JP5912281B2 - Decryption result verification apparatus, method, system, and program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a computer calculation technique. In particular, the present invention relates to a technique for performing calculations using calculation results obtained by other computers.

  The following techniques for determining whether or not the calculation result of the decoding performed by the decoding apparatus is correct using the confirmation information Q (m) such as the parity bit can be considered. For the parity bit, see Non-Patent Document 1, for example.

  The requesting device obtains ciphertext E (m || Q (m)) in which m || Q (m) obtained by bit-combining confirmation information Q (m) such as parity bits with the message m is plaintext. Decoding is performed using the calculation result to be performed by the decoding device. Here, Q (m) is, for example, an even parity bit. That is, 0 is output when the number of 1 bits out of the bits constituting Q (m) is an even number, and 1 is output when the number is odd.

  First, the requesting device transmits the ciphertext E (m || Q (m)) to the decrypting device.

  The decryption device decrypts the received ciphertext E (m || Q (m)) and transmits the calculation result m || Q (m) to the requesting device.

  The requesting device separates the received calculation result m || Q (m) into a message m and confirmation information Q (m). The requesting device determines whether the separated confirmation information Q (m) matches the confirmation information Q (m) generated from the separated message m.

  If they match, it can be determined that the received calculation result m || Q (m) is correct, and the separated message m is set as a correctly decoded message m.

  If they do not match, it can be determined that the received calculation result m || Q (m) is not correct, and it is assumed that the separated message m is not a correctly decoded message m.

  As a result, when the calculation result m || Q (m) of the decoding device includes an accidental error, the requesting device can detect the error with a certain probability.

Edited by Makoto Nagao (7 outside), “Iwanami Information Science Dictionary”, 1st edition, Iwanami Shoten, May 25, 1995, p. 592

  In the technology described in the background art, the message m added with the confirmation information Q (m) is the object of encryption, and the generated ciphertext is compared with the case where only the message m is the object of encryption. The length can be longer.

  An object of the present invention is to provide a decryption result verification apparatus, method, system, and program capable of verifying whether or not the decryption apparatus has correctly performed calculation for decryption while the object of encryption is the message m. .

The decryption result verification apparatus according to an aspect of the present invention generates a ciphertext by encrypting only a message m using h as a hash function and E (m, r) as an integer r, and generates a message m from the generated ciphertext. It is possible to decrypt the ciphertext c received with the decryption function D corresponding to the encryption function E, with E (m, h (m)) as the ciphertext c, There is a transmitting unit that transmits the decoding result m ′ to the decoding device, a receiving unit that receives the decoding result m ′ from the decoding device, and verification information E (m ′, h (m ′) using the decoding result m ′. )) And a determination unit that determines whether the ciphertext c and the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) match.

  By using the hash value h (m) of the message m as an integer used by the encryption function, it is possible to verify whether or not the decryption apparatus has correctly performed the calculation for decryption while the message m is the encryption target. it can.

The block diagram for demonstrating the structure of the decoding result verification apparatus of embodiment. The flowchart for demonstrating the process of the decoding result verification apparatus of embodiment. The figure for demonstrating the outline | summary of the algorithm of embodiment. The figure for demonstrating the outline | summary of the example of the algorithm using a Pillar encryption. The figure for demonstrating the outline | summary of the example of the algorithm using ElGamal encryption.

  An embodiment of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

[Definition of symbols]
First, symbols are defined as follows.
m is a message.
E (m, r) is an encryption function that encrypts the message m using the integer r to generate a ciphertext and does not leak the information of the message m from the generated ciphertext. r is, for example, a random number. For example, let E (m, r) be an encryption function of probabilistic public key cryptography described by a probabilistic algorithm. For E (m, r), a predetermined integer r may be used as the initial value of the random number. A specific example of the encryption function E (m, r) will be described later.

For example, h is a secure hash function such as SHA-256 that can be regarded as a random function.
c = E (m, h (m)) is a ciphertext.

  D is a decryption function in the public key cryptosystem corresponding to E. That is, D (E (m)) = m for an arbitrary message m.

[Embodiment]
The decryption result verification device 1 (FIG. 1) according to an embodiment of the present invention decrypts the ciphertext c using the result of a predetermined calculation performed by the decryption device 2. At that time, the decryption result verification apparatus 1 can verify whether the calculation result of the decryption apparatus 2 is correctly performed. It is also possible to verify whether or not the decryption device 2 has modified the message m.

