JP5367023B2 - Information encryption method, information encryption apparatus, program, and recording medium - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an information encryption method which provides a high security, ensures a high efficient communication traffic and calculation amount, can cope with communicated information of even streaming data, and can be used with a device of a standard specification. <P>SOLUTION: The information encryption method using a common key comprises steps of generating a mask M having a bit length equal to that of information m to be communicated using a common key R (1322, S62), calculating an exclusive OR of the mask M and the information m to encrypt the information m (1324, S84), combining an input constant P<SB POS="POST">n+1</SB>and encryption information c' (1325, S86), using the common key R and the encryption information c' to generate an authenticator Tag of the encryption information c' in security against RKA (1326, S64), and combining the encryption information c' and the authenticator Tag. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2012,JPO&amp;INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an information encryption method, an information encryption device, a program, and a recording medium.

  First, terms used in this specification will be described. “Encrypt” refers to information to be transmitted (a bit string, also referred to as “plain text” hereinafter, including not only textual text but also video information, audio information, etc.) using a certain key (bit string). Usually, it is converted into a bit string (which is completely different from the original data) (hereinafter also referred to as “ciphertext”). However, there are various security requirements depending on the situation, such as it is difficult to obtain information about plaintext only from the ciphertext, and it is difficult to obtain information about the key only from the corresponding plaintext and ciphertext pair. The An “encryption device” refers to a device that encrypts data. “Decrypt” means restoring a ciphertext to the original data (plain text) using a key, and “decryption device” refers to a device that decrypts encrypted data. Furthermore, the terms “encryption”, “encryption technology”, “encryption algorithm”, “encryption device”, “encryption method”, and “encryption means” include both encryption and decryption.

  In general, ciphers can be classified into two types: public key ciphers and common key ciphers. Public key cryptography is used when the transmission side encrypts data (plain text) using the public key (not secret) of the reception side and transmits it. On the other hand, common key cryptography is used for encrypting and transmitting data (plain text) when the transmitting side and the receiving side hold the same key secretly. Since public key cryptography is generally slower than common key cryptography, when performing encrypted communication, public key cryptography is used to solve the secret key sharing problem (key distribution problem), which is a problem with common key cryptography. Common key encryption is often used for communication concealment after the secret key is shared. The public key cryptosystem is a system including a public key book for registering a public key, a transmission device, and a reception device. Public key cryptosystems can be implemented using only public key cryptography, but it is common for public keys to distribute keys using public key cryptography, and to encrypt and communicate plaintext using common key cryptography using a shared secret key. It is a cryptographic (hybrid cryptographic) system.

  As a method for realizing hybrid cryptography that is being standardized, there is a configuration based on KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) -DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism) (Non-Patent Document 1). This configuration will be described below.

FIG. 1 shows a functional configuration of the key encapsulation device (KEM) 2. This means comprises a key bit length parameter 4, a key generation unit 6, a secret key generation / encryption unit 8, and a secret key decryption unit 10. The key bit length parameter 4 is a component that executes a deterministic algorithm, and outputs the bit length parameter kl of the secret key from the security parameter λ. The symbol represents kl = KL (λ). Here, it is assumed that the security parameter λ is an integer greater than or equal to 0 and is determined in advance between the sender and the receiver. The security parameter λ is a parameter that is theoretically necessary, and is provided to specify that each algorithm that takes this argument ends within a polynomial time with respect to λ. The key generator 6 is a component that executes a probabilistic algorithm, and outputs a set of a public key pk and a private key sk from the security parameter λ. The symbol represents (pk, sk) ← KG (λ). The secret key generation / encryption unit 8 is a component that executes a probabilistic algorithm, and outputs a set of a secret key a and an encrypted secret key e from the public key pk. In the symbol, (a, e) ← KE (pk) is expressed. Here, the secret key a is composed of 0 or 1 having a bit length of kl, and is represented by aε {0, 1} ^{kl in} symbols. The encrypted secret key has an arbitrary bit length of 0 or 1, and is represented by eε {0, 1} ^* . The secret key decryption unit 10 is a component that executes a deterministic algorithm, decrypts the secret key e encrypted using the private key sk, and outputs the secret key a. In the symbol, a = KD _sk (e). In the key encapsulation device (KEM) 2, a = KD _sk (e) always holds for any (pk, sk) ← KG (λ) and (a, e) ← KE (pk). The above-mentioned “←” means that it is determined probabilistically, and “=” indicates that it is determined deterministically.

FIG. 2 shows a functional configuration of the data encapsulation device (DEM) 12. This apparatus includes a key bit length parameter 14, an information encryption unit 16, and an information decryption unit 18. The key bit length parameter 14 is a component that executes a deterministic algorithm, and outputs the bit length parameter dl of the secret key from the security parameter λ. In the symbol, dl = DL (λ). The information encryption unit 16 is a deterministic algorithm component, encrypts the plaintext m using the secret key a, and outputs a ciphertext c. In the symbol, c = DE _a (m). Here, the secret key a is a bit string consisting of 0 or 1 having a bit length of dl (aε {0, 1} ^dl ). The plaintext m and the ciphertext c are bit strings each having a bit length of 0 or 1 (m∈ {0,1} ^* , c∈ {0,1} ^* ). The information decryption unit 18 is a component that executes a deterministic algorithm, decrypts the ciphertext c using the secret key a, and outputs plaintext m. In the symbol, m = DD _a (c). In the data encapsulation device (DEM) 12, DD _a (DE _a (m)) = m always holds for any aε {0,1} ^dl and mε {0,1} ^* .

  FIG. 3 shows a functional configuration of the hybrid cryptographic system. The hybrid encryption system includes an encryption device 20 and a decryption device 40, which are a combination of the configuration device in the key encapsulation device 2 and the configuration device in the data encapsulation device 12. Also, since the secret key a is used in both the key encapsulation device 2 and the data encapsulation device 12, it is necessary that kl = dl be established in this system.

The encryption device 20 obtains a pair of the private key a and the encrypted private key e (eε {0,1} ^* ) from the public key pk of the recipient by the private key generation / encryption unit 8 ((a E) <-KE (pk)). Next, the information encryption unit 16 encrypts the plaintext m (mε {0,1} ^* ) using the secret key a to obtain a ciphertext c (cε {0,1} ^* ) (c = DE _a (m)). In this way, the encryption device 20 obtains a set (e, c) of the encrypted secret key e and ciphertext c as an output to the decryption device 40.

In the decryption device 40, the key generation unit 42 obtains a set of the public key pk and the private key sk from the security parameter λ in advance ((pk, sk) ← KG (λ)). The public key pk is publicized in advance and used by the encryption device 20 as described above. The private key sk is stored in advance in the private key / public key storage unit 44 in the decryption device 40. When the decryption device 40 receives the pair of the encrypted private key e and the ciphertext c from the encryption device 20, the decryption device 40 decrypts the private key e encrypted using the private key sk. The private key a is obtained (a = KD _sk (e)). Next, the information decryption unit 18 decrypts the ciphertext c using the secret key a to obtain plaintext m (m = DD _a (c)).

