JP7247638B2 - Electronic information storage medium, IC card, falsification check method, and program - Google Patents

Description

The present invention relates to a technical field of a secure element such as an IC card capable of detecting falsification due to an external attack or the like.

A secure element, in which security is emphasized, must be equipped with measures to prevent unauthorized operations caused by attacks from the outside. An external attack is a method for causing a malfunction in a secure element, and DFA (Differential Fault Analysis) is known as a typical attack method. In this attack method, for example, by irradiating the secure element with a laser and analyzing the erroneous calculation result output by comparing it with the correct calculation result, the attacker can obtain the information inside the secure element. It has become. Patent Literature 1 discloses a malfunction occurrence attack detection circuit capable of detecting laser irradiation before a malfunction occurs due to laser irradiation and avoiding an attack.

Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2010-279003

By the way, an application installed in a secure element is generally constructed so as to call a function according to an instruction code and use the result of processing by the called function. However, there is concern that the result of processing by the function may be tampered with by an external attack. Therefore, a mechanism for checking such falsification more efficiently without requiring a complicated circuit is desired.

Therefore, the present invention provides an electronic information storage medium, an IC card, a tampering check method, and a program that can more efficiently check tampering due to external attacks without requiring a complicated circuit. is the subject.

In order to solve the above problems, the invention according to claim 1 is an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result. , a first storage unit for storing the processing result as first data to be checked for falsification, and a second storage unit for storing second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing. and a tampering check unit that performs tampering check using the first data and the second data.

The invention according to claim 2 is the electronic information storage medium according to claim 1, wherein the function is a first API ( Application Programming Interface).

The invention according to claim 3 is the electronic information storage medium according to claim 2, wherein the first data is a return value sent from the first API to the application, and the first data is used by the application. 1 storage unit, and the second data is stored in the second storage unit used by an operating system installed in the electronic information storage medium.

A fourth aspect of the present invention is the electronic information storage medium of the third aspect. A falsification check is performed using the first data and the second data.

The invention according to claim 5 is the electronic information storage medium according to claim 3, wherein in the processing by the second API that is called from the application and is different from the first API, from the second storage unit The second data is obtained, the second data is returned as a return value to the application, and in the processing by the application, the tampering check unit performs an tampering check using the first data and the second data. characterized by

The invention according to claim 6 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the second storage unit stores second data obtained when the processing is completed. and the tampering check unit performs the tampering check by determining whether or not the first data and the second data match.

The invention according to claim 7 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the second storage unit stores the second data obtained before the end of the process. data is stored, and the tampering check unit stores data from the time before the end of the process to the time until the end of the process, based on the second data obtained at the time before the end of the process. The tampering check is performed by calculating the third data by the processing to be performed in the first step, and determining whether or not the first data and the third data match.

The invention according to claim 8 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the tampering check unit is stored immediately in the first data and the second storage unit. A tampering check is performed using the second data that has been obtained.

The invention according to claim 9 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the second storage unit stores the second data according to the processing by each of the plurality of functions. are stored separately for each function, and the tampering check unit stores the first data and the second data stored in the second storage unit according to processing by a function designated from among the plurality of second data. A falsification check is performed using the second data.

According to a tenth aspect of the invention, there is provided an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, wherein the plurality of second APIs for checking include: Calling a second API according to the first processing result by the first API, executing processing by the called second API, and checking for tampering using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API and a tampering check unit that executes

According to an eleventh aspect of the invention, there is provided an IC card that calls a function in accordance with a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result, wherein the processing result is subject to falsification check. a first storage unit for storing as first data, a second storage unit for storing second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing, the first data and the second and a falsification check unit that performs falsification check using the two data.

According to a twelfth aspect of the invention, there is provided an IC card that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, wherein the first API out of a plurality of second APIs for checking call a second API according to the result of the first processing by the second API, execute processing by the called second API, and perform a tampering check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API. and a tampering check unit that

According to a thirteenth aspect of the invention, there is provided a falsification check method executed by a computer contained in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result. a step of storing the processing result in a first storage unit as first data to be checked for falsification; The method is characterized by comprising the step of storing in a second storage unit, and the step of performing a falsification check using the first data and the second data.

According to a fourteenth aspect of the invention, there is provided a tampering check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, the method comprising: a step of calling a second API corresponding to a first processing result by the first API among a plurality of second APIs to be used, and executing processing by the called second API; a first processing result by the first API; and a step of performing a tampering check using the second processing result by the second API.

