JP2020135265A - Electronic information storage media, ic card, falsification check method, and program - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide an electronic information storage media capable of more efficiently checking falsification by an external attack without requiring a complicated circuit, an IC card, a falsification check method, and a program.SOLUTION: A secure element stores processing results by a function called according to a byte code owned by an application in an application memory area M1 as first data subjected to falsification check. Second data obtained at any timing from a start to an end of the processing is stored in an OS memory area M2. The falsification check is executed using the first data and the second data.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 4

Description

The present invention relates to the technical field of a secure element such as an IC card capable of detecting falsification due to an attack from the outside.

Secure elements, where security is important, need to be equipped with preventive measures against unauthorized operations due to attacks from the outside. An attack from the outside is a method for causing a malfunction of a secure element, and DFA (Differential Fault Analysis) is known as a typical attack method. In this attack method, for example, an attacker can obtain information inside the secure element by analyzing the erroneous calculation result output by irradiating the secure element with a laser and comparing it with the correct calculation result. It has become. Patent Document 1 discloses a malfunction occurrence attack detection circuit capable of detecting laser irradiation before a malfunction occurs due to laser irradiation and avoiding an attack.

JP-A-2010-279003

By the way, an application mounted on a secure element is generally constructed so as to call a function according to an instruction code and use the result of processing by the called function. However, there is a concern that the result of processing by the function may be falsified by an external attack. Therefore, a mechanism for more efficiently checking such tampering without requiring a complicated circuit is desired.

Therefore, the present invention provides an electronic information storage medium, an IC card, a falsification check method, and a program capable of more efficiently checking falsification due to an attack from the outside without requiring a complicated circuit. Is the subject.

In order to solve the above problems, the invention according to claim 1 is an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result. , A first storage unit that stores the processing result as the first data to be tampered with, and a second storage that stores the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing. It is characterized by including a unit and a tampering check unit that executes a tampering check using the first data and the second data.

The invention according to claim 2 is the first API (in the electronic information storage medium according to claim 1, wherein the function is called from the application according to the instruction code of the application mounted on the electronic information storage medium. It is characterized by being included in the Application Programming Interface).

The invention according to claim 3 is the electronic information storage medium according to claim 2, wherein the first data is a return value in response to the application from the first API, and the first data is used by the application. It is stored in one storage unit, and the second data is stored in the second storage unit used by the operating system mounted on the electronic information storage medium.

According to the fourth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic information storage medium according to the third aspect, in the processing by the second API, which is the second API called from the application and is different from the first API, the falsification check unit is used. It is characterized in that a falsification check is executed using the first data and the second data.

The invention according to claim 5 is the second API called from the application in the electronic information storage medium according to claim 3, and is different from the first API in the processing by the second storage unit from the second storage unit. The second data is acquired, the second data is responded to the application as a return value, and in the processing by the application, the falsification check unit executes a falsification check using the first data and the second data. It is characterized by doing.

The invention according to claim 6 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the second storage unit is the second data obtained at the time when the processing is completed. The tampering check unit is characterized in that the tampering check is executed by determining whether or not the first data and the second data match.

The invention according to claim 7 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the second storage unit is obtained at a time before the end of the process. The tampering check unit stores data, and based on the second data obtained at the time before the end of the process, from the time before the end of the process to the time when the end of the process is reached. It is characterized in that the tampering check is executed by calculating the third data by the processing to be performed in 1 and determining whether or not the first data and the third data match.

The invention according to claim 8 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the falsification check unit is most recently stored in the first data and the second storage unit. It is characterized in that a falsification check is executed using the second data.

The invention according to claim 9 is the electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the second storage unit is the second data corresponding to processing by each of the plurality of the functions. Is stored separately for each of the functions, and the tampering check unit responds to processing by a function specified from the first data and a plurality of the second data stored by the second storage unit. It is characterized in that a tampering check is executed using the second data.

