JP5032550B2 - Electronic device, game machine, main control board, peripheral board, authentication method and authentication program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that include a plurality of boards and authenticate communication between these boards.

  Conventionally, in an electronic apparatus having a plurality of substrates, various techniques have been proposed for preventing fraud on these substrates. As an electronic device provided with a plurality of substrates, for example, there is a pachinko gaming machine. The pachinko gaming machine includes a main control board that controls the operation of the entire electronic device and a controlled board (peripheral board) that performs the operation of each part of the electronic device. The main control board outputs a control signal including a control command to the peripheral board, and the other peripheral boards have a function of executing an operation according to the control signal transmitted from the main control board.

  Examples of frauds with respect to the main control board include a method of replacing a regular main control board with an illegal control board, or altering a program code that defines processing performed by the main control board. In order to prevent such fraud, for example, a technique has been proposed in which program data stored in a ROM mounted in the main control board is checked by a ROM checker to prevent unauthorized exchange of the ROM ( For example, see the following Patent Document 1.)

  As another method, the ROM mounted in the peripheral board such as the display control unit holds in advance an expected value for collating other boards, and this expected value is compared with the main control board and When the sum of IDs (unique values) of other peripheral boards matches, a technique for detecting that an illegal board has been inserted by authenticating other boards has been proposed (for example, (See Patent Document 2 below.)

JP 11-333108 A JP-A-2005-21330

  However, according to the technique disclosed in Patent Document 1 described above, although falsification of program data can be detected, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a controlled board. Can not. For this reason, there is a problem that the controlled substrate performs unauthorized control by the control signal output from the unauthorized control substrate.

  Here, a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art will be described with reference to FIGS. 16 and 17. FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an outline of a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art. FIG. 17 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of inserting an unauthorized control board. As shown in FIG. 16, the regular main control board 1601 outputs a regular control signal RS to the peripheral board 1602 to control the operation of the peripheral board 1602. The regular main control board 1601 is provided with an inspection port 1603. The program data stored in the ROM or the like provided inside the regular main control board 1601 is inspected from the inspection port 1603 to inspect whether the regular main control board 1601 is fraudulent.

  However, as shown in FIG. 17, an unauthorized control board 1701 may be inserted between the regular main control board 1601 and the peripheral board 1602. The unauthorized control board 1701 discards or ignores the regular control signal RS output from the regular main control board 1601 and outputs an unauthorized control signal FS to the peripheral board 1602 instead. Here, the peripheral board 1602 cannot determine whether the input signal is the normal control signal RS or the illegal control signal FS. For this reason, there is a problem that the peripheral board 1602 operates in accordance with an illegal control signal FS.

  In addition, since the inspection port 1603 is provided only on the regular main control board 1601, even if the inspection using the inspection port 1603 is performed, the inspection result for the process in the regular main control board 1601 is returned. . For this reason, there is a problem that even if the inspection using the inspection port 1603 is performed, the unauthorized control by the unauthorized control board 1701 cannot be detected.

  Further, with the technique of Patent Document 2 described above, it can be detected that an unauthorized control board has been inserted. However, since the ID changes when the substrate is changed, there is a problem that the expected value must be rewritten every time another substrate is changed. Therefore, there is a problem that the setting of the board for performing authentication of the main control board and other peripheral boards must be changed every time the main control board and other peripheral boards are changed, which is troublesome.

  Further, in the technique of Patent Document 2, when any of the boards is changed, an abnormality canceling switch is provided that automatically updates the expected value with the sum of the IDs of the changed main control board and other peripheral boards. . However, for example, if the abnormality release switch is operated while an unauthorized substrate is inserted, there is a problem that the unauthorized substrate is authenticated as a regular substrate.

  The present invention corrects the expected value used for authenticating the main control board by a simple method in order to solve the above-mentioned problems caused by the prior art, and also performs illegal control from the main control board to the peripheral board, the expected value and It is an object of the present invention to provide an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that can prevent the use of information related to authentication.

  In order to solve the above-described problems and achieve the object, an electronic device according to a first aspect of the present invention includes a main control unit that transmits a control command, and a predetermined control based on the control command transmitted by the main control unit. A peripheral unit that performs processing, wherein the main control unit is a data storage unit that stores predetermined data, and the data used for generating authentication data for authenticating the main control unit. A determination unit for determining an amount (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”), and dividing the data in the data storage unit into the data amount, and performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on the divided data. Authentication data generating means for generating the authentication data corresponding to the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”), held in the peripheral part, and transmitted from the main control unit Correction data generation means for generating correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value used for verification of the authentication data, and dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions When the control command transmitted to the peripheral part is a predetermined control command, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation unit is used as the control command. When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral portion is a predetermined control command before adding the authentication data for the number of divisions, the correction data generated by the correction data generating means When the control command added to the control command and transmitted to the peripheral part is a predetermined control command, the authentication data Or adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generating means to the control command to which the correction data is not added, and the control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter, “ The control command with correction data ”, the control command with the authentication data added (hereinafter referred to as“ control command with authentication data ”), or the control command with the dummy authentication data added (hereinafter referred to as“ dummy authentication data ”). Transmission means for transmitting the control command to the peripheral portion, the peripheral portion including the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data, or the dummy authentication transmitted by the main control portion. A receiving means for receiving a control command with data; and the correction data by the receiving means. When the control command with the correction data is received, the correction means for correcting the expected value held in the peripheral portion using the control command with the correction data, and the binary operation on the authentication data for the number of divisions And authenticating means for authenticating the main control unit based on whether or not the value calculated by the two-term operation matches the expected value corrected by the correcting means, The authentication means identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control unit is established, and performs the authentication. It is characterized by performing.

  According to the first aspect of the present invention, when the control command transmitted from the main control unit is a predetermined control command, correction data or authentication data is added to the control command. Thereby, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted independently, the communication load between a main control part and a peripheral part can be reduced. Moreover, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted alone, the possibility that correction data or authentication data is extracted from communication data and analyzed can be reduced. In addition, since the correction process or authentication process for correcting the expected value is performed only when a predetermined control command is transmitted, the main control is compared with the case where the authentication process or the correction process is performed when all control commands are transmitted. The processing load on the part and the peripheral part can be reduced. In addition, since the correction process can be performed before the authentication process is performed, for example, even if the main control unit is changed, the changed main control unit can be authenticated as a regular board.

  According to the first aspect of the present invention, the main control unit can select an arbitrary timing before starting to transmit the authentication data for the number of divisions or after starting to transmit the authentication data for the number of divisions until the transmission is completed. The correction data is transmitted. Accordingly, the main control unit can transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions. For example, when the division number obtained by generating the authentication data is 3, the main control unit transmits the correction data at an arbitrary timing until the transmission of the third authentication data is completed. Can do. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of transmitting the correction data. Further, the number of divisions is a value that only the main control unit knows, and the peripheral unit can know the number of authentication data (number of connections) subjected to the binary operation when authentication to the main control unit is established. it can. For this reason, the third party cannot know the number of divisions. For example, even if one authentication data is known to a third party, the value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is the third party. Can be prevented from being known. The value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit in the peripheral part. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the third party from stealing the correction data and the value for establishing the authentication for the main control unit, so that the authentication strength can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 1, the main control unit generates dummy data (dummy authentication data) of the authentication data based on the number of divisions obtained by generating the authentication data and transmits it to the peripheral unit. . In addition, the peripheral part identifies authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (number of connections) that has been subjected to binary operation when authentication with respect to the main control part is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control unit and the peripheral unit, a third party cannot distinguish between authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, the authentication data for the number of divisions is stolen by a third party, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is combined, so that the value for establishing authentication for the main control unit may be illegally stolen. Can be reduced. Thereby, the intensity | strength of the authentication process between a main control part and a peripheral part can be improved.

  According to the first aspect of the invention, the amount of data used for generating the authentication data is determined instead of determining the number of divisions. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  According to a second aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the first aspect, the determining means determines the data amount for each of the authentication data, and the authentication data generating means The authentication data is generated using the data for the data amount determined for each data.

  According to the second aspect of the present invention, the amount of data can be determined every time each authentication data is generated. Thereby, compared with the case where the data amount is determined in advance, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be further reduced.

  The electronic device according to a third aspect of the invention is the electronic device according to the first or second aspect, wherein the authenticating means satisfies two or more types of two satisfying a coupling law for the authentication data for the number of divisions. An operation is performed, and the main control unit is authenticated based on whether or not any of two or more values calculated by the binomial operation matches the expected value.

  According to the invention of claim 3, the peripheral unit performs all binary operations that can be selected when generating authentication data in the main control unit with respect to the authentication data transmitted from the main control unit. Then, a value used for collation of the main control unit is calculated for each of the two terms. Then, the peripheral unit authenticates the main control unit based on whether any of the values used for collation of the main control unit matches the expected value. Thus, the peripheral unit can generate a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit without knowing the number of authentication data necessary for establishing authentication or the calculation method used for generating authentication data. Yes, the authentication process of the main control unit can be performed. Further, since the number of persons who can know the number of authentication data for generating a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit can be limited, the strength of authentication can be improved.

  The electronic device according to a fourth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to third aspects, wherein the dummy authentication data generating means generates the same number of dummy authentication data as the number of divisions, The authentication unit performs the authentication by identifying, as the dummy authentication data, values corresponding to the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication is established.

  According to the fourth aspect of the present invention, the peripheral portion uses the same number of dummy authentication data as the authentication data, and performs the same processing as when authentication data is received. As a result, the peripheral unit temporarily authenticates the main control unit in the same manner as the authentication process is performed by receiving authentication data corresponding to the number of regular divisions, such as the processing time in the peripheral unit or the amount of heat generated by the process. (Hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication process”). Therefore, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing at which the authentication process is performed in the peripheral portion. For this reason, the intensity | strength of authentication can be raised more.

  The electronic device according to a fifth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to the fourth aspect, wherein the adding means adds the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after adding the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions. A control command with authentication data is added, and the authentication means becomes a target of the two-term operation among the values received immediately after the authentication data subjected to the two-term operation when the authentication is established. Further, the authentication is performed by identifying values corresponding to the number of the authentication data as the dummy authentication data.

  According to the invention of claim 5, the peripheral part can identify the data corresponding to the number of combinations received immediately after the authentication data as dummy authentication data. Thereby, it is possible to identify the authentication data and the dummy authentication data without increasing the processing load on the peripheral portion, and perform the authentication process or the dummy authentication process.

  An electronic device according to a sixth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to fifth aspects, wherein the adding means uses the correction data, the authentication data, or the dummy authentication data in the same manner. It is added to a type of control command.

  According to the sixth aspect of the present invention, correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data is added to the same type of control command, so that the same type of control command is transmitted in the correction processing, authentication processing, or dummy authentication processing. Can only be done when For this reason, the processing load on the main control unit and the peripheral part due to the correction process, the authentication process or the dummy authentication process is reduced as compared with the case where the correction process, the authentication process or the dummy authentication process is performed when all the control commands are transmitted. Can do. For example, when correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data is added to the jackpot command sent to the peripheral part by the main control unit, the jackpot command is sent for each round of jackpot, so during a certain period of time in the jackpot state Correction processing and authentication processing can be performed. Furthermore, the dummy authentication process can be performed at a timing other than the timing at which the correction process or the authentication process is performed. For this reason, the time interval between the correction process and the authentication process is shortened, and further, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing for performing the correction process or the authentication process. As a result, the strength of the authentication process can be improved.

