In addition, on this route, the distance from the accident candidate section to the operation relay is 4 or more sections (which is longer than the protection range of the type), and the terminal is 3 sections or less (protection range of the type) from the accident candidate section. , Accident candidate section +
S relay that protects only in the direction (C (variable) BC-1L
S and B (variant) BC-2LS) exist. Since one type of relay is set for this relay, each of the C (variable) BC-1L and B (variable) BC-2L terminals malfunctions one by one as a protection relay. Judge that -Route 03 Since the accident elimination relay is the S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, there is an S relay (B (variable) BC-1LS) in which the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section and two type relays are set at the terminal. Therefore, it is determined that the two main protection relays are malfunctioning at this terminal. -Route 04 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, there is an S relay (C (variable) BC-1LS) in which the relay is not operating at the terminal of the accident candidate section and two type relays are set at the terminal. Therefore, it is determined that the two main protection relays are malfunctioning at this terminal. In addition, on this route, the distance from the accident candidate section to the operation relay is 4 or more sections (which is longer than the protection range of the type), and the terminal is 3 sections or less (protection range of the type) from the accident candidate section. , Accident candidate section +
S relay that protects only in the direction (C (variable) BC-1L
S and B (variant) BC-2LS) exist. Since one type of relay is set for this relay, each of the C (variable) BC-1L and B (variable) BC-2L terminals malfunctions one by one as a protection relay. Judge that

B. Candidate accident section: C (variable) bus ・ Route 05 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, on this route, the distance from the accident candidate section to the operation relay is 4 or more sections (which is longer than the protection range of the type), and the terminal is 3 sections or less (the protection range of the type) from the accident candidate section. There is an S relay (B (variable) BC-1LS) that protects only the accident candidate section in the + direction. Since one type relay is set in this relay, it is determined that one back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at the terminal of B (variable) BC-1L.・ Route 06 Since the accident elimination relay is an S relay, it is impossible to judge a malfunction by comparing the magnitude of the settling time. However, on this route, the distance from the accident candidate section to the operation relay is 4 or more sections (which is longer than the protection range of the type), and the terminal is 3 sections or less (the protection range of the type) from the accident candidate section. There is an S relay (B (variable) BC-2LS) that protects only the accident candidate section in the + direction. Since one type relay is set in this relay, it is determined that one back-up protection relay is malfunctioning at the terminal of B (variable) BC-2L.

(5) Limitation of fault candidate section As a result of the above-mentioned relay operation verification, equipment in which the total number of malfunction relays and malfunction relays becomes 2 or more is deleted from the fault candidate section, and the fault candidate section is limited. I do. That is, as for the accident candidate section BC-1L, as a result of the relay operation verification, two main protection relays are provided at the terminal of B (variable) BC-1LS and two main protection relays are provided at the terminal of C (variable) BC-1LS.
Pcs, one back-up protection relay B (variable) BC-2L S terminal and one back-up protection relay
Since there are a total of six malfunctioning relays such as
This section BC-1L can be deleted from the accident candidate section. In addition, as for the accident candidate section C (variable) bus, as a result of the relay operation verification, the terminal of B (variable) BC-1L S has a back-up protection relay of one.
Individual B (variable) BC-2L S terminal with 1 protection relay
Since there are a total of two malfunctioning relays such as
This C (variable) bus can be deleted from the accident candidate section. In addition, the accident candidate section BC-2L is the section BC-1L.
By the same relay operation verification as above, the section is excluded from the accident candidate section.

As a result, in the examples of FIGS. 7 and 8, as a conclusion, similarly to FIGS. 5 and 6, sections AB-1L, AB-2L,
The result remains that the accident is any of the B (variable) buses. Therefore, in conclusion, sections AB-1L, AB-2L, B
The accident candidate section can be significantly limited as compared with the related art in which the result of any one of the (variable) bus, the section BC-1L, the BC-2L, and the C (variable) bus remains.

[0048]

As described above, according to the first or second aspect of the present invention, when an aggregate information relay such as an S relay or a G relay exists on a relay operation verification target path,
In the related art, the verification accuracy of the relay operation and the accuracy of the accident section determination are improved as compared with the case where the relay operation cannot be strictly verified based on the protection range of the protection relay or the time coordination relation of the settling time. This has been confirmed by simulation. Further, even in a system for presenting the accident situation to the operator, more detailed information on the aggregated relay information can be provided. For example, more detailed information such as the malfunction of the main protection relay and the malfunction of the rear protection relay can be provided at the terminal from which the aggregated information is obtained. Such information is very effective information when presenting the accident section determination result and its reason to the operator.

