JPH11296607A - Electronic voting system and method using disclosed key cipher and record medium recording electronic voting program - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide electronic voting system and method using disclosed key cipher and a record medium recording an electronic voting program capable of accurately realizing the secrecy of voting contents and multiple voting denial. SOLUTION: In the ciphering part 12 for a sum-up person of a cipher/ signature device 1, the voting contents are ciphered by the public key (Pc) of the sum-up person and the signature of a voting person is ciphered by the secret key (Kv) of the voting person and transmitted. In the voting person signature verification part 21 of a voting person management device 2, the signature of the voting person is verified by the public key (Pv) of the voting person, multiple voting is judged and the signature of a manager is ciphered by the secret key (Km) of the manager and transmitted to a voting sum-up device 3. In the voting sum-up device 3, the signature of the manager is verified by the public key (Pm) of the manager and whether or not it is invalid voting is judged. In the case that it is not the invalid voting the voting contents are deciphered by the secret key (Kc) of the sum-up person and integrated as a voting sum-up list 35.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a method for electronically receiving the contents of a vote from a voter, encrypting the contents of the vote with a public key cryptosystem, and verifying the voter on an administrator side.
More particularly, the present invention relates to an electronic voting system and method using public key cryptography in which voting contents encrypted by a public key cryptosystem are decrypted and counted by a tallyer while verifying an administrator on a tallyer side. The present invention relates to an electronic voting system and method using public key cryptography capable of realizing confidentiality of contents and multiple voting rejection, and a recording medium storing an electronic voting program.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art An electronic voting system using the Internet is used in various community fields (communities for reflecting attitudes such as public opinion polls, public opinion polls, dynamic surveys, local elections, and national elections), and reduces labor costs. Reduction, real-time information understanding, voting from home or remote places,
It has various useful points such as immediate reflection of voting results,
Future use is desired. On the other hand, as seen in the electronic voting system, the information distribution system using the Internet, which provides these benefits, can distribute information globally at low cost, and the information distributed is simple in terms of digital information. Although it has the advantage of being able to be copied and reused, it is important to ensure that voting content is not viewed by other voters or managers, while at the same time ensuring that voting content is digital information. It is necessary to guarantee multiple voting refusal to prevent falsification of multiple voting. Only with these two guarantees will voters be able to vote safely and securely, administrators will be able to rigorously verify multiple votes and simulate the various voting environments currently being practiced in the real world. Become.

In a voting system in actual social activities, a voting right holder (hereinafter abbreviated as a voter) performs voting based on a voting right issued from an election administration office which manages a voting object, and Election managers (hereinafter abbreviated as managers), elected by the head of the office, authenticate voters and implement multiple vote rejection. That is, a signed voting right (which is a prerequisite that this voting right is not given to others) is passed to the election manager, the voting is verified by address confirmation, etc. The confidentiality of the voting content is guaranteed. There must be assurance between the voter and the election manager regarding the signing, verification and confidentiality of the voting content of this voter.

[0004] On the other hand, since the voter is verified by the election manager, in order to guarantee whether or not the verification has been falsified, the electoral tallyer (hereinafter also referred to as the tallyer) is signed by the manager. Need to be verified. That is, it is necessary to verify the correctness of the manager who has verified the voter between the manager and the tallyer. After performing this verification, that is, verifying that the voter has not correctly performed multiple voting, the content of the voter's voting is browsed, and the voting results are totaled. Therefore, it is necessary to guarantee the correctness of the multiple vote rejection property of the voter by the signature and verification of the administrator who has guaranteed the correctness between the manager and the tallyer. In addition, between the voter and the tallyer, it is necessary to ensure that the administrator can view the contents of the voting that guarantees confidentiality.

[0005]

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION In implementing an electronic voting system, a voter, a manager, and a tallyer are required to sign a voter's voting right, verify the voting right, and secure the voting contents. It is necessary to be able to guarantee between and the administrator.
It is also necessary to guarantee the correctness of the multiple vote rejection of the voter by the signature and verification of the administrator who has guaranteed between the manager and the tallyer. Furthermore, between the voter and the tallyer, it is necessary to ensure that the administrator can view the contents of the voting that has ensured confidentiality to the manager.