  The electronic device according to a seventh aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to fifth aspects, wherein the adding means adds the correction data to the authentication data or the dummy authentication data. The control command is added to a different type of control command.

  According to the seventh aspect of the present invention, by adding correction data to a control command of a type different from the control command to which authentication data is added, the main control unit can correct the correction data or the authentication according to the control command transmission order. Correction data or authentication data can be added so that the data is transmitted in the desired order. In this case, for example, the main control unit adds correction data or authentication data to a control command in which the order of transmission from the main control unit to the peripheral unit is determined. Accordingly, the main control unit can transmit the correction data or the authentication data at an arbitrary timing without increasing the processing load on the main control unit. Specifically, for example, the main control unit can transmit the correction data before the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions is transmitted. More specifically, for example, when the main control unit adds authentication data to the jackpot command and adds correction data to the jackpot reach command or jackpot start command transmitted before the jackpot command, the authentication process is performed. Correction processing can be performed before it is performed.

  According to the invention of claim 7, the peripheral part can identify the correction data and the authentication data or the dummy authentication data according to the type of the control command. Here, the peripheral part identifies authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of divisions. Accordingly, the peripheral part can identify the correction data, the authentication data, or the dummy authentication data and perform the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process without increasing the processing load on the peripheral part.

  According to an eighth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to any one of the first to seventh aspects, the correction data generating means is configured such that the main control unit is changed to another main control unit. In this case, correction data for correcting the expected value held in the peripheral portion to an expected value used for collation of data transmitted from the other main control unit is generated.

  According to the eighth aspect of the invention, the correction process can be performed every time the main control unit is changed. For this reason, it is possible to prevent the expected value held in the peripheral part from being corrected, although the main control part is changed.

  An electronic device according to a ninth aspect of the invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to eighth aspects, wherein the correction data generation means uses a unique value stored in the data storage means. The correction data is generated.

  According to the ninth aspect of the present invention, when there are a plurality of main control units, it is possible to generate correction data with values that can recognize each main control unit. As a result, the expected value can be set to a value unique to each main control unit, so that it becomes easier to detect an unauthorized substrate and the strength of authentication can be improved.

  An electronic device according to a tenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to the ninth aspect, wherein the correction data generation means is configured to store the data storage means when the main control section is changed to another main control section. The difference between the unique value set in the main controller before being changed and the unique value set in the other main controller after being changed is stored in It is generated as data.

  According to the tenth aspect of the present invention, when there are a plurality of main control units, it is possible to generate correction data based on a difference in values that can recognize each main control unit. As a result, the expected value can be set to a value unique to each main control unit, so that it becomes easier to detect an unauthorized substrate and the strength of authentication can be improved.

  An electronic device according to an eleventh aspect of the invention is the electronic device according to the ninth or tenth aspect, wherein the correction data generating means uses the control command to add the correction data together with the specific value. It is characterized by generating data.

  According to the eleventh aspect of the present invention, the correction data is generated using the predetermined control command transmitted together with the correction data. In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of a regular main control unit. Therefore, if the correction data is generated using the control command to be transmitted this time, even if the correction data is reused by an unauthorized control board, the correction data and the control command cannot be matched, and fraud is detected. be able to.

  An electronic apparatus according to a twelfth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to eighth aspects, wherein the correction data generation means uses the program data stored in the data storage means. Correction data is generated.

  According to the twelfth aspect of the present invention, correction data is generated using program data such as instruction codes and fixed data stored in the main control unit. Thereby, fraud such as rewriting of program data stored in the main control unit or replacement of the main control unit can be detected.

  According to a thirteenth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the twelfth aspect, the correction data generation means generates the correction data using the control command for adding the correction data together with the program data. It is characterized by doing.

  According to the thirteenth aspect of the present invention, the correction data is generated using the control command (predetermined control command) transmitted together with the correction data. In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of a regular main control unit. Therefore, if the correction data is generated using the control command to be transmitted this time, even if the correction data is reused by an unauthorized control board, the correction data and the control command cannot be matched, and fraud is detected. be able to.

  An electronic device according to a fourteenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to thirteenth aspects, wherein the authentication data generating means uses the program data stored in the data storage means. The authentication data is generated.

  According to the fourteenth aspect of the present invention, the authentication data is generated using the program data stored in the main control unit. Thereby, fraud such as rewriting of program data stored in the main control unit or replacement of the main control unit can be detected.

  According to a fifteenth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the fourteenth aspect, the authentication data generating means generates the authentication data using the control command that adds the authentication data together with the program data. It is characterized by doing.

  According to the fifteenth aspect of the present invention, the authentication data is generated using the predetermined control command transmitted together with the authentication data. Therefore, if the authentication data is generated using the control command to be transmitted this time, even if the authentication data is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data and the control command cannot be matched, and fraud is detected. be able to.

  An electronic device according to a sixteenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to fifteenth aspects, wherein the authentication data generating means encrypts the authentication data by a predetermined encryption method, The authenticating means decrypts the authentication data by a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method, and performs the authentication.

  According to the sixteenth aspect of the present invention, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data generation method is analyzed or the authentication data is reused.

  An electronic device according to a seventeenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to sixteenth aspects, wherein the two or more binary operations are addition and exclusive OR operations. Features.

  According to the seventeenth aspect of the present invention, addition and exclusive OR operation can be switched and used as the binary operation used for generating the authentication data.

  An electronic device according to an invention of claim 18 is the electronic device according to any one of claims 1 to 17, wherein the correction means is configured such that the control command transmitted from the main control unit includes the correction data. In the case of a control command, the expected value held in the peripheral portion is corrected using the control command with correction data.

  According to the eighteenth aspect of the present invention, the peripheral portion can determine whether or not to perform the correction process only by confirming whether or not the correction data is added to the control command. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the processing load on the peripheral part due to the correction process.

  An electronic device according to a nineteenth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to seventeenth aspects, wherein the correction means is configured such that the control command transmitted from the main control unit is the predetermined control. If it is a command, the expected value held in the peripheral portion is corrected using the control command with correction data.

  According to the nineteenth aspect of the present invention, the peripheral unit can confirm the type of the control command transmitted by the main control unit and determine whether or not to perform the correction process. Therefore, it is possible to facilitate the timing design between the process based on the control command and the correction process.

  An electronic device according to a twentieth aspect of the invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to twentieth aspects, wherein the peripheral portion is notified when the main control portion is not authenticated by the authenticating means. Output means for outputting a signal is provided.

  According to the twentieth aspect of the present invention, the user can be notified that fraud has been made to the main control unit.

  A gaming machine according to a twenty-first aspect of the invention includes the electronic device according to any one of the first to twentieth aspects, the main control unit transmits the control command with authentication data, and the peripheral unit An authentication process is performed based on the control command with authentication data transmitted by the main control unit.

  According to the twenty-first aspect of the present invention, the function of the electronic device according to the first to twentieth aspects can be applied to a gaming machine such as a pachinko gaming machine.

  A main control board according to the invention of claim 22 is a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command for causing a peripheral board to perform a predetermined process, and is a data storage means for storing predetermined data. Determining means for determining the amount of data used to generate authentication data for authenticating the main control board (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”), and converting the data in the data storage means to the data amount An authentication data generating means for performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling rule on each of the divided data and generating the authentication data for the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”); Correction data that generates correction data for correction processing that corrects an expected value that is held in the peripheral board and used for verification of the authentication data transmitted from the main control board Generating means, dummy authentication data generating means for generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions, and the control command transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command If it is, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation means is added to the control command, and transmitted to the peripheral board before the authentication data for the number of divisions is transmitted. When the control command is a predetermined control command, the correction data generated by the correction data generation means is added to the control command, and the control command transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command. The dummy authentication data generation is added to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added. Adding means for adding the dummy authentication data generated by the stage, the control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), and the control command to which the authentication data is added ( And a transmission means for transmitting the control command to which the dummy authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) to the peripheral board. It is characterized by.

  According to the invention of claim 22, when the control command transmitted from the main control board is a predetermined control command, correction data or authentication data is added to the control command. Thereby, the communication load between the main control board and the peripheral board can be reduced as compared with the case where the correction data or the authentication data is transmitted alone. Moreover, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted alone, the possibility that correction data or authentication data is extracted from communication data and analyzed can be reduced. In addition, the correction process or the authentication process for correcting the expected value is performed only when a predetermined control command is transmitted. Therefore, the authentication process is performed when all control commands are transmitted. The processing load on the substrate can be reduced. Further, since the correction process can be performed before the authentication process is performed, for example, even if the main control board is changed, the changed main control board can be reliably authenticated as a regular board.

  According to the invention of claim 22, the main control board can perform arbitrary timing before starting to transmit the authentication data for the number of divisions or from the start of transmission of the authentication data for the number of divisions to the end of transmission. Then, the correction data is transmitted to the peripheral board. As a result, the main control board can transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data transmitted last among the authentication data for the number of divisions. For example, when the division number obtained by generating the authentication data is 3, the main control board can transmit the correction data at an arbitrary timing until the transmission of the third authentication data is completed. it can. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of transmitting the correction data. Further, the number of divisions is a value that only the main control board knows, and the peripheral board knows the number of authentication data (the number of connections) that has been subjected to the binary operation when authentication for the main control board is established. it can. For this reason, the third party cannot know the number of divisions. For example, even if one authentication data is known to a third party, the value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is the third party. Can be prevented from being known. The value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is a value for establishing authentication for the main control board in the peripheral board. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the third party from stealing the correction data and the value for establishing the authentication for the main control board, so that the authentication strength can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 22, the main control board generates dummy data of the authentication data (dummy authentication data) based on the number of divisions obtained by generating the authentication data and transmits it to the peripheral board. . In addition, the peripheral board identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (number of couplings) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control board is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control board and the peripheral board, a third party cannot distinguish between authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, the authentication data for the number of divisions is stolen by a third party, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is combined, so that the value for establishing authentication for the main control board may be illegally stolen. Can be reduced. Thereby, the strength of the authentication process between the main control board and the peripheral board can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 22, the amount of data used for generating the authentication data is determined instead of determining the division number itself. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  The peripheral board according to the invention of claim 23 determines the amount of data (hereinafter referred to as “data quantity”) used to generate authentication data for authenticating the main control board, and stores the stored data in the peripheral board. The data is divided into data amounts, and the binary data satisfying the combination rule is performed on the divided data, and the authentication data for the number of divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) is generated, Correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value used for verification of the authentication data held and transmitted from the main control board is generated, and dummy data (hereinafter, “ When the control command transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command, the generated authentication data for the number of divisions is used as the control command. In addition, before the transmission of the authentication data for the number of divisions is completed, if the control command transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command, the generated correction data is added to the control command, and the peripheral command is transmitted. When the control command to be transmitted to the board is a predetermined control command, the control command in which the generated dummy authentication data is added to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added and the correction data is added. (Hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), a control command to which the authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”) or a control command to which the dummy authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”). Process corresponding to the control command transmitted from the main control board. A receiving means for receiving the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data, or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control board; When a control command with correction data is received, correction means for correcting the expected value held on the peripheral board using the control command with correction data, and two items for the authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions An authentication unit that performs an operation and authenticates the main control board based on whether or not the value calculated by the binary operation and the expected value corrected by the correction unit match. The authentication means is based on the number of the authentication data subjected to the calculation of the two terms when the authentication for the main control board is established. The authentication data and the dummy authentication data are identified and the authentication is performed, and the authentication means performs two or more types of binary operations that satisfy a combining law on the authentication data for the number of divisions, The main control board is authenticated based on whether or not any of two or more values calculated by a binary operation matches the expected value.