Moreover, as a proposal of an encryption method specialized for broadcast communication, there is, for example, Patent Document 1.
Hereinafter, transmission / reception of the KEM / DEM / DEM method and transmission / reception of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method, which are conventional techniques for improving the efficiency of the encryption method for broadcast communication, will be described. First, items common to these two methods will be described.

  FIG. 4 is a functional configuration example of the key sharing apparatus 50. The key sharing device 50 includes a key bit length parameter 52, a common key generation unit 54, a common key encryption unit 56, and a common key decryption unit 58. The key bit length parameter 52 is a deterministic algorithm device that outputs the bit length ml of the common key R from the security parameter λ. In the symbol, ml = ML (λ).

Common key generating unit 54, a probabilistic algorithm device no input or secret key a _1, ..., a deterministic algorithm device for inputting all or part of a _n, the common key R (R∈ {0,1 } ^ml ). The symbol, in the case of probabilistic algorithm R ← MG (), in the case of deterministic algorithm _{R = MG (a 1, ...} , a n) and is represented as.

The common key encryption unit 56 is a deterministic algorithm device that encrypts the common key R using the secret key a _i of each device and outputs the encrypted common key y _i . The symbol is y _i = ME _ai (R).

The common key decryption unit 58 is a deterministic algorithm device that decrypts the encrypted common key y _i using the secret key a _i and outputs the common key R. The symbol is R = MD _ai (y _i ). In the key sharing apparatus 50, for any a _i ∈ {0,1} ^kli and any R ← MG () or deterministic R = MG (a ₁ ,..., _An ), MD _ai ( ME _ai (R)) = R holds.

  FIG. 5 shows an example of a system that performs encrypted broadcast communication. This example includes n + 1 transmitting / receiving devices 60i (i = 0, 1, 2,..., N). Each transmission / reception device 60i includes a transmission device 62i, a reception device 64i, and a recording device in which the configuration device in the key encapsulation device 2, the configuration device in the data encapsulation device 12, and the configuration device in the key sharing device 50 are combined. 66i.

  Next, transmission / reception of the KEM / DEM / DEM system and transmission / reception of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP system will be described. The first processes “KEM” and “Tag-KEM” indicate a process for generating a secret key and a process for encrypting the generated secret key, and the second processes “DEM” and “OTP” The process of encrypting the generated common key is shown, and the processes of the third processes “DEM” and “OTP” show the process of encrypting information to be transmitted, that is, plaintext m. Details of these two methods will be described below.

KEM / DEM / DEM system FIG. 6 shows an example of the functional configuration of a KEM / DEM / DEM transceiver, and FIG. 7 shows the main processing flow of the KEM / DEM / DEM transceiver. It is a flowchart. The same functional components as those in the above-mentioned figure are given the same reference numerals, and redundant description is omitted. The same applies to the following description.

  Also, transmission / reception by broadcast communication is performed between the transmission device of the transmission / reception device 600 whose i value is “0” and the other reception devices of the n transmission / reception devices 60i (i = 1, 2,..., N). explain.

  The transmission device 70 in the transmission / reception device 600 includes a secret key generation / encryption unit 8, a common key generation unit 54, a key length change unit 55, a common key encryption unit 56, and an information encryption unit 16. There are n secret key generation / encryption units 8 in the transmission device 70 corresponding to the number of reception devices, that is, n.

  The receiving device 80i of the transmitting / receiving device 60i includes a secret key decryption unit 10i, a common key decryption unit 58i, an information decryption unit 18i, and a key generation unit 6i.

First, the public key pk _i and the private key sk _i (i = 1,..., N) are generated by (pk _i , sk _i ) ← KG (λ) using the security parameter λ in the key generation unit 6i. (Step S2). The generated private key sk _i is temporarily stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76 _i (step S 4). The public key pk _i may be stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76i (step S6). The public key pk _i is made public and input to the secret key generation / encryption unit 8 of the transmission device 70.

In the secret key generation / encryption unit 8 (KEM), a secret key e _i in which the secret key a _i and the secret key a _i are encrypted is generated by (a _i , e _i ) ← KE (pk _i ). (Step S8). The secret key a _i is input to the common key generation unit 54 and the common key encryption unit 56.

In the common key generation unit 54, the common key R is generated by R ← MG () or R = MG (a ₁ , a ₂ ,..., _An ) (step S10). The common key R may be stored in the common key storage unit 74i indicated by a broken line, and the same common key R may be used in the second and subsequent broadcast communications.

  The key length changing unit 55 uses a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), which is a pseudo-random number generator, to double the key length of the common key R, and the first common key r and the second common key r. 'Is generated. The bit lengths of R, r, and r 'are all equal, and the first common key r and the second common key r' are independent of each other. The first common key r and the second common key r ′ are combined and input to the common key encryption unit 56 in a state r′r ′. In this description and the description of the drawings, “‖” indicates that they are combined. The first common key r and the second common key r ′ are input to the information encryption unit 16 in an independent state.

The common key encryption unit 56 (DEM) encrypts the common key r‖r ′ using the secret key a _i to generate an encrypted common key y _i . Specifically, y _i = ME _ai (r r ′) is generated (step S12).

Next, the DEM that is the information encryption unit 16 will be described. Using the first common key r and the second common key r ′ that are independent of each other, the information encryption unit 16 encrypts the plaintext m and generates a ciphertext c. Specifically, ciphertext c is generated by encryption using c = DE _{r, r ′} (m) (step S13).

There are usually three possible configurations for the DEM (information encryption unit 16). There are three types: Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. The DEM (information encryption unit 16) includes an information encryption unit (Encrypt), an authenticator generation unit (MAC: Message Authentication Code), and a combining unit. Is different. The information encryption unit 16 (DEM) of the transmission device 70 may have any of these three configurations. Hereinafter, these three processes will be described.

  FIG. 8 shows the structure of Encrypt-and-MAC, FIG. 9 shows the structure of MAC-then-Encrypt, and FIG. 10 shows the structure of Encrypt-then-MAC.

In the Encrypt-and-MAC described in FIG. 8, the information encryption means (Encrypt) 160 encrypts the plaintext m using the first common key r to generate a temporary ciphertext c ′. Specifically, c ′ = Enc _r (m). Further, the authenticator generation means (MAC) 162 generates an authenticator Tag of plaintext m using the second common key r ′. Specifically, it is generated by Tag = MAC _r (m). The generated ciphertext c ′ and the authenticator Tag are input to the combining unit 164.

  The combination means 164 combines the temporary ciphertext c ′ and the authenticator Tag to generate a ciphertext c. Specifically, it is generated by c = c′‖Tag.