The invention according to claim 10 is an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, and among a plurality of second APIs for checking, the said invention. The second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API is called, the processing by the called second API is executed, and the falsification check is performed using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API. It is characterized by having a falsification check unit for executing the above.

The invention according to claim 11 is an IC card that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result, and the processing result is subject to tampering check. A first storage unit that stores the first data, a second storage unit that stores the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process, the first data, and the first data. 2 It is characterized by including a tampering check unit that executes a tampering check using data.

The invention according to claim 12 is an IC card that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API, and is the first API among a plurality of second APIs for checking. The second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API is called, the processing by the called second API is executed, and the tampering check is executed using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API. It is characterized by being provided with a tampering check unit.

The invention according to claim 13 is a tampering check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result. The step of storing the processing result in the first storage unit as the first data to be tampered with, and the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing. It is characterized by including a step of storing in the second storage unit and a step of executing a tampering check using the first data and the second data.

The invention according to claim 14 is a falsification check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API. Of the plurality of second APIs to be used, a step of calling the second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API and executing the processing by the called second API, the first processing result by the first API, and the above. It is characterized by including a step of executing a falsification check using the second processing result by the second API.

The invention according to claim 15 calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and transmits the processing result to a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that stores the processing result. A step of storing in the first storage unit as the first data to be tamper-checked, and a step of storing the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process in the second storage unit. , The step of executing the tampering check using the first data and the second data, and the step of executing the tampering check.

The invention according to claim 16 is among a plurality of second APIs for checking the computer included in the electronic information storage medium that calls the first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes the processing by the called first API. , The step of calling the second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API and executing the processing by the called second API, the first processing result by the first API, and the second processing result by the second API. It is characterized in that it executes a step of executing a tampering check by using it.

According to the present invention, falsification due to an attack from the outside can be checked more efficiently without requiring a complicated circuit.

It is a figure which shows the hardware configuration example of SE. It is a figure which shows the logical structure example of SE. It is a figure which shows an example of the memory map in SE. The first data obtained as a result of processing by API (1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained when the processing by API (1) is completed is stored in the OS memory area M2. It is a conceptual diagram which shows the state. The first data obtained as a result of processing by API (1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained before the end of processing by API (1) is stored in the OS memory area M2. It is a conceptual diagram which shows the state of being done. It is a figure which shows the list which contains the 2nd data corresponding to the processing by each of a plurality of functions. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the processing by an application in Example 1. FIG. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the processing by an OS in Example 1. FIG. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the processing by the application in Example 2. It is a flowchart which shows an example of the processing by the OS in Example 2. It is the figure which represented the processing content in the modification by pseudo code.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. The embodiment described below is an embodiment when the present invention is applied to a secure element (hereinafter referred to as “SE”).

[1. SE configuration and function]
First, the configuration and function of SE (an example of the electronic information storage medium of the present invention) according to the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a hardware configuration example of SE, and FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a logical configuration example of SE. As shown in FIG. 1, the SE includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 10, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 11, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 12, an NVM (Nonvolatile Memory) 13 (nonvolatile memory), and an I / O. A circuit 14 and the like are provided. However, the ROM 12 may not be provided. Various programs and data are stored in the ROM 12 or the NVM 13. As a result, as shown in FIG. 2, the SE is equipped with the application, APIs (1) to (3), and an operating system (hereinafter referred to as "OS"). In the example of FIG. 2, one application is installed, but a plurality of applications may be installed.

The SE may be mounted on an IC card as an IC chip, or mounted on an embedded board as an eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card) so that it cannot be easily removed or replaced from the terminal (that is, integrated with the terminal). It may be formed in). The I / O circuit 14 serves as an interface with an external device that is a communication partner of the SE. Examples of the interface include an ISO7816 interface, a SWP (Single Wire Protocol) interface, and an SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface). Examples of external devices include servers and terminals. The I / O circuit 14 may include, for example, an antenna and a modulation / demodulation circuit.