  According to the twenty-third aspect of the present invention, when the control command transmitted from the main control board is a predetermined control command, correction data or authentication data is added to the control command. Thereby, the communication load between the main control board and the peripheral board can be reduced as compared with the case where the correction data or the authentication data is transmitted alone. Moreover, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted alone, the possibility that correction data or authentication data is extracted from communication data and analyzed can be reduced. In addition, the correction process or the authentication process for correcting the expected value is performed only when a predetermined control command is transmitted. Therefore, the authentication process is performed when all control commands are transmitted. The processing load on the substrate can be reduced. Further, since the correction process can be performed before the authentication process is performed, for example, even if the main control board is changed, the changed main control board can be authenticated as a regular board.

  According to the invention of claim 23, the final expected value used for collation is known by not holding the fixed value, which is the final expected value (corrected expected value) itself used for collation of the main control board, in the peripheral board. The person who gets can be limited. As a result, it is possible to reduce risks such as leakage of information regarding expected values.

  According to the invention of claim 23, the peripheral board performs all the binary operations that can be selected when generating the authentication data in the main control board with respect to the authentication data transmitted from the main control board. And a value used for collation of the main control board is calculated for each binary operation. Then, the peripheral board authenticates the main control board based on whether any of the values used for matching the main control board matches the expected value. This allows the peripheral board to generate a value for establishing authentication for the main control board without knowing the number of authentication data necessary for establishing authentication or the calculation method used for generating authentication data. Yes, the authentication process of the main control board can be performed. In addition, since the number of persons who can know the number of authentication data for generating a value for establishing authentication for the main control board can be limited, the strength of authentication can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 23, the peripheral board is configured to use the authentication data and the dummy authentication based on the number of authentication data (number of couplings) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control board is established. Identify the data. The number of divisions is a value that only the main control board knows, and the peripheral board can know the number of authentication data (number of connections) that has been subjected to the binary operation when authentication for the main control board is established. For this reason, the third party cannot know the number of connections, and therefore cannot know the timing of the authentication process or the dummy authentication process. Therefore, the strength of the authentication process between the main control board and the peripheral board can be improved.

  An authentication method according to the invention of claim 24 is an electronic device comprising: a main control unit that transmits a control command; and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on the control command transmitted by the main control unit. A determination step of determining an amount of data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate authentication data for authenticating the main control unit in the main control unit; The predetermined data stored in the section is divided into the data amount, the binary data satisfying the combining law is performed on the divided data, and the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”). ) Authentication data generation step for generating the authentication data, and a correction for correcting the expected value used for collation of the authentication data held in the peripheral part and transmitted from the main control part. A correction data generating step for generating correction data for processing; a dummy authentication data generating step for generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions; When the control command to be transmitted is a predetermined control command, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation step is added to the control command, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is added. When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral portion is a predetermined control command before finishing, the correction data generated by the correction data generation step is added to the control command and transmitted to the peripheral portion. If the control command is a predetermined control command, the control data to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added is added. An addition step of adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generation step to the command, the control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), the authentication data The control command to which is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”) or the control command to which the dummy authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) is transmitted to the peripheral portion. A receiving step for receiving the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data, or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control unit in the peripheral portion, and When the control command with correction data is received by the receiving process, the correction data A correction process for correcting the expected value held in the peripheral portion using a control command with a data, and a binary operation is performed on the authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions. An authentication step of authenticating the main control unit based on whether or not the expected value corrected by the correction step matches the value, and the authentication step includes: The authentication is performed by identifying the authentication data and the dummy authentication data on the basis of the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication is established.

  According to the twenty-fourth aspect of the present invention, when the control command transmitted from the main control unit is a predetermined control command, correction data or authentication data is added to the control command. Thereby, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted independently, the communication load between a main control part and a peripheral part can be reduced. Moreover, compared with the case where correction data or authentication data is transmitted alone, the possibility that correction data or authentication data is extracted from communication data and analyzed can be reduced. In addition, since the correction process or the authentication process for correcting the expected value is performed only when a predetermined control command is transmitted, the main control unit and peripheral devices are compared with the case where the authentication process is performed when all control commands are transmitted. The processing load on the part can be reduced. In addition, since the correction process can be performed before the authentication process is performed, for example, even if the main control unit is changed, the changed main control unit can be authenticated as a regular board.

  Further, according to the invention of claim 24, the main control unit can perform arbitrary timing before starting to transmit the authentication data for the number of divisions or from the start of transmitting the authentication data for the number of divisions to the end of transmission. Then, the correction data is transmitted to the peripheral part. Accordingly, the main control unit can transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions. For example, when the division number obtained by generating the authentication data is 3, the main control unit can transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data transmitted third. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of transmitting the correction data. Further, the number of divisions is a value that only the main control unit knows, and the peripheral unit can know the number of authentication data (number of connections) subjected to the binary operation when authentication to the main control unit is established. it can. For this reason, the third party cannot know the number of divisions. For example, even if one authentication data is known to a third party, the value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is the third party. Can be prevented from being known. The value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions is a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit in the peripheral part. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the third party from stealing the correction data and the value for establishing the authentication for the main control unit, so that the authentication strength can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 24, the main control unit generates dummy data of the authentication data (dummy authentication data) based on the number of divisions obtained by generating the authentication data and transmits it to the peripheral unit. . In addition, the peripheral part identifies authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (number of connections) that has been subjected to binary operation when authentication with respect to the main control part is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control unit and the peripheral unit, a third party cannot distinguish between authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, the authentication data for the number of divisions is stolen by a third party, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is combined, so that the value for establishing authentication for the main control unit may be illegally stolen. Can be reduced. Thereby, the intensity | strength of the authentication process between a main control part and a peripheral part can be improved.

  According to the invention of claim 24, the amount of data used for generating the authentication data is determined instead of determining the number of divisions itself. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  An authentication method according to the invention of claim 25 is the authentication method according to claim 24, wherein the authentication step performs two or more binary operations that satisfy a combining rule for the authentication data for the number of divisions. And the main control unit is authenticated based on whether any of the two or more values calculated by the binary operation matches the expected value.

  According to the invention of claim 25, the peripheral unit performs all the binary operations that can be selected when generating the authentication data in the main control unit with respect to the authentication data transmitted from the main control unit. Then, a value used for collation of the main control unit is calculated for each of the two terms. Then, the peripheral unit authenticates the main control unit based on whether any of the values used for collation of the main control unit matches the expected value. Thus, the peripheral unit can generate a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit without knowing the number of authentication data necessary for establishing authentication or the calculation method used for generating authentication data. Yes, the authentication process of the main control unit can be performed. For example, even if the number of divisions and the calculation method are not known, the peripheral unit can generate a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit, and can authenticate the main control unit. Further, since the number of persons who can know the number of authentication data for generating a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit can be limited, the strength of authentication can be improved.

  An authentication program according to a twenty-sixth aspect of the present invention causes a computer to execute the authentication method according to the twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth aspect.

  According to the invention of claim 26, it is possible to cause a computer to execute the authentication method according to claim 24 or 25.

  According to the electronic device, the gaming machine, the main control board, the peripheral board, the authentication method, and the authentication program according to the present invention, the expected value used for authenticating the main control board is corrected by a simple method, and from the main control board There is an effect that it is possible to prevent unauthorized control on the peripheral board and diversion of information on expected values and authentication.

It is a front view which shows an example of the game board of the pachinko game machine of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the internal structure of the control part of a pachinko game machine. It is a block diagram which shows the functional structure of a main control board and a peripheral board | substrate. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a time chart which shows the transmission timing of a jackpot related command. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the symbol variation process by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the process at the time of the big hit by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the lamp control process at the time of the symbol variation by a lamp control part. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the data format of the control signal which a main control part outputs. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the production | generation method of the authentication data (inspection value) in a main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the transmission process of the control signal by a main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the reception process of the control signal by an effect control part. It is a sequence diagram which shows an example of the flow of the control signal between control parts. It is a sequence diagram which shows an example of the flow of the control signal between control parts. It is explanatory drawing which shows the outline | summary of the fraud prevention technique by a prior art. It is explanatory drawing which shows the example of insertion of an unauthorized control board.

(Embodiment)
Referring to the accompanying drawings, control signals between a pachinko gaming machine having the function of an electronic device according to the present invention and a plurality of boards (main control board and peripheral board) mounted on the pachinko gaming machine will be described below. A preferred embodiment of an authentication method and an authentication program for authenticating an included control command will be described in detail.

(Basic configuration of pachinko machine)
FIG. 1 is a front view showing an example of a game board of a pachinko gaming machine according to the present invention. A game ball launched by driving a launching unit (see FIG. 2) arranged at a lower position of the game board 101 ascends between the rails 102a and 102b and reaches an upper position of the game board 101, and then the game area 103 Fall inside. A plurality of nails (not shown) are provided in the game area 103, and a game ball is dropped in various directions, and a windmill or a prize opening that changes the fall direction of the game ball is placed in the middle of the fall. Is arranged.

  A symbol display unit 104 is arranged at the center of the game area 103 of the game board 101. As the symbol display unit 104, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD) is used. The symbol display unit 104 is not limited to the LCD, and a CRT or the like can also be used. Below the symbol display unit 104, a start winning port 105 for starting winning is arranged. Winning gates 106 are arranged on the left and right of the symbol display unit 104, respectively.

  The winning gate 106 is provided to detect the passing of the game ball and perform a lottery to open the start winning opening 105 for a predetermined time. A normal winning opening 107 is disposed on the side of the symbol display unit 104 or below. When a game ball wins the normal winning opening 107, the number of winning balls (for example, 10) at the time of the normal winning is paid out. At the bottom of the game area 103, there is provided a collection port 108 for collecting game balls that have not won any winning ports.

  The symbol display unit 104 described above starts a variation in the display of a plurality of symbols when a game ball is won at a specific winning opening (at the time of starting winning), and the symbol stops after a predetermined time. When the specific symbols (for example, “777”) are aligned at the time of the stop, a big hit state is obtained. In the big hit state, the big winning opening 109 located below repeats opening for a predetermined period for a predetermined round (for example, 15 rounds), and pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning game balls.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of the control unit of the pachinko gaming machine. The control unit 200 includes a plurality of control units. In the example of illustration, it has the main control part 201 and the peripheral part (The effect control part 202, the prize ball control part 203). The main control unit 201 controls basic operations related to the game of the pachinko gaming machine. The production control unit 202 controls the production operation during the game. The prize ball control unit 203 controls the number of prize balls to be paid out.

  Based on the program data stored in the ROM 212, the main control unit 201 executes a CPU 211 that performs basic processing as the game content progresses, a RAM 213 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 211 performs arithmetic processing, and each detection unit 221- An interface (I / F) 214 that receives various data from the H.224 and transmits various data to the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 is configured. The main control unit 201 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called main control board.

  On the input side of the main control unit 201, a start winning port detection unit 221 that detects a winning ball that has won a winning winning port 105, a gate detection unit 222 that detects a game ball that has passed through the winning gate 106, and a normal win An ordinary winning opening detection unit 223 that detects a game ball won in the mouth 107 and a large winning opening detection unit 224 that detects a winning ball won in the big winning opening 109 are connected via the I / F 214. These detection units can be configured using proximity switches or the like.