  As illustrated in FIG. 1, the decoding result verification apparatus 1 includes a transmission unit 11, a reception unit 12, a verification information generation unit 13, a determination unit 14, and an output unit 15, for example. An outline of the algorithm of this embodiment is shown in FIG.

  The ciphertext c = E (m, h (m)) is generated by the encryption device 0 (step e1, FIG. 2) and transmitted to the decryption result verification device 1.

  The transmission unit 11 of the decryption result verification device 1 transmits the ciphertext c to the decryption device 2 (step v1).

  The decryption device 2 can decrypt the received ciphertext c with the decryption function D, and outputs the decryption result m '(step d1). When the decoding device 2 correctly calculates, the decoding result m ′ = m. However, the decoding device 2 does not have to calculate correctly. As a result, a decoding result m ′ in which the decoding result m ′ ≠ m may be transmitted to the decoding result verification apparatus 1.

  The receiving unit 12 of the decoding result verification device 1 receives the decoding result m ′ from the decoding device 2 (step v2). The received decryption result m ′ is transmitted to the verification information generation unit 13.

  The verification information generation unit 13 of the decoding result verification apparatus 1 calculates the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) using the decoding result m ′ (step v3). The calculated verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) is transmitted to the determination unit 14.

  The determination unit 14 determines whether the ciphertext c matches the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) (step v4). The determination result is transmitted to the output unit 15.

  If they match, it can be determined that the calculation result of the decoding device 2 is correct and the decoding result m 'is m (step v5).

  If they do not match, the calculation result of the decoding device 2 is not correct, and it can be determined that the decoding result m 'is not m (step v6).

  From the definition of E (m, r), the information of the message m is not leaked from the generated ciphertext c. For this reason, the decryption apparatus 2 cannot generate a decryption result m ′ that is not m ′ = m so that the ciphertext c matches the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)). For this reason, it can be judged as described above.

  When it is possible to determine that the decoding result m ′ is m, the output unit 15 of the decoding result verification apparatus 1 outputs the decoding result m ′ as m.

  In this way, by using the hash value h (m) of the message m as an integer used by the encryption function E, whether or not the decryption apparatus has correctly performed the calculation for decryption while the object of the encryption remains the message m. Can be verified.

[Specific example 1 of encryption function and decryption function]
The encryption function E and the decryption function D can be configured using so-called Pillar encryption. An outline of the algorithm in this case is illustrated in FIG. See, for example, the following references for the Pillar cipher.

  [References] Pascal Paillier, “Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes”, ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY ― EUROCRYPT '99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1999, Volume 1592/1999, pp.223-238

An encryption function E (, where p and q are prime numbers, N = pq, N ² is a public key, λ which is the least common multiple of p−1 and q−1 is a secret key, and g is a reversible element of Z / N ² Z. m, r) = g ^m r ^N mod N ² That is, the ciphertext c = E (m, h (m)) = g ^m h (m) ^N mod N ² .

  The decryption function D is defined by the following five expressions, for example. In step d1, the decoding device 2 calculates the value of m ′ defined by the following equation and outputs it as a decoding result. The calculation of the value of m ′ defined by the following formula means that the calculation method is not limited as long as the value is calculated. That is, it means that the value may be calculated by a mathematically equivalent calculation method.

w = g ^λ mod N ²
z = (w−1) / N
μ = z ⁻¹ mod N
u = c ^λ mod N ²
v = (u-1) / N
m ′ = vμ mod N

If the hash function h can be regarded as a random function and N and g are selected so that the Discrete Composite Residue Problem Problem is difficult, the method of Example 1 is safe. . The identification / combining residue problem is a problem for identifying a random number r ₁ , r _{2 given} g ^a r ₁ ^N mod N ² and r ₂ ^N mod N ² with a secret number a.

Let m be a message defined by a random variable that follows a certain distribution M. If h can be regarded as a random function, c = g ^m h (m) ^N mod N ² is difficult to distinguish from c = g ^m r ₁ ^N mod N ² for random number r ₁ . If the discriminative synthesis residue problem is difficult, g ^m r ₁ ^N mod N ² is difficult to discriminate from r ₂ ^N mod N ² for random number r ₂ . Therefore, c is difficult to distinguish from r ₂ ^N mod N ₂ . Since r ₂ ^N mod N ² does not include the information of the message m, the information of the message m from the ciphertext c is not leaked.

