JPH06286368A - Record carrier card and device for determine its genuineness - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To correctly judge genuineness of a card body by reading a punched hole position data and a security data of the card body by a hole detecting circuit, reading a magnetism remaining quantity data by a magnetism detecting circuit, and comparing used frequencies detected by these detecting circuits. CONSTITUTION:In a record carrier card, for example, in a telephone card body 1, at a punched hole 3 to be punched as an aim of remaining quantity, a ferromagnetic material layer 2 is provided and a security code is written in it. For determining genuineness of the card body 1 by a genuineness determining device C, a punched hole position data and a security data of the card body 1 are read by a hole detecting circuit 13 and a magnetism remaining quantity data is read by a magnetism detecting circuit 10, and these detected data are respectively inputted to a microcomputer 12. A used frequency detected by the magnetism detecting circuit 10 is compared with a used frequency detected by the hold detecting circuit 13 so as to determine whether the card body 1 is true one or not. Thus, genuineness of the card body 1 can be determined simply and correctly.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a record carrier card, such as a telephone card, which records information to be managed magnetically, and an authenticity judging device for the same.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Currently, as a record carrier card of this type,
The most commonly used prepaid card in Japan is for public telephones issued by NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) known by the name of telephone card. This card is prepaid for the price, and the usage amount or the usage value is recorded in advance as management information, and the usage value is rewritten each time the card is used, and the credit is normally managed. The management method is based on the frequency information magnetically recorded on the magnetic layer and punch holes that are physically drilled according to the usage frequency. The contents of this magnetic recording have not been opened to the public, and it has been generally impossible to tamper with them. However, recently, telephone cards with altered call frequency have appeared on the market.
It has been reported by media and has become a major social issue.

[0003]

It has been pointed out that one of the reasons why such modified cards are circulated is the insufficient data security function of the prepaid card. One of them is that the recorded contents can be read by a magnetic developer or the like as an essential drawback of the magnetic recording system. In addition, the punched holes that are also used for power management have little effect on security, and there is a possibility that the so-called maniacs may alter the usage power. Currently, there are about 700,000 card-type public telephones nationwide, and if the frequency control system is changed to prevent alteration, the cost of the card itself and the telephone remodeling cost will increase, which is significant for the operation of public telephone communications. It becomes a problem.

An object of the present invention is to provide an inexpensive and highly secure record carrier card which is easy to detect alterations, and a record carrier card authenticity determination device capable of easily and highly accurately determining its authenticity. To provide.

[0005]

In order to achieve this object, a record carrier card according to the present invention has a first recording area in which information to be managed is recorded and a position different from the first recording area. A magnetic material layer such as an amorphous magnetic material layer is arranged, and a second recording area provided so as to punch a required number of punch holes is provided. A security code may be magnetically recorded in the second recording area.

Further, the authenticity determining device for a record carrier card according to the present invention comprises a reading means for reading the management object information magnetically recorded in the first recording area, with the record carrier card as the object to be handled. A magnetic sensor for detecting the existence position of the punch hole by the magnetic detection output from the ferromagnetic material layer when the punch hole exists in the second recording area and when the punch hole exists. Whether the record carrier card is a genuine product or a counterfeit product is determined by whether or not the content of the management target information read by the reading means and the read result by the magnetic sensor are properly matched. And a determining means. Further, when the security code is recorded in the second recording area, the accuracy of the authenticity determination can be further increased by adding the correctness of the read information to the determination condition.