[0006] The present invention has been made in view of the above,
An object of the present invention is to provide an electronic voting system and method using public key cryptography and a recording medium on which an electronic voting program is recorded, which can accurately realize confidentiality of voting contents and multiple voting rejection. .

[0007]

In order to achieve the above object, according to the present invention, the contents of a vote from a voter are electronically received, and the contents of the vote are encrypted by a public key cryptosystem. An electronic device using public key cryptography, in which the voter is verified by the administrator and the administrator is verified by the tallyer, while the content of the voting encrypted by the public key cryptosystem is decrypted and counted by the tallyer. A voting system, which accepts the voting content voted by a voter, encrypts the voting content with a public key of a tallyer, encrypts the voter's signature with a private key of the voting person, said encrypted voting content and An encryption / signature device for transmitting the signature of the encrypted voter to the administrator side and transmitting the encrypted vote content to the tallyer; and the encryption / signature device provided on the administrator side and transmitted from the encryption / signature device. Encrypted voting content and said encryption Receiving the voter signature, verifying the received encrypted voter signature with the public key of the voter, and voting the voter if the result of the verification indicates that the signature of the voter is valid. Registered in the voted voter list, refer to the voted voter list, check whether the voter has already voted, determine multiple voting, encrypt the signature of the administrator with the secret key of the administrator, A voter management device that transmits the received encrypted voting content and the encrypted administrator signature to the tallyer side, and the encrypted voting content and the Receiving the administrator signature, verifying the signature of the administrator with the public key of the administrator, and if the verification result reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting content is regarded as invalid voting. Handling, invalid voting The encrypted voting content is received from the encryption / signature device, the encrypted voting content is determined as to whether or not the content is an invalid vote based on the invalid voting list. If the encrypted vote is determined to be an invalid vote,
Registered in the invalid voting candidate list, and when it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting content according to the determination result, the encrypted voting content is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer, and the decrypted voting content is The gist of the present invention is to have a vote counting device that counts as a ballot count list.

According to the present invention, the contents of the vote from the voter are encrypted by the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted by the secret key of the voter, and transmitted. The side verifies the encrypted voter's signature from the voter with the voter's public key, and if the voter's signature is valid, registers it in the voted voter list and refers to the voterized voter list. To determine multiple votes, encrypt the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, send it to the tallyer, and the aggregator verifies the administrator's signature with the administrator's public key. If the signature is invalid, register it as an invalid vote in the invalid vote list, determine whether the encrypted voting content from the voter side is an invalid vote based on the invalid vote list, and if it is an invalid vote, Registered on the invalid vote candidate list The reduction has been vote content decrypted with the private key of the totalizer, for integrating the vote tabulation list, it can be implemented accurately secrecy and multispecific voting denial of vote content.

Further, the present invention described in claim 2 is based on claim 1.
In the invention described in the above, the encryption / signature device includes a voting accepting unit that accepts a voting content voted by a voter, and a voting content encryption for encrypting the voting content received by the voting accepting device with a public key of a tallyer Means, a voter signature encrypting means for encrypting the voter's signature with the voter's private key, and transmitting the encrypted vote content and the encrypted voter's signature to the administrator side And transmitting means for transmitting the encrypted voting contents to the tallyer.

According to the present invention, the content of the vote cast by the voter is accepted, the content of the vote is encrypted by the public key of the tallyer, and the signature of the voter is signed by the secret key of the voter. Encrypted, the encrypted voting content and the signature of the voter are transmitted to the manager side, and the encrypted voting content is transmitted to the tallyer side, so that the confidentiality of the voting content can be guaranteed. .

