JPH11249967A - Method for preventing unjust copy of nc data - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent peculiar data set up by an NC maker from being copied and unjustly used and to enable a legal user to smoothly perform the restoration work of a numerical controller. SOLUTION: When backup data of an SRM 14 is preserved in a memory card 20, a peculiar code of a ROM 12 is written in the memory card 20. When backup information is set up again, it is discriminated whether a peculiar code of a numerical controller 10 is matched with the peculiar code of the memory card 20 or not, and backup information is permitted to be set up again only in the case of coincidence between them, thereby preventing backup data generated in another numerical controller from being unjustly taken in.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

The present invention relates to a method for preventing unauthorized copying of NC data.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art When a numerical controller is shipped, important information such as an operating system, various parameter values, and application programs required for drive control is stored in a nonvolatile RAM such as an SRAM by an NC manufacturer in advance. It is common to ship it.

However, in practice, data such as an operating system, various parameters, or application programs in a nonvolatile RAM is lost due to a malfunction or an erroneous operation of the numerical controller, for example, a write operation or an overwrite operation due to a memory protection error. In some cases, abnormalities or damage may occur, and it is necessary to smoothly restore the numerical control device, and the user often saves the information in the non-volatile RAM by backing it up to an external storage medium such as a memory card.

[0004] Backup information is re-set up for a numerical control device in which information in the nonvolatile RAM has been damaged, that is, a numerical control device that has been set up beforehand and shipped with an operating system, various parameters or application programs, etc. on the NC manufacturer side. It is not inconvenient to use the numerical control device after returning it to the same state as when it was shipped, but it is a contract condition to transfer the backup information to another numerical control device and use it. However, it is generally illegal from the principle of one license and one product package, and such illegal copying must be prohibited in some way.

[0005] In addition, since such backup information often includes a secret source code or the like, an external storage medium such as a memory card storing the backup information is copied to a third party. NC manufacturers will suffer a great deal of damage in terms of confidentiality.

[0006]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to solve the above-mentioned drawbacks of the prior art and to prevent the unique data set up by the NC maker from being carelessly copied and used illegally. Another object of the present invention is to provide a method for preventing unauthorized copying of NC data, which allows a proper user to smoothly perform a recovery operation of the numerical control device.

[0007]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention provides a nonvolatile RA
When the backup of the information of M is stored in the external storage medium, the non-rewritable unique code stored in the numerical control device is forcibly written to the external storage medium. The above object is achieved by a configuration in which the re-setup operation is executed only when the unique code written in the external storage medium matches the unique code of the numerical controller.

Therefore, it is practically impossible to transfer the backup information generated by a certain numerical control device to another numerical control device having a different unique code. If you want to reset up your backup information,
By matching the unique codes, the input of a serial number or the like can be omitted, and a smooth re-setup operation can be performed.
In addition, since a non-rewritable unique code is written to the external storage medium storing the backup information, if the external storage medium is illegally taken out or lent, the source, that is, the numerical value that generated the backup information The control device can be easily located.

In addition, a password for resetting is written from the numerical controller to the external storage medium together with the unique code, and at the time of resetting the backup information, the unique code written on the external storage medium is changed to the numerical control. Even if the password does not match the device's unique code, if the password for resetting written on the external storage medium matches the password entered by the operator into the numerical controller, the resetting operation is performed. Being able to do so has streamlined the service work of local workers commissioned by NC manufacturers.

[0010] For example, by adding a new license contract, another numerical control that the user has at the time possesses the function that the user has already obtained and used a license with another numerical control device at that time. If you want to add a device and use it, even if there is no backup information required for the numerical control device to which you want to add a license agreement, disclose the password for re-setup on behalf of the NC manufacturer. As long as there are only local workers who have been able to do so, new functions can be added to the numerical controller by performing a re-setup operation on the existing numerical controller using backup information generated by another numerical controller. Therefore, there is no need for the NC maker to collect the existing numerical control device from the user and perform the re-setup work. In addition, the NC manufacturer checks the unique code of the existing numerical control device owned by the user and performs a backup corresponding to the numerical control device. There is no need to store information in an external storage medium and distribute it to users, so that the license can be updated smoothly. Moreover, when the backup information generated by the numerical controller with the updated license is stored in the external storage medium, the unique code of the numerical controller itself is written, so once the license is updated, In the event that an abnormality occurs in the numerical control device, the re-setup operation can be easily performed by the user himself.