[0007]

The position of the punch hole in the telephone card is generally detected by an optical sensor, and it seems that the tampered telephone card has the punch hole blocked by a simple light blocking tape. According to the present invention, a ferromagnetic material layer such as an amorphous magnetic material layer is adhered or sandwiched in the peripheral portion of the punch hole in the card. When the card is used, holes are punched according to the remaining frequency. The card according to the invention is not an optical sensor,
The position of the hole is detected by the magnetic sensor. That is, if there is a physical defect (punch hole) in the ferromagnetic material layer, the magnetic change occurs in that part, and the hole position can be detected by an external magnetic bias and a magnetic sensor. Moreover, magnetic detection is possible even if the magnetic material is tampered with to block the hole. Further, for tampering with the same magnetic material, the authenticity can be determined by writing a security code in a certain portion in the ferromagnetic material layer and always referring to the code. Writing can be performed by utilizing the crystallization irreversibility of the ferromagnetic material layer due to heat, rewriting,
It cannot be erased, and high security can be realized. Also, so-called hybrid tampering, in which all the punched portions are replaced, can be dealt with by using a special ferromagnetic material layer such as an amorphous magnetic material layer and writing a security code. For example, when a FeCoSiB-based ferromagnetic amorphous magnetic material layer is used, it is possible to utilize the magnetization characteristics having a high magnetic permeability and a sharp rising characteristic, and it is possible to distinguish from generally available magnetic materials such as ferrite and permalloy. You can

[0008]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS FIG. 1 shows an embodiment of the present invention, in which reference numeral 1 denotes a magnetic card body used for a prepaid card. Hereinafter, a telephone card, which is a typical magnetic card, will be described as an example. Reference numeral 2 is an amorphous magnetic material layer serving as a ferromagnetic layer provided in the punched hole portion of the telephone card.
Reference numeral 3 is a punched hole in which a telephone card is used and which is used as a guide for the remaining amount. Reference numeral 4 is a security code written in the above-mentioned amorphous magnetic material layer 2.

As shown in FIG. 2, the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is applied to a telephone card. In Example 1 shown in FIG. 2A, the thin amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is attached to the surface or vapor deposition by sputtering, or It is arranged by electrodeposition by plating method. The magnetic material film 2 attached to the surface is protected from the external environment by applying a protective layer. In Example 2 shown in (b), the magnetic material film 2 has a structure of being sandwiched within the base material (base) of the telephone card body 1. The attachment and the like are the same as in Example 1. In this example, the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 cannot be seen from the outside, and there is a strong advantage in the use environment.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the construction of a telephone card authenticity determination device provided with measures according to the present invention, and a waveform diagram for explaining the operating principle thereof. Here, 5 is a magnetic head for punch hole detection, and 6 is an amorphous magnetic material layer 2
Is an exciting coil, and 7 is an exciting power supply for exciting the exciting coil 6. Amorphous magnetic material layer 2
If a FeCoSiB-based ferromagnetic material is used for
Due to the sharp rising characteristic, when a magnetic field is applied from the outside by the exciting coil, a partial magnetic field change occurs in the end face portion, punch hole portion, and heat changing portion, and the magnetic head 5 for hole detection detects the voltage. As shown in FIG. 3, when the telephone card 1 is sandwiched between the magnetic head 5 and the exciting coil 6 and moved, a detected voltage is obtained at each of the above-mentioned portions.

FIG. 4 shows the authenticity determination operation according to the present invention for a telephone card which has been tampered with by closing a punch hole with a magnetic material. Reference numeral 8 is a shielding material provided for the purpose of reproducing punch holes. No matter what kind of material is used for the shielding material 8, it is not possible to prevent changes in the electromagnetic field from the portion of the hole 3 and the portion in which the security code 4 is written. Therefore, after the hole 3 is once formed, for example, a ferromagnetic material such as ferrite, permalloy or pure iron, a paramagnetic material such as aluminum or copper,
Even if the amorphous magnetic material used in the present invention is used as the shielding material 8, the end face and the hole portion can be detected.
That is, as shown in FIG. 4, despite the shielding, there is a change in the magnetic field at the end surface of the shielding material 8 and the hole position, which can be detected. Therefore, forgery of the record carrier card according to the invention is not possible.