  A prize winning opening / closing part 231 is connected to the output side of the main control part 201, and the opening / closing of the prize winning opening / closing part 231 is controlled. The special prize opening / closing unit 231 has a function of opening the special prize opening 109 for a certain period of time when a big hit is made, and is configured using a solenoid or the like. This jackpot is programmed in advance to occur with a predetermined probability (for example, 1/300, etc.) based on the generated random number (random number for jackpot determination).

  The effect control unit 202 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 242 based on these commands to perform effect control during the game. The effect control unit 202 includes a CPU 241 that executes effect processing, a RAM 243 that functions as a data work area during the calculation processing of the CPU 241, a VRAM 244 that writes image data to be displayed on the symbol display unit 104, and various types from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 245 for receiving data and transmitting various data to the lamp control unit 251 and the voice control unit 252 is provided. The effect control unit 202 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called effect board. In addition, the above-described symbol display unit (LCD) 104, lamp control unit 251, and voice control unit 252 are connected to the output side of the effect control unit 202 via the I / F 245.

  The winning ball control unit 203 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 282 based on these commands to perform winning ball control. The prize ball control unit 203 includes a CPU 281 that executes prize ball control processing, a RAM 283 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 281 performs arithmetic processing, and various data reception and emission units 292 from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 284 that transmits and receives various data is provided. The prize ball control unit 203 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called prize ball substrate.

  The winning ball control unit 203 performs control for paying out the number of winning balls at the time of winning a prize to the connected paying unit 291. In addition, an operation of launching a game ball with respect to the launch unit 292 is detected, and the launch of the game ball is controlled. The payout unit 291 includes a motor for paying out a predetermined number from the game ball storage unit. The winning ball control unit 203 controls the paying unit 291 to pay out the number of winning balls corresponding to the game balls won in each winning port (start winning port 105, normal winning port 107, large winning port 109). Do it.

  The launcher 292 launches a game ball for a game, and includes a sensor that detects a game operation by the player, a solenoid that launches the game ball, and the like. When the prize ball control unit 203 detects a game operation by the sensor of the launch unit 292, the prize ball control unit 203 intermittently fires a game ball by driving a solenoid or the like in response to the detected game operation, and the game area 103 of the game board 101 A game ball is sent out.

  The main control unit 201, the effect control unit 202, and the prize ball control unit 203 configured as described above are provided on different printed circuit boards (main control board, effect board, and prize ball board). For example, the prize ball control unit 203 can be provided on the same printed circuit board as the main control unit 201.

(Functional configuration of main control board and peripheral board)
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a main control board (main control unit) and peripheral boards (effect control unit, prize ball control unit). First, a functional configuration of the main control board 310 having a function as the main control unit 201 will be described. As shown in FIG. 3, the main control board 310 is a functional unit that transmits a control command for operating the peripheral board 330, and includes a control command storage unit 311, a data storage unit 312, a correction data generation unit 313, and a determination unit. 314, an authentication data generation unit 315, a dummy authentication data generation unit 316, an addition unit 317, and a transmission unit 318.

  The control command storage unit 311 stores control command data (control command data) transmitted to the peripheral board 330. The data storage unit 312 stores program data such as values unique to the main control board 310, predetermined instruction codes, and fixed data. The value unique to the main control board 310 is a value by which each main control board 310 can be identified when there are a plurality of main control boards 310, for example.

  For example, the main control board 310 selects a control command to be transmitted from the control command storage unit 311 to the peripheral board 330 according to predetermined program data stored in the data storage unit 312 and transmits the control command to the peripheral board 330. To do. As the data storage unit 312, for example, a part of the ROM 212 (see FIG. 2) of the main control unit 201 can be used. Note that the control command storage unit 311 and the data storage unit 312 may not be provided separately, but may be integrated. For example, control command data, program data, and values unique to the main control board 310 may be stored in the data storage unit 312.

  The correction data generation unit 313 generates correction data for correcting an expected value used for collation of data transmitted from the main control board 310. The expected value is, for example, a value that is held in advance (such as during manufacturing) on the peripheral board 330 and is a value that is used when collating data transmitted from the main control board 310 on the peripheral board 330. Further, the expected value is not a fixed value, but may be a value generated by calculation from a basic value, for example. Also, the peripheral board 330 may hold one expected value for one main control board 310, or may hold a plurality of expected values for every binary operation used for generating authentication data. Also good. When there are a plurality of main control boards 310, the expected values are different for each main control board 310. Therefore, for example, when the main control board 310 is changed to another main control board 310, even if the other main control board 310 is a valid main control board 310, the expected value of the peripheral board 330 is not corrected. The peripheral board 330 may not be verified, or the legitimate main control board 310 may be determined to be an illegal control board. In order to prevent such a verification failure, the main control board 310 transmits correction data for correcting the expected value held in the peripheral board 330 to the peripheral board 330.

  The timing at which the correction data generation unit 313 generates the correction data is, for example, when the main control board 310 is changed to another main control board 310. In this case, the correction data generation unit 313 uses the expected value corresponding to the main control board 310 before the change held in the peripheral board 330 for the verification of the data transmitted from the other main control board 310 after the change. Correction data for correcting the value is generated.

  Also, the timing at which the correction data generation unit 313 generates the correction data is switched, for example, when the main control board 310 generates authentication data when the peripheral board 330 has only one expected value. This is the case. In this case, the correction data generation unit 313 corresponds to the expected value corresponding to the main control board 310 before the main control board 310 switches the calculation method, and corresponds to the main control board 310 after the main control board 310 switches the calculation method. Correction data for correcting the expected value to be generated is generated.

  As a method of generating correction data by the correction data generation unit 313, correction data may be generated using a unique value or program data stored in the data storage unit 312. Specifically, for example, when the main control board 310 is changed to another main control board 310, the correction data generation unit 313 includes a unique value and data set in the other main control board 310 after the change. A difference from the unique value set in the main control board 310 before the change stored in the storage unit 312 is generated as correction data. Furthermore, the correction data generation unit 313 may generate correction data using the control command transmitted this time together with the unique value. Further, the correction data generation unit 313 may generate correction data using program data stored in the data storage unit 312. Further, the correction data generation unit 313 may generate correction data using the control command transmitted this time together with the program data.

  The determination unit 314 determines the amount of data (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) used to generate authentication data for authenticating the main control unit 201. For example, the determination unit 314 determines a value generated by a random number generation circuit or a random number generation program as a data amount, or determines a value generated in another process of the main control board 310 as a data amount.

  The authentication data generation unit 315 generates authentication data for authenticating the main control board 310. The authentication data generation unit 315 selects a predetermined binary operation from two or more types of binary operations that satisfy the combining rule, and divides the data in the data storage unit 312 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314. Then, a predetermined binary operation is performed on each of the divided data to generate authentication data for the number of divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”). Specifically, the authentication data generation unit 315 divides the program data stored in the data storage unit 312 and the value unique to the main control board 310 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314, and the number of divisions Generate authentication data. The binary operation satisfying the combining rule is, for example, addition or exclusive OR operation. In this case, the authentication data generation unit 315 selects either addition or exclusive OR operation, performs the selected operation on each of the divided data, and generates authentication data for the number of divisions.

  Further, when generating authentication data, the authentication data generation unit 315 uses all data stored in the data storage unit 312 without duplication. Specifically, for example, the amount of data determined by the determination unit 314 is read sequentially from the top of the address in the data storage unit 312 to generate authentication data.

  The authentication data generation unit 315 may generate authentication data using program data stored in the data storage unit 312, for example. Further, the authentication data generation unit 315 may generate the authentication data using the control command transmitted this time together with the program data. Further, the authentication data generation unit 315 may generate authentication data using a control command in a control signal described later. In this case, the authentication data generation unit 315 divides the control command together with the data in the data storage unit 312 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314. The authentication data is used by an authenticator (peripheral board 330) to verify that the main control board 310 is a legitimate main control board 310 by performing verification using an expected value held in the peripheral board 330. Information.

  Here, the authentication data generation unit 315 is used to generate the next authentication data out of all the binary operations held by the main control board 310 based on the number of divisions obtained by generating the authentication data. Select a binary operation. Specifically, for example, when the division number is an odd number, the calculation is changed to a calculation different from the calculation used this time, and when the division number is an even number, the same calculation as this time is used. Further, the authentication data generation unit 315 may select a binary operation used for generation of the next authentication data based on the number of divisions that can be predicted when generating the authentication data. Further, the authentication data generation unit 315 may hold only one binary operation that satisfies the combining law.

  The dummy authentication data generation unit 316 generates dummy data of authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions known by the authentication data generation unit 315. For example, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 generates the same number of dummy authentication data as the number of divisions. Specifically, for example, when the number of divisions known by the authentication data generation unit 315 is 2, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 generates two dummy authentication data. As will be described later, the two dummy authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral board 330 immediately after the authentication data is transmitted, for example. The number of divisions is a value that only the main control board 310 knows. Therefore, the third party cannot distinguish between the authentication data and the dummy authentication data, and the third party can prevent the authentication data from being illegally stolen.

  The dummy authentication data is data transmitted in order to prevent a third party from analyzing the transmission timing of regular authentication data. The dummy authentication data and the authentication data are generated so that the peripheral board 330 cannot be identified. Thereby, persons other than the main control board 310 can be made unable to distinguish the authentication data from the dummy authentication data. The dummy authentication data may be, for example, authentication data used for another authentication process different from the authentication process performed between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330.

  Further, the number of dummy authentication data generated may be appropriately determined between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330. For example, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 may generate dummy authentication data for the number of divisions for each dummy authentication data timing, or the timing at which the authentication data generation unit 315 can know or predict the number of divisions. One dummy authentication data may be generated. For example, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 may generate dummy authentication data when the number of divisions is an odd number. Further, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 may generate dummy authentication data by the number of values obtained by performing a predetermined operation on the number of divisions, or by switching the arrangement of the number of dummy authentication data generations according to the number of divisions Also good.

  Further, the dummy authentication data generation unit 316 may generate dummy authentication data of the same number as the number of divisions, for example, with the data amount determined by the determination unit 314, similarly to the authentication data generation unit 315. As a result, the main control board 310 can generate dummy authentication data with the same amount of heat when generating dummy authentication data as that of generating and transmitting authentication data for the number of regular divisions. For this reason, it can further prevent that the transmission timing of regular authentication data is analyzed by a third party.

  The adding unit 317 generates the control signal by adding the correction data generated by the correction data generating unit 313 to the control command transmitted to the peripheral board 330. The adding unit 317 generates a control signal by adding the authentication data generated by the authentication data generating unit 315 to the control command transmitted to the peripheral board 330. The adding unit 317 generates a control signal by adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generating unit 316 to a control command to which correction data or authentication data is not added.

  In addition, the adding unit 317 performs control so that correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data is transmitted in a desired order to a control command in which the order of transmission from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 330 is determined. Correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data may be added according to the command transmission order. Here, the control command for adding correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data may be a similar type of control command or a different type of control command.

  Specifically, for example, when the control command transmitted to the peripheral board 330 is a jackpot command, the adding unit 317 may add correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data to the jackpot command. For example, when the control command for adding authentication data or dummy authentication data for the number of divisions is a jackpot command, the adding unit 317 corrects the jackpot reach command or jackpot start command transmitted before the jackpot command. Data may be added.

  Further, the adding unit 317 adds correction data to a predetermined control command before adding the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generating unit 315 to another control command. Specifically, the adding unit 317 can transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions. More specifically, the adding unit 317 may transmit the correction data before transmitting the authentication data to be transmitted third when the number of divisions known by the authentication data generating unit 315 is 3, for example. it can.