In the MAC-then-Encrypt shown in FIG. 9, the authenticator generation unit 166 (MAC) generates the authenticator Tag of plaintext m using the second common key r ′. Specifically, it is generated by Tag = MAC _{r ′} (m). The generated authenticator Tag is input to the coupling means 168.

  The combination means 168 combines the plaintext m and the generated authenticator Tag to generate m‖Tag. The generated m‖Tag is input to the information encryption unit 170 (Encrypt).

The information encryption unit 170 encrypts m‖Tag using the first common key r and generates a ciphertext c. Specifically, c = Enc _r (mｃTag) is generated.

In the Encrypt-then-MAC described in FIG. 10, the information encryption unit 172 encrypts the plaintext m using the first common key r to generate a provisional ciphertext c ′. Specifically, c ′ = Enc _r (m). The generated temporary ciphertext c ′ is input to the authenticator generation unit 174 and the combination unit 176.

The authenticator generation unit 174 generates an authenticator Tag for the temporary ciphertext c ′ using the second common key r ′. Specifically, it is generated by Tag = MAC _{r ′} (c ′). The generated authenticator Tag is input to the combining unit 176.

  The combining unit 176 combines the authenticator Tag and the provisional ciphertext c ′ to generate a ciphertext c. Specifically, it is generated by c = c′‖Tag.

Returning to FIG. 6, the transmitting device 70 sends a secret key e _i (i = 1, 2,..., N) encrypted for each receiving device 80 i and a common encrypted for each receiving device 80 i. A set of key y _i and one ciphertext c is transmitted.

  As described above, the secret key generation / encryption unit 8 corresponds to KEM, the common key encryption unit 56 corresponds to DEM, and the information encryption unit 16 corresponds to DEM.

Next, decoding of the receiving device 80i will be described. The private key decryption unit 10i decrypts the encrypted private key e _i received from the transmission device 70 using the private key sk _i stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76i and the decryption function KD. A secret key a _i is required. Specifically, it is determined by a _i = KD _ski (e _i ) (step S14).

The common key decryption unit 58i decrypts the encrypted common key y _i received from the transmission device using the secret key a _i and the decryption function MD, and the first common key r and the second common key r 'And asked. Specifically, it is obtained by r‖r ′ = MD _ai (y _i ) (step S16).

The information decryption unit 18i decrypts the ciphertext c received from the transmission device using the obtained first common key r, second common key r ′, and decryption function DD, thereby obtaining plaintext m. It is done. Specifically, it is obtained by m = DD _{r, r ′} (c) (step S18). Details of the KEM / DEM / DEM method are described in Patent Document 2.

Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP
Next, a Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP transmission / reception apparatus will be described. Details are described in Non-Patent Document 2. Here, OTP means one-time pad, and data and key (if the key length is shorter than the data length, the key length is expanded to the same length as the data length by a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). To calculate the exclusive OR of FIG. 11 shows an example of the functional configuration of a Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP transmission / reception device, which is composed of a transmission device 90 and a reception device 100i (i = 1,..., N). FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing the main processing flow of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP transmission / reception apparatus.

  The transmission apparatus 90 includes a secret key / internal state generation unit 92, a key length change unit 93, a common key generation unit 54, an information encryption unit 95, a common key encryption unit 94, and a secret key encryption unit 96. And is composed of. The receiving device 100i includes a secret key decryption unit 102i, a common key decryption unit 104i, an information decryption unit 106i, and a key generation unit 6i.

The private key sk _i and the public key pk _i are generated by the key generation unit 6i in the receiving device 100i, the private key sk _i is stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76i, and the public key pk _i is released (step) S20, step S22, step S24). The public key pk _i is input to the secret key / internal state generation unit 92.

The secret key / internal state generation unit 92 generates the secret key a _i and the internal state ω _i using the public key pk _i and the Tag-KEM secret key generation function G _i . Specifically, (a _i , ω _i ) ← G _i (pk _i ) is generated (step S28). The secret key a _i is input to the secret key encryption unit 96 and the common key encryption unit 94, and the internal state ω _i is input to the secret key encryption unit 96.

  Further, the common key R is generated by the common key generation unit 54 (step S29). The generated common key R is input to a key length changing unit 93 (PRNG: pseudorandom number generator). The bit length of the common key R is shorter than the bit length of the plaintext m. Therefore, for the processing of the information encryption unit 95 described below, the bit length of the common key R and the bit length of the plaintext m must be the same. In the key length changing unit 93, the bit length of the common key R is changed so that the bit length of the common key R is the same as that of the plaintext m, and the common key R 'is generated. The common key R ′ is input to the information encryption unit 95 and the common key encryption unit 94.

The common key encryption unit 94 calculates the exclusive OR of the common key R ′ and the secret key a _i , that is, the common key R ′ is encrypted by calculating the following formula, and the encrypted common key x _i is obtained (step S30).

The encrypted common key x _i is input to the secret key encryption unit 96.

  Also, the information encryption unit 95 encrypts the plaintext m using the common key R ′ to obtain the ciphertext c. Specifically, the ciphertext c is obtained by the following equation (step S31).

  The obtained ciphertext c is input to the secret key encryption unit 96.

The secret key encryption unit 96 encrypts the secret key a _i using the Tag-KEM encryption function E _i , the internal state ω _i, and the ciphertext c, and obtains the encrypted secret key z _i. It is done. Specifically, it is obtained by z _i ← E _i (ω _i , x _i ‖c) (step S32).

From the transmission device 90, a secret key z _i encrypted for each reception device 100i, a common key x _i encrypted for each reception device 100i, and one ciphertext c are transmitted.

  The secret key / internal state generation unit 92 and the secret key encryption unit 96 correspond to Tag-KEM, the common key encryption unit 94 corresponds to the first OTP, and the information encryption unit 95 corresponds to the second. Corresponds to OTP.

Next, processing of the receiving device 100i will be described. The secret key decryption unit 102i decrypts the encrypted secret key z _i received from the transmission device 90 using the private key sk _i and the decryption function D _i . Specifically, it is decoded by a _i = D _i (z _i , x _i ‖c) (step S36).

In the decryption of the secret key z _i of the secret key decryption unit 102i, as is apparent from the decryption formula, the secret key a _i cannot be obtained unless all the ciphertext c is received (step S34). That is, when the plain text m is a video or the like and the streaming data, the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method cannot be used.

The common key decryption unit 104i uses the obtained secret key a _i to decrypt the encrypted common key x _i to obtain a common key R ′ having an extended bit length. Specifically, it can be obtained by the following equation (step S38).

The obtained common key R ′ is input to the information decryption unit 106 i. In the information decryption unit 106i, the ciphertext c is decrypted using the common key R 'to obtain the plaintext m. Specifically, the plaintext m is obtained by the following equation (step S40).