Further, a second password for rewriting a password for resetting stored in the numerical control device is stored in the numerical control device, and the second password stored in the numerical control device is stored in the second password. NC that rewrites the password for re-setup only when the password entered by the operator into the numerical controller matches the NC
Reduced risk burden on manufacturers.

If the password for resetting is rewritten using the second password known only to the NC maker, the password for resetting and the local worker included in the backup information generated by the numerical controller can be used before. Since the notified password for resetting is different, the backup information generated by the numerical controller cannot be ported to another numerical controller by field workers. Further, since the rewriting of the password for resetting is protected by the second password, the password for resetting itself is copied from the external storage medium or its data even if an illegal copying operation is performed in any way. Since the password remains for the numerical control device and the password for resetting is confirmed, the numerical control device that generated the backup information and the local worker who performed the illegal work can be easily located.

[0013]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a numerical control device 10 according to an embodiment to which an illegal copy prevention method of the present invention is applied and a main part of a machine tool driven and controlled by the numerical control device 10.

The processor 11 is a processor for controlling the numerical controller 10 as a whole, reads out a system program stored in the ROM 12 via the bus 21, and controls the numerical controller 10 as a whole according to the system program. . RAM 13 has temporary calculation data,
Display data and the like are stored.

The SRAM 14 is backed up by a battery (not shown), is configured as a nonvolatile RAM that retains the storage state even when the power of the numerical controller 10 is turned off, and includes data set up by an NC maker, for example,
Important information related to the operating system, various parameters, application programs, and the like is stored.

An interface 15 is an interface for an external device. A drive unit 72 for reading and writing data from and to a memory card 20 serving as an external storage medium is connected to the interface 15 for backing up data from the SRAM 14 to the memory card 20. , Memory card 2
The operation of resetting data from 0 to the SRAM 14 can be performed.

A program for encoding, compressing, and writing data required for data backup from the SRAM 14 to the memory card 20, and a decompression and decoding required for data re-setup from the memory card 20 to the SRAM 14. The data writing program is stored in the ROM 12.

The unique code of the numerical control device 10 including the serial number of the device is stored in the ROM 12 in a non-rewritable state, and a password for re-setup and a second password for rewriting this password are stored.
Are registered in the SRAM 14 in advance by the NC maker at the stage of shipment of the numerical controller 10.

At the time of shipment of the device, the SRAM
The contents of the password for resetting registered in 14 or the password for resetting rewritten by the NC maker after that will be disclosed to the local worker entrusted with the service work by the NC maker. The information of the second password for rewriting the password is kept secret inside the NC maker.

A PMC (programmable machine controller) 16 controls the machine tool by a sequence program built in the numerical controller 10. That is, in accordance with the functions instructed by the machining program, these sequence programs convert the signals into necessary signals on the machine tool side, and output the signals from the I / O unit 17 to the machine tool. Various actuators on the machine tool are operated by this output signal. Also,
Upon receiving signals from limit switches on the machine tool side and various switches on the machine operation panel, necessary processing is performed, and the signals are passed to the processor 11.

Signals such as the current position of each axis, an alarm, and image data are sent to the display device of the CRT / MDI unit 70 and displayed on the display device. Interface 18 is C
The data from the keyboard of the RT / MDI unit 70 is received and passed to the processor 11. The interface 19 is connected to the manual pulse generator 71 and the manual pulse generator 7
Receive a pulse from 1. The manual pulse generator 71 is mounted on the machine operation panel on the machine tool side, and is used for manually positioning the movable part of the machine precisely.

The axis control circuits 30 to 32 receive the movement commands of the respective axes from the processor 11 and output the commands of the respective axes to the servo amplifiers 40 to 42. The servo amplifiers 40 to 42 receive the command and drive the servo motors 50 to 52 of each axis. The servomotors 50 to 52 for each of the X, Y, and Z axes have a built-in pulse coder for detecting the position and speed.
32. Each of the servo control CPUs incorporated in the axis control circuits 30 to 32 performs each processing of a position loop, a speed loop, and a current loop based on these feedback signals and the above-described movement command, and performs final drive control. Is obtained for each axis to control the positions and speeds of the servo motors 50 to 52 for each axis.