  The adding unit 317 adds dummy authentication data to a predetermined control command at a timing other than the timing of adding the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generating unit 315. At this time, the adding unit 317 may add dummy authentication data for the number of divisions to a predetermined control command. Further, the adding unit 317 may add dummy authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after adding authentication data for the number of divisions, for example.

  The timing for adding dummy authentication data may be appropriately determined between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330. For example, when the number of divisions known by the authentication data generation unit 315 is 2, dummy authentication data may be added to every two control commands transmitted to the peripheral board 330. Further, the arrangement of timing for adding dummy authentication data may be switched depending on the number of divisions.

  Further, the adding unit 317 adds authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions for each control command transmitted to the peripheral board 330. The order of adding authentication data for the number of divisions is arbitrary. The adding unit 317 may add the authentication data to the control command in the order in which the authentication data is generated, or may add the authentication data to the control command in an order different from the order in which the authentication data is generated. Further, the adding unit 317 adds dummy authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions for each control command transmitted to the peripheral board 330. The order of adding dummy authentication data for the number of divisions is arbitrary.

  The adding unit 317 may add correction data to a plurality of control commands during the period from when the power is turned on to when the power is turned off. Further, after adding correction data to a control command, the adding unit 317 may add authentication data or dummy authentication data to all control commands, or may add authentication data to any control command. .

  The transmission unit 318 includes a control command to which correction data is added by the adding unit 317 (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”) and a control command to which authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”). Alternatively, a control command to which dummy authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) is transmitted to the peripheral board 330.

  Further, the transmission unit 318 transmits the control command with correction data to the peripheral board 330 before the transmission of the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions is completed. For example, when the command to be transmitted this time is a jackpot command, the transmission unit 318 may transmit the control command with authentication data or the control command with correction data for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330. Further, when the command to be transmitted this time is a jackpot command, the transmission unit 318 may transmit the control command with dummy authentication data for the number of divisions. At this time, the transmitting unit 318 may transmit dummy authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after transmitting authentication data for the number of divisions.

  Further, when the command to be transmitted this time is not a jackpot command, the transmission unit 318 may transmit a control command to which correction data or authentication data is not added or a control command with dummy authentication data to the peripheral board 330. Note that even if the command to be transmitted this time is a jackpot command, the transmission unit 318 may transmit a control command with dummy authentication data to the peripheral board 330 when correction data or authentication data is not added.

  As described above, the adding unit 317 and the transmission unit 318 can transmit the correction data to the peripheral board 330 before the authentication process of the main control board 310 is performed in the peripheral board 330. For this reason, for example, when the main control board 310 is changed to another main control board 310, it is possible to prevent the authentication process from being performed before the expected value is corrected.

  In addition, when the correction data is added in this way, for example, the authentication data generation unit 315 generates authentication data using a binary operation selected from a plurality of binary operations held by the main control board 310. In addition, the peripheral board 330 can correct the expected value every time the main control board 310 switches the calculation method. Accordingly, it is possible to prevent the legitimate main control board 310 from being authenticated as an invalid main control board 310 in the authentication process on the peripheral board 330.

  Further, the addition unit 317 and the transmission unit 318 add the correction data to the control command and send the control command with correction data to the peripheral board 330 before the transmission of the control commands with authentication data for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330 is completed. Send. By transmitting the correction data in this way, for example, the correction data can be transmitted between one authentication data and the next authentication data. As a result, the third party cannot identify whether the correction data or the authentication data is added to the control command, so that the third party can know when the correction data is transmitted. Can be prevented.

  Further, the addition unit 317 and the transmission unit 318 transmit authentication data-attached control commands for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330. Since the number of divisions is a value that only the main control board 310 knows, the third party cannot know the number of authentication data transmitted to the peripheral board 330. As a result, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing a value calculated by combining authentication data for the number of divisions (a value for establishing authentication for the main control board 310). Therefore, since it is possible to prevent the correction data and the value for establishing authentication with respect to the main control board 310 from being stolen, the strength of authentication can be improved.

  Further, the adding unit 317 and the transmitting unit 318 transmit the control command with dummy authentication data for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330. Thus, for example, when the peripheral board 330 receives dummy authentication data for the number of divisions, the peripheral board 330 can perform the same processing as when authentication data is received using the same number of dummy authentication data as the authentication data. . As a result, the peripheral board 330 has the same processing time as the peripheral board 330 or the amount of heat generated by the process when receiving the normal authentication data and performing the authentication process. Temporary authentication processing (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication processing”) can be performed.

  The adding unit 317 and the transmission unit 318 transmit the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330 immediately after transmitting the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions to the peripheral board 330. Thereby, the peripheral board 330 can identify the data corresponding to the number of connections received immediately after the authentication data as dummy authentication data. For this reason, it is possible to identify the authentication data and the dummy authentication data without increasing the processing load on the peripheral portion, and perform the authentication process or the dummy authentication process.

  Further, by adding correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data to the same type of control command by the addition unit 317 and the transmission unit 318, correction processing and authentication processing are performed only when the same type of control command is transmitted. Alternatively, a dummy authentication process can be performed. For this reason, the processing load on the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330 due to the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process is smaller than when the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process is performed when all the control commands are transmitted. Can be reduced. For example, when correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data is added to the jackpot command transmitted from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 330, the jackpot command is transmitted for each round of jackpot, so the jackpot state is constant. Correction processing and authentication processing can be performed during the period. Furthermore, the dummy authentication process can be performed at a timing other than the timing at which the correction process or the authentication process is performed. For example, the peripheral substrate 330 can perform a dummy authentication process immediately after performing the authentication process. For this reason, the time interval between the correction process and the authentication process is shortened, and further, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing for performing the correction process or the authentication process. As a result, the strength of the authentication process can be improved.

Further, by adding authentication data or dummy authentication data to the same type of control command by the addition unit 317 and the transmission unit 318, even if the type of the control command to which the authentication data is added is known to a third party, the authentication It is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of transmitting data. For this reason, authentication data can be prevented from being stolen by a third party.

  Further, the addition unit 317 and the transmission unit 318 add the correction data to the control command of a type different from the control command to which the authentication data is added and transmit the control command so that the main control board 310 follows the control command transmission order. The correction data or the authentication data can be added so that the correction data or the authentication data is transmitted in a desired order. In this case, for example, the main control board 310 adds correction data or authentication data to a control command in which the order of transmission from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 330 is determined. As a result, the main control board 310 can transmit the correction data or the authentication data at an arbitrary timing without increasing the processing load of the main control unit. In addition, the main control board 310 can transmit the correction data before the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions is transmitted, for example. More specifically, for example, when the main control board 310 adds authentication data to the jackpot command and adds correction data to the jackpot reach command or jackpot start command transmitted before the jackpot command, the authentication process is performed. Correction processing can be performed before this is performed.

  Further, by adding the correction data to the control command of a type different from the control command for adding the authentication data or the dummy authentication data by the adding unit 317 and the transmitting unit 318, the peripheral board 330 transmits the type of the control command. Thus, the correction data and the authentication data or the dummy authentication data can be identified. Here, the peripheral board 330 identifies authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of divisions. Accordingly, the peripheral board 330 can identify the correction data, the authentication data, or the dummy authentication data and perform the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process without increasing the processing load on the peripheral board 330. At this time, the main control board 310 may add dummy authentication data to a control command of a type different from the control command to which authentication data is added.

  Since the correction data of the expected value is transmitted from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 330, when the main control board 310 is changed, the peripheral board 330 is changed or the expected value held in the peripheral board 330 is changed. Even if the setting is not changed, the expected value corresponding to the changed main control board 310 can be easily corrected. Further, the transmission unit 318 does not transmit the expected value as it is, but transmits only the correction value. Therefore, for example, even if data transmitted by a third party is stolen, the expected value is not decoded, so that the strength of the authentication process can be improved.

  In addition, when adding correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data to a predetermined type of control command, the adding unit 317 adds correction data, authentication data to the control signal only when, for example, a jackpot command is transmitted to the peripheral board 330. Alternatively, dummy authentication data is added. For this reason, for example, a conventional main control board that transmits only control signals that do not add correction data, authentication data, and dummy authentication data is used to transmit control signals that include correction data, authentication data, and dummy authentication data. In the case of changing to the main control board 310 according to the present embodiment, it is possible to save the trouble of adding correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data addition processing to the transmission processing of all control commands. As described above, since it is only necessary to add an additional process to the transmission process of a single control command, it is easy to set a difficulty for adding a process, and the time required for the setting can be shortened.

  Next, a functional configuration of the peripheral board 330 having functions as peripheral portions such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 will be described. As shown in FIG. 3, the peripheral board 330 such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 includes a reception unit 331, a correction unit 332, a calculation value storage unit 333, an authentication unit 334, and a notification signal output unit 335. The

  The receiving unit 331 receives a control signal including the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data, or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control board 310. The receiving unit 331 determines whether the received control signal is a control signal including any one of a control command with correction data, a control command with authentication data, or a control command with dummy authentication data in a predetermined order. You may judge. In this case, the receiving unit 331 does not have to identify whether the received data is authentication data or dummy authentication data.

  The calculated value storage unit 333 extracts authentication data from the control command with authentication data received by the receiving unit 331, and performs a binary operation on the authentication data to obtain an inspection value. Then, the calculated value storage unit 333 combines the acquired inspection value and the inspection value already stored in the calculated value storage unit 333, and stores the combined inspection value. At this time, the calculated value storage unit 333 is the authentication data extracted from the authentication data extracted from the control command with authentication data, among the authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions necessary for establishing the authentication for the main control board 310, at first. In the case of data, the inspection value is stored without performing the combining process on the inspection value acquired from the authentication data. The calculation method selected by the calculation value storage unit 333 is set to match the binary calculation used by the main control board 310 to generate the authentication data. A method of combining the inspection values acquired from the authentication data and generating a value for establishing authentication for the main control board 310 will be described later.

  Further, the calculated value storage unit 333 extracts dummy authentication data from the control command with dummy authentication data received by the receiving unit 331 and performs a calculation on the dummy authentication data to obtain a temporary inspection value. Good. As the calculation method at this time, the same calculation method as the binary operation performed on the authentication data may be used, or a different calculation method may be used. The calculated value storage unit 333 may use the temporary inspection value obtained by performing calculation on the dummy authentication data for other (different types) of authentication processing. The other authentication processing is, for example, authentication processing that does not require expected value correction processing. Further, the temporary inspection value obtained by performing an operation on the dummy authentication data may be information for performing the dummy authentication process. In this case, even if the control command with dummy authentication data is received by the reception unit 331, the calculated value storage unit 333 may perform the same processing as when the control command with authentication data is received by the reception unit 331. it can.

  Further, the calculated value storage unit 333 deletes the inspection value stored in the calculated value storage unit 333 when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. That is, the calculated value storage unit 333 performs a combining process on the inspection value extracted from the authentication data until the authentication for the main control board 310 is established, and stores the combined inspection value. Further, when the calculated value storage unit 333 stores the temporary inspection value obtained by performing the calculation on the dummy authentication data in the calculated value storage unit 333, the calculated value is authenticated with respect to the main control board 310. It may be deleted when is established. Moreover, when the temporary test value is used for another authentication process, the calculated value storage unit 333 may be deleted when another authentication is established.