V. Shoup, “FCD 18033-2 Encryption algorithms-Part 2: Asymmetric ciphers,” ISO / IEC JTC 1 / SC 27, Berlin, 2004. “Tag-KEM / DEM: A New Framework for Hybrid Encryption and a New Analysis of Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM” Masayuki Abe, Rosario Gennaro, Kaoru Kurosawa, and Victor Shou 22 March 2005 Eurocrypt 2005 meeting

No. 08-004265 Japanese Patent Application No. 2005-015154

Four problems of the conventional technology are described below.

(1) Problem of Communication Volume FIGS. 13A to 13F are diagrams conceptually showing an encrypted secret key and the like. FIG. 13A shows n encrypted secret keys z _i in the case of Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method, and FIG. 13B shows Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP. and it shows the common key _{x i} which is the n encryption in the case of method, FIG. 13C is indicative ciphertext c when the Tag over KEM / OTP / OTP method, Figure 13D, KEM / and shows the secret key _{e i} n number of encrypted when the DEM / DEM scheme, FIG. 13E shows a common key _{y i} which is the n encryption in the case of KEM / DEM / DEM scheme FIG. 13F shows the ciphertext c in the case of the KEM / DEM / DEM method.

In the case of the KEM / DEM / DEM method, an authenticator Tag is added to the encrypted common key y _i and ciphertext c, as indicated by hatching in FIGS. 13E and 13F. The size of this authenticator depends on the security parameters, but in most cases is equal to the size of the common key y _i . The capacity of the authenticator added to the ciphertext c is considerably smaller than the capacity of the ciphertext. Further, one ciphertext c is sent to each receiving apparatus. Therefore, there is no particular problem with the authenticator added to the ciphertext c.

However, the capacity of the encrypted common key y _i is doubled by adding the authenticator Tag. In addition, since the encrypted common key y _i is sent to n receiving devices, there are n types. Therefore, the amount of communication increases and the transmission efficiency deteriorates.

  On the other hand, the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP system can perform efficient transmission.

  Therefore, the KEM / DEM / DEM method has a problem that the amount of communication increases.

(2) Calculation amount problem Next, the calculation amount problem will be described. The (2) Description of the computational problem only for KEM / DEM / DEM scheme and Tag over KEM / OTP / OTP method, for purposes of explanation simplicity, KEM _/ DEM 1 _/ DEM ₂ scheme, Tag chromatography KEM / OTP ₁ / OTP _{2 will} be described.

First, a calculation amount in the case of performing encrypted communication from a transmission device to one reception device will be described. Generally, the following formulas hold for the amount of calculation for each process. Note that [A] indicates the calculation amount of the processing of A.
[KEM] <[Tag-KEM]
[DEM ₁ ]> [OTP ₁ ]
[DEM ₂ ]> [OTP ₂ ]
_{[KEM] + [DEM 2]} = [Tag-KEM] + [OTP 2]
Therefore, [KEM] + [DEM ₁ ] + [DEM ₂ ]> [Tag-KEM] + [OTP ₁ ] + [OTP ₂ ]. Therefore, when performing encrypted communication from the transmitting apparatus to one receiving apparatus, the calculation amount of the KEM / DEM / DEM method is larger than the calculation amount of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method.

  Next, the amount of calculation in the case of performing encrypted communication from the transmitting device to n (n ≧ 2) receiving devices will be described.

In the case of the KEM / DEM / DEM system, when the secret key generation / encryption unit 8 generates the encrypted secret key e _i , the calculation of (a _i , e _i ) ← KE (pk _i ) is received. It is only necessary to calculate the number n of devices, and the size of the ciphertext c is not considered.

On the other hand, in the case of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method, as described above, the secret key encryption unit 96 shown in FIG. 8 considers the size of the ciphertext c and performs the secret key encryption process (z _i ← E _i (ω _i , a _i ‖c)). Therefore, when the size of the ciphertext c is large, the calculation amount of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method is larger than the calculation amount of the KEM / DEM / DEM method as the value of n increases. Therefore, when performing encrypted communication from the transmitting device to n (n ≧ 2) receiving devices, the amount of calculation of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method is larger than the amount of calculation of the KEM / DEM / DEM method. .

(3) In the case of streaming problems KEM / DEM / DEM scheme, also decryption of the private key _{a i} by the private key decryption unit 10i illustrated in FIG. 6, as is apparent from the step S14 in FIG. 7 described, _{a i} = KD _ski (e _i ) need only be calculated. Therefore, even if the plain text m is streaming data, it can be handled.

On the other hand, in the case of the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method, in the decryption process of the receiving device 100i shown in FIG. 11, as shown in step S34 of FIG. If it is not received, decryption processing cannot be performed. This is also clear from the decryption calculation a _i = D _i (z _i , x _i ‖c) by the secret key decryption unit 102i. Therefore, when the plaintext m is streaming data, there arises a problem that the Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP method cannot be applied.

(4) Standards issues The KEM / DEM method is standardized by standardization organizations such as ISO (International Organization for Standardization) and NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption), so KEM / DEM / In the case of the DEM method, existing modules can be used in conformity with these standard specifications.

  On the other hand, the secret key / internal state generation unit 92 and the secret key encryption unit 96 (see FIG. 11) corresponding to Tag-KEM are not standardized, and a new module must be created. Arise. In addition, even if it is newly developed, it does not conform to the standard, so interoperability cannot be ensured.

  The present invention relates to a broadcast encryption method for encrypting and transmitting information to a plurality of destinations, wherein the secret key is generated and encrypted by using the destination public key and the encryption function. Then, an encrypted secret key obtained by encrypting the secret key is generated. A common key generation unit generates a combination of the first common key and the second common key (hereinafter referred to as a combined common key), and the common key encryption unit exclusives the combined common key and the secret key. Calculate the logical sum and encrypt the composite common key. The information encryption means encrypts the information using the first common key, and the authenticator generation means uses the second common key to securely store the encrypted information against the related key attack. An authenticator is generated, and the encrypted information and the authenticator are combined by the combining means.

  Further, it is a broadcast encryption method for encrypting and transmitting information to a plurality of destinations, and the secret key generation / encryption means uses the destination public key and the encryption function to An encrypted secret key obtained by encrypting the secret key is generated, and the common key is generated by the common key generation means. The common key encryption means calculates the exclusive OR of the common key and the secret key to encrypt the common key, and the authenticator generation means uses the common key to set the bit length of the information to be communicated. Generate equal masks pseudo-randomly. The information encryption means calculates the exclusive OR of the mask and the information to encrypt the information, and the authenticator generation means uses the common key and the encrypted information to The authenticator of the encrypted information is generated safely, and the encrypted information and the authenticator are combined by the combining means.