In the fifteenth aspect of the invention, a function is called according to a predetermined instruction code, a process by the called function is executed, and a computer included in an electronic information storage medium storing the process result stores the process result, a step of storing in a first storage unit as first data to be checked for falsification; and a step of storing in a second storage unit second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing. , and performing a falsification check using the first data and the second data.

According to a sixteenth aspect of the invention, a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, among the plurality of second APIs for checking, , a step of calling a second API according to a first processing result by the first API and executing processing by the called second API; and a first processing result by the first API and a second processing result by the second API. and performing a tampering check using the

ADVANTAGE OF THE INVENTION According to this invention, the falsification by the attack from the outside can be checked more efficiently, without requiring a complicated circuit.

It is a figure which shows the hardware structural example of SE. It is a figure which shows the logical structural example of SE. It is a figure which shows an example of the memory map in SE. First data obtained as a result of processing by API(1) is stored in application memory area M1, and second data obtained when processing by API(1) is completed is stored in OS memory area M2. It is a conceptual diagram showing a state of First data obtained as a result of processing by API(1) is stored in application memory area M1, and second data obtained before the end of processing by API(1) is stored in OS memory area M2. FIG. 10 is a conceptual diagram showing how it is done. FIG. 10 is a diagram showing a list containing second data according to processing by each of a plurality of functions; 7 is a flowchart illustrating an example of processing by an application in Embodiment 1; 4 is a flowchart illustrating an example of processing by an OS in Embodiment 1; FIG. 11 is a flow chart showing an example of processing by an application according to the second embodiment; FIG. 10 is a flowchart illustrating an example of processing by an OS in Example 2; It is the figure which represented the processing content in a modification with the pseudo code.

BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. The embodiment described below is an embodiment in which the present invention is applied to a secure element (hereinafter referred to as "SE").

[1. Configuration and functions of SE]
First, with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2, the configuration and functions of an SE (an example of an electronic information storage medium of the present invention) according to this embodiment will be described. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a hardware configuration example of the SE, and FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a logical configuration example of the SE. As shown in FIG. 1, SE includes CPU (Central Processing Unit) 10, RAM (Random Access Memory) 11, ROM (Read Only Memory) 12, NVM (Nonvolatile Memory) 13 (nonvolatile memory), and I/O Circuit 14 and the like are provided. However, the ROM 12 may not be provided in some cases. Various programs and data are stored in the ROM 12 or NVM 13 . Accordingly, as shown in FIG. 2, the SE is loaded with applications, APIs (1) to (3), and an operating system (hereinafter referred to as "OS"). Although the example in FIG. 2 shows an example in which one application is installed, a plurality of applications may be installed.

The SE may be mounted on an IC card as an IC chip, or may be mounted on an embedded board as an eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card) so that it cannot be easily removed or replaced from the terminal (i.e. integrated with the terminal). may be formed). The I/O circuit 14 serves as an interface with an external device with which the SE communicates. Examples of interfaces include an ISO7816 interface, an SWP (Single Wire Protocol) interface, and an SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface). Examples of external devices include servers and terminals. The I/O circuitry 14 may include, for example, an antenna and modulation/demodulation circuitry.

An application is an instance that is created as an entity from a class that defines the behavior of an object, that is executed on an OS, and that includes a plurality of bytecodes (an example of instruction codes). Bytecode is intermediate code between source code and native code. When executing an application, the bytecode of the application is interpreted by a virtual machine (for example, Java (registered trademark) Virtual Machine) installed as a function of the OS (that is, what kind of instruction it is specified). Processing (processing by the application) is performed according to the received bytecode. Examples of instructions specified by bytecodes include write instructions, read instructions, logic operation instructions, conditional branch instructions, and function call instructions. An example of a bytecode indicating a function call instruction is INVOKEVIRTUAL, which can call an API (any of APIs (1)-(3)).