Further, the present invention according to claim 3 provides the invention according to claim 1.
In the invention described in the above, the voter management device receives the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voter signature transmitted from the encryption / signature device, and the encrypted voting received by the receiving device. Voter signature verification means for verifying the signature of the voter using the public key of the voter, and a signature for notifying the encryption / signature device of a signature improper message when the result of the verification indicates that the signature of the voter is invalid. Refer to the illegitimate message notifying means, the voted voter list registering means for registering the voter in the voted voter list when the signature of the voter is found to be valid based on the verification result, and the voted voter list. Means for checking whether or not the voter has already voted, and determining a multiple vote, and a pipe for encrypting the signature of the administrator with the secret key of the administrator. 'S signature encryption means, and summarized in that a transmission means for transmitting received the encrypted vote content and the encrypted administrator signed by the reception unit to the aggregation side.

According to the third aspect of the present invention, the manager receives the encrypted voting contents and the voter signature from the voter, and transmits the encrypted voter signature to the voter. It verifies with the public key, and if the signature of the voter is invalid, notifies the voter side of the signature invalid message.If the signature of the voter is valid, registers it in the voted voter list, and registers the voted voter list. , And the signature of the administrator is encrypted with the secret key of the administrator and transmitted to the tallyer, so that multiple vote rejection can be properly realized.

According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, in the first aspect of the present invention, the vote counting device receives the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the voter management device, An administrator signature verifying means for verifying the signature of the administrator with the public key of the administrator, and when the verification result reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting content is treated as an invalid vote, Invalid voting list registration means for registering in the invalid voting list, receiving the encrypted voting content from the encryption / signature device, and determining whether or not the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list. Invalid voting determination means for determining, and invalid voting list registration means for registering in the invalid voting candidate list when the encrypted voting content is determined to be invalid voting as a result of the determination,
When it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting by the invalid voting determination means, the voting content decrypting means decrypts the encrypted voting content with a secret key of a tallyer. And a voting content tally registration means for integrating the voting content as a voting tally list.

According to the present invention, the tallyer receives the encrypted voting contents and the manager's signature from the manager, and verifies the manager's signature with the manager's public key. If the signature of the administrator is invalid, register it as an invalid vote in the invalid vote list, receive the encrypted voting content from the voter side, and determine whether or not it is an invalid vote based on the invalid vote list If it is an invalid vote, it is registered in the invalid vote candidate list, and if it is not an invalid vote, the contents of the vote are decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer and added to the vote total list. Rejection can be realized.

According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, the contents of a vote from a voter are electronically received, the content of the vote is encrypted by a public key cryptosystem, and the voter is verified by an administrator. This is an electronic voting method using public key cryptography in which voting contents encrypted by the public key encryption method are decrypted and counted by the tallyer while verifying the administrator by the tallyer. The vote content is accepted, the vote content is encrypted with the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the private key of the voter, and the encrypted vote content and the signature of the encrypted voter are managed by the administrator. Transmitting the encrypted voting content to the tallyer side, receiving the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voting signature sent from the voter side,
The received encrypted voter signature is verified with the public key of the voter, and if the result of the verification shows that the signature of the voter is valid, the voter is registered in the voted voter list, With reference to the voted voter list, it is checked whether or not the voter has already voted, to judge multiple voting, encrypt the signature of the administrator with the secret key of the administrator, and And transmitting the encrypted administrator signature to the tallyer, receiving the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the administrator, and verifying the signature of the administrator with the public key of the administrator. If the verification result reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid,
Treat the encrypted voting content as invalid voting, register it in the invalid voting list, receive the encrypted voting content from the voter side, and determine whether the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list. If the encrypted voting content is determined to be an invalid vote based on the determination result,
Registered in the invalid voting candidate list, and when it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting content according to the determination result, the encrypted voting content is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer, and the decrypted voting content is The summary is to add up as a voting tally list.