  An information decryption method for decrypting encrypted information, wherein a key generation unit generates a public key and a private key, and a secret key decryption unit uses a private key and a decryption function to receive the received encryption. The secret key thus obtained is decrypted to obtain a secret key. The common key decryption means calculates the exclusive OR of the secret key and the received encrypted common key to obtain the first common key and the second common key, and the separation means receives the combination The encrypted information and the authenticator of the encrypted information are separated to obtain the encrypted information and the authenticator of the encrypted information. The information decryption means decrypts the encrypted information using the first common key to obtain information, and the authenticator determination means generates a confirmation authenticator using the second common key, It is determined whether or not the authenticator of the encrypted information matches the authenticator for confirmation. If the authenticator determination means determines that they do not match, the information decryption means discards the information.

  An information decryption method for decrypting encrypted information, wherein a key generation unit generates a public key and a private key, and a secret key decryption unit uses a private key and a decryption function to receive the received encryption. The secret key thus obtained is decrypted to obtain a secret key. The common key decryption means calculates the exclusive OR of the secret key and the received encrypted common key to obtain the common key, and the separation means receives the combined encrypted information received and The authenticator of the encrypted information is separated, and the encrypted information and the authenticator of the encrypted information are obtained. The authenticator generation means generates a mask equal to the bit length of the encrypted information using the common key, and the information decryption means calculates the exclusive OR of the encrypted information and the mask, Decrypt the encrypted information and obtain the information. The authenticator determination means generates a confirmation authenticator using the common key, determines whether or not the encrypted information authenticator and the confirmation authenticator match, and the authenticator determination means matches. If it is determined not to do so, the information decoding means discards the information.

  With the above configuration, for the problem of (1) traffic, the authenticator Tag is added to the encrypted common key by making the method for encrypting the common key a one-time pad (calculating exclusive OR). Will not be added. As a result, the amount of communication is reduced, and the problem of (1) communication amount is solved.

  As for the problem of the above (2) calculation amount, the calculation amount when the common key is encrypted can be reduced by using the one-time pad process as the method for encrypting the common key. Also, the ciphertext c is not used in the secret key encryption process, and the size of the ciphertext c is not considered. Therefore, the problem of (2) calculation amount is solved.

  Regarding the above (3) streaming problem, encrypted information is not used for decryption processing of the private key on the receiving side. Therefore, even if all encrypted information is not received, there is no hindrance to the decryption process, and even if the information is streaming data, it can be handled. Therefore, the above (3) streaming problem is solved.

  Regarding the above (4) standard problem, KEM, OTP, and DEM are used in the present invention. The KEM / DEM method is standardized by a standards body. Therefore, this standard specification can be used. Therefore, the above (4) standard problem is solved.

The figure which shows the function structure of the key encapsulation apparatus 2. FIG. The figure which shows the function structure of the data encapsulation apparatus 12. FIG. The figure which shows the function structure of a hybrid encryption system. The figure which shows the function structural example of the key sharing apparatus 50. FIG. The figure which shows the example of the system which performs encryption broadcast communication. The figure which shows the function structural example of the transmission / reception apparatus of a KEM / DEM / DEM system. The flowchart which showed the main processes of the transmitter / receiver of a KEM / DEM / DEM system. The figure which shows the function structural example of DEM which is Encrypt-and-MAC. The figure which shows the function structural example of DEM which is MAC-then-Encrypt. The figure which shows the function structural example of DEM which is Encrypt-then-MAC. The figure which shows the function structural example of the transmission / reception apparatus of Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP system. The flowchart which shows the flow of the main processes of the transmission / reception apparatus of Tag-KEM / OTP / OTP system. The conceptual diagram which shows the problem of the prior art. The figure which shows the function structural example of the transmitter 110 of Example 1 of this invention. The figure which shows the function structural example of the receiver 120i of Example 1 of this invention. The flowchart which shows the flow of the main processes of the receiver 120i of Example 1 of this invention. The flowchart which shows the flow of the main processes of the transmitter 110 of Example 1 of this invention. The figure which shows the function structural example of the transmitter 130 of Example 2 of this invention. The figure which shows the function structural example of the receiver 140i of Example 2 of this invention. The flowchart which shows the flow of the main processes of the receiver 140i of Example 2 of this invention. The flowchart which shows the flow of the main processes of the transmitter 130 of Example 2 of this invention. The figure which showed the data flow etc. of the information encryption part 132 of Example 2 of this invention.

Before describing the best mode for carrying out the present invention, the principle of the present invention will be described. First, in order to solve the problem (1), the KEM / DEM / DEM method is changed to the KEM / OTP / DEM method. In other words, the encryption of the common key is changed to one-time pad processing (OTP) (calculation of exclusive OR). In the KEM / DEM / DEM method, the common key encryption unit 56 shown in FIG. 6 encrypts the common key R using y _i = ME _ai (R). However, in the KEM / OTP / DEM method, The key R is encrypted by calculating an exclusive OR of the common key R and the secret key a _i , that is, by calculating the following equation.

  Thereby, the amount of calculation can be reduced. However, this KEM / OTP / DEM method is not safe. That is, even if both KEM and DEM are normal “CCA safe”, the KEM / OTP / DEM method is not always safe. So, if DEM is “safe against relational key attacks (RKA security)”, which is stronger than normal “CCA security”, KEM will remain in normal CCA security and KEM / OTP / DEM method It can show that it is safe.

  Next, a DEM that is “safe against relational key attacks (RKA security)” will be described. As described above, DEM usually has three configurations: Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC (see FIGS. 8 to 10). In these three types of DEMs, which configuration is best for forming a DEM that is “safe against relational key attacks (RKA security)” will be described.

  When the configuration of the DEM is Encrypt-and-MAC shown in FIG. 8, both the information encryption unit 160 (Encrypt) and the authenticator generation unit 162 (MAC) must be RKA safe. Therefore, it is not appropriate to make the DEM with the Encrypt-and-MAC configuration RKA safe.

  When the configuration of the DEM is MAC-then-Encrypt shown in FIG. 9, if the information encryption means 170 (Encrypt) at the last stage is RKA safe, the entire DEM is RKA safe. However, the RKA secure information encryption means 170 (Encrypt) is practically equivalent to being an RKA secure DEM with very strong constraints, and the configuration method of the RKA secure information encryption means 170 is also unclear. Absent. Therefore, it is not appropriate to make the DEM having the MAC-then-Encrypt configuration RKA safe.

  When the configuration of the DEM is Encrypt-then-MAC shown in FIG. 10, if the authenticator generation means 174 (MAC) at the last stage is RKA safe, the entire DEM is RKA safe. Although the configuration method of the RKA secure authenticator generation means 174 (MAC) is a problem, it can be assumed that virtually all existing MACs are RKA secure. This is because RKA security for MAC is a very weak constraint. Therefore, as a configuration for making the entire DEM RKA safe, it is most suitable that the encryption-and-MAC and the MAC is RKA safe. Therefore, Encrypt-and-MAC is adopted for the information encryption unit (DEM) in the transmission apparatus described in the first embodiment.

