JPH0619943A - Electronic voting system - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To obtain a safe and fair electronic voting method capable of holding privacy by ciphering the contents of a vote to form a voting sentence and transmitting a disturbed voting sheet with a signature to an election supervisor. CONSTITUTION:Respective voter devices 100 for T voters Vi are connected to an election supervisor device 200 through a register communication line 400 and connected also to a totalizer device 300 through an anonymous communication line 500. The device 300 opens a table 600 for the contents of votes. The device 100 is constituted so as to access the table 600. Since a voting sentence disturbed the contents of a vote by a random number, an election supervisor A and a totalizer C can not find out the contents of the vote from the disturbed voting sentence and unsigned voting is also guaranteed. Since a formal objection claiming a valid voter Vi is shown only by transmitting the ciphered voting sentence and the signature of the supervisor A to the totalizer C, it can be executed without clarifying the contents of the vote.

Description

Detailed Description of the Invention

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to an electronic voting method and apparatus, and more particularly to a safe and fair secret ballot when conducting a questionnaire survey or other votes through a telecommunication device. The present invention relates to an electronic voting method and device.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art A secret ballot can keep the correspondence between the voter and the contents of the vote secret, and is suitable for protecting the privacy of the individual's ideological belief.
It can be used for questionnaire surveys and other surveys and voting when an interactive telecommunications device such as ATV is adopted.

In a two-way telecommunication device, in order to carry out a secure and fair secret ballot, the impersonation of the voter,
It is necessary to prevent double voting, leakage of voting contents due to wiretapping of voting text, and other inconveniences. As a method for solving these inconveniences, an electronic voting method employing a digital signature has been proposed. For example, Kazuo Ohta: “Electronic Voting Method Using Single Election Administrator”, 1988 Electronic Information There is A-294 (Sho 63-3), the National Conference of the Telecommunications Society of Japan.

[0004]

However, this method has an inherent problem to be solved. First, if an election administrator commits fraud, in order for a voter to challenge it, it is necessary to disclose the content of the voter's vote, which violates the voter's privacy.

Further, although the election manager gathers votes in an anonymous form, all the contents are readable by the election manager. Therefore, for example, by leaking the progress of the vote to the voters, the election result can be confirmed. It can be influenced. The present invention provides a safe and fair electronic voting method and device that can make an objection without invading privacy and has no room for the progress of counting to affect voting. .

[0006]

[Means for Solving the Problem] The voter V _i votes v
_i is encrypted by the random number component k _i, and it is perturbed by the random number component r _i to create a voting sentence e _i , which is sent to the election manager A with the signature s _i , and the election manager A is added. was in after authenticating the validity of the voter V _i based on the signature s _i, the election administrator a signature d _i voting statement election administrator a to vote statement e _i is signed d _i to voter V _i In return, the voter V _i seeks the voting text x _i , y _i with the signature of the election manager A and sends it to the aggregator C, who receives the voted text signed by the election manager A. After confirming that the voting text is encrypted, the voting text is disclosed in the encrypted form, and the voter V _i encrypts it if it is confirmed that his voting text is registered in the published voting text list. while transmitting the random number component k _i used to aggregate user C, if not registered dispute the totalizer C, Total's C constituted the electronic voting method to aggregate this by taking out all of the voting contents from voting statement. Then, the random number component k _i generated by using the random number generator 110 is input, and the encryption unit 120 that encrypts the voting content v _i and the random number component r _i generated by using the random number generator 130 are input. And the signature generator 150 that inputs the voting text e _i created by the perturbator 140, attaches the signature s _i to the voting text e _i , and transmits the voting text e _i to the election management device 200. , A random number component remover 1 that inputs a voting text signed by an election manager and removes the influence of a random number component from this to obtain encrypted signature information y _i of the voting text
60, signature information Signature checker 170 to check the y _i, confirm that the device for transmitting the encrypted vote content x _i and signature information y _i to the totalizer 300, and voting statement self exists on the table Based on the above, the voter device 100 including the device for transmitting the random number component k _i used for encryption to the aggregator device 300 is provided, and the disturbed vote text e _i for which the voter confirmation is performed is input. An election manager device 200 including a signature creator 230 that creates a voting text with an election manager signature and sends it back to the voter device 100 is provided. Device 200
A signature verifier 310 to confirm that the signature is signed by
Table creator 3 that makes voting text into a table 600 and makes it known
An electronic voting device including the aggregator device 300 including an aggregator 340 for aggregating 20 and voting texts was also configured.