APIs (1) to (3) each consist of one or more functions (also called methods). The functions provided by APIs (1)-(3) (functions that assist applications) are different from each other. For example, API (1) is an example of the first API, and the processing result of API (1) is required to ensure security. An example of processing by API (1) is signature verification processing. For example, boolean verifyCert( ) is used as a function that configures API(1) in this case. Arguments (inputs) of boolean verifyCert are input (input data), inputLen (input data length), certificate (signature data), certLen (signature data length), and algo (signature (encryption calculation) algorithm). The result of signature verification by boolean verifyCert( ) (that is, the processing result as output) is true or false. Note that the processing result by API (1) is not limited to a boolean type value. Data such as FF'(h)) can be applied as long as it is data related to processing results. On the other hand, API(2) is an example of a second API, and is used for checking falsification of the processing result by API(1) (that is, the second API is for checking). Note that security is not required for processing results by API (3), so no tampering check is performed on the processing results.

The OS executes processing by the API called by the application (that is, processing by functions constituting the API), and responds to the application with the processing result as a return value. The returned value (processing result) thus responded is stored in the application memory area used by the application and used in the processing by the application. In particular, the result of processing by API (1) is stored in the application memory area as the first data to be checked for falsification.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of a memory map within the SE. As shown in FIG. 3, the SE includes an application memory area M1 (an example of a first storage section) used by applications and an OS memory area M2 (an example of a second storage section) used by the OS. , is secured in the RAM 11 or the NVM 13, for example. The application memory area M1 includes a stack area having a last-in first-out structure. Local variables, arguments, return values, etc. are written to the stack area in units of frames, and then retrieved in units of frames. The OS memory area M2 stores second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of processing by API(1). For example, the second data obtained when the processing by API(1) ends is stored in the OS memory area M2. Alternatively, the second data obtained before the end of processing by API(1) is stored in the OS memory area M2. Then, the tampering check is performed using the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the second data stored in the OS memory area M2.

In FIG. 4, the first data obtained as a result of processing by API(1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained when the processing by API(1) is completed is stored in the OS memory area. FIG. 4 is a conceptual diagram showing how data is stored in M2; In the example of FIG. 4, since the first data and the second data are data obtained at the same timing, they have the same value unless one of the data is tampered with by an external attack. Therefore, in this case, the tampering check is executed by determining whether or not the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the second data stored in the OS memory area M2 match. If the data and the second data do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. The possibility that the first data and the second data are tampered with the same value by an attack from the outside is extremely low. According to the configuration shown in FIG. 4, the processing time required for the falsification check can be further shortened.

On the other hand, in FIG. 5, the first data obtained as a result of processing by API(1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained before the end of processing by API(1) is stored in the application memory area M1. FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram showing how data is stored in an OS memory area M2; In the example of FIG. 5, the second data is data in the middle of processing by API (1) (in this example, the return value of function 2), so any one of the data must not be tampered with by an external attack. are not the same value. Therefore, in this case, based on the second data stored in the OS memory area M2 (that is, the second data obtained before the end of the processing by API (1)), the processing by API (1) The third data is calculated by the process (process α in the example of FIG. 5) to be performed from the point before the end of the process until the end of the process. Then, the tampering check is executed by determining whether the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the calculated third data match, and the first data and the third data are checked. If they do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. According to the configuration shown in FIG. 5, since the first data and the second data are stored at different timings and have different values, the first data and the second data can be tampered with to the same value by an external attack. It is possible to further reduce the possibility of being

By the way, as shown in FIGS. 4 and 5, it is preferable that the latest second data (one second data) is stored in the OS memory area M2 in which the second data is stored. That is, the second data is kept up-to-date by overwriting the second data already stored in the OS memory area M2 with the second data obtained by subsequent processing by API (1). As a result, the size (memory capacity) of the OS memory area M2 reserved for storing the second data can be reduced. The size of the OS memory area M2 may be determined according to the size of the second data obtained by processing by API (1). In this case, for example, the size of the OS memory area M2 when the cryptographic operation result is stored as the second data is larger than the size of the OS memory area M2 when the boolean type value is stored as the second data. .

Note that the second data used for the falsification check is acquired from the OS memory area M2, for example, in processing by API(2). For example, boolean checkResult() is used as a function that configures API(2) in this case. boolean checkResult( ) obtains the latest second data stored most recently from the OS memory area M2 (that is, stored by processing by the immediately preceding function), and can respond to the application as a return value. . In this case, the boolean checkResult() argument is not necessary (because the memory area where the second data is stored is fixed), and the second data obtained in the processing by API (2) is used as the return value. In response to the application, a tamper check is then performed using the first data and the second data in processing by the application. That is, in this case, the application performs the tampering check as the tampering check unit. As another example, in the processing by API (2), acquisition of the first data and the second data, falsification check using the first data and the second data are executed, and the falsification check result (for example, no data falsification ) may be returned to the application. In this case, the OS performs the tampering check as the tampering check unit.