  FIG. 14 shows a functional configuration example of the transmission apparatus according to the first embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 15 shows a functional configuration example of the reception apparatus, and FIG. 16 shows a main processing flow of the reception apparatus. The flow of processing is shown in FIG.

  14 includes a secret key generation / encryption unit 8, a common key generation unit 54, an information encryption unit 116, a common key encryption unit 94, and an output unit 114. The transmission device 110 shown in FIG. A key storage unit 72 is also added. The information encryption unit 116 (DEM) has the configuration of Encrypt-and-MAC described with reference to FIG. The information encryption unit 116 includes a temporary ciphertext generation unit (information encryption unit in FIG. 10) 172, an authenticator generation unit 174, and a combination unit 176. The authenticator generation means 174 is RKA safe.

  The receiving device 120i illustrated in FIG. 15 includes a key generation unit 6i, a secret key decryption unit 10i, a common key decryption unit 58i, an input unit 121i, a separation unit 122i, an information decryption unit 18i, and an authenticator determination unit 124i. Accordingly, a private key / public key storage unit 76i and a common key storage unit 74i are added. The authenticator determination unit 124i includes a confirmation authenticator generation unit 1242i and a determination unit 1244i.

First, a set of a public key pk _i and a private key sk _i is generated from the security parameter λ by the key generation unit 6i shown in FIG. 15 (step S50). Specifically, it is generated by (pk _i , sk _i ) ← KG (λ). The generated private key sk _i is stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76 _i (step S 52), and the public key pk _i is made public. If necessary, the public key pk _i may be stored in the private key / public key storage unit 76 _i (step S 54).

The published public key pk _i is input to the secret key generation / encryption unit 8 shown in FIG. The secret key generation / encryption unit 8 uses the public key pk _{i of the} transmission destination and the encryption function KE, and the secret key a _i for each receiving device 120 i (i = 1,..., N) and the secret the secret key e _i that the key has been encrypted is generated. Specifically, it is generated by (a _i , e _i ) ← KE (pk _i ) (step S56 described in FIG. 17). The encrypted secret key e _i is input to the output unit 114, and the secret key a _i is input to the common key encryption unit 94 and the common key generation unit 54.

The common key generation unit 54 generates a composite common key r‖r ′. r represents the first common key, and r ′ represents the second common key. A specific generation formula is generated by r‖r ′ ← MG (), or by using all or a part of the secret key a _i for each receiving device 120 _i , r‖r ′ = MG (a ₁ , a ₂ ,..., A _i ) (step S57).

  The composite common key r‖r ′ is input to the common key encryption unit 94, the first common key r is input to the temporary ciphertext generation unit 172, and the second common key r ′ is input to the authenticator generation unit 174. Is done.

The common key encryption unit 94 calculates the exclusive OR of the secret key a _i and the composite common key r′r ′, so that the composite common key r′r ′ is encrypted and encrypted. A key w _i is generated. Specifically, encryption is performed by calculating the following equation (step S60).

The encrypted composite common key w _i is input to the output unit 114.

  In the information encryption unit 116, the plaintext m is encrypted and a ciphertext c is generated (step S61). Specific processing of the information encryption unit 116 will be described. As described above, the information encryption unit (DEM) 116 has an Encrypt-then-MAC configuration, and the authenticator generation unit (MAC) 174 is an RKA-secure (secure against relational key attack) MAC. .

The plaintext m is encrypted using the first common key r by the information encryption means (Encrypt) 172, and a temporary ciphertext c ′ is generated (step S62). Specifically, c ′ = Enc _r (m). The generated temporary ciphertext c ′ is input to the authenticator generation unit 174 and the combination unit 176.

The authenticator generation unit 174 generates the authenticator Tag of the temporary ciphertext c ′ safely (with RKA safely) using the second common key r ′. Specifically, it is generated by Tag = MAC _{r ′} (c ′) (step S64). The generated authenticator Tag is input to the combining unit 176.

  The combining unit 176 combines the authenticator Tag and the provisional ciphertext c ′ to generate a ciphertext c. Specifically, c = c′ｃTag is generated (step S66). The generated ciphertext c is input to the output unit 114.

From the output unit 114, the encrypted secret key e _i (i = 1,..., N) for each receiving device 120i, the encrypted common key w _i for each receiving device 120i, and one ciphertext c Is sent.

Next, the receiving device 120i illustrated in FIG. 15 will be described. And the private key e _i encrypted than transmitting apparatus 110, a common key w _i encrypted, the ciphertext c is input to the input section 121i. The ciphertext c is input to the separation unit 122i, the encrypted common key w _i is input to the common key decryption unit 58i, and the encrypted secret key e _i is input to the secret key decryption unit 10i.

First, the private key decryption unit 10i decrypts the received encrypted private key e _i using the private key sk _i and the decryption function KD to obtain the private key a _i . Specifically, it is obtained by a _i = KD _ski (e _i ) (step S68 in FIG. 16). The obtained secret key a _i is input to the common key decryption unit 58 _i .

The common key decryption unit 58i calculates the exclusive OR of the encrypted common key w _i and the secret key a _i to obtain the composite common key r‖r ′. Specifically, it is obtained by the following equation (step S70).

  The composite common key r‖r ′ is separated into a first common key r and a second common key r ′, the first common key r is input to the information decryption unit 18i, and the second common key r ′ is confirmed. To the authenticator generation means 1242i.

  In the separation unit 122i, the ciphertext c (= c′‖Tag) is separated, and the authenticator Tag of the temporary ciphertext c ′ and the temporary ciphertext c ′ is obtained. The temporary ciphertext c 'is input to the confirmation authenticator generation unit 1242i and the information decryption unit 18i, and the authenticator Tag is input to the determination unit 1244i.

The information decryption unit 18i decrypts the temporary ciphertext c ′ using the first common key r and the decryption function Enc− ¹ to obtain the plaintext m. Specifically, it is obtained by m = Enc ⁻¹ _r (c ′) (step S72).

Next, an authentication process for determining whether or not the sender of the receiving device 120i is correct will be described. The authentication authenticator generating unit 1242i is the same algorithm as the authenticator generating unit 174 (MAC) (see FIG. 14) of the transmission device 110. A confirmation authenticator Tag ′ is generated by the confirmation authenticator generation means 1242i using the second common key r ′. Specifically, Tag ′ = MAC _{r ′} (c ′) is generated (step S73). The generated authenticator Tag ′ for confirmation is input to the determination unit 1244i.