  Further, for example, when performing two or more types of binary operations on the extracted authentication data, the calculated value storage unit 333 may store an inspection value for each binary operation. In this case, the calculation value storage unit 333 can generate a value that establishes authentication for the main control board 310 without the peripheral board 330 knowing the binary calculation selected by the main control board 310. For example, even after the power is turned on, even if the authentication for the main control board 310 has not yet been established, the peripheral board 330 can generate a value for establishing the authentication for the main control board 310. The control board 310 can be authenticated.

  When the correction unit with correction data is received by the reception unit 331, the correction unit 332 corrects the expected value held on the peripheral board 330 using the control command with correction data. When the received correction data is encrypted, the correction unit 332 corrects the expected value using a value obtained by restoring the correction data. Further, the correction unit 332 may correct all of the plurality of expected values when the peripheral substrate 330 holds a plurality of expected values for every binary operation held by the main control board 310. In this case, the correction unit 332 may receive a plurality of correction data corresponding to each of a plurality of expected values. Further, when the received correction data is correction data for one expected value among a plurality of expected values, the correcting unit 332 authenticates at least one expected value among the plurality of expected values with respect to the main control board 310. You may correct | amend so that it may become a value which corresponds with the value to be materialized.

  Further, when the correction unit 332 can identify an expected value to be corrected among a plurality of expected values held by the peripheral board 330, the correction unit 332 may correct only the expected value used for the verification of the main control board 310. Good. When the expected value to be corrected can be identified, for example, when the peripheral board 330 knows the number of authentication data (the number of connections) when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established, the main control board 310 This is a case where the binary operation used for the next authentication process can be known from all the binary operations held by.

  The expected value correction timing is when the division number is determined by the main control board 310 knowing or predicting the division number, for example. In this case, the main control board 310 generates correction data according to the expected value to be corrected, and transmits this correction data to the peripheral board 330. The correction unit 332 corrects the expected value using the correction data transmitted from the main control board 310. Accordingly, the correction unit 332 can perform the correction process before the authentication process is performed after the peripheral substrate 330 switches the binary operation.

  For example, the correction unit 332 determines whether or not correction data is added to the control command. When the correction data is added to the control command, the correction unit 332 corrects the expected value of the peripheral board 330 using the correction data. The correction unit 332 determines whether or not the control command is a predetermined control command when correction data is added to the predetermined type of control command, and when the control command is the predetermined control command. The expected value of the peripheral substrate 330 may be corrected using the correction data.

  When the authentication unit 334 receives the control command with authentication data by the receiving unit 331, the authentication unit 334 determines whether the value calculated using the control command with authentication data matches the expected value corrected by the correction unit 332 or not. Based on this, the main control board 310 is authenticated. For example, the authentication unit 334 determines whether or not authentication data is added to the control command. If the authentication data is added to the control command transmitted from the main control board 310, the authentication unit 334 uses the control command with authentication data. The main control board 310 is authenticated based on whether or not the calculated value matches a predetermined expected value.

  Here, the predetermined expected value is, for example, a value obtained by performing the above-described binary operation on all data in the data storage unit 312. The binary operation performed by the authentication unit 334 and the binary operation performed by the authentication data generation unit 315 of the main control board 310 are the same type of binary operation. Since this binary operation satisfies the combining law, the expected value generated from all the data in the data storage unit 312 matches the value obtained by performing the same operation on the authentication data generated from the divided data. . As a result, the authentication unit 334 can authenticate the validity of the main control board 310.

  Specifically, the authentication unit 334 authenticates the main control board 310 based on whether or not the inspection value stored in the calculation value storage unit 333 matches the expected value corrected by the correction unit 332. . The expected value is a value calculated by performing a binary operation on predetermined data in the data storage unit 312. Further, the inspection value stored in the operation value storage unit 333 is obtained by performing a binary operation on the authentication data generated by dividing predetermined data in the data storage unit 312 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314. This is a value obtained by combining the calculated values. Since the binary operation satisfies the combining law, the inspection value stored in the operation value storage unit 333 matches the expected value. Accordingly, the authentication unit 334 authenticates the validity of the main control board 310.

  In addition, when the receiving unit 331 receives the control command with dummy authentication data, the authentication unit 334 temporarily authenticates the main control board 310 (dummy authentication processing). Specifically, for example, when the authentication unit 334 receives the control command with dummy authentication data by the reception unit 331, the temporary inspection value stored in the calculation value storage unit 333 does not match the expected value. Also, the main control board 310 is authenticated. Further, the authentication unit 334 may authenticate the main control board 310 by omitting the process of whether or not the temporary inspection value stored in the calculation value storage unit 333 matches the expected value. By doing in this way, even when the receiving unit 331 receives the dummy authentication data, the peripheral board 330 has the same amount of heat generated during the processing time or processing as when receiving the normal authentication data. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing at which regular authentication data is received in the peripheral board 330. Thereby, the strength of authentication can be further increased.

  Further, the authentication unit 334 stores any one of the inspection values generated for every binary operation stored in the operation value storage unit 333 and held in the main control board 310 and the expectation corrected by the correction unit 332. The main control board 310 may be authenticated based on whether or not the values match. As a result, the peripheral board 330 combines the authentication data for the number of divisions without having to know the number of authentication data necessary for establishing authentication or the calculation method used to generate the authentication data. Authentication processing can be performed. In addition, it is possible to limit the number of persons who can know the number of authentication data for generating a value for establishing authentication for the main control board 310, and the strength of authentication can be improved.

  Further, when correction data, authentication data, or dummy authentication data is added to a predetermined type of control command, the authentication unit 334 determines, for example, whether the control command is a jackpot command, and from the main control board 310, When the transmitted control command is a jackpot command, the main control board 310 may be authenticated based on whether or not the value calculated using the control command with authentication data matches the expected value.

  Further, the calculated value storage unit 333 and the authentication unit 334 authenticate the authentication data based on the number of authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “the number of connections”) subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. And dummy authentication data are identified. For example, after receiving as many pieces of authentication data as the target of the binary operation when the authentication is established, the combined number data is identified as dummy authentication data. Specifically, for example, out of the data received immediately after the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication is established, the number of authentication data corresponding to the binary operation when the authentication is established. Identify the data as dummy authentication data. More specifically, when the number of authentication data subjected to binary operation when authentication is established is 2, two of the data received immediately after receiving the two authentication data are dummy authentication data. Identify as.

  Since the number of authentication data (number of connections) subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established matches the number of divisions, the calculated value storage unit 333 and the authentication unit 334 determine which data Whether it is dummy authentication data can be identified. Therefore, the peripheral board 330 can identify the authentication data and perform the authentication process on the regular main control board 310 even when the authentication data and the dummy authentication data are mixed.

  Here, since the number of divisions is a value that only the main control board 310 knows, the third party cannot know the timing when the authentication of the main control board 310 is established. Further, the peripheral board 330 identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (number of couplings) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. For this reason, the number of couplings is a value that only the peripheral substrate 330 knows. Therefore, since the third party cannot know the number of divisions and the number of connections, the authentication data and the dummy authentication data cannot be identified. For this reason, authentication data for the number of divisions may be stolen by a third party, and authentication data for the number of divisions may be combined to illegally steal values for establishing authentication for the main control board 310. And the strength of the authentication process between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330 can be improved.

In addition, when the processing amount when the normal authentication data is received and the processing amount when the dummy authentication data is received in the peripheral board 330 are different, the third party knows when the authentication data is transmitted. There is a possibility that. For this reason, for example, dummy authentication processing may be performed using dummy authentication data so that the processing amount in the peripheral substrate 330 does not vary.

  If the main control board 310 is not authenticated by the authentication unit 334, the notification signal output unit 335 outputs a notification signal. When the peripheral board 330 is the effect control unit 202, the notification signal output unit 335 outputs the symbol display unit 104, the lamp control unit 251, the sound control unit 252 (see FIG. 2), and the like, for example. The notification signal output unit 335 may output a notification signal to a center control device that manages pachinko gaming machines.

  Based on the notification signal output by the notification signal output unit 335, the symbol display unit 104, the lamp control unit 251, and the audio control unit 252 notify that there is a possibility that the main control board 310 has been cheated. Execute. This effect is, for example, causing a character that does not normally appear in the symbol display unit 104 to appear, or causing a character that normally appears to appear in a manner different from normal. Further, the luminance of the symbol display unit 104 may be changed, the color may be changed, or the lamp control unit 251 may be controlled to display a predetermined lamp 261. In any case, it is only necessary for employees to be aware of the condition when passing in front of the pachinko machine. Further, this effect may be an effect that the customer does not notice the state or an effect that the customer can easily notice. If the production is easily noticed by the customer, fraud can be efficiently suppressed.

  In addition, information related to the gaming state of the pachinko gaming machine, such as “Big hit” or “Probability changing” may be included in the notification signal. Based on the information on the gaming state, a determination may be made as to whether an illegal act has been performed by a center control device that manages pachinko gaming machines. For example, there may be cases where winnings are concentrated during jackpots or probability fluctuations, even if the winnings are concentrated. Therefore, during the jackpot or the probability fluctuation, it is better to determine whether there is a possibility of fraudulent behavior under conditions different from other states. Moreover, you may make it output the information regarding a gaming state as another signal, without including in a notification signal. In this case, the employee determines whether there is a risk of fraud based on both the notification signal and the information regarding the gaming state.

  In FIG. 3, the expected value may be transmitted to the peripheral board 330 from another component. The other components are, for example, other peripheral units, a dedicated processing unit for generating expected values (hereinafter referred to as “expected value calculating unit”), and the like. The main control unit and the expected value calculation unit may transmit an expected value stored in advance to the peripheral board 330, or may generate an expected value for each matching process. Also, a coefficient necessary for calculating an expected value may be transmitted from an external device to the peripheral board 330 or the expected value calculation unit via an external connection I / F (not shown). As described above, when the expected value is not stored in advance in the peripheral substrate 330 and acquired from another component unit, the correction unit 332 acquires the correction value from the correction data received by the reception unit 331, and the authentication unit 334 also determines whether the value calculated using the acquired expected value and the correction value matches the value calculated using the control command with authentication data received by the receiving unit 331. Good.

  Further, the peripheral board 330 may not hold the expected value (final expected value) itself after correction as a fixed value. In this case, for example, the design is made so that the authentication is not established when the authentication data is received unless the correction process using the correction data is performed from the time of manufacture. By doing in this way, the person who can know the final expected value can be limited, and the risk of leakage of information related to the expected value can be reduced.

  The adding unit 317 may add the correction value in a distributed manner. For example, in the case of a 16-bit correction value, the upper 8 bits and the lower 8 bits may be added in two portions. Note that the number of bits to be divided is arbitrary, and the bit positions may be random. That is, a 16-bit correction value may be added in three steps, for example, 2 bits, 5 bits, and 9 bits, regardless of the bit position. In this case, correction values may be sequentially added to the number of control commands in which correction values are dispersed from a predetermined control command. The receiving unit 331 may determine that the number of control commands obtained by dispersing correction values from predetermined control commands is a control command with correction data. The number of variances of correction values may be set in advance on the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 330.

  Further, the correction data generation unit 313 and the authentication data generation unit 315 may perform a plurality of encryption processes on the correction data and the authentication data. Further, the correction data generation unit 313 and the authentication data generation unit 315 may perform encryption processing by selecting one of two or more types of encryption methods. In this case, in the peripheral board 330, the error check value is obtained by decoding by two or more kinds of decoding methods, and when any of the obtained error check values matches the expected value by the authentication unit 334, The main control board 310 may be authenticated.