The spindle control circuit 60 outputs a spindle speed signal to the spindle amplifier 61 in response to a spindle rotation command and a command such as spindle orientation. Upon receiving the spindle speed signal, the spindle amplifier 61 rotates the spindle motor 62 at the commanded rotation speed. In addition, the rotational position of the spindle motor 62 is positioned at a predetermined position by an orientation command.

FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram showing an outline of the processing of the numerical controller 10 during the backup operation.

As described above, the encoding, compression, and data writing programs required for the data backup operation are stored in the ROM 12, and the memory card 20 is set in the drive unit 72 and the CRT is read.
By inputting a backup data creation command from the / MDI unit 70, the processor 11
4 to write data to the memory card 20;
Start encoding and compression work with it.

At this time, the unique code of the numerical controller 10 is read from the ROM 12 and stored in the memory card 20, and the password for resetting and the second password registered in the SRAM 14 are stored in the operating system in the SRAM 14. Along with various parameters and application programs.

Therefore, if the numerical controller 10 malfunctions or the operator ignores the alert, etc.
When the operating system, various parameters, application programs, and the like in the memory 14 are damaged, the information stored as backup data in the memory card 20 is directly set up again in the SRAM 14 to recover the failure of the numerical controller 10. It can be carried out.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing the processing operation of the processor 11 during the re-setup operation.

When an operator inputs a re-setup command from the CRT / MDI unit 70, the processor 11 which has detected this command clears the SRAM 14 and sends a guidance message to the effect that the memory card 20 is set in the drive unit 72 to the CRT / MDI unit. 70 (step a1), and enters a standby state waiting for insertion of the memory card 20 (step a2).

Then, when the memory card 20 is inserted, the processor 11 which has detected this inserts the memory card 2 into the memory card 2.
0 of the data related to the unique code of the numerical controller from the data stored in
After reading the data into the AM 13 and executing processing relating to decompression and decoding, the unique code of the numerical control device stored in the memory card 20 is compared with the unique code registered in the ROM 12 (step a3). It is determined whether or not it is (step a4).

If they match, the memory card 20
Is the backup data generated by the numerical controller 10 and means that the user is about to perform a legal re-setup operation.
Continuously reads data related to the operating system, various parameters, application programs, and the like from the memory card 20 and executes processing relating to decompression and decoding. The restored data and two passwords registered in the memory card 20 are numerically represented. The data is written into the SRAM 14 of the control device 10 to restore the data in the SRAM 14 to the state before the occurrence of the damage (step a).
9).

If the unique code of the numerical control device stored in the memory card 20 does not match the unique code registered in the ROM 12 and the determination result of step a4 is false, the processor 11 Further, a guidance message for inputting a password for re-setup is displayed on the CRT / MDI unit 70 (step a5), and a standby state for inputting a password is entered (step a6).

When the operator inputs a password via the keyboard or the like of the CRT / MDI unit 70,
Upon detecting this, the processor 11 transfers the data of the portion related to the password for resetting out of the data stored in the memory card 20 from the memory card 20 to the R.
The data is read into the AM 13 to execute processing relating to decompression and decoding, and the password input by the operator is compared with the password for resetting stored in the memory card 20 (step a7). Is determined (step a8).

If the passwords match, the operator who is going to perform the re-setup work knows the password for the re-setup, that is, the worker is a local worker commissioned for the service of the NC maker. Therefore, the processor 11 continuously reads data related to the operating system, various parameters, application programs, and the like from the memory card 20 and executes processing relating to decompression and decoding. The two passwords are written into the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10 (step a9).

In this case, even if the unique code of the numerical control device stored in the memory card 20 and the unique code registered in the ROM 12 are different, the re-setup work can be performed. Therefore, the data stored in the memory card 20 is not necessarily the same as the data set up by the NC manufacturer in the numerical controller 10 at first, and new data related to the operating system, various parameters, application programs, and the like are not included. A function may be added to the SRAM 14.

For example, for an existing numerical controller 10,
A new function may be added by performing a re-setup operation using backup information generated by another newer numerical control device. This work can only be performed by local workers who have disclosed the password for resetting. To receive such services, it is obvious that a new license agreement must be renewed between the user and the manufacturer. Required.