  Further, the determination unit 1244i determines whether or not the authenticator Tag from the separation unit 122i matches the verification authenticator Tag ′ from the verification authenticator generation unit 1242i (step S74). If they do not match, there is a possibility that the transmission information has been altered during transmission. If Tag and Tag ′ do not match, the provisional ciphertext c ′ in the information decryption unit 18 i is discarded without performing the information decryption processing by the information decryption unit 18 i.

A case where the plain text m (received transmission target information) is the streaming data m ₁ will be described. In the receiving apparatus 120i, it receives all the encrypted data c _1, decodes, after obtaining all the streaming data m _1, may be performed determination by the authenticator determining unit 124i.

  With such a configuration of the transmission device and the reception device, the one-time pad is used for encryption of the common key, and the authenticator Tag is not added to the encrypted common key. Therefore, the problem of the traffic amount of the problem (1) is solved.

  In addition, the amount of calculation for encrypting the common key is reduced by making the common key encryption processing of the common key decryption unit 58i shown in FIG. 17 one-time pad processing. In addition, the ciphertext c is not used in the secret key encryption processing of the secret key generation / encryption unit 8, and the size of the ciphertext c is not considered. Therefore, the problem of (2) calculation amount is solved.

  Therefore, the problem of (2) calculation amount is solved.

  Further, unlike the process of the secret key decryption unit 10i illustrated in FIG. 15, the encrypted information is not used for the decryption process of the reception side secret key. Therefore, even if all encrypted information is not received, there is no hindrance to the decryption process, and even if the information is streaming data, it can be handled. Therefore, the above (3) streaming problem is solved.

  Further, since KEM (secret key generation / encryption unit 8) and DEM (information encryption unit 16) standardized by a standardization organization are used, standard specifications can be diverted, and the above-mentioned problems (4 ) Can also be solved.

  In the transmission device 110 (see FIG. 14) described in the first embodiment, the common key (first common key r) used in the temporary ciphertext generation unit 172 in the information encryption unit 116 and the authenticator generation The common key (second common key r ′) used by the means 174 must be independent. Therefore, the first common key r and the second common key r ′ are necessary, and the common key generation unit 54 generates the first common key r and the second common key r ′. As a result, the authenticator is not added to the encrypted common key, but the key length of the common key is doubled, and the communication amount of the key length becomes a problem.

  In the second embodiment, a configuration of an information encryption device and a transmission / reception device that solves the problem of the key length will be described. 18 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the transmission device 130, FIG. 19 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration example of the reception device 140i, and FIG. 20 is a flowchart illustrating a processing flow of the reception device 140i. FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing the processing flow of the transmission device 130.

  The difference between the transmission apparatus 110 according to the first embodiment and the transmission apparatus 130 according to the second embodiment is that in the second embodiment, only one common key may be used and the configuration of the information encryption unit is different. is there.

  The information encryption unit 132 includes a mask generation unit 1322, a temporary ciphertext generation unit 1324, a constant addition unit 1325, an authenticator generation unit 1326, and a combination unit 1328. FIG. 22 shows the data flow in the information encryption unit 132 in detail.

The common key R from the common key generation unit 54 is input to the mask generation unit 1322. Further, the counter mode _p g (g = _1~G) is also input to the mask generator 1322. The value of G will be described later. The counter mode p _g, a constant which has been predetermined by the transmitter and the receiver, for example, a p g ₌ 0‖1. In mask generation unit 1322, the mask M counter mode p _g using the common key R is generated. Actually, in the process of the mask generation means 1322, one MAC performs G processes, but for simplicity of explanation, there are G MACs 1320g (g = 1,..., G) in FIG. It is described as being provided. Detailed processing will be described below.

A counter mode authenticator CTag _g is generated pseudo-randomly by the MAC 1320g. Specifically, it is generated by CTag _g = MAC _R (p _g ). Here, the MAC that generates an authenticator pseudo-randomly will be described. The MAC that generates a pseudo-random authenticator is a PRF (Pseudo Random Function) type MAC, and has higher security than a normal MAC. For example, block cipher based OMAC, hash function type HMAC, etc. are PRF type MACs. The generated CTag _g is input to the authenticator coupling unit 1323.

In the authenticator combination means 1323, the authenticators CTag _g (g = 1,..., G) are combined to obtain the mask M. Specifically, M = MAC _R (p ₁ ) ‖MAC _R (p ₂ ) ‖,. . . , ‖MAC _R (p _G ). The generated mask M is input to the provisional ciphertext generation unit 1324.

  The provisional ciphertext generation unit 1324 (OTP) encrypts the plaintext m using the mask M and generates a provisional ciphertext c ′. Specifically, the exclusive OR of the plaintext m and the mask M is calculated, that is, the provisional ciphertext c ′ is generated by calculating the following equation.

  The obtained temporary ciphertext c ′ is input to the constant adding unit 1325 and the combining unit 1328.

The following describes the values of G Counter mode _p g (g = _1~G). As described above, the provisional ciphertext generation unit 1324 calculates the exclusive OR of the mask M and the plaintext m. Therefore, the bit length of the mask M and the bit length of the plaintext m must match. The bit length α of the mask M generated by the mask generation unit 1322 (MAC) is determined in advance (for example, α = 128 bits). Therefore, if the bit length of the plaintext m is β, the value obtained by dividing β by α and raising the quotient is the value of G.

  For example, if the bit length β of the plaintext m is 500 bits and the bit length α of the mask M is 128 bits, 500 ÷ 128 = 3.90625, and the value “4” obtained by raising the quotient is the value of G. However, in this example, the bit length β of the plaintext m is 500 bits, the bit length α of the mask M is 128 × 4 = 512 bits, and α and β do not match. Therefore, in this case, the mask M may be cut out by 12 bits and the values of α and β may be made to coincide.

Constants addition means 1325, a counter mode _{p g + 1} which is input as the temporary ciphertext c 'is coupled c'‖p _{g + 1} is determined. The obtained c′‖pg _{+ 1} is input to the authenticator generation means 1326. The counter mode _{pg + 1} is also a constant determined in advance between the sender and the receiver.

The authenticator generation unit 1326 generates the authenticator Tag of c′‖pg _{+ 1} using the common key R safely against the relation key attack (securely RKA). Specifically, it is generated by Tag = MAC _R (p _{g + 1} ‖c ′). The generated Tag is input to the combining unit 1328.

  In the combining unit 1328, the provisional ciphertext c 'and Tag are combined to obtain the ciphertext c. Specifically, it is generated by c = c′‖Tag.

In addition, the common key encryption unit 94 (see FIG. 18) generates an encrypted common key z _i by calculating an exclusive OR of the secret key a _i and the common key R. Specifically, it is obtained by the following formula.

As described above, the mask generation unit 1322 (MAC) and the authenticator generation unit 1326 (MAC) are the same. By adding the constant _{pn + 1} to the temporary ciphertext c from the temporary ciphertext generation means 1324 by the constant addition means 1325, it is possible to encrypt information using only one common key.