Further, when the API (1) is composed of a plurality of functions, for example, second data (for example, the latest second data for each function) corresponding to processing by each of the plurality of functions shown in FIG. may be stored separately for each. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a list including second data according to processing by each of a plurality of functions. Such a list is stored in the OS memory area M2. In this case, it is necessary to specify the second data corresponding to the processing by which function to use as the second data used for the falsification check. For example, when using the boolean checkResult() described above, by specifying the function (or the address indicating the storage area of the second data according to the processing by the function) as an argument, the return value of the boolean checkResult() is specified. The second data corresponding to the processing by the function is responded to the application, and then the first data and the second data are used in the processing by the application to check for tampering. Thereby, security can be further improved. Also in this case, as in the other example described above, in the processing by the API (2), the acquisition of the first data and the second data and the tampering check using the first data and the second data are executed. A check result (eg, no data tampering) may be returned to the application.

[2. Operation of SE]
Next, the operation of the SE will be described separately for a first embodiment and a second embodiment.

(Example 1)
First, Example 1 of the operation of the SE will be described with reference to FIGS. 7 and 8. FIG. The first embodiment is an example in which an application checks for tampering. FIG. 7 is a flow chart showing an example of processing by an application in the first embodiment, and FIG. 8 is a flow chart showing an example of processing by an OS in the first embodiment.

The processing shown in FIG. 7 is started when the SE receives, for example, a command indicating an instruction to execute signature verification from an external device. When the process shown in FIG. 7 is started, the application calls API (1) in response to the command (step S1), and returns the result of processing by the called API (1) (that is, the first data). value, and stores the return value in the application memory area M1 (step S2). Next, the application calls API (2) (step S3), acquires the processing result (that is, second data) by the called API (2) as a return value, and stores the return value in application memory area M1. (step S4).

Next, the application performs a falsification check using the first data stored in step S2 and the second data stored in step S4 to determine whether or not data has been falsified (step S5). In the falsification check, for example, it is determined whether or not the first data and the second data match, and if the first data and the second data do not match, it is determined that the data has been falsified. Alternatively, in the falsification check, as described above, the third data is calculated from the second data, it is determined whether or not the first data and the third data match, and the first data and the third data are determined. If they do not match, it is determined that the data has been falsified.

If it is determined that data has been falsified (step S5: Yes), error processing is performed (step S6). In error processing, for example, the operation of the SE is stopped and an error response is output to the external device. On the other hand, if it is determined that the data has not been falsified (step S5: no), the application continues processing (step S7).

On the other hand, the processing shown in FIG. 8 is started when an API is called from an application. When the process shown in FIG. 8 is started, the OS determines whether the called API is the API (1) to be checked for tampering (verified) (step S11). If it is determined that the called API is API (1) (step S11: YES), the process proceeds to step S12. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (1) (step S11: NO), the process proceeds to step S15.

In step S12, the OS starts processing by API (1) called by the application. Next, the OS converts the second data obtained when the processing by API(1) ends or the second data obtained before the processing by API(1) ends to the OS Store in the memory area M2 (step S13). Next, the OS responds to the application with the result of processing by API (1) (that is, the first data) as a return value (step S14).

In step S15, the OS determines whether the called API is the tampering check API (2). If it is determined that the called API is API (2) (step S15: YES), the process proceeds to step S16. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (2) (step S15: NO), the process proceeds to step S19.

In step S16, the OS starts processing by API (2) called by the application. Then, the OS acquires the latest second data or the second data according to the processing by the specified function from the OS memory area M2 (step S17). Next, the OS responds to the application with the result of processing by API (2) (that is, second data) as a return value (step S18). On the other hand, in step S19, the OS executes processing by the called normal API (3), and responds to the application with the processing result as a return value (step S20).

(Example 2)
Next, Example 2 of the operation of the SE will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. FIG. The second embodiment is an example in which the OS checks for tampering. FIG. 9 is a flow chart showing an example of processing by an application in the second embodiment, and FIG. 10 is a flow chart showing an example of processing by an OS in the second embodiment.