FIG. 5 shows a so-called hybrid method forgery means, in which the telephone card 1 is divided into two parts A and B, and the part A is a substrate without punch holes or the magnetic material 2 is attached. Then, it was made to look like an unused card by sticking it with the part B that was tampered with. In order to prevent such tampering, there is a method of detecting the use of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 having a composition that is not normally available and the characteristics of the material, and determining that the material is a counterfeit product if it is other than that. There is a method in which the security code 4 is written in advance on the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 and checked at the time of reading.

As one of realizing the former method, the saturation magnetic characteristic of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 can be utilized. Some amorphous magnetic materials have large saturation magnetic characteristics with respect to a small external magnetic field. B of FIG.
The characteristic is shown in the -H curve. In order to detect this, as shown in FIG. 7, a static magnetic field is added to the AC exciting magnetic field applied from the exciting coil 6, and the AC exciting signal is not detected from the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 during the addition. By setting the bias magnetic field appropriately according to the material, it can be determined that this is the material of the genuine amorphous magnetic material layer 2.

In order to realize the latter method, the security code 4 which cannot be written by the usual means is written in the amorphous magnetic material layer 2. As one of the methods, it is possible to use the change in the magnetic characteristics due to the heating of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2. FIG. 6 shows an example of BH characteristics of an amorphous magnetic material. The composition of the amorphous material after heating changes, and the magnetic permeability, holding characteristics, and saturation characteristics change. In particular, the change is remarkable near the crystallization temperature, and when heating is partially applied by a high-power laser, the heating part causes a change in the magnetic characteristics, and for example, it is used as data by partially heating like a bar code. be able to. Since this portion undergoes an irreversible change, there is no fear of rewriting or erasing like magnetic writing. In addition, writing is possible only with a writing position and a high-power laser whose heating power is controllable, and there is no possibility of being easily forged.

FIG. 8 shows an embodiment of the tampered card detection device C according to the present invention, which summarizes the above-mentioned determination conditions. 7
Is an exciting power supply for exciting the exciting coil 6, and is a circuit capable of passing an alternating current and an alternating current to which a direct current is added according to an instruction from the microcomputer 12. Reference numeral 13 denotes a hole detection circuit for reading punch hole positions and security data, which amplifies a read signal from the magnetic head 5 for hole detection, performs waveform shaping, and digitizes. The digitized signal is sent to a main control unit such as a microcomputer. Reference numeral 9 is a magnetic head for reading / writing magnetic recording data of a conventional telephone card. Reference numeral 10 is a magnetic recording detection circuit for amplifying, waveform shaping, and digitizing a signal read from the magnetic head 9. Reference numeral 11 is a card feeding device for moving the card laterally in order to read the data on the telephone card. Reference numeral 12 is a main control unit using a microcomputer or the like.

Next, the authenticity determination operation of the used card 1 will be described with reference to the flow chart of FIG. First, when the card 1 is inserted into a card slot (not shown) of the tampered card detection device C (S ₁ ), the card feeding device 11 is activated and the card 1 is taken into the device (S ₂ ). Subsequently, the punch hole position data and the security data indicating the usage amount of the card 1 that have been taken in are read by the hole detection circuit 13, and the magnetic remaining amount data is read by the magnetic recording detection circuit 10 (S ₃ ). It is input to the microcomputer 12. In order to determine whether or not the card 1 has been tampered with, the usage frequency obtained from the magnetic recording detection circuit 10 and the usage frequency obtained from the hole detection circuit 8 are compared (S ₄ ), and both are properly matched. (S ₅ ), when the security code is correct (S ₆ ), and the magnetic characteristic test of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is performed (S ₇ ), and the magnetic characteristic of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 used is suitable ( It determines that the S _8), is a genuine product (S _9). When any one of the conditions is not satisfied, it is determined that the card 1 is a counterfeit product depending on the condition (error processing I or II). Even if the condition of is excluded from the condition of authenticity determination, it is possible to actually determine most of the counterfeit products (error processing I).

