JP2003187214A - Recording carrier card - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an inexpensive recording carrier card with high security and whose alteration is easily detected. <P>SOLUTION: The recording carrier card has a first recording area in which information to be managed is recorded and a second recording area in which an amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having predetermined specific saturated magnetic characteristics is arranged at a place different from the first recording area and a necessary number of through holes are to be punched. Magnetic recording of a security code which is not rewritten can be further performed by using crystallization irreversibility due to heat of the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having the predetermined specific saturated magnetic characteristics in the second recording area. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2003,JPO

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a record carrier card such as a telephone card for magnetically recording information to be managed.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art Currently, as a record carrier card of this type,
The most commonly used prepaid card in Japan is for public telephones issued by NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) known by the name of telephone card. This card is prepaid for the price, and the usage amount or the usage value is recorded in advance as management information, and the usage value is rewritten each time the card is used, and the credit is normally managed. The management method is based on the frequency information magnetically recorded on the magnetic layer and punch holes that are physically drilled according to the usage frequency. The contents of this magnetic recording have not been opened to the public, and it has been generally impossible to tamper with them. However, recently, telephone cards with altered call frequency have appeared on the market.
It has been reported by media and has become a major social issue.

[0003]

It has been pointed out that one of the reasons why such modified cards are circulated is the insufficient data security function of the prepaid card. One of them is that the recorded contents can be read by a magnetic developer or the like as an essential drawback of the magnetic recording system. In addition, the punched holes that are also used for power management have little effect on security, and there is a possibility that the so-called maniacs may alter the usage power. Currently, there are about 700,000 card-type public telephones nationwide, and if the frequency control system is changed to prevent alteration, the cost of the card itself and the telephone remodeling cost will increase, which is significant for the operation of public telephone communications. It becomes a problem.

It is an object of the present invention to provide a record carrier card which is inexpensive and has a high security which allows easy alteration detection.

[0005]

In order to achieve this object, a record carrier card according to the present invention has a first recording area in which information to be managed is recorded and a position different from the first recording area. And a second recording area provided for arranging a required number of punch holes and arranging an amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation magnetic characteristic. There is. A security code, which is not rewritten, is magnetically recorded in the second recording area by utilizing the heat crystallization irreversibility of the Moalphas ferromagnetic material layer having the predetermined specific saturation magnetic property. You can

[0006]

The position of the punch hole in the telephone card is generally detected by an optical sensor, and it seems that the tampered telephone card has the punch hole blocked by a simple light blocking tape. According to the present invention, an amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation magnetic property is attached or sandwiched in the peripheral portion of the punch hole in the card. When the card is used, holes are punched according to the remaining frequency. In the card according to the present invention, the position of the hole is detected by a magnetic sensor rather than an optical sensor. That is, if there is a physical defect (punch hole) in the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation magnetic characteristic, there is a magnetic change having the predetermined specific saturation magnetic characteristic in that portion, The position of the hole can be detected by the magnetic bias and the magnetic sensor.
Moreover, magnetic detection is possible even if the magnetic material is tampered with to block the hole.

Further, in the case of tampering with the same magnetic material, a security code which is not rewritten is written in a certain part of the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation magnetic characteristic, and the security from that part is always maintained. The authenticity can be determined by referring to the read output of the code. Writing can be performed by utilizing the irreversible crystallization due to heat of the ferromagnetic material layer, rewriting and erasing are impossible, and high security can be realized. Also, so-called hybrid tampering, in which all the punched portions are replaced, can be handled by using an amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation magnetic property and writing a security code that is not rewritten. . For example, when a FeCoSiB-based ferromagnetic amorphous magnetic material layer is used, it is possible to utilize the magnetization characteristics having a high magnetic permeability and a sharp rising characteristic, and to distinguish it from generally available magnetic materials such as ferrite and permalloy. You can do it.

[0008]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS FIG. 1 shows an embodiment of the present invention, in which reference numeral 1 denotes a magnetic card body used for a prepaid card. Hereinafter, a telephone card, which is a typical magnetic card, will be described as an example. Reference numeral 2 is an amorphous magnetic material layer serving as a ferromagnetic layer provided in the punched hole portion of the telephone card. Reference numeral 3 is a punched hole in which a telephone card is used and which is used as a guide for the remaining amount. Reference numeral 4 is a security code written in the above-mentioned amorphous magnetic material layer 2.