The processing shown in FIG. 9 is started when the SE receives, for example, a command indicating an instruction to execute signature verification from an external device. When the process shown in FIG. 9 is started, the application calls API (1) in response to the command (step S21), and returns the result of processing by the called API (1) (that is, the first data). value, and stores the return value in the application memory area M1 (step S22). Next, the application calls API (2) (step S23), acquires the processing result (no data falsification) by the called API (2) as a return value (step S24), and continues processing (step S25). .

On the other hand, the processing shown in FIG. 10 is started when an API is called from an application. When the process shown in FIG. 10 is started, the OS determines whether the called API is the API (1) to be checked for tampering (step S31). If it is determined that the called API is API (1) (step S31: YES), the process proceeds to step S32. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (1) (step S31: NO), the process proceeds to step S35.

In step S32, the OS starts processing by API (1) called by the application. Next, the OS converts the second data obtained when the processing by API(1) ends or the second data obtained before the processing by API(1) ends to the OS Store in the memory area M2 (step S33). Next, the OS responds to the application with the result of processing by API (1) (that is, the first data) as a return value (step S34).

In step S35, the OS determines whether the called API is the tampering check API (2). If it is determined that the called API is API (2) (step S35: YES), the process proceeds to step S36. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (2) (step S35: NO), the process proceeds to step S42.

In step S36, the OS starts processing by API (2) called by the application. Then, the OS acquires the first data from the application memory area M1 (step S37). Next, the OS acquires the latest second data or the second data according to the processing by the designated function from the OS memory area M2 (step S38). Next, the OS performs a falsification check using the first data obtained in step S37 and the second data obtained in step S38 to determine whether or not data has been falsified (step S39). This falsification check is performed in the same manner as in step S5.

If it is determined that data has been falsified (step S39: Yes), error processing is performed (step S40). On the other hand, if it is determined that there is no data falsification (step S39: no), the result of processing by API (2) (that is, no data falsification) is returned as a return value to the application (step S41). In step S42, processing by the called normal API is executed, and the processing result is returned to the application as a return value (step S43).

As described above, according to the above embodiment, the SE stores in the application memory area M1 the result of processing by the function called according to the bytecode of the application as the first data to be checked for tampering. The second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of is stored in the OS memory area M2, and the falsification check is performed using the first data and the second data. It is possible to efficiently check for tampering due to an attack from a host without requiring a complicated circuit, and perform error processing when tampering is detected.

In particular, when APIs with general-purpose functions are used in processes that require security, there is concern that the processing results of the APIs may be tampered with by external attacks. Because it is fixed, it is difficult to implement additional security measures within the API. According to the above embodiment, the SE stores in the application memory area M1 the result of processing by API (1), which requires security assurance, as the first data to be checked for falsification, and the processing is started to end. Since the second data obtained at any timing up to is stored in the OS memory area M2 and the tampering check is performed using the first data and the second data, additional security measures are taken within the API. Even if it is difficult to perform the tampering, it is possible to more efficiently check for tampering due to an attack from the outside, and to perform error processing when tampering is detected.

Furthermore, according to the above-described embodiment, the tampering check of the processing result by API (1), which requires security assurance, is performed using another API (2), so the configuration is simpler. can implement the tampering check function in the SE.

(Modification)
In the above embodiment, an example in which the application memory area M1 for storing the processing result by API (1) is prepared has been described. can be configured to more efficiently check for tampering due to external attacks. In this case, the SE calls the API (1) according to the bytecode of the application, executes the processing by the called API (1), and executes the processing by the API (1) among the multiple APIs (2) for checking. calling API(2) according to the first processing result, executing processing by the called API(2), using the first processing result by API(1) and the second processing result by API(2); tamper check. In this tampering check, it is determined whether or not the first processing result and the second processing result match, and if the first processing result and the second processing result do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. As a result, error processing is performed as described above.