  Further, the authentication data generation unit 315 may change the authentication data encryption method based on the number of divisions obtained by generating the authentication data. Specifically, for example, when the division number is an odd number, the encryption method is changed to an encryption method different from the encryption method used this time, and when the division number is an even number, the encryption method is the same as the encryption method used this time. In this case, if the encryption method in the authentication data generation unit 315 is changed based on the number of divisions, the authentication unit 334 performs authentication performed by the authentication unit 334 when authentication for the main control board 310 is established. The decoding method may be changed based on the number of data.

(Basic operation of pachinko machines)
An example of the basic operation of the pachinko gaming machine having the above configuration will be described. The main control unit 201 outputs the winning status of the game ball for each winning port to the winning ball control unit 203 as a control command. The winning ball control unit 203 pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning situation in accordance with the control command output from the main control unit 201.

  The main control unit 201 outputs a corresponding control command to the effect control unit 202 every time a game ball wins the start winning opening 105, and the effect control unit 202 displays the symbols on the symbol display unit 104 in a variable manner. Repeat to stop. When the occurrence of the big hit has been determined, the corresponding control command is output to the effect control unit 202, and the effect control unit 202 stops with a predetermined pattern aligned. At the same time, control for opening the special winning opening 109 is performed. The effect control unit 202 displays various effects on the symbol display unit 104 in addition to the symbol variation display during the jackpot occurrence period, during the reach until the jackpot occurrence, or at the time of reach notice. . In addition, a specific drive is performed for various types of accessories, and effects such as changing the display state of the lamp 261 are performed.

  When a big hit occurs, the big winning opening 109 is opened a plurality of times. One release is one round, for example, 15 rounds are repeatedly executed. The period of one round is set, for example, when 10 game balls are won or for a predetermined period (for example, 30 seconds). At this time, the winning ball control unit 203 pays out with, for example, 15 winning balls per winning game ball to the big winning opening 109. After the jackpot is over, the jackpot state is canceled and the normal gaming state is restored.

(Details of processing by each control unit)
Next, details of various processes performed by each control unit will be described. First, the control process of the effect control unit 202 by the main control unit 201 will be described. 4 and 5 are flowcharts showing the procedure of the control process of the effect control unit by the main control unit. 4 to 9, correction data, authentication data, dummy authentication data, and accompanying data are not considered in order to clarify the control processing procedure of the effect control unit 202. That is, in the description of FIGS. 4 to 9, “transmit a command” means “transmit a control signal including data (control command data) indicating the command”, for example, correction data or authentication. The presence / absence of data, dummy authentication data, and accompanying data (see FIG. 10) is not considered.

  4 and 5, the main control unit 201 first waits until the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: No loop). When the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a power-on command to peripheral parts such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 (step S402). ). When the power-on command is transmitted, the effect control unit 202 controls the lamp control unit 251, the sound control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104 for the control command for the effect at the time of power-on (specifically, the lamp control unit 202). Control command to instruct the lighting of the LED, output of sound, display of the demonstration screen, etc.).

  Next, the main control unit 201 refers to the unlotted winning number data stored in the ROM 212 or the RAM 213 and determines whether or not the unlotted winning number is 0 (step S403). The number of undrawn winnings is the number obtained by subtracting the number of times that a lottery corresponding to the winning ball has been performed (number of already drawn lots) from the number of winning balls detected at the start winning opening 105 (number of winnings). When the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 (step S403: Yes), the main control unit 201 measures the time elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S404).

  When a predetermined time elapses after the demonstration is started (step S405: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a customer waiting demonstration command to the effect control unit 202 (step S406), and proceeds to step S407. If the predetermined time has not elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S405: No), the process proceeds to step S407 as it is. When the customer waiting demonstration command is transmitted in step S406, the effect control unit 202 transmits a control signal for the customer waiting demonstration to the lamp control unit 251, the voice control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104. In step S403, when the number of undrawn winning prizes is not zero (step S403: No), the process proceeds to step S410.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not a winning ball to the starting winning port 105 is detected by the starting winning port detection unit 221 (step S407). When a winning ball to the start winning opening 105 is detected (step S407: Yes), the main control unit 201 clears the time measured since the demonstration was started (step S408), and the number of unselected lottery winnings 1 is added to (step S409). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 acquires a jackpot determination random number (step S410), subtracts 1 from the number of undrawn winning prizes (step S411), and proceeds to step S412 in FIG. If no winning ball to the start winning opening 105 is detected in step S407 (step S407: No), the process returns to step S404 and the subsequent processing is continued.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the jackpot determination random number acquired in step S410 is a predetermined jackpot random number (step S412). When the jackpot determination random number is a jackpot random number (step S412: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot reach command (symbol variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S413). The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S415).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot start command to the effect control unit 202 (step S416), and then sequentially transmits commands corresponding to the rounds during the jackpot (jackpot command) (step S417). Then, when transmission of the jackpot command for all rounds is completed, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot end command (step S418), and proceeds to step S422.

  On the other hand, if the jackpot determination random number is not a jackpot random number in step S412, the main control unit 201 transmits a shift reach command (design variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S419). . The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S421).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S403 in FIG. 4 and repeats the subsequent processing until the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: No). Then, when the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits an end process command to the effect control unit 202 (step S423), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  FIG. 6 is a time chart showing the transmission timing of a jackpot related command (a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, a jackpot command, a jackpot end command). The jackpot reach command is transmitted more frequently and randomly than the actual jackpot occurs. The jackpot start command is transmitted only once when shifting to the jackpot state when a jackpot is actually generated. The jackpot command is continuously transmitted for each round after shifting to the jackpot state. The jackpot end command is transmitted only once when all rounds of the jackpot state are completed and the normal state is entered.

  Next, processing by the effect control unit 202 will be described. In the following, processing of the effect control unit 202 at the time of symbol variation (when a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a loss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5) is received) and a jackpot time will be described. .

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the symbol variation process by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 7, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a miss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5), which is a symbol variation command. (Step S701: No loop). When the symbol variation command is received (step S701: Yes), the effect control unit 202 acquires a random effect selection random number (step S702), and selects a variation effect type based on the acquired random number (step S703). ). Then, the effect control unit 202 transmits an effect start command for each variable effect to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S704).

  The effect control unit 202 determines whether or not the effect time of the variable effect has elapsed (step S705) and whether or not a symbol stop command (see steps S415 and S421 in FIG. 5) has been received from the main control unit 201. (Step S706). When the production time has elapsed (step S705: Yes), or when the symbol stop command has been received (step S706: Yes), the production control unit 202 sends a production stop command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252. Is transmitted (step S707). If the production time has not elapsed (step S705: No) and the symbol stop command has not been received (step S706: No), the process returns to step S705, and the subsequent processing is repeated.

  Next, the processing for the big hit of the effect control unit 202 will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the big hit processing by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 8, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot start command (see step S416 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S801: No loop). When the jackpot start command is received (step S801: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot start processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S802).

  Next, the effect control unit 202 waits until receiving a round jackpot command (see step S417 in FIG. 5) from the main control unit 201 (step S803: No loop). When the jackpot command is received (step S803: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a round processing command corresponding to the received round jackpot command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S804). ).

  Subsequently, the effect control unit 202 waits until a jackpot end command (see step S418 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S805: No loop). When the jackpot end command is received (step S805: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot end processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252 (step S806), and ends the processing according to this flowchart. To do.

  Subsequently, a lamp control process by the lamp control unit 251 will be described. Here, processing when a symbol variation command is received from the effect control unit 202 (during symbol variation) will be described. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the lamp control process when the symbol is changed by the lamp control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 9, the lamp control unit 251 first waits until an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: No loop).

  When an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 reads data prepared for each command (step S902) and executes a selection routine for each command (step S903). ), Ramp data is set (step S904). Then, the lamp control unit 251 outputs lamp data to the lamp 261 (step S905). Based on the lamp data output from the lamp control unit 251, the lamp 261 is turned on or off.

  Until the lamp control unit 251 receives an effect stop command from the effect control unit 202 (step S906: No), the lamp control unit 251 returns to step S905 and continues outputting the lamp data. When the production stop command is received (step S906: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 stops the output of the lamp data (step S907) and ends the processing according to this flowchart.

  Note that although the processing of the lamp control unit 251 is shown in FIG. 9, the sound control by the sound control unit 252 is almost the same as the processing of FIG. In the sound control process by the sound control unit 252, “ramp data” in steps S <b> 904, S <b> 905, and S <b> 907 in the process of FIG.

  As described above, peripheral units such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 perform various processes based on the control commands output by the main control unit 201. On the other hand, when the output source of the control command is not the regular main control unit 201, for example, when an unauthorized control board is connected between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit (see FIG. 17), The peripheral portion performs an illegal operation by an illegal control command output from an unauthorized control board.

  In order to prevent this unauthorized operation, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, for example, in the pachinko gaming machine, when the control command output from the main control unit 201 is a predetermined command, the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit Authentication processing is performed with Specifically, the predetermined command is a jackpot command transmitted while the jackpot state continues. This authentication process detects fraud such as the main control unit 201 being replaced with an unauthorized control board or an unauthorized control board being attached between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part. Fraud can be prevented.

  On the other hand, in the peripheral part, when the authentication process for the main control part 201 is performed, the data output from the main control part 201 is collated with the expected value held in the peripheral part, and calculated using this data. The main control unit 201 is authenticated when the obtained value matches the expected value. At this time, for example, when the specifications of the pachinko gaming machine are changed or the number of prize balls or the probability is changed, if the main control unit 201 is changed to another main control unit 201, the main part before the change is displayed in the peripheral part. Since the expected value corresponding to the control unit 201 is held, the other main control unit 201 after the change cannot be authenticated. For this reason, the other main control unit 201 after the change is authenticated as an unauthorized control board although it is a legitimate control board, and the authentication process is erroneous.

  In order to prevent this authentication processing error, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, for example, in a pachinko gaming machine, if the control command output from the main control unit 201 is a predetermined command, The correction data for correcting the expected value is transmitted to the section. Then, in the peripheral portion, the expected value is corrected using this correction data. Specifically, the predetermined command is a jackpot command transmitted while the jackpot state continues. Even if the main control unit 201 is changed to another main control unit 201 by this authentication process, the peripheral unit is not changed and the expected value is not changed. The expected value can be corrected. Therefore, an error in the authentication process can be prevented, and even if the main control unit 201 is changed, for example, the other main control unit 201 after the change can be authenticated as a regular control board. Further, since only the correction value is transmitted and the expected value itself is not transmitted, the expected value is not easily stolen by a third party, and fraud to the pachinko gaming machine can be prevented.

(Control signal data format)
Next, the data format of the control signal output from the main control unit 201 to the peripheral unit will be described. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a data format of a control signal output from the main control unit. As shown in FIG. 10, the normal control signal 1010 output from the main control unit 201 includes control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. The control command data 1001 is data unique to each command such as a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, and a round command. The accompanying data 1002 is data accompanying the control command data 1001, and is data necessary for processing based on the control command data 1001, such as the number of winning game balls.

  On the other hand, when the control command data 1001 in the control signal is a specific type of command, the main control unit 201 receives authentication data 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 in addition to the control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. The control signal with authentication data 1020, the control signal with correction data 1030, or the control signal with dummy authentication data 1040 is output to the peripheral portion.