As shown in FIG. 2, the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is applied to a telephone card. In Example 1 shown in FIG. 2A, the thin amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is attached to the surface or vapor deposition by sputtering, or It is arranged by electrodeposition by plating method. The magnetic material film 2 attached to the surface is protected from the external environment by applying a protective layer. In Example 2 shown in (b), the magnetic material film 2 has a structure of being sandwiched within the base material (base) of the telephone card body 1. The attachment and the like are the same as in Example 1. In this example, the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 cannot be seen from the outside, and there is a strong advantage in the use environment.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of the construction of a telephone card authenticity determination device provided with measures according to the present invention, and a waveform diagram for explaining the operating principle thereof. Here, 5 is a punched hole detecting magnetic head, 6 is an exciting coil for exciting the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2, and 7 is an exciting power supply for exciting the exciting coil 6. When a FeCoSiB-based ferromagnetic material is used for the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2, when a magnetic field is externally applied by an exciting coil due to its high magnetic permeability and sharp rising characteristics, a partial magnetic field is generated in the end face part, punch hole part, and heat change part. A change occurs, which is detected as a voltage in the magnetic head 5 for hole detection. As shown in FIG. 3, the magnetic head 5
When the telephone card 1 is sandwiched between the magnetizing coil 6 and the exciting coil 6 and moved, a detected voltage is obtained at each of the above-mentioned portions.

FIG. 4 shows the authenticity determination operation according to the present invention for a telephone card which has been tampered with by closing a punch hole with a magnetic material. Reference numeral 8 is a shielding material provided for the purpose of reproducing punch holes. No matter what kind of material is used for the shielding material 8, it is not possible to prevent changes in the electromagnetic field from the portion of the hole 3 and the portion in which the security code 4 is written. Therefore, after the hole 3 is once formed, for example, a ferromagnetic material such as ferrite, permalloy or pure iron, a paramagnetic material such as aluminum or copper,
Even if the amorphous magnetic material used in the present invention is used as the shielding material 8, the end face and the hole portion can be detected.
That is, as shown in FIG. 4, despite the shielding, there is a change in the magnetic field at the end surface of the shielding material 8 and the hole position, which can be detected. Therefore, forgery of the record carrier card according to the invention is not possible.

FIG. 5 shows a so-called hybrid method, which is a forgery means, in which the telephone card 1 is divided into two parts A and B, and the part A is a substrate without punch holes or the magnetic material 2 is attached. Then, it was made to look like an unused card by sticking it with the part B that was tampered with. In order to prevent such tampering, the use of the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2 having a predetermined composition, which is not normally available, and the characteristics of the material are detected, and any other material is regarded as a counterfeit product. There is a method of judging, and a method of previously writing the security code 4 which is not rewritten in the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2 and checking it at the time of reading.

As one of realizing the former method, the saturation magnetic characteristic of the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2 can be utilized. Some amorphous magnetic materials have certain large saturation magnetic properties for small external magnetic fields.
The characteristic is shown in the BH curve of FIG. In order to detect this, as shown in FIG. 7, ON-OFF control is performed to determine whether or not a bias static magnetic field of a specific level is added to the AC exciting magnetic field applied from the exciting coil 6, thereby
Corresponding to the N-OFF control, it can be controlled whether or not the AC excitation signal is detected from the amorphous magnetic material layer 2. Therefore, by appropriately setting the level of the bias magnetic field according to the material, it can be determined that this is the material of the genuine amorphous magnetic material layer 2.

In order to realize the latter method, the security code 4 which cannot be written by the usual means is written in the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2. As one of the methods, it is possible to use the change in the magnetic characteristics due to the heating of the amorphous ferromagnetic material layer 2. FIG. 6 shows an example of BH characteristics of an amorphous magnetic material. The composition of the amorphous material after heating changes, and the magnetic permeability, holding characteristics, and saturation characteristics change. In particular, the change is remarkable near the crystallization temperature, and when heating is partially applied by a high-power laser, the heating part causes a change in the magnetic characteristics, and for example, it is used as data by partially heating like a bar code. be able to. Since this portion undergoes an irreversible change, there is no fear of rewriting or erasing like magnetic writing. In addition, writing is possible only with a writing position and a high-power laser whose heating power is controllable, and there is no possibility of being easily forged.

FIG. 8 shows an embodiment of the tampered card detection device C which summarizes the above-mentioned determination conditions. Reference numeral 7 denotes an exciting power source for exciting the exciting coil 6, and is a circuit capable of passing an alternating current and an alternating current to which a direct current is added according to an instruction from the microcomputer 12. Reference numeral 13 denotes a hole detection circuit for reading punch hole positions and security data, which amplifies a read signal from the magnetic head 5 for hole detection, performs waveform shaping, and digitizes. The digitized signal is sent to a main control unit such as a microcomputer. Reference numeral 9 is a magnetic head for reading / writing magnetic recording data of a conventional telephone card. Reference numeral 10 is a magnetic recording detection circuit for amplifying, waveform shaping, and digitizing a signal read from the magnetic head 9. Reference numeral 11 is a card feeding device for moving the card laterally in order to read the data on the telephone card. Reference numeral 12 is a main control unit using a microcomputer or the like.