  For example, if the prime factorization of N is difficult, an algorithm for efficiently solving the discriminative synthesis residue problem is not known, and it is considered that the discriminative synthesis residue problem is difficult. Also, if a secure hash function such as SHA-256 is selected as h, when M has an entropy of k bits or more with respect to the security parameter k, the distribution given by h (m) for m selected from M is a random number. H can be regarded as a random function.

[Specific example 2 of encryption function and decryption function]
The encryption function E and the decryption function D can be configured using so-called ElGamal encryption. An outline of the algorithm in this case is illustrated in FIG.

Cyclic group of G, g a generator of the group G, the private key a predetermined integer s, the public key y = g ^s.

Encryption function E to _(m, r), a function that outputs c 0 = my ^r and _c 1 = ^{g r.} That is, a set (c ₀ , c ₁ ) of the first ciphertext c ₀ = my ^{h (m)} and the second ciphertext c ₁ = gh ^(m) becomes the ciphertext c.

Let the decoding function D be c ₀ c ₁ ^-s .

In step v3, the verification information generation unit 13 of the decryption result verification apparatus 1 calculates the first verification information c ₀ ′ = m′y ^{h (m ′)} and the second verification information c ₁ ′ = g ^{h (m ′)} . The set (c ₀ ′, c ₁ ′) of the calculated first verification information c ₀ ′ and second verification information c ₁ ′ becomes verification information.

Determination unit 14 of the decoding result verification apparatus 1 in step v4, or a first ciphertext c ₀ the first verification information c _{0 'match,} and the first ciphertext c ₁ and the first verification information c ₁ Determine whether 'matches. If both match, it is determined that the ciphertext c and the verification information match. If at least one does not match, it is determined that the ciphertext c and the verification information do not match.

  If the hash function h can be regarded as a random function and the identification Diffie-Hellman problem is difficult, the method of this specific example 2 is safe.

The identification Diffie-Hellman problem is that random (a, b, c) and ^a set (g, g ^a , g ^b , g ^ab ) and a set (g, g ^a , g ^b , g ^c ) are stochastic polynomial times. It is a problem identified by the algorithm. For example, SHA-256 is known as a hash function that can be regarded as a random function. Further, as a group in which the identification Diffie-Hellman problem is difficult, there are a finite field multiplicative group and a group used for general ElGamal encryption such as an elliptic curve.

At this time, it is difficult to distinguish the pair (g, g ^s , gh ^(m) , g ^{sh (m)} ) and the pair (g, g ^s , gh ^(m) , g ^d ), where d is an arbitrary integer. It is. Therefore, a set (g, g ^s , gh ^(m) , mg ^{sh (m)} ) and a set (g, g ^s , gh ^(m) , mg ^d ) obtained by multiplying the fourth element of each set by m Both are difficult to identify. This is, considering that it is a y = ^{g s,} g, as known to ^{g s,} the set ^{(my h (m), g} h (m)) and the set ^{(mg d, g h (m} )) and Is synonymous with being difficult to identify. Therefore, the distribution of the pair (my ^{h (m)} , gh ^(m) ) and the distribution of the pair (mg ^d , gh ^(m) ) are equal, and the pair (my ^{h (m)} , The information about the message m cannot be obtained from ^{gh (m)} ).

  As described above, the encryption function E defined in the specific example 2 satisfies the property that the information of the message m is not leaked from the generated ciphertext.

[Modifications, etc.]
Data exchange between the units of the decryption result verification apparatus 1 may be performed directly or may be performed via a storage unit (not shown).

  In addition, the present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment. For example, the various processes described above are not only executed in time series according to the description, but may also be executed in parallel or individually as required by the processing capability of the apparatus that executes the processes.

  Further, when the above-described configuration is realized by a computer, processing contents of functions that each device should have are described by a program. The processing functions are realized on the computer by executing the program on the computer.

  The program describing the processing contents can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. As the computer-readable recording medium, for example, any recording medium such as a magnetic recording device, an optical disk, a magneto-optical recording medium, and a semiconductor memory may be used.