Although the above description has been given mainly with respect to the telephone card in which the management information is recorded by magnetic recording, the present invention is obviously applicable to other prepaid cards. That is, basically, the same principle can be applied to not only the prepaid card used in a golf driving range but also an IC card whose usage field is expanding recently.

[0018]

As described above in detail, according to the present invention, it is possible to reliably prevent the enormous damage caused by the unauthorized use of the counterfeit prepaid card, which has been recently reported. Extremely large.

[Brief description of drawings]

1 is a plan view showing an embodiment of a record carrier card according to the present invention. FIG.

FIG. 2 is a sectional view showing an embodiment of a record carrier card according to the present invention.

3A and 3B are a schematic diagram and a waveform diagram for explaining an operation, showing a configuration example of the authenticity determination device for a record carrier card according to the present invention.

4A and 4B are a sectional view and a waveform diagram for explaining the authenticity determination operation according to the present invention when the record carrier card according to the present invention is falsified.

FIG. 5 is a plan view showing another example of tampering with the record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a characteristic diagram for explaining another example of authenticity determination according to the present invention.

FIG. 7 is a waveform diagram for explaining another example of authenticity determination according to the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of an authenticity determination device for a record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the device of the present invention.

[Explanation of Codes] 1 magnetic card body 2 amorphous magnetic material layer 3 punch hole 4 security code 5 punch hole detecting magnetic head 6 exciting coil 7 exciting power source 8 shielding material 9 magnetic recording data read / write magnetic head 10 magnetic recording detection Circuit 11 Card feeder 12 Main controller 13 Hole detection circuit

─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuation of the front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁵ Identification number Reference number within the agency FI Technical display location G06K 19/10 G07F 7/12 G11B 25/04 F (72) Inventor Yuu Maruyama Suginami-ku, Tokyo Kugayama 1-74-1 Iwasaki Tsushinki Co., Ltd.

Claims (4)

[Claims] 1. A first recording area in which information to be managed is recorded, and a ferromagnetic material layer is arranged at a position different from the first recording area, and a necessary number of punch holes are planned. A record carrier card having a second recording area provided by the above. 2. The record carrier card according to claim 1, wherein a security code is magnetically recorded in the second recording area. 3. A first recording area for magnetically recording information to be managed, a ferromagnetic material layer is arranged at a position different from the first recording area, and a necessary number of punch holes are formed. A read-out means for reading out the management target information magnetically recorded in the first recording area, with a record carrier card having a second recording area provided in advance as a handling target, and the second recording area A magnetic sensor for detecting the existence position of the punched hole by the magnetic detection output from the ferromagnetic material layer when the punched hole exists, and the presence of the punched hole. Determination means for determining whether the record carrier card is a genuine product or a counterfeit product based on whether or not the content of the management target information and the reading result by the magnetic sensor are properly matched. Authenticity determination apparatus of the example was the record carrier card. 4. A first recording area for magnetically recording information to be managed, a ferromagnetic material layer is arranged at a position different from the first recording area, and a necessary number of punch holes are formed. A second recording area provided in advance, and the second recording area is magnetically recorded in the first recording area for a record carrier card in which a security code is magnetically recorded. First read-out means for reading out management target information; and whether or not the punched hole exists in the second recording area, and when the punched hole exists, the punched hole is detected by the magnetic detection output from the ferromagnetic material layer. A magnetic sensor for detecting the presence position of the security code, a second reading means for reading the security code from the second recording area, and a content of the management target information read by the first reading means. When the read result obtained by the magnetic sensor is properly matched and it is detected that the security code read by the second reading means is correct, it is determined that the record carrier card is authentic and the read security is When it is not detected that the code is correct, or when it is not detected that the content of the management target information read by the first reading unit and the read result by the magnetic sensor are properly detected, An authenticity determination device for a record carrier card, comprising: a determination means for determining that the record carrier card is a counterfeit product.