Even if a new function is added by performing a re-setup operation from the memory card 20 having a different unique code in this way, the S
When the backup is saved from the RAM 14 to the memory card 20, the unique code of the numerical controller 10 itself is saved from the ROM 12 to the memory card 20, so if the SRAM 1 of the numerical controller 10 is
In the event that the user does not know the password for resetting, if the user does not know the password for resetting, the user can perform the resetting operation by using the memory card 20 in which the backup data is stored from the numerical controller 10. Damage to the SRAM 14 can be easily recovered by code matching.

Further, when the re-setup operation is performed using the re-setup password, the value of the password used at that time is stored as it is in the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10 which is the target of the re-setup. In the case where a local worker performs a re-setup operation by an illegal procedure, for example, when the contents of the SRAM 14 of another numerical controller are copied without permission to the numerical controller 10 without updating the license contract, Manufacturers
By checking the password for resetting stored in the SRAM 14, the local worker using the password, that is, the local worker who has performed the illegal copying work can be easily specified.

Also, since the memory card 20 stores the unique code of the numerical controller 10 in which the backup data is stored in the memory card 20, when the memory card 20 itself is illegally taken out or lent. Also, it is possible to easily specify the numerical control device 10 that is the copy source.

If the password for resetting stored in the memory card 20 does not match the password input by the operator and the result of the determination in step a8 is false, an attempt is made to perform a resetting operation. This means that some workers do not know the password for resetting, which means that unauthorized copying is being performed by a person other than the authorized local workers entrusted with the service of the NC manufacturer. The processor 11
The re-setup process in step a9 is canceled and the process ends.

The above processing prevents unauthorized copying of data by the user, but cannot prevent unauthorized copying of data by a local worker who knows the password for resetting. Therefore, if stricter management is desired, it is necessary to check the numerical controller 10 on the maker side as necessary to confirm whether or not illegal data is brought into the SRAM 14.

That is, the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10
If the password for resetting stored in the numerical controller 10 matches the password set up in the numerical controller 10 by the manufacturer in advance, is there no history of damage to the SRAM 14 in the numerical controller 10? The backup data generated by the numerical controller 10 itself in order to repair the damage even if there is a history of occurrence of the damage, and the user has to set up the backup data. There is no point.

On the other hand, if the password for resetting stored in the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10 does not match the password set up in the numerical controller 10 by the manufacturer in advance, at least the local It is clear that the backup data was brought in from another numerical controller using the password for password. And it is legal to have a license agreement between the user and the manufacturer regarding the new features added,
If the license agreement has not been renewed, it means that illegal work has been performed.

FIG. 4 is a flow chart showing a process when the manufacturer confirms the password for resetting stored in the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10.

When the operator inputs a password confirmation command from the CRT / MDI unit 70, the processor 11, upon detecting this, displays a password confirmation screen on the CRT / MD.
It is displayed on the I unit 70 (step b1), a guidance message for inputting the second password is displayed (step b2), and the apparatus enters a waiting state for inputting the password (step b3). It should be noted that the method of inputting the password confirmation command is not disclosed to the user and the local worker, but is kept secret within the NC maker.

When the operator inputs a password through the keyboard or the like of the CRT / MDI unit 70,
Upon detecting this, the processor 11 reads the second password registered in the SRAM 14 and compares the password entered by the operator with the second password registered in the SRAM 14 (step b4). It is determined whether they match (step b5).

If they match, the worker who is trying to confirm the password for resetting is N
Since it means that the operator is a worker of the C manufacturer, the processor 11 reads the password for resetting from the SRAM 14 and displays the value on the CRT / MDI unit 70 to disclose to the operator (step b6).

Also, the second registered in the SRAM 14
If the password at step b5 does not match the password entered by the operator and the determination result at step b5 is false, the operator attempting to confirm the password for re-setup needs to enter the second password. Since it does not know, that is, it is not an operator of the NC maker, the processor 11 cancels the display processing in step b6 and ends the processing.

As described above, there is no problem as long as the password for resetting displayed in the process of step B6 matches the password set up by the manufacturer in the numerical controller 10 in advance. If this is the case, it means that at least the local worker brought backup data from another numerical controller to the numerical controller 10 using the password for re-setup, and Will need to find out whether a license agreement has been signed between the user and the manufacturer for the new features added.