[0007]

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT An embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. According to the present invention, first, the voter V _i encrypts the voting content v _i with the random number component k _i . On which encrypts the vote content, further create a poll statement e _i which was disturbed by random number r _i. The vote content and sends it assigned the result of disrupting a further random number on encrypted e _i to the signature s _i election administrator A. The election manager A authenticates the legitimacy of the voter V _i based on the added signature s _i , and then the election manager A signs d _i on the voting text e _i and votes with the election manager A signature d _i . to return the statement to the voter V _i. The voter V _i removes the influence of random numbers from the voting text with the signature of the election manager A, obtains the signed voting text x _i , y _i , and transmits this to the aggregator C. After confirming that the voting text received is signed by the election manager A, the aggregator C publishes the voting text in a list as encrypted. If the voter V _i confirms that his / her voting text is registered in the list of published voting texts,
The random number component k _i used for encryption is transmitted to the aggregator C.
If it is not registered, the objector C is challenged. The aggregator C takes out all the voting contents from the voting text and aggregates them.

As described above, since the voting text disturbs the voting content by random numbers, the election manager A and the aggregator C cannot obtain the voting content from the disturbed voting text, and Anonymity is also guaranteed. Also, as to the objection, it can be shown that the user is the legitimate voter V _i only by transmitting the encrypted voting text and the signature of the election manager A to the aggregator C. , Opposition can be implemented without clarifying the content of the vote. Further, since the encrypted vote contents are gathered to the totalizer C, it is possible to say that it is a fair voting method because the progress of the vote is not clear during the vote. That is, the present invention can prevent the illegal influence on the voting due to the invasion of privacy at the time of opposition and the leakage of the progress, which has been pointed out in the past.

A specific embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. FIG. 1A is a diagram showing the overall configuration of the present invention. FIG. 1B shows a list of voting contents after voting, and FIG. 1C shows a list of voting contents after counting. Where T
Each voter device 100 of each voter V _i is connected to the election manager device 200 via the signing communication path 400, and the totalizer device 3 via the anonymous communication path 500.
Connected to 00. The aggregator apparatus 300 publishes a vote content list 600. The voter device 100 is configured to be able to access the list 600.
2 shows the communication sequence of the present invention, FIG. 3 shows the voter device 100, FIG. 4 shows the election manager device 200, and FIG. 5 shows the counter device 300.

Referring now to these figures, voter V
_{A case where i} votes for the totalizer C after the vote content v _i has been approved by the election manager A will be described. here,
For simplicity, we use the following notation. x = ξ (v, k): encryption function (message v, random component k) v = ρ (x, k): decryption function (ciphertext x, random component k) s = σ _i (m): vote 's V _i signature creation functions (message _{m) m = ζ i (s} ): signature verification function of the voter V _i (signature _{s) s = σ a (m} ): signature creation function of the election administrator a (message m ) _M = ζ _A (s): Signature verification function (signature s) of election manager A e = ω _A (m, r): Disturbance function (message m, random number r) y = δ _A (d, r): Random Number Component Removal Function (Signature d, Random Number r) The election manager A's signature function (σ _A , ζ _A ) is capable of perturbing random numbers (ω _A ) and removing random number components (δ _A ).

For this signature function, for example, there are an encryption function and a decryption function of RSA encryption (Ronald Rivest, A
di Shamir, Leonard Adleman: “A method for obtaini
ngdigital signatures and public-key cryptosystem
s ”, Communications of the ACM, Vol.21, No.2, pp.12
0-126 (Feb., 1978)), for details on the method of random number perturbation, see David Chaum: “Security without identificat.
ion: Transactionsystems to make big brother obsole
te ”, Communications of the ACM, Vol.28, No.10, p
p.1030-1044 (Oct., 1985).

The voting procedure will be described below. Step 1 The voter V _i prepares for voting via the voter device 100 as follows. Step 1-1 The voter V _i determines the vote content v _i by the random number generator 1
The random number component k _i randomly selected from 10 is used for encryption by the encryptor 120 to create the voting paper x _i x _i = ξ (v _i , k _i ).

Step 1-2 Voter V _i is random number generator 130
Is used to generate r _i , and the disruptor 140 is used to create the voting sentence e _i e _i = ω _A (x _i , r _i ). Step 1-3 The voter V _i uses the signature creator 150 to
e _i of the signature s _i s _i = σ _i create a (e _i), to send e _i, a s _i to the election administrator A.

Step 2 The election manager A is the election management device 20.
The approval procedure is performed through 0 as follows. Step 2-1 The election manager A uses the signature inspector 220 to inspect s _i and e _i and confirms that the voter V _i is a voter. If not, Election Administrator A refuses approval.

Step 2-2 The election manager A inspects whether the voter V _i has been approved by the election manager A before this. If it has already been approved, the election manager A rejects the approval. Step 2-3 The election manager A passes e _i through the signature generator 230 to calculate the signature d _i d _i = σ _A (e _i ) and sends d _i to the voter V _i as approval for e _i To do.

Step 3 The voter V _i creates a ballot and its signature information via the voter device 100 as follows. Step 3-1 The voter V _i inputs d _i and r _i into the random number component remover 160 to obtain signature information y _i y _i = δ (d _i , r _i ) of the voting paper x _i .