An application is an instance created as an entity from a class that defines the behavior of an object and executed on the OS, and is configured to include a plurality of byte codes (examples of instruction codes). Bytecode is an intermediate code between source code and native code. In the execution of an application, the bytecode of the application is interpreted (that is, what kind of instruction is specified) and interpreted by a virtual machine (for example, Java (registered trademark) Virtual Machine) installed as a function of the OS. Processing (processing by the application) is performed according to the bytecode. Examples of instructions specified by bytecode include write instructions, read instructions, logical operation instructions, conditional branch instructions, function call instructions, and the like. INVOKE VIRTUAL is an example of a bytecode indicating a function call instruction, which can call an API (any of APIs (1) to (3)).

APIs (1) to (3) are each composed of one or more functions (also referred to as methods). The functions (functions that assist the application) provided by APIs (1) to (3) are different from each other. For example, API (1) is an example of the first API, and the processing result by the API (1) is required to ensure security. An example of processing by API (1) is signature verification processing. For example, boolean verifyCert () is used as a function constituting API (1) in this case. The arguments (input) of boolean verifyCert are input (input data), inputLen (input data length), certificate (signature data), certLen (signature data length), and algo (signature (cryptographic operation) algorithm). The signature verification result (that is, the processing result as output) by boolean verifyCert () is true (true) or false (false). The processing result by API (1) is not limited to the boolean type value, and is, for example, a comparison result (for example, a value indicating match or disagreement) or a cryptographic operation result (for example, '11 22 33 ... Any data related to the processing result, such as (data such as FF'(h)), can be applied. On the other hand, the API (2) is an example of the second API, and is used for checking the falsification of the processing result by the API (1) (that is, the second API is for checking). Since security is not required for the processing result by API (3), the falsification check of the processing result is not performed.

The OS executes the processing by the API called by the application (that is, the processing by the functions constituting the API), and responds to the application with the processing result as a return value. The return value (processing result) returned in this way is stored in the application memory area used by the application and used in the processing by the application. In particular, the processing result by API (1) is stored in the application memory area as the first data to be checked for falsification.

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of a memory map in the SE. As shown in FIG. 3, the application memory area M1 (an example of the first storage unit) used by the application and the OS memory area M2 (an example of the second storage unit) used by the OS are contained in the SE. For example, it is secured in RAM 11 or NVM 13. The application memory area M1 is configured to include a stack area having a back-in first-out structure. Local variables, arguments, return values, etc. are written in the stack area in frame units, and then acquired in frame units. The OS memory area M2 stores the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the processing by the API (1). For example, the second data obtained when the processing by the API (1) is completed is stored in the OS memory area M2. Alternatively, the second data obtained at a time before the end of the processing by the API (1) is stored in the OS memory area M2. Then, the falsification check is executed using the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the second data stored in the OS memory area M2.

In FIG. 4, the first data obtained as a result of processing by API (1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained when the processing by API (1) is completed is the OS memory area. It is a conceptual diagram which shows the state which is stored in M2. In the example of FIG. 4, since the first data and the second data are data obtained at the same timing, they have the same value unless one of the data is falsified by an attack from the outside. Therefore, in this case, the falsification check is executed by determining whether or not the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the second data stored in the OS memory area M2 match, and the first If the data and the second data do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. It is extremely unlikely that the first data and the second data will be tampered with to the same value by an attack from the outside. According to the configuration shown in FIG. 4, the processing time required for the falsification check can be further shortened.

On the other hand, in FIG. 5, the first data obtained as a result of processing by API (1) is stored in the application memory area M1, and the second data obtained before the end of processing by API (1) is obtained. It is a conceptual diagram which shows the state of being stored in the OS memory area M2. In the example of FIG. 5, since the second data is the data in the middle of processing by API (1) (in this example, the return value of the function 2), one of the data is not tampered with by an external attack. Do not have the same value. Therefore, in this case, the processing by the API (1) is based on the second data stored in the OS memory area M2 (that is, the second data obtained before the end of the processing by the API (1)). The third data is calculated by the process (process α in the example of FIG. 5) that should be performed from the point before the end of the process to the time when the process ends. Then, a falsification check is executed by determining whether or not the first data stored in the application memory area M1 and the calculated third data match, and the first data and the third data are combined. If they do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. According to the configuration shown in FIG. 5, since the first data and the second data are stored at different timings and have different values, the first data and the second data are falsified to the same value by an attack from the outside. The possibility of being done can be further reduced.