Next, points to be noted about the mask generation unit 1322 will be described. As described above, the mask generation unit 1322 (MAC) and the authenticator generation unit 1326 (MAC) are the same algorithm. Normally, the MAC only accepts input of data that is a multiple of a certain bit length γ (for example, multiple bits of 512). Therefore, the bit length and the counter mode p _g which is input to the mask generator 1322, the bit length of p _{g + 1} ‖c inputted to the authentication code generation unit 1326 regardless of whether or not a multiple-bit data γ Normally, data is always added (padding). While maintaining the uniqueness of p _g and p _{g + 1} ‖c data because, and the bit length is so that a multiple of gamma.

Further, the counter mode _{p g (g = 1, ...} , G) each value, the counter mode _p g after padding (g = 1, ..., G ) respective _{values, p g + 1 ‖c} value, All values of pg ₊ 1‖c after padding must be different.

This is because the attacker can freely see the mask M from the mask generator 1322 and the authenticator Tag from the authenticator generator 1326. In If If the value of the values and (after padding) p g _{+ 1} ‖c of an inputted (after padding) counter mode p _g is the same, can determine the MAC, from DEM itself is unsafe is there.

  Since other processes are the same as those in the first embodiment, a description thereof will be omitted.

  As described above, the plaintext m (information) can be encrypted with one common key by configuring the DEM as the information encryption unit 132. Therefore, the key length problem that cannot be solved in the first embodiment can be solved. In the second embodiment, an example in which the information encryption unit 132 is applied to the KEM-OTP-DEM transmission device 130 has been described. I can do it.

  Further, by making the MAC (mask generation unit 1322 or authenticator generation unit 1326) PRF type, more efficient encrypted broadcast communication can be performed.

  Next, the receiving device 140i will be described. The difference from the receiving device 120i described in the first embodiment is that the processing content of the confirmation authenticator generation unit 1482i, the processing content of the information decryption unit 146i, and the mask generation unit 144i are newly added.

In mask generation unit 144i, a common key R, using a counter mode _{p g,} the mask M is generated (step S100). Here counter mode p _g used is identical to the counter mode p _g used in the mask generation means 1322 on the transmission side. The mask M is input to the information decoding unit 146i.

  The information decryption unit 146i decrypts the temporary ciphertext c ′ using the mask M, and obtains the plaintext m. Specifically, it is obtained by the following equation (step S102).

Also, the confirmation authenticator Tag ′ is generated by the confirmation authenticator generation means 1482i. Specifically, Tag ′ = MAC _r (p _{n + 1} ‖c ′) is generated (step S104). The authenticator Tag ′ for confirmation is input to the determination unit 1244i.

  Since other processes are the same as those of the receiving apparatus 120i of the first embodiment, a description thereof will be omitted.

  In addition to the above embodiments, the broadcast encryption method and decryption method according to the present invention are not limited to the above-described embodiments, and can be appropriately changed without departing from the spirit of the present invention. In addition, the processes described in the broadcast encryption method and the decryption method are not only executed in time series according to the order of description, but also in parallel or individually as required by the processing capability of the apparatus that executes the process. It may be executed.

  Further, when the processing in the broadcast encryption method and decryption method of the present invention is realized by a computer, the processing contents of the functions that the broadcast encryption method and decryption method should have are described by a program. By executing this program on a computer, processing functions in the broadcast communication encryption method and the decryption method are realized on the computer.

  The program describing the processing contents can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. As the computer-readable recording medium, for example, any recording medium such as a magnetic recording device, an optical disk, a magneto-optical recording medium, and a semiconductor memory may be used. Specifically, for example, as a magnetic recording device, a hard disk device, a flexible disk, a magnetic tape or the like is used as an optical disc, and a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc), a DVD-RAM (Random Access Memory), a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read Only Memory), a CD-R (Recordable). ) / RW (ReWritable), etc., magneto-optical recording medium, MO (Magneto-Optical disc), etc., semiconductor memory, EEP-ROM (Electronically Erasable Programmable-Read Only Memory), etc. can be used.

  The program is distributed by selling, transferring, or lending a portable recording medium such as a DVD or CD-ROM in which the program is recorded. Furthermore, the program may be distributed by storing the program in a storage device of the server computer and transferring the program from the server computer to another computer via a network.

  A computer that executes such a program first stores, for example, a program recorded on a portable recording medium or a program transferred from a server computer in its own storage device. When executing the process, the computer reads a program stored in its own recording medium and executes a process according to the read program. As another execution form of the program, the computer may directly read the program from a portable recording medium and execute processing according to the program, and the program is transferred from the server computer to the computer. Each time, the processing according to the received program may be executed sequentially. Further, the above-described processing may be executed by a so-called ASP (Application Service Provider) type service that realizes a processing function only by an execution instruction and result acquisition without transferring a program from the server computer to the computer. Good. Note that the program in this embodiment includes information that is used for processing by an electronic computer and that conforms to the program (data that is not a direct command to the computer but has a property that defines the processing of the computer).

  In this embodiment, a broadcast encryption method and a decryption method are configured by executing a predetermined program on a computer. However, at least a part of these processing contents is realized by hardware. It is good as well.

Claims (4)

An information encryption method using a common key,
A transmission apparatus, a common key generation process in which the common key is generated by the common key generation means;
Transmitting device, authentication code generation means, by using the common key, and securely, mask generation process that generates an equal mask bit length of the communication object information to related key attacks,
A temporary ciphertext generation process in which the transmitting device generates a temporary ciphertext by encrypting the information by calculating an exclusive OR of the mask and the information by a temporary ciphertext generation means;
A constant adding process in which the transmitting device combines the input constant and the temporary ciphertext by the constant adding means to generate a constant-added temporary ciphertext;
An authenticator generating process in which the transmitting device generates the authenticator of the temporary ciphertext safely using the common key and the constant-added temporary ciphertext using the common key and the constant-added temporary ciphertext;
An information encryption method, characterized in that the transmitting apparatus includes a combining step of encrypting the information by combining the temporary ciphertext and the authenticator by combining means. An information encryption device using a common key,
A common key generation unit for generating the common key;
By using the common key, and securely, authenticator generating unit that generates an equal mask bit length of the communication object information to related key attacks,
A temporary ciphertext generation unit that generates a temporary ciphertext by encrypting the information by calculating an exclusive OR of the mask and the information;
A constant adding unit that combines the input constant and the temporary ciphertext to generate a constant-added temporary ciphertext;
Using the common key and the constant-added temporary ciphertext, the authenticator generation unit that generates an authenticator of the temporary ciphertext safely against a relational key attack;
An information encryption apparatus comprising: a combining unit that encrypts the information by combining the temporary ciphertext and the authenticator.   A program for causing a computer to execute each step of the method according to claim 1.   A computer-readable recording medium on which the program according to claim 3 is recorded.

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