According to the fifth aspect of the present invention, the contents of the vote from the voter are encrypted by the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted by the secret key of the voter, and transmitted. The side verifies the encrypted voter's signature from the voter with the voter's public key, and if the voter's signature is valid, registers it in the voted voter list and refers to the voterized voter list. To determine multiple votes, encrypt the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, send it to the tallyer, and the aggregator verifies the administrator's signature with the administrator's public key. If the signature is invalid, register it as an invalid vote in the invalid vote list, determine whether the encrypted voting content from the voter side is an invalid vote based on the invalid vote list, and if it is an invalid vote, Registered on the invalid vote candidate list The reduction has been vote content decrypted with the private key of the totalizer, for integrating the vote tabulation list, it can be implemented accurately secrecy and multispecific voting denial of vote content.

Further, according to the present invention, the contents of a vote from a voter are electronically received, the content of the vote is encrypted by a public key cryptosystem, and the voter is verified by an administrator. A recording medium recording an electronic voting program using public key cryptography, which verifies the administrator on the side of the tallyer and decrypts and tallies the contents of the voting encrypted by the public key cryptosystem on the side of the tallyer, Accepting the voting content voted by the voter, encrypting the voting content with the public key of the aggregator, encrypting the voter's signature with the private key of the voter, the encrypted voting content and the encrypted Sending a signature to an administrator; transmitting the encrypted voting content to a tallyer; receiving the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voting signature sent from the voter; Voter signing of voters When the verification is performed by opening the key, and the verification result indicates that the signature of the voter is valid, the voter is registered in the voted voter list, and the voter is referred to the voted voter list. It checks whether or not it has already voted, determines multiple voting, encrypts the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, and sends the received encrypted voting content and the encrypted administrator's signature to the tallyer side Receiving the encrypted voting content and the administrator's signature transmitted from the administrator, verifying the administrator's signature with the administrator's public key, and verifying the administrator's signature based on the verification result. If it is found, the encrypted voting content is treated as an invalid vote, registered in an invalid voting list, the encrypted voting content from the voter is received, and the encrypted voting content is stored in the invalid voting list. Invalid voting based on There it is judged whether or not a case where the encrypted vote content by said determination result is determined to be invalid vote, register to disable voting candidate list,
When it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting result, the encrypted voting content is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer, and the decrypted voting content is integrated as a voting tally list. Make a summary.

According to the present invention, the content of the vote from the voter is encrypted with the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the secret key of the voter and transmitted. The side verifies the encrypted voter's signature from the voter with the voter's public key, and if the voter's signature is valid, registers it in the voted voter list and refers to the voterized voter list. To determine multiple votes, encrypt the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, send it to the tallyer, and the aggregator verifies the administrator's signature with the administrator's public key. If the signature is invalid, register it as an invalid vote in the invalid vote list, determine whether the encrypted voting content from the voter side is an invalid vote based on the invalid vote list, and if it is an invalid vote, Registered on the invalid vote candidate list The reduction has been vote content decrypted with the private key of the totalizer, since the recording medium electronic voting program for integrating the vote tabulation list, using the recording medium, it is possible to enhance the flow properties.

[0019]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a configuration of an electronic voting system using public key cryptography according to an embodiment of the present invention. The electronic voting system shown in FIG. 1 includes an encryption / signature device 1 provided on a voter side as a device for the voter.
It is composed of a voter management device 2 provided on the manager side as a device for the administrator, and a vote counting device 3 provided on the tallyer side as a device for the tallyer, and each device is connected by a network such as the Internet. The signature of the voter is transmitted from the encryption / signature device 1 to the voter management device 2 via the network, the signature of the administrator is transmitted from the voter management device 2 to the vote counting device 3, and the encryption / signature The encrypted voting content is transmitted from the signature device 1 to the voting counting device 3.