By the way, as shown in FIGS. 4 and 5, it is preferable that the latest second data (second data for one time) is stored in the OS memory area M2 in which the second data is stored. That is, the second data already stored in the OS memory area M2 is overwritten by the second data obtained in the subsequent processing by the API (1), so that the second data is kept up to date. As a result, the size (memory capacity) of the OS memory area M2 reserved for storing the second data can be reduced. The size of the OS memory area M2 may be determined according to the size of the second data obtained by the processing by API (1). In this case, for example, the size of the OS memory area M2 when the cryptographic operation result is stored as the second data is larger than the size of the OS memory area M2 when the boolean type value is stored as the second data. ..

The second data used for the falsification check is acquired from the OS memory area M2 in the processing by the API (2), for example. For example, boolean checkResult () is used as a function constituting API (2) in this case. boolean checkResult () can acquire the latest second data stored most recently (that is, stored in the process by the previous function) from the OS memory area M2, and can respond to the application using this as the return value. .. In this case, the argument of boolean checkResult () is not necessary (because the memory area where the second data is stored is fixed), and the second data acquired in the processing by API (2) is used as the return value. After responding to the application, the tampering check is executed using the first data and the second data in the processing by the application. That is, in this case, the application performs a tampering check as a tampering check unit. As another example, in the processing by API (2), the acquisition of the first data and the second data and the falsification check using the first data and the second data are executed, and the falsification check result (for example, no data falsification) is executed. ) May be responded to by the application. In this case, the OS performs a falsification check as a falsification check unit.

When the API (1) is composed of a plurality of functions, for example, the second data corresponding to the processing by each of the plurality of functions shown in FIG. 5 (for example, the latest second data for each function) is a function. It may be distinguished and stored for each. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a list including the second data corresponding to the processing by each of the plurality of functions. Such a list will be stored in the OS memory area M2. In this case, it is necessary to specify which function is used as the second data to be used for the falsification check. For example, when the above-mentioned boolean checkResult () is used, it is specified as the return value of boolean checkResult () by specifying the function (or the address indicating the storage area of the second data according to the processing by the function) by the argument. The second data corresponding to the processing by the function is returned to the application, and then the falsification check is executed by using the first data and the second data in the processing by the application. As a result, security can be further improved. In this case as well, as in the other example described above, in the processing by API (2), the acquisition of the first data and the second data and the falsification check using the first data and the second data are executed, and the falsification is performed. The check result (for example, no data tampering) may be returned to the application.

[2. SE operation]
Next, the operation of SE will be described separately for Example 1 and Example 2.

(Example 1)
First, the first embodiment of the SE operation will be described with reference to FIGS. 7 and 8. The first embodiment is an example in which the application performs a tampering check. FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing an example of processing by the application in the first embodiment, and FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing by the OS in the first embodiment.

The process shown in FIG. 7 is started when the SE receives, for example, a command indicating an execution command for signature verification from an external device. When the process shown in FIG. 7 is started, the application calls the API (1) in response to the above command (step S1), and returns the processing result (that is, the first data) by the called API (1). It is acquired as a value and the return value is stored in the application memory area M1 (step S2). Next, the application calls the API (2) (step S3), acquires the processing result (that is, the second data) by the called API (2) as a return value, and stores the return value in the application memory area M1. (Step S4).