FIG. 11 is a diagram representing processing contents in the modified example in pseudo code. In the example of FIG. 11, the function that configures API (1) is verifyCert(), and the functions that configure multiple APIs for checking (2) are isTrue() and isFalse(), respectively. ing. The first processing result (true or false) by API (1) is held by the OS. Then, if the first processing result is true, the API (2) corresponding to true (in other words, the API (2) corresponding to true) isTrue() is called, and the process by the called isTrue() is executed, the immediately preceding processing result is obtained as the second processing result. Then, the first processing result of verifyCert() (that is, the first processing result held in the memory area managed by the OS) is compared with the second processing result of isTrue(), and if they match, It ends normally, but if it does not match, it ends abnormally. On the other hand, if the first processing result is false, isFalse(), which is API (2) corresponding to false, is called, and the processing by the called isFalse() is executed, so that the previous processing result is changed to the second Acquired as a processing result. Then, the first processing result of verifyCert() (that is, the first processing result held by the OS) and the second processing result of isFalse() are compared, and if they match, the processing ends normally. , and if they do not match, an abnormal end occurs. In addition, the modified example is another example where the first processing result and the second processing result are values that are distinguished by two or more values such as true/false (e.g., the same, larger, smaller, minus, plus, etc.) It is also applicable to

In the above embodiment, the present invention is applied to an SE equipped with a virtual machine that interprets bytecodes. is applicable.

10 CPUs
11 RAM
12 ROMs
13 NVM
14 I/O circuit

Claims (16)

An electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result,
a first storage unit that stores the processing result as first data to be checked for falsification;
a second storage unit that stores second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing;
a tampering check unit that performs a tampering check using the first data and the second data;
An electronic information storage medium comprising: 2. The electronic information storage according to claim 1, wherein said function is included in a first API (Application Programming Interface) called by said application according to said instruction code possessed by said application installed in said electronic information storage medium. medium. the first data is a return value returned from the first API to the application and is stored in the first storage unit used by the application;
3. The electronic information storage medium according to claim 2, wherein said second data is stored in said second storage unit used by an operating system installed in said electronic information storage medium. The tampering check unit performs an tampering check using the first data and the second data in processing by a second API that is called from the application and is different from the first API. 4. The electronic information storage medium according to claim 3. The second data is acquired from the second storage unit in a process by the second API that is called from the application and is different from the first API, and the second data is returned as a return value to the application. ,
4. The electronic information storage medium according to claim 3, wherein in the processing by the application, the tampering check section performs the tampering check using the first data and the second data. The second storage unit stores second data obtained when the processing is completed,
6. The tampering check unit according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the tampering check is performed by determining whether the first data and the second data match. electronic information storage media. The second storage unit stores second data obtained before the end of the process,
The tampering check unit performs processing to be performed from a time before the end of the process to a time before the end of the process, based on second data obtained at a time before the end of the process. 6. The tampering check is executed by calculating the third data by and determining whether or not the first data and the third data match. The electronic information storage medium described in . 8. The tampering check unit executes the tampering check using the first data and the second data stored most recently in the second storage unit. The electronic information storage medium described in . wherein the second storage unit stores the second data according to the processing by each of the plurality of functions separately for each function;
The tampering check unit performs an tampering check using the first data and the second data according to processing by a specified function from among the plurality of second data stored in the second storage unit. 8. The electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized by: An electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API,
Calling a second API according to a first processing result by the first API among a plurality of second APIs for checking, executing processing by the called second API,
a tampering check unit that performs a tampering check using a first processing result by the first API and a second processing result by the second API;
An electronic information storage medium comprising: An IC card that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result,
a first storage unit that stores the processing result as first data to be checked for falsification;
a second storage unit that stores second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing;
a tampering check unit that performs a tampering check using the first data and the second data;
An IC card comprising: An IC card that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API,
Calling a second API according to a first processing result by the first API among a plurality of second APIs for checking, executing processing by the called second API,
a tampering check unit that performs a tampering check using a first processing result by the first API and a second processing result by the second API;
An IC card comprising: A tampering check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result,
a step of storing the processing result in a first storage unit as first data to be checked for falsification;
a step of storing second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process in a second storage unit;
performing a tampering check using the first data and the second data;
A tampering check method characterized by comprising: A tampering check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API,
a step of calling a second API according to a first processing result by the first API among a plurality of second APIs for checking, and executing processing by the called second API;
performing a tampering check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API;
A tampering check method comprising: A computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result,
a step of storing the processing result in a first storage unit as first data to be checked for falsification;
a step of storing second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process in a second storage unit;
performing a tampering check using the first data and the second data;
A program characterized by causing the execution of A computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API,
a step of calling a second API according to a first processing result by the first API among a plurality of second APIs for checking, and executing processing by the called second API;
performing a tampering check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API;
A program characterized by causing the execution of

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