Naturally, if a formal license agreement is concluded, the information on the password for resetting the memory card 20 that has provided the backup data used for adding the new function must be managed by the manufacturer. It is possible to compare the two.

There is no problem if the formal license agreement is confirmed here, but if not confirmed, the NC maker outsourced the service work to illegally copy the data without the manufacturer's permission. Means that.

In order to identify the local worker, the value of the password for resetting displayed in the process of step b6 may be confirmed. In other words, the local worker who disclosed the password for resetting by the manufacturer side is the person who performed the illegal data copying work.

When such problems occur and the reliability of the local worker is reduced, it is dangerous if the password for the resetting is made available to the local worker without any change. Must be updated to make the old password unusable.

FIGS. 5 and 6 are flowcharts showing a process for changing the password for resetting.

First, the operator operates the CRT / MDI unit 7.
When a password change command is input from 0, the processor 11 that has detected this command displays a password change screen on the CRT.
/ MDI unit 70 (step c1), a guidance message for inputting the second password is displayed (step c2), and the apparatus enters a standby state waiting for the input of the password (step c3). The method of inputting the password change command is not disclosed to the user and local workers, but is kept secret within the NC maker.

When the operator inputs a password via the keyboard or the like of the CRT / MDI unit 70,
Upon detecting this, the processor 11 reads the second password registered in the SRAM 14 and compares the password entered by the operator with the second password registered in the SRAM 14 (step c4). It is determined whether they match (step c5).

If they do not match, the operator trying to change the password for re-setup does not know the second password, that is, the
Since it means that it is not a worker on the manufacturer side,
The processor 11 cancels the processing after step c6 and ends the processing. Therefore, in this case, the work of changing the password for resetting is not performed.

If the result of the determination in step c5 is true and it is confirmed that the operator is an NC manufacturer, the processor 11 further resets the password used up to that time, that is, The CRT / MDI unit 70 displays on the CRT / MDI unit 70 a guidance message for inputting a password for resetting which has reduced reliability due to a problem (step c6), and waits for input of a password for resetting which has been used until then. The operation enters a standby state (step c7).

When the operator inputs the password in question via the keyboard or the like of the CRT / MDI unit 70, the processor 11 which has detected the password enters S
The password for resetting stored in the RAM 14 is read, and the password input by the operator and the SRA
By comparing the password with the password for resetting stored in M14 (step c8), it is determined whether or not the passwords match each other. Then, it is determined whether or not the re-setup has been performed using the set-up password (step c9).

If the password for resetting which is in question and the password for resetting stored in the SRAM 14 of the numerical controller 10 do not match, the resetting operation for the numerical controller 10 is problematic. It should not be meaninglessly rewritten, because it means that there is no reset password.

Accordingly, when the result of the determination in step c9 is false, the processor 11 cancels the processing in step c10 and thereafter, terminates the processing, and substantially cancels the password change operation for resetting. I do.

Steps c6 to c9 are performed when the user owns a large number of numerical control devices.
This is to prevent an accident that a password for resetting a properly used numerical control device is inadvertently rewritten with another password.

If the result of the determination in step c9 is true, it means that the re-setup work for the numerical controller 10 has been carried out using the password for the re-setup which is currently a problem. ,
In order to prevent important information from being taken out of the numerical controller 10 again, the password for resetting the numerical controller 10 is changed, and the password for resetting that has been used by the local worker is changed. Must be disabled.

In this case, the processor 11 sends a guidance message for inputting a new password to the CRT /
The new password is displayed on the MDI unit 70 (step c10), the input of a new password is waited for (step c11), the new password input by the operator is once stored, and the input of the new password is requested again (step c12).
After confirming the input (step c13), the password input for the first time is compared with the password input for the second time (step c14), and it is determined whether the two match or not (step c15).

If the password entered the first time does not match the password entered the second time, it means that the operator who entered the password has made an error in the operation of the keyboard or the like. Processor 11
Repeatedly causes the operator to execute the processing after step c10 again.

In the case of this embodiment, the CRT / MDI unit 7 needs to maintain the confidentiality of the input password.
In the state where the display of 0 is blindly displayed, the input processing of the new password in step c10 to step c14 is performed, and the operator himself cannot confirm the erroneous touch of the keyboard or the like. In this case, an erroneous operation of the keyboard or the like is detected in the internal processing of the numerical controller 10 by inputting the number of times.