The encryption / signature device 1 has a voting content (Vα) voted by a voter (α) as shown in FIG.
Voting function unit 11 which is a voting accepting means for accepting
And a voting content encrypting means for encrypting the voting content (Vα) received by the voting function unit 11 with the public key (Pc) of the voting content to generate an encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)). In order to declare that the voter has the right to vote and cannot perform multiple voting, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the secret key (Kv) of the voter and the encrypted voter signature (Sv ), And a signature encrypting unit 13 for the administrator, which is a voter signature encrypting means for generating the voter's signature.
(Vα)) and the encrypted voter signature (Sv) are transmitted to the voter management device 2, and an unjust message is received as described later, and the unjust message is sent to the voter via the voting function unit 11. The encryption unit 12 for the tallyer is configured to return the encrypted voting contents (Kc (V
α)) is transmitted to the vote counting device 3. In addition, the voting function unit 11 receives an unauthorized message from the vote counting device 3 and returns it to the voter.

The voter management device 2 is described in detail in FIG.
As shown in (1), the encrypted vote contents (Kc (Vα)) and the encrypted voter signature (Sv) transmitted from the encryption / signature device 1 are received, and the received encrypted voter signature (Sv) is received.
v) The voter signature verification unit 21 for verifying v) with the voter's public key (Pv), and if the verification result reveals that the voter's signature is invalid, the signature is sent via the voter signature verification unit 21. When an invalid message is notified to the encryption / signature device 1 and the signature of the voter is found to be valid based on the verification result, the voter is registered in the voted voter list 23 and the voter voter list is registered. With reference to 23, the voter's signature is encrypted with the voter's voter list registration unit 22 that checks whether or not the voter has already voted to determine multiple voting, and the administrator's secret key (Km). An administrator signature unit 24 that generates an encryption administrator signature (Sm) and transmits the received encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)) and the encryption administrator signature (Sm) to the vote counting device 3.
It is composed of

Further, as shown in FIG. 4, the vote counting device 3 receives the encrypted voting contents (Kc (Vα)) and the administrator signature (Sm) transmitted from the voter management device 2. The signature of the administrator is verified with the public key (Pm) of the administrator, and if the verification result reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting content is treated as an invalid voting candidate, and the invalid voting is performed. An administrator signature verification unit 31 registered in the candidate list 32 and the encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)) from the encryption / signature device 1 are received, and the encrypted voting content is invalidated based on the invalid voting candidate list 32. It is determined whether or not it is a voting. If the encrypted voting content is determined to be an invalid voting, an invalid message indicating that the voting is invalid is returned to the encryption / signature device 1 and an invalid voting candidate is determined. Listing 32 And if the encrypted voting content is determined not to be invalid voting as a result of the determination, a voting content decryption unit 33 for decrypting the encrypted voting content with the secret key (Kc) of the tallyer, and this decryption And a voting contents totaling registration unit 34 for totalizing the converted voting contents as a voting total list 35.

FIG. 5 is an overall configuration diagram of an electronic voting system in which the encryption / signature device 1, the voter management device 2, and the vote counting device 3 configured as described above are connected in accordance with the connection relationship shown in FIG. Is shown.

Next, the operation of the present embodiment configured as described above will be described. When the voter (α) votes in the encryption / signature device 1, the vote is accepted by the voting function unit 11, and is input to the encryptor for tallyer 12 as the content of the vote (Vα). The tallyer encrypting unit 12 encrypts the voting content (Vα) with the tallyer's public key (Pc) to generate an encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)), and the encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα) )) Vote counting device 3
To send over the network.

In order to declare that the voter has the right to vote and cannot perform multiple voting, the signature of the voter himself is stored in the signature encryption unit 13 for the administrator in the secret key (K) of the voter.
Encrypted in v) to generate an encrypted voter signature (Sv). The administrator signature encryption unit 13 transmits the encrypted vote content (Kc (Vα)) and the encrypted voter signature (Sv) to the voter management device 2 via the network.

The voter management device 2 includes the encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)) transmitted from the signature encryption unit 13 for the administrator of the encryption / signature device 1 and the encrypted voter signature (S
v) is received by the voter signature verification unit 21, the received encrypted voter signature (Sv) is verified by the public key (Pv) of the voter, and the signature of the voter is invalid based on the verification result. When it is determined, the unauthorized message is notified to the encryption / signature device 1 via the voter signature verification unit 21. The encryption / signature device 1 converts the unauthorized message into a signature encryption unit 13 for the administrator.
And returns it to the voter via the voting function unit 11.