Next, the application executes a falsification check using the first data stored in step S2 and the second data stored in step S4 to determine whether or not the data has been tampered with (step S5). In the falsification check, for example, it is determined whether or not the first data and the second data match, and if the first data and the second data do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. Alternatively, in the falsification check, as described above, the third data is calculated from the second data, it is determined whether or not the first data and the third data match, and the first data and the third data are combined. If they do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with.

Then, when it is determined that the data has been tampered with (step S5: yes), error processing is performed (step S6). In the error processing, for example, the SE operation is stopped and an error response is output to the external device. On the other hand, when it is determined that the data has not been tampered with (step S5: none), the processing by the application is continued (step S7).

On the other hand, the process shown in FIG. 8 is started when the application calls the API. When the process shown in FIG. 8 is started, the OS determines whether or not the called API is the API (1) of the falsification check target (verification target) (step S11). If it is determined that the called API is API (1) (step S11: YES), the process proceeds to step S12. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (1) (step S11: NO), the process proceeds to step S15.

In step S12, the OS starts processing by API (1) called by the application. Next, the OS uses the second data obtained at the time when the processing by API (1) is completed, or the second data obtained at the time before the processing by API (1) is completed. It is stored in the memory area M2 (step S13). Next, the OS responds to the application with the processing result (that is, the first data) by the API (1) as a return value (step S14).

In step S15, the OS determines whether or not the called API is the API (2) for tampering check. If it is determined that the called API is API (2) (step S15: YES), the process proceeds to step S16. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (2) (step S15: NO), the process proceeds to step S19.

In step S16, the OS starts processing by the API (2) called by the application. Then, the OS acquires the latest second data from the OS memory area M2 or the second data corresponding to the processing by the designated function (step S17). Next, the OS responds to the application with the processing result (that is, the second data) by the API (2) as a return value (step S18). On the other hand, in step S19, the OS executes the processing by the normal API (3) that has been called, and responds to the application with the processing result as a return value (step S20).

(Example 2)
Next, the second embodiment of the SE operation will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. The second embodiment is an example in which the OS performs a tampering check. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of processing by the application in the second embodiment, and FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing by the OS in the second embodiment.

The process shown in FIG. 9 is started when the SE receives, for example, a command indicating an execution command for signature verification from an external device. When the process shown in FIG. 9 is started, the application calls the API (1) in response to the above command (step S21), and returns the processing result (that is, the first data) by the called API (1). It is acquired as a value and the return value is stored in the application memory area M1 (step S22). Next, the application calls the API (2) (step S23), acquires the processing result (no data tampering) by the called API (2) as a return value (step S24), and continues the processing (step S25). ..

On the other hand, the process shown in FIG. 10 is started when the application calls the API. When the process shown in FIG. 10 is started, the OS determines whether or not the called API is the API (1) to be tampered with (step S31). If it is determined that the called API is API (1) (step S31: YES), the process proceeds to step S32. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (1) (step S31: NO), the process proceeds to step S35.

In step S32, the OS starts processing by the API (1) called by the application. Next, the OS uses the second data obtained at the time when the processing by API (1) is completed, or the second data obtained at the time before the processing by API (1) is completed. It is stored in the memory area M2 (step S33). Next, the OS responds to the application with the processing result (that is, the first data) by the API (1) as a return value (step S34).

In step S35, the OS determines whether or not the called API is the API (2) for tampering check. If it is determined that the called API is API (2) (step S35: YES), the process proceeds to step S36. On the other hand, if it is determined that the called API is not API (2) (step S35: NO), the process proceeds to step S42.

In step S36, the OS starts processing by the API (2) called by the application. Then, the OS acquires the first data from the application memory area M1 (step S37). Next, the OS acquires the latest second data from the OS memory area M2 or the second data according to the processing by the designated function (step S38). Next, the OS executes a falsification check using the first data acquired in step S37 and the second data acquired in step S38 to determine the presence or absence of data tampering (step S39). In this falsification check, the process is performed in the same manner as in step S5.