Further, in any of the first and second aspects of the present invention, it is necessary to add additional information to the relay database, and the additional information includes a flag or a numerical value consisting of digital values of "0" and "1". (Integer). In recent years, the database capacity of the computer system has been steadily increasing with the enlargement and complexity of the power system. However, as described above, the database capacity required for realizing the present invention is extremely small. Since there is no need to squeeze computer resources. Incidentally, in the invention of claim 1, the main protection flag and the back-up protection flag are each set to 1 By.
If expressed in te, the database capacity increases only by 10 KByte even if the number of relays is 10,000.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing processing steps of the invention described in claim 1;

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing additional information of an integrated information relay according to the invention of claim 1;

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing processing steps of the invention described in claim 2;

FIG. 4 is a diagram showing additional information of an aggregate information relay according to the invention of claim 2;

FIG. 5 is a system configuration diagram to which the embodiment of the invention described in claim 1 is applied.

FIG. 6 is a system configuration diagram to which the embodiment of the invention described in claim 1 is applied.

FIG. 7 is a system configuration diagram to which the embodiment of the invention described in claim 2 is applied.

FIG. 8 is a system configuration diagram to which the embodiment of the invention described in claim 2 is applied.

[Explanation of symbols]

AB-1L, AB-2L, BC-1L, BC-2L Section A (variable), B (variable), C (variable) Bus CB1 to CB8 Circuit breaker

Claims (2)

[Claims] When an accident occurs in an electric power system, a protection relay operated on a computer system of a power supply station or a control station, using the system status before and after the accident and the accident status such as various state change information as input information. A fault candidate section is generated in the power failure section based on the protection range of the fault, and an inflow path of the fault current is extracted as a relay operation verification target path from a path from the fault candidate section to the end of the power failure section, and each relay operation verification target path is extracted. In each case, the fault elimination relay is determined by focusing on the settling time or operating time of the operation relay on the path, and the size of the fault is determined by comparing the protection range of the installed relay on the path to be verified for each relay operation and the settling time of the accident elimination relay. Verify the validity of the operation of the installation relay, detect the number of illegal operations of the installation relay, delete the accident candidate section where the number of illegal operations is a certain number or more, localize the accident candidate section This is a method of determining a power system fault section by determining the fault section by going on. In the method of recognizing a relay which is inputted online and gives this aggregate information as an aggregate information relay having a protection range, a main protection relay at a terminal of interest as additional information of the aggregate information relay on a relay database. A main protection flag that indicates the presence or absence of a protection relay that indicates the presence or absence of a backup protection relay whose protection direction is only in the direction of the transmission line, and a relay that should operate using these additional information during relay operation verification. The power system is characterized in that, when the relay is inoperative, it is determined that the relay has malfunctioned. Section determination method. 2. A protection relay which operates when a fault occurs in a power system on a computer system of a power supply station or a control station, using a fault status such as a system status before and after the fault and various status change information as input information. A fault candidate section is generated in the power failure section based on the protection range of the fault, and an inflow path of the fault current is extracted as a relay operation verification target path from a path from the fault candidate section to the end of the power failure section, and each relay operation verification target path is extracted. In each case, the fault elimination relay is determined by focusing on the settling time or operating time of the operation relay on the path, and the size of the fault is determined by comparing the protection range of the installed relay on the path to be verified for each relay operation and the settling time of the accident elimination relay. Verify the validity of the operation of the installation relay, detect the number of illegal operations of the installation relay, delete the accident candidate section where the number of illegal operations is a certain number or more, localize the accident candidate section This is a method of determining a power system fault section by determining the fault section by going on. In a method of recognizing a relay which is input online and gives this aggregate information as an aggregate information relay having a protection range, a terminal having an aggregate information relay as additional information of the aggregate information relay on a relay database. The relays actually installed at the site are classified according to the protection range and the settling time, and the number of relays of the corresponding type is set as additional information at the corresponding terminal, and operation is performed using these additional information during relay operation verification. Determine which relay to perform, and if the relay is inoperative, determine that the relay has malfunctioned Power system fault section determination method comprising Rukoto.