Step 3-2 The voter V _i is the signature verifier 170
Verify that y _i is the signature of election manager A. If unsuccessful, the voter V _i is e _i ,
Claim the dishonor of election manager A by showing d _i . Step 3-3 The voter V _i transmits x _i and y _i to the aggregator C via the aggregator device 300 and the anonymous communication channel 500.

Step 4 The totalizer C uses the totalizer device 300
Then collect the votes as follows. Step 4-1 Aggregator C is the aggregator device 300 and signature inspection
Using vessel 310 _iIs ballot x_iThe signature of
And confirm. If it passes, the totalizer C will vote
Ballot x on To 600_iAnd its signature y_iL, x_i, Y
_iAnd number it.

Step 4-2 After all the votes are voted, the totalizer C publishes the list. This list shall be accessible to all voters V _i . Step 5 The totalizer C makes a vote through the totalizer device 300 as follows. Step 5-1 voter V _i checks whether the number of votes that have been on the list through the voter apparatus 100 matches the number of voters. If it fails, the number l and the random number r _i are announced and the election manager A is wrongly claimed.

Step 5-2 Voter V _i checks whether his ballot is posted. If it is not posted, the allegor C's injustice is claimed by publishing x _i and y _i . Step 5-3 The voter V _i , together with the number l, has a random number component k _i ,
That is, l and k _i are transmitted to the aggregator C via the anonymous communication path 500.

Step 6 The totalizer C totals as follows via the totalizer device 300. Step 6-1 The aggregator C uses the random number component k _i to vote the voting paper x _i with the decoder 330, obtains the voting content v _i , and checks whether the voting v _i is a correct vote. Step 6-2 The aggregator C aggregates the votes v _i by using the aggregator 340 and publicizes the result, and also k _i and v _i
To the list.

Step 7 The voter V _i confirms via the voter device 100 that the operation of the totalizer C is correct.

[0023]

As described above, according to the present invention, the voting content v is encrypted to create the voting text x, so that the election manager A and the aggregator C cannot obtain the voting content from the voting text. . Since the voter V _i sends the disturbed ballot form to the election manager A with a signature, the election manager A cannot illegally mix the voting text and send it to the aggregator C. This is because the election manager A cannot hold a signature for an illegal voting text. Further, even if the aggregator falsifies the voting contents, it is possible to detect the falsification of the voting contents by browsing the published list of voting contents. That is, when the vote of the user is not displayed, the encrypted ballot sheet and the signature of the election manager may be disclosed and the injustice may be claimed. At this time, the disclosure is encrypted, so the privacy at the time of opposition is guaranteed. Further, according to the present invention, since the voting contents are encrypted and transmitted, it is possible to prevent fraudulence in which the aggregator leaks the progress in the middle of collecting the voting paper and affects the election.

[Brief description of drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of the present invention, in which (a) a block diagram thereof, (b) a list of voting contents after voting, and (c) a diagram of voting contents after counting. Is.

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a communication sequence of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a voter device.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an election manager device.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of an aggregator device.

[Explanation of symbols]

 100 Voter apparatus 110 Random number generator 120 Encryptor 130 Random number generator 140 Disturber 150 Signature creator 160 Random component remover 170 Signature checker 200 Election administrator apparatus 230 Signature creator 300 Aggregator apparatus 310 Signature checker 320 Table Creator 340 Aggregator 600 Table

Claims (2)

[Claims] 1. A voter encrypts the contents of a vote with a random number component, scrambles with the random number component to create a voting text, attaches a signature to this and sends it to the election manager, and the election manager is added. After validating the voter's legitimacy based on the signature, the voter signs the vote by sending it back to the voter with a vote signed by the voter, who asks for the vote signed by the voter. This is sent to the aggregator, the aggregator confirms that the received voting text is signed by the election manager, and then publishes the voting text in an encrypted list, and the voter publishes the voting text. If it is confirmed that your voting text is registered in the list of, the random number component used for encryption is transmitted to the aggregator, but if it is not registered, the aggregator is challenged and aggregated. Who took all the votes from the vote An electronic voting method that counts this. 2. An encryptor for inputting a random number component generated by using a random number generator to encrypt voting contents, and a vote sentence disturbed by inputting a random number component generated by using a random number generator. Create a randomizer, enter the voting text created by the electronic disturber, add a signature to it, and send it to the election manager's device.Enter a voting text with an election manager signature. Random component remover that removes influence and obtains signature information of encrypted voting text, signature checker that confirms signature information, device that sends encrypted voting content and signature information to aggregator device, own vote It is equipped with a voter device consisting of a device that sends the random number component used for encryption to the aggregator device based on the confirmation that the sentence exists in the table. Enter and vote with election manager signature Equipped with an election manager device consisting of a signature generator that creates a sentence and sends it back to the voter device, input the signed vote sentence to and confirm that the vote sentence is signed by the election manager device An electronic voting device, comprising: a signature inspector, a table generator for making a voting text into a table and making it known to the public, and an aggregator device comprising an aggregator for aggregating voting texts.