Then, when it is determined that the data has been tampered with (step S39: yes), error processing is performed (step S40). On the other hand, when it is determined that there is no data tampering (step S39: none), the processing result by API (2) (that is, no data tampering) is returned to the application as a return value (step S41). In step S42, the processing by the normal API that was called is executed, and the processing result is returned to the application as a return value (step S43).

As described above, according to the above embodiment, the SE stores the processing result by the function called according to the byte code of the application in the application memory area M1 as the first data to be tampered with, and the processing is performed. The second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of is stored in the OS memory area M2, and the falsification check is executed using the first data and the second data. It is possible to check tampering due to an attack from the user more efficiently without the need for a complicated circuit, and to perform error processing when tampering is detected.

In particular, when an API that has a general-purpose function is used in processing that requires security, there is a concern that the processing result by the API may be falsified by an attack from the outside, but the API specifications are Since it is fixed, it is difficult to take additional security measures within the API. According to the above embodiment, the SE stores the processing result by the API (1), which is required to ensure security, in the application memory area M1 as the first data to be tampered with, and goes from the start to the end of the processing. Since the second data obtained at any of the timings up to is stored in the OS memory area M2 and the falsification check is executed using the first data and the second data, additional security measures are taken in the API. Even if it is difficult to perform the above, it is possible to more efficiently check the falsification caused by an external attack and perform error processing when the falsification is detected.

Further, according to the above embodiment, the falsification check of the processing result by the API (1), which is required to ensure the security, is executed by using another API (2), so that the configuration is simpler. The tampering check function can be implemented in SE.

(Modification example)
In the above embodiment, an example in which the application memory area M1 for storing the processing result by the API (1) is prepared has been described, but according to the modification described below, such an application memory area M1 It can also be configured to more efficiently check for tampering due to external attacks without having to prepare. In this case, the SE calls the API (1) according to the byte code of the application, executes the process by the called API (1), and uses the API (1) among the plurality of APIs (2) to be checked. The API (2) according to the first processing result is called, the processing by the called API (2) is executed, and the first processing result by the API (1) and the second processing result by the API (2) are used. And execute a tampering check. In this falsification check, it is determined whether or not the first processing result and the second processing result match, and if the first processing result and the second processing result do not match, it is determined that the data has been tampered with. As a result, error processing is performed as described above.

FIG. 11 is a diagram showing the processing contents in the modified example with pseudo code. In the example of FIG. 11, the functions constituting API (1) are verifyCert (), and the functions constituting a plurality of APIs (2) to be checked are isTrue () and isFalse (), respectively. ing. The first processing result (true or false) by API (1) is held by the OS. Then, if the first processing result is true, isTrue (), which is API (2) corresponding to true (in other words, API (2) corresponding to true) is called, and the processing by the called isTrue () is performed. Is executed, the immediately preceding processing result is acquired as the second processing result. Then, the first processing result by verifyCert () (that is, the first processing result held in the memory area managed by the OS) is compared with the second processing result by isTrue (), and if they match. It ends normally, but if they do not match, it ends abnormally. On the other hand, if the first processing result is false, isFalse (), which is API (2) corresponding to false, is called, and the processing by the called isFalse () is executed, so that the immediately preceding processing result is the second. Obtained as a processing result. Then, the first processing result by verifyCert () (that is, the first processing result held by the OS) is compared with the second processing result by isFalse (), and if they match, the process ends normally. If they do not match, the process ends abnormally. In addition, the modified example is another example in which the first processing result and the second processing result are values that can be distinguished by two or more values (for example, same, large, small, minus, plus, etc.) such as true / false. It is also applicable to.

In the above embodiment, the present invention is applied to an SE equipped with a virtual machine that interprets a bytecode, but the present invention is also applied to an SE capable of executing an instruction code other than a bytecode. Is applicable.