Next, the authenticity determination operation of the used card 1 will be described with reference to the flow chart of FIG. First, when the card 1 is inserted into a card slot (not shown) of the tampered card detection device C (S ₁ ), the card feeding device 11 is activated and the card 1 is taken into the device (S ₂ ). Subsequently, the punch hole position data and the security data indicating the usage amount of the card 1 that have been taken in are read by the hole detection circuit 13, and the magnetic remaining amount data is read by the magnetic recording detection circuit 10 (S ₃ ). It is input to the microcomputer 12. In order to determine whether or not the card 1 has been tampered with, the usage frequency obtained from the magnetic recording detection circuit 10 and the usage frequency obtained from the hole detection circuit 8 are compared (S ₄ ), and both are properly matched. (S
_5), the security code is correct (S _6), and,
A magnetic characteristic test of the amorphous magnetic material layer 2 is performed (S
₇ ), when the magnetic characteristics of the used amorphous magnetic material layer 2 match the predetermined true magnetic characteristics (S
₈ ), it is determined that the product is genuine (S ₉ ). When any one of the conditions is not satisfied, it is determined that the card 1 is a counterfeit product according to the condition (error processing I or
II). Even if the condition of is excluded from the condition of authenticity determination, it is possible to actually determine most of the counterfeit products (error processing I).

Although the above description has been given mainly with respect to the telephone card in which the management information is recorded by magnetic recording, the present invention is obviously applicable to other prepaid cards. That is, basically, the same principle can be applied to not only the prepaid card used in a golf driving range but also an IC card whose usage field is expanding recently.

[0018]

As described above in detail, according to the present invention, it is possible to reliably prevent the enormous damage caused by the unauthorized use of the counterfeit prepaid card, which has been recently reported. Extremely large.

[Brief description of drawings]

1 is a plan view showing an embodiment of a record carrier card according to the present invention. FIG.

FIG. 2 is a sectional view showing an embodiment of a record carrier card according to the present invention.

3A and 3B are a schematic diagram and a waveform diagram for explaining the operation, showing an example of the configuration of the authenticity determination device for determining the authenticity of the record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a sectional view and a waveform diagram for explaining an authenticity determination operation when the record carrier card according to the present invention is falsified.

FIG. 5 is a plan view showing another example of tampering with the record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 6 is a characteristic diagram for explaining another example of authenticity determination for the record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 7 is a waveform diagram for explaining another example of authenticity determination for the record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of another authenticity determination device for determining authenticity of a record carrier card according to the present invention.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the device for determining the authenticity of the record carrier card according to the present invention.

[Explanation of symbols]

1 Magnetic card body 2 Amorphous magnetic material layer 3 punch holes 4 security code 5 Punch hole detection magnetic head 6 Excitation coil 7 Excitation power supply 8 Shielding material 9 Magnetic recording data read / write magnetic head 10 Magnetic recording detection circuit 11 Card feeder 12 Main control unit 13 hole detection circuit

─────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuation of front page (51) Int.Cl. ⁷ Identification code FI theme code (reference) G11B 5/64 G11B 5/80 5/73 G06K 19/00 R 5/80 B (72) Inventor Nishi Atsushi Tomomi, Kugayama 1-41, Suginami-ku, Tokyo Iwasaki Tsushinki Co., Ltd. (72) Inventor, Isamu Maruyama 1-41, Kugayama, Suginami-ku, Tokyo I-saki F-Term (Reference) 2C005 HA02 HB04 JA01 JA14 JB31 JB40 KA06 KA15 5B035 AA13 BB02 BC02 5D006 BB01 CB07 DA01 EA03 FA00

Claims (2)

[Claims] 1. A first recording area in which information to be managed is recorded, and an amorphous ferromagnetic material layer having a predetermined specific saturation characteristic is arranged at a position different from the first recording area and required. A record carrier card, comprising: a second recording area, which is provided so as to punch a large number of punch holes. 2. A non-rewritable security code is magnetically recorded in the second recording area by utilizing the heat crystallization irreversibility of the mo-alphas ferromagnetic material layer having the predetermined specific saturation magnetic property. A record carrier card according to claim 1, characterized in that