  Needless to say, other modifications are possible without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Decoding result verification apparatus 11 Transmission part 12 Reception part 13 Verification information generation part 14 Determination part 15 Output part 2 Decoding apparatus

Claims (6)

A decryption result verification device that requests the decryption device to decrypt the ciphertext and verifies the returned result,
h a hash function, E (m, r) encryption function for generating a ciphertext by encrypting only messages m using a public key and an integer r a, E (m, h (m )) ciphertext c As
The encryption function E is a probabilistic public key cryptosystem that does not leak the information of the message m from the generated ciphertext,
The message m to be input to the E (m, h (m) ) is no additional bit plaintext,
The ciphertext c, transmission unit that transmits the ciphertext c received by decryption function D that corresponds to the encryption function E is decodable using a secret key to the decoding apparatus for outputting the decoded result m ' When,
A receiving unit for receiving the decoding result m ′ from the decoding device;
A verification information generation unit that calculates verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) using only the public key by using the decryption result m ′;
A determination unit that determines whether the ciphertext c and the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) match;
A decryption result verification device. In the decryption result verification apparatus according to claim 1,
Generating a ciphertext c to verify the encryption function E (m, r) is, p, prime numbers q, N = pq, the public key ^{N 2,} is the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1 lambda Is represented by g ^m r ^N mod N ² , where g is the above-mentioned secret key and g is a reversible element of Z / N ² Z,
The decryption function D for decrypting the ciphertext c is represented by a function for calculating the value of m ′ defined by the following equation:
w = g ^λ mod N ²
z = (w−1) / N
μ = z ⁻¹ mod N
u = c ^λ mod N ²
v = (u-1) / N
m ′ = vμ mod N
The decoding result verification apparatus characterized by the above-mentioned . In the decryption result verification apparatus according to claim 1,
The encryption function E which generates a ciphertext c to validate (m, r) is a group visited G, g a generator of the group G, the private key a predetermined integer s, y = g ^s the public key Is expressed by a function that outputs c ₀ = my ^r and c ₁ = g ^r ,
The ciphertext c is represented by a set of a first ciphertext c ₀ = my ^{h (m)} and a second ciphertext c ₁ = gh ^(m) ,
The decryption function D for decrypting the ciphertext c is represented by c ₀ c ₁ ^-s ,
The verification information generation unit calculates the first verification information ^{_{c 0 '= m'y h (m}} ') and the second verification information ^{_{c 1 '= g h (m}} '),
Whether the first ciphertext c ₀ and the first verification information c ₀ ′ match, or whether the second ciphertext c ₁ and the second verification information c ₁ ′ match Determine
The decoding result verification apparatus characterized by the above-mentioned . A decryption result verification method that requests the decryption device to decrypt the ciphertext and verifies the returned result,
h a hash function, E (m, r) encryption function for generating a ciphertext by encrypting only messages m using a public key and an integer r a, E (m, h (m )) ciphertext c As
The encryption function E is a probabilistic public key cryptosystem that does not leak the information of the message m from the generated ciphertext,
The message m to be input to the E (m, h (m) ) is no additional bit plaintext,
Transmitting unit transmits, to the ciphertext c, and the ciphertext c received by decryption function D that corresponds to the encryption function E can be decrypted using the private key to the decoding apparatus for outputting the decoded result m ' Sending step to
A receiving step in which the receiving unit receives the decoding result m ′ from the decoding device;
A verification information generation step in which a verification information generation unit calculates verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) using only the public key and the decryption result m ′;
A determination step for determining whether the ciphertext c and the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) match;
A decryption result verification method including: In the decryption result verification system that requests the decryption device to decrypt the ciphertext and verifies the returned result,
h a hash function, E (m, r) encryption function for generating a ciphertext by encrypting only messages m using a public key and an integer r a, E (m, h (m )) ciphertext c As
The encryption function E is a probabilistic public key cryptosystem that does not leak the information of the message m from the generated ciphertext,
The message m to be input to the E (m, h (m) ) is no additional bit plaintext,
A decryption device capable of decrypting the ciphertext c received by the decryption function D corresponding to the encryption function E using a secret key, and outputting the decryption result m ′;
A transmission unit that transmits the ciphertext c to the decryption device, a reception unit that receives the decryption result m ′ from the decryption device, and verification information E (m ′) using only the public key and the decryption result m ′ , H (m ′)), and a decryption result including a determination unit that determines whether the ciphertext c and the verification information E (m ′, h (m ′)) match. A verification device;
A decryption result verification system including:   The program for functioning a computer as each part of the decoding result verification apparatus in any one of Claim 1 to 3.

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