10 CPU
11 RAM
12 ROM
13 NVM
14 I / O circuit

Claims (16)

An electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result.
A first storage unit that stores the processing result as the first data to be checked for falsification, and
A second storage unit that stores the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process, and
A falsification check unit that executes a falsification check using the first data and the second data, and
An electronic information storage medium characterized by comprising. The electronic information storage according to claim 1, wherein the function is included in a first API (Application Programming Interface) called from the application according to the instruction code of the application mounted on the electronic information storage medium. Medium. The first data is a return value in response to the application from the first API, and is stored in the first storage unit used by the application.
The electronic information storage medium according to claim 2, wherein the second data is stored in the second storage unit used by an operating system mounted on the electronic information storage medium. In the processing by the second API, which is the second API called from the application and is different from the first API, the falsification check unit is characterized in that the falsification check is executed using the first data and the second data. The electronic information storage medium according to claim 3. In the processing by the second API, which is the second API called from the application and is different from the first API, the second data is acquired from the second storage unit, and the second data is returned to the application as a return value. ,
The electronic information storage medium according to claim 3, wherein the falsification check unit executes a falsification check using the first data and the second data in the processing by the application. The second storage unit stores the second data obtained at the time when the processing is completed, and stores the second data.
The falsification check unit according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the falsification check unit executes the falsification check by determining whether or not the first data and the second data match. Electronic information storage medium. The second storage unit stores the second data obtained at a time before the end of the process, and stores the second data.
The falsification check unit is a process to be performed from a time before the end of the process to a time when the process is completed, based on the second data obtained at the time before the end of the process. Any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the falsification check is executed by calculating the third data according to the above method and determining whether or not the first data and the third data match. The electronic information storage medium described in. Any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the falsification check unit executes a falsification check using the first data and the second data most recently stored in the second storage unit. The electronic information storage medium described in. The second storage unit separately stores the second data corresponding to the processing by each of the plurality of functions for each function, and stores the second data.
The tampering check unit executes a tampering check using the first data and the second data corresponding to the processing by the designated function from the plurality of the second data stored by the second storage unit. The electronic information storage medium according to any one of claims 1 to 7, wherein the electronic information storage medium is characterized by the above. An electronic information storage medium that calls the first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API.
Of the plurality of second APIs to be checked, the second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API is called, and the processing by the called second API is executed.
A falsification check unit that executes a falsification check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API.
An electronic information storage medium characterized by comprising. An IC card that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result.
A first storage unit that stores the processing result as the first data to be checked for falsification, and
A second storage unit that stores the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process, and
A falsification check unit that executes a falsification check using the first data and the second data, and
An IC card characterized by being equipped with. An IC card that calls the first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes processing by the called first API.
Of the plurality of second APIs to be checked, the second API corresponding to the first processing result by the first API is called, and the processing by the called second API is executed.
A falsification check unit that executes a falsification check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API.
An IC card characterized by being equipped with. It is a falsification check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result.
A step of storing the processing result in the first storage unit as the first data to be tampered with,
A step of storing the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process in the second storage unit, and
A step of executing a tampering check using the first data and the second data, and
A tampering check method characterized by including. It is a falsification check method executed by a computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls the first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes the processing by the called first API.
Of the plurality of second APIs to be checked, a step of calling the second API according to the first processing result of the first API and executing the processing by the called second API.
A step of executing a tampering check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API, and
A tampering check method characterized by being equipped with. A computer included in an electronic information storage medium that calls a function according to a predetermined instruction code, executes processing by the called function, and stores the processing result.
A step of storing the processing result in the first storage unit as the first data to be tampered with,
A step of storing the second data obtained at any timing from the start to the end of the process in the second storage unit, and
A step of executing a tampering check using the first data and the second data, and
A program characterized by executing. To the computer included in the electronic information storage medium that calls the first API according to a predetermined instruction code and executes the processing by the called first API.
Of the plurality of second APIs for checking, a step of calling the second API according to the first processing result of the first API and executing the processing by the called second API
A step of executing a tampering check using the first processing result by the first API and the second processing result by the second API, and
A program characterized by executing.

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