If the signature of the voter is found to be valid based on the result of the verification by the voter signature verification unit 21, the voted voter list registration unit 22 registers the voter in the voted voter list 23. At the same time, with reference to the voted voter list 23, it is determined whether or not the voter has already voted, and a multiple vote is determined. Further, the administrator signature unit 24 generates an encrypted administrator signature (Sm) by encrypting the administrator's signature with the administrator's secret key (Km) in order to notify that the voters are valid. The encryption manager signature (Sm) is transmitted to the vote counting device 3 together with the encrypted voting contents (Kc (Vα)).

The voting counting device 3 receives the encrypted voting contents (Kc (Vα)) and the administrator signature (Sm) transmitted from the voter management device 2 by the administrator signature verifying section 31, and The signature is verified with the public key (Pm) of the administrator. If the verification result indicates that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting contents are treated as invalid voting candidates and registered in the invalid voting candidate list 32. I do. In addition, the encrypted voting content (Kc (Vα)) from the encryption / signature device 1 is received by the voting content decryption unit 33, and the encrypted voting content is determined based on the invalid voting candidate list 32 as to whether or not the voting is invalid. Is determined. When it is determined that the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting as a result of the determination, an invalid message indicating that the voting is invalid is returned to the encryption / signature device 1 and registered in the invalid voting candidate list 32. The encryption / signature device 1 sends an illegitimate message from the vote counting device 3 to the voting function unit 11.
And return it to voters.

If the encrypted voting content is determined not to be invalid voting as a result of the determination in the voting content decrypting section 33, the encrypted voting content is transferred to the secret key (Kc) of the tallyer.
Then, the decrypted voting contents are totaled as a voting total list 35 by the voting content total registration unit 34.

FIG. 6 shows an example in which an electronic voting system is implemented by voting on a homepage in the news system via the Internet. In the electronic voting system shown in the figure, a voter having a membership holding an unspecified number of terminals (PCs) guarantees the membership managed by the management server 63, and further, the voting result is obtained by the tallying server 65. To form a distributed system. In the present electronic voting system, voting contents are generated by a voter clicking a voting button according to the contents of a homepage.
The contents of the voting are counted as voting results in the voting tally database of the news homepage according to the present system. Specifically, as shown in FIG.
(World-Wide Web) W existing on the terminal (PC) side
WW browser 61 controls the interface with the voter,
An unspecified number of voters who can be connected to the Internet are W
The encryption / signature device 1 is implemented by a Java language description program plugged into the WW browser 61. Also,
The management server 63 and the tallying server 65 respectively connect the voter management device 2 and the voting tallying device 3 to the CGI (Comm.
on Gateway Interface) (standard user interface). The interface between the device 1 and the device 2 or the device 3 is a standard interface based on HTTP, and the interface between the device 2 and the device 3 is processed by a communication message between programs by CGI.

[0031]

As described above, according to the present invention,
The contents of the vote are encrypted with the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the private key of the voter and transmitted, and the signature of the voter is verified by the administrator using the public key of the voter and multiple voting is performed. Judges, encrypts the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, sends it to the tallyer, and the tallyer verifies the administrator's signature with the administrator's public key to judge whether or not the vote is invalid However, if the vote is not invalid, the content of the vote is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer and added up as a vote count list. Can give a good vote. Since the voting-related service has a short period from the start to the end at a certain point in time, the public key and the private key are changed for each voting-related service to provide a more secure and reliable electronic device. A voting system can be built. Furthermore, it is necessary to guarantee the real-time performance of voting as much as possible in consideration of the load of aggregation. However, in this electronic voting system, the results of voting are aggregated by the aggregation device with regard to the strength of public keys and private keys. After the information is accumulated, the contents of the personal voting are often meaningless, and thus it is considered that the function can be sufficiently exerted even by the public key encryption based on the random number generation information with a small amount of calculation.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a configuration of an electronic voting system using public key cryptography according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a detailed configuration of an encryption / signature device used in the electronic voting system shown in FIG.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a detailed configuration of a voter management device used in the electronic voting system shown in FIG. 1;

FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a detailed configuration of a vote counting device used in the electronic voting system shown in FIG. 1;

FIG. 5 shows an overall configuration of an electronic voting system in which the encryption / signature device, the voter management device, and the vote counting device configured as shown in FIGS. 2, 3, and 4 are connected in accordance with the connection relationship shown in FIG. FIG.

FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example in which the electronic voting system shown in FIG. 1 is implemented by voting on a homepage in a news system as an electronic voting system via the Internet.

[Explanation of symbols]

 REFERENCE SIGNS LIST 1 encryption / signature device 2 voter management device 3 vote counting device 11 voting function unit 12 encryption unit for totalizer 13 signature encryption unit for manager 21 voter signature verification unit 22 voted voter list registration unit 23 voted voters List 24 administrator signature section 31 administrator signature verification section 32 invalid voting candidate list 33 voting content decryption section 34 voting content total registration section 35 voting total list

Claims (6)

[Claims] Claims: 1. A voting content from a voter is electronically received, the voting content is encrypted by a public key cryptosystem, the voter is verified by a manager, and the manager is verified by a tallyer. An electronic voting system using public key cryptography that uses a public key cryptosystem to decrypt and totalize the voting contents encrypted by the public key cryptosystem on the tallyer side. Is encrypted with the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the secret key of the voter, the encrypted vote content and the signature of the encrypted voter are transmitted to the administrator side, and the encrypted vote content is And an encryption / signature device for transmitting the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voter signature provided from the encryption / signature device to the tallyer. Voter signing of voters When the verification is performed by opening the key, and the verification result indicates that the signature of the voter is valid, the voter is registered in the voted voter list, and the voter is referred to the voted voter list. It checks whether or not it has already voted, determines multiple voting, encrypts the administrator's signature with the administrator's private key, and sends the received encrypted voting content and the encrypted administrator's signature to the tallyer side A voter management device to be provided, provided on the tallyer side, receiving the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the voter management device,
The signature of the manager is verified with the public key of the manager. If the verification result reveals that the signature of the manager is invalid, the encrypted voting contents are treated as invalid voting and registered in the invalid voting list. Receiving the encrypted voting content from the encryption / signature device, determining whether or not the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list; If the content is determined to be an invalid vote, it is registered in an invalid vote candidate list, and if the encrypted vote content is determined not to be an invalid vote based on the result of the determination, the encrypted vote content is stored in the secret key of the tallyer. And a voting tally device for integrating the decrypted voting contents as a voting tally list. An electronic voting system using public key cryptography. 2. The voting / signing device, comprising: a voting accepting unit for accepting a voting content voted by a voter; and a voting content encryption for encrypting the voting content received by the voting accepting device with a public key of a tallyer. Means, a voter signature encrypting means for encrypting the voter's signature with the voter's private key, and transmitting the encrypted vote content and the encrypted voter's signature to the administrator side 2. An electronic voting system using public key encryption according to claim 1, further comprising transmission means for transmitting said encrypted voting contents to a tallyer. 3. The voter management device includes: a receiving unit that receives the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voting signature transmitted from the encryption / signature device; and the encrypted voting received by the receiving unit. Voter signature verifying means for verifying the signature of the voter using the public key of the voter, and a signature for notifying the encryption / signature device of a signature invalid message when the result of the verification reveals that the signature of the voter is incorrect. Refer to the illegitimate message notifying means, the voted voter list registering means for registering the voter in the voted voter list when the signature of the voter is found to be valid based on the verification result, and the voted voter list. Means for checking whether or not the voter has already voted to determine the multiple voting, and an administrator signature for encrypting the administrator's signature with the administrator's secret key 2. The public key cryptosystem according to claim 1, further comprising: an encryption unit; and a transmission unit that transmits the encrypted voting content and the encryption administrator signature received by the reception unit to a tallyer. Electronic voting system. 4. An administrator who receives the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the voter management device, and verifies the signature of the administrator with the public key of the administrator. Signature verification means, and when the verification result reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the invalid voting list registration means for treating the encrypted voting content as invalid voting and registering it in an invalid voting list; Invalid voting determination means for receiving the encrypted voting content from the signature device and determining whether or not the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list; and the encryption based on the determination result. Invalid voting list registration means for registering in the invalid voting candidate list when the voting content is determined to be invalid voting;