Then, if the password entered for the first time matches the password entered for the second time, step c
If the determination result in step 15 becomes true, the processor 11 recognizes that the password for resetting as intended by the operator has been input, and overwrites the password in the SRAM 14 to thereby reset the password which has been used up to that time. The setup password is invalidated, and the newly set password for resetting is enabled (step c1).
6).

Once the manufacturer's worker rewrites the password for resetting, the password for resetting that had been used by the local worker becomes invalid. Porting the backup data to another numerical control device via the memory card 20 cannot be performed by local workers.

[0069]

According to the present invention, the unique code stored in the backup information is compared with the unique code of the numerical controller itself to determine whether or not the backup information can be reset from the external storage medium. It is possible to prevent important information set up in the nonvolatile RAM by the NC maker from being inadvertently copied to another numerical controller by the user's hand and used illegally. In addition, when a legitimate user restores a numerical control device whose data has been damaged, the troublesome security check is omitted by matching the unique code stored in the backup information with the unique code of the numerical control device itself. And a smooth re-setup operation can be performed.

Also, since the unique code of the numerical control device that generated the backup information is written in the external storage medium storing the backup information, even if the external storage medium is illegally taken out or lent, The source can be easily located.

Further, by using the password for resetting, even if the unique code written in the external storage medium does not match the unique code of the numerical controller itself, the resetting work can be performed. Therefore, it is possible to efficiently perform the service work of the local worker including the renewal of the license contract when adding a new function to the numerical control device.

Further, since the password for resetting can be rewritten by using the second password known only to the manufacturer, if a problem occurs in the reliability of the local worker, the password must be used until then. The reset password that has been set can be invalidated and a new reset password can be set.

Further, since the rewriting of the password for resetting is protected by the second password, even if an illegal copying operation is performed by any method, the password for resetting used for the illegal copying is stored in the external storage medium. Alternatively, since the data remains in the copied numerical controller, the local operator who has performed the illegal work can be easily located by checking the password used for the re-setup.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a main part of a numerical controller according to an embodiment to which an illegal copy prevention method of the present invention is applied.

FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an outline of processing of a numerical control device during a backup operation.

FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing a processing operation at the time of a re-setup operation.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing a process for confirming a password for resetting stored in the numerical controller.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a process when a password for resetting is changed.

FIG. 6 is a continuation of the flowchart showing the processing when the password for resetting is changed.

[Explanation of symbols]

Reference Signs List 10 Numerical control device 11 Processor 12 ROM 13 RAM 14 SRAM (non-volatile RAM) 15 Interface 16 PMC (Programmable Machine Controller) 17 I / O unit 18 Interface 19 Interface 20 Memory card (external storage medium) 21 Bus 30 to 32 Axis control circuit 40 to 42 Servo amplifier 50 to 52 Servo motor 60 Spindle control circuit 61 Spindle amplifier 62 Spindle motor 70 CRT / MDI unit 71 Manual pulse generator 72 Drive unit for external storage medium

Claims (3)

[Claims] 1. Non-volatile R required for a numerical controller
A numerical controller having a function of storing a backup of AM information in an external storage medium and a function of resetting the backup information of the external storage medium in a nonvolatile RAM. When storing in the medium, the non-rewritable unique code stored in the numerical controller is forcibly written to the external storage medium, and is written to the external storage medium when the backup information is set up again. A method for preventing unauthorized copying of NC data, wherein a re-setup operation is executed only when a unique code that is present matches a unique code of a numerical controller. 2. A password for resetting is written together with the unique code from the numerical controller to an external storage medium. When the backup information is set up again, the unique code written on the external storage medium is numerically controlled. Even if the password does not match the device's unique code, if the password for resetting written on the external storage medium matches the password entered by the operator into the numerical controller, the resetting operation is performed. 2. The method for preventing unauthorized copying of NC data according to claim 1, wherein the method is executed. 3. A second password for rewriting the password for resetting stored in the numerical controller is stored in the numerical controller, and the second password stored in the numerical controller is stored in the second password. 3. The method for preventing unauthorized copying of NC data according to claim 2, wherein the password for resetting is rewritten only when the password input by the operator to the numerical controller matches.