When it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting by the invalid voting determination means, the voting content decrypting means decrypts the encrypted voting content with a secret key of a tallyer. 2. An electronic voting system using public key encryption according to claim 1, further comprising: a voting content tally registration means for adding the voting content as a voting tally list. 5. The contents of a vote from a voter are electronically received, the contents of the vote are encrypted by a public key cryptosystem, the voter is verified by a manager, and the manager is verified by a tallyer. An electronic voting method using public key cryptography in which the content of a vote encrypted by the public key encryption method is decrypted and counted by the tallyer, and the content of the vote received by the voter is accepted. Is encrypted with the public key of the tallyer, the signature of the voter is encrypted with the secret key of the voter, the encrypted vote content and the signature of the encrypted voter are transmitted to the administrator side, and the encrypted vote content is To the tallyer side, receive the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voter signature sent from the voter side, verify the received encrypted voter signature with the public key of the voter, As a result of this verification, the voter's signature If it is in the art it has been found,
The voter is registered in the voted voter list, and by referring to the voterized voter list, it is checked whether or not the voter has already voted, and multiple vote is determined. Encrypting the signature, transmitting the received encrypted voting content and the encrypted administrator signature to the tallyer side, receiving the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the manager side, The signature of the person is verified with the public key of the administrator, and if the result of the verification reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting content is treated as an invalid vote, and registered in an invalid vote list, Receiving the encrypted voting content from the voter side and determining whether or not the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list; Is determined to be Registered in the invalid voting candidate list, and when it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting content based on the determination result, the encrypted voting content is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer. An electronic voting method using public key cryptography, wherein voting contents are integrated as a voting count list. 6. The contents of a vote from a voter are electronically received, the contents of the vote are encrypted by a public key cryptosystem, the voter is verified by a manager, and the manager is verified by a tallyer. In the meantime, a recording medium that records an electronic voting program using public key cryptography that decrypts and tallies the contents of voting encrypted by public key cryptography on the side of the tallyer, Accepting, encrypting the contents of the vote with the public key of the tallyer, encrypting the signature of the voter with the private key of the voter, transmitting the encrypted vote contents and the signature of the encrypted voter to the administrator side, Transmitting the encrypted voting content to the tallyer side, receiving the encrypted voting content and the encrypted voting signature sent from the voting side, and publishing the received encrypted voting signature to the voting party Verification with the key, this verification result If the more the voters of the signature that is valid has been found,
The voter is registered in the voted voter list, and by referring to the voterized voter list, it is checked whether or not the voter has already voted, and multiple vote is determined. Encrypting the signature, transmitting the received encrypted voting content and the encrypted administrator signature to the tallyer side, receiving the encrypted voting content and the administrator signature transmitted from the manager side, The signature of the person is verified with the public key of the administrator, and if the result of the verification reveals that the signature of the administrator is invalid, the encrypted voting content is treated as an invalid vote, and registered in an invalid vote list, Receiving the encrypted voting content from the voter side, and determining whether the encrypted voting content is an invalid voting based on the invalid voting list; Is determined to be Registered in the invalid voting candidate list, and when it is determined that the encrypted voting content is not an invalid voting result, the encrypted voting content is decrypted with the secret key of the tallyer. A recording medium storing an electronic voting program using public key encryption, wherein voting contents are integrated as a voting count list.