  By including the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy authentication data 1005 in the control signal, compared with the case where the authentication data alone, the correction data alone, or the dummy authentication data alone is transmitted, the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part The communication load between them can be reduced. In addition, by including authentication data 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 in the control signal, authentication data 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 is authenticated from the communication data as compared with the case where the authentication data 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 is transmitted alone. The possibility that the data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is extracted and analyzed can be reduced. Since the control signal with correction data 1030, the control signal with dummy authentication data 1040, and the control signals with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions are randomly transmitted in an arbitrary order, the authentication process is performed when all control commands are transmitted. Compared with performing the process, it is possible to reduce the processing load on the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit due to the authentication process.

  The authentication data 1003 is data for authenticating that the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are output from the regular main control unit 201 by collating with the expected value held by the peripheral part. It is. Also, the authentication data 1003 is calculated using a binary operation that satisfies the combining law. The authentication data 1003 is, for example, a value generated by dividing the program data stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314. The authentication data 1003 includes, for example, errors such as computation using a hash function, parity check, cyclic redundancy check (CRC), and checksum for all or part of the program data stored in the ROM 212. It is a value generated by encrypting a value obtained by performing the detection calculation (hereinafter referred to as “program code authentication value”) with a predetermined encryption method and dividing it into a data amount determined by the determination unit 314. There may be. A more specific method for generating the authentication data 1003 will be described later.

  As described above, the authentication data 1003 is obtained by dividing the program data stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 into the data amount determined by the determination unit 314 and satisfying the combining law for the divided data. Generated by performing an operation. For this reason, the peripheral unit performs the same binary operation as the main control unit 201 on the authentication data 1003 for the number of divisions, and collates the combination result of the values calculated by the binary operation with the expected value. By performing the authentication, it can be determined whether or not the output source of the control signal is the regular main control unit 201. Further, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program code stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 or unauthorized replacement of the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201.

  Note that the main control unit 201 generates different authentication data 1003 for each control signal. Specifically, for example, the range of the program code in the ROM 212 used for generating the authentication data 1003 is different, or the error detection calculation for generating the authentication data 1003 is different. The data used for generating the authentication data 1003 is not limited to the program code, and may be any data stored in the ROM 212.

  The correction data 1004 is data for correcting an expected value used for collation of data transmitted from the main control unit 201 in the peripheral part. The correction data 1004 is a value generated based on a value unique to the main control unit 201, for example. Specifically, the correction data 1004 is a value that can identify each main control unit 201 when there are a plurality of main control units 201. For example, the main control unit 201 is changed to another main control unit 201. In this case, the expected value corresponding to the main control unit 201 before the change held in the peripheral part is a value for correcting the expected value according to the other main control unit 201 after the change. More specifically, when the main control unit 201 is changed to another main control unit 201, the correction data 1004 is changed with a unique value set in the main control unit 201 before being changed. This is a difference from a unique value set in the other main control unit 201 later. Further, the correction data 1004 may be a value generated based on the program data stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, for example, similarly to the authentication data 1003.

  Further, the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 may include data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 can be obtained by performing an operation using the error detection method as described above on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, or the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. Value.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. If the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 are generated using the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 are reused by an unauthorized control board. Even in this case, the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 and the control command data 1001 cannot be matched, and fraud can be detected.

  When the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 includes data related to the control command data 1001 or the accompanying data 1002, the main control unit 201 encrypts the data related to the control command data 1001 or the accompanying data 1002 together with, for example, a program code authentication value. Thus, the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 may be generated.

  Here, since the normal control signal 1010 does not include the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004, the data size is smaller than that of the control signal with authentication data 1020 and the control signal with correction data 1030. For this reason, the control signal to which the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004 are added is easily overlooked, and these data are easily stolen.

  In order to prevent such a problem, dummy authentication data 1005 having the same size as the correction data 1004 and the authentication data 1003 is added to a normal control signal 1010 that does not include the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004. The control signal 1040 may be used.

  The dummy authentication data 1005 is dummy data of the authentication data 1003 and is invalid data for authentication processing in the peripheral portion. That is, it is assumed that the dummy authentication data 1005 indicates that the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are output from the regular main control unit 201 without collating with the expected value held by the peripheral part. This is data for authentication. The dummy authentication data 1005 is collated with the expected value held by the peripheral part, and the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are output from the regular main control unit 201 regardless of whether the collation result is coincident or disagreeable. This is data for temporarily authenticating that it has been done.

  The dummy authentication data 1005 may be generated by the same value as the authentication data 1003, for example. The dummy authentication data 1005 may be authentication data used for another (different type) authentication process. Further, the dummy authentication data 1005 may be, for example, authentication data used for another authentication process different from the authentication process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part.

  The number of transmissions of the dummy authentication data 1005 is determined by the number of divisions used for generating the authentication data 1003 described above. For example, when the number of divisions at the time of generating the authentication data 1003 is 2, after the generated two authentication data 1003 are transmitted, the two dummy authentication data 1005 are transmitted. More specifically, after transmitting two authentication data-added control signals 1020 with two authentication data 1003 added thereto, two dummy authentication data-added control signals 1040 added with dummy authentication data 1005 are transmitted.

  Further, the peripheral unit can know the number of transmissions of the dummy authentication data 1005 from the number of authentication data 1003 (the number of connections) when the authentication process using the authentication data 1003 is established. For example, in the above-described example, the number of authentication data 1003 (the number of connections) when the authentication process is established is 2. For this reason, the dummy control data 1005 is included in the two control signals received next, and it can be determined that it should be discarded without being used for the authentication process. On the other hand, since the third party cannot know the division number, the authentication data 1003 and the dummy authentication data 1005 cannot be distinguished. Thereby, the possibility that the authentication data 1003 is stolen by a third party can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process can be improved. Note that the above-described relationship between the number of divisions and the transmission timing of the dummy authentication data 1005 is an example, and an arbitrary agreement may be made between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  The arrangement of the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy authentication data 1005 is not limited to the order shown in FIG. 10, and for example, the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy Authentication data 1005 may be used as the head of a control signal, or authentication data 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 may be inserted between control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. Further, the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy authentication data 1005 may be output separately from the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. For example, after transmitting a control signal including a jackpot command, dummy authentication data 1005 is added when the (n-1) th control signal is transmitted, and correction data 1004 is added when the nth control signal is transmitted. Authentication data 1003 may be added at the time of signal transmission.

  The dummy authentication data 1005 may be added to all of the normal control signals 1010 that do not include the authentication data 1003 and the correction data 1004, or authentication among the control signals that include predetermined command data (big hit command). You may add to the normal control signal 1010 which does not contain the data 1003 and the correction data 1004. By doing in this way, the data size of the normal control signal 1010 can be made comparable with the control signal with authentication data 1020 and the control signal with correction data 1030. For this reason, it is possible to prevent a third party from seeing through the control signal to which the authentication data 1003 or the correction data 1004 is added due to a difference in data size.

  The timing for outputting the control signal with authentication data 1020, the control signal with correction data 1030, or the control signal with dummy authentication data 1040 is arbitrary. For example, the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy authentication data 1005 may be added so that the control signal with authentication data 1020 or the control signal with correction data 1030 can be transmitted every predetermined time. Further, the control signal with authentication data 1020 or the control signal with dummy authentication data 1040 may be output whenever the control signal with correction data 1030 is not output. Further, for example, when the control command data 1001 in the control signal is a specific type of command, the authentication data 1003, the correction data 1004, or the dummy authentication data 1005 may be added. Further, the control signal with authentication data 1020, the control signal with correction data 1030, and the dummy authentication data 1005 for the number of divisions may be transmitted at random.

(Method for generating authentication data (inspection value))
FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a method of generating authentication data (inspection value) in the main control unit. The authentication data 1003 is generated using data stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 or the like. More specifically, after dividing data stored in a predetermined area of the ROM 212 into an arbitrary amount of data, a binary operation (semi-group operation) that satisfies the combining law for the data stored in each of the divided areas ) To calculate the inspection value. Examples of the semi-group operation include addition and exclusive OR operation. Then, a value obtained by performing a predetermined operation (for example, encryption processing) on the inspection value is set as authentication data. Whether or not to inspect the inspection value is arbitrary, but it is desirable to encrypt it from the viewpoint of fraud prevention. In addition, when a predetermined calculation is performed on the inspection value, a control command to which the inspection value is added may be used. In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. If the authentication data 1003 is generated by using the control command to be transmitted this time, even if the authentication data is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data and the control command cannot be matched, and fraud is detected. Can do.

  For example, every time one inspection value is generated, the main control unit 201 determines the amount of data (data amount) used for the generation. In this case, the main control unit 201 repeats the determination of the data amount and the generation of the inspection value until the generation of the inspection value using all the data in the predetermined area of the ROM 212 is completed. For this reason, it is not known how many inspection values are generated (that is, how many divisions are made) until the generation of inspection values using all data in the predetermined area of the ROM 212 is completed.

  Instead of determining the amount of data every time one inspection value is generated, the amount of data used for generating the inspection value may be determined in advance. Further, the data amount used for generation of all inspection values may be made equal. In this case, the number of divisions can be predicted when the data amount is determined.

  The type of data used for calculating the inspection value is arbitrary, but for example, program data (instruction code or fixed data) stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 can be used. By using the program data stored in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program code or unauthorized replacement of the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201.

  For example, the program data storage unit 1100 shown in FIG. 11 stores 12 pieces of data (0x01 to 0x09, 0x0A to 0x0C, and the data amount of one data is 1 byte). When the amount of data used to generate the inspection value is 4 bytes, 3 bytes, and 5 bytes, the program data storage unit 1100 includes, for example, a first block 1100a that includes 4 bytes of data, and a second block that includes 3 bytes of data. The block 1100b can be divided into three blocks, that is, a third block 1100c including data of 5 bytes. That is, the number of divisions is 3. The main control unit 201 calculates a test value by performing a semi-group operation on the data stored in each block. The data amount described above is an example.

  For example, if the method of using addition as a semi-group operation is method A, 4-byte data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a is added to obtain the first inspection value 0x0A. Similarly, 3 bytes of data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b are added to obtain the second check value 0x12 as 5 bytes of data 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A stored in the third block 1100c. , 0x0B, 0x0C are added to obtain a third inspection value 0x32.

  For example, if the method using the exclusive OR operation as the semi-group operation is method B, the exclusive OR operation is performed on the 4-byte data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a. A first inspection value 0x04 is obtained. Similarly, exclusive OR operation is performed on the data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 for 3 bytes stored in the second block 1100b, and the second check value 0x04 is 0x08 for 5 bytes stored in the third block 1100c. , 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, and 0x0C are subjected to an exclusive OR operation to obtain third check values 0x0C, respectively.

  Then, the obtained inspection value is encrypted to obtain authentication data. At the time of this encryption processing, the encryption processing may be performed including the inspection value and data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 that are transmitted at the same time. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 includes the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, operations on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 using a hash function, a parity check, and a cyclic redundancy check (Cyclic Redundancy Check). : CRC), a value obtained by performing an operation such as a checksum.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. Therefore, if the authentication data 1003 is generated using the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002, even if the authentication data 1003 is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data 1003 matches the control command. Unable to detect fraud.

  On the other hand, the peripheral part, which is the authenticator, holds the value obtained by performing the semi-group operation on the entire data stored in the program data storage part 1100 as an expected value. For example, the expected value in the case of method A is 0x4E, which is the sum of 0x01 to 0x0C. In addition, the expected value in the case of method B is 0x0C, which is an exclusive OR of 0x01 to 0x0C. In the peripheral part, the same number of expected values as the number of inspection value generation methods by the main control part 201 may be held. Further, in the peripheral portion, only one expected value is held, and correction data 1004 is transmitted from the main control portion 201 to the peripheral portion every time the inspection value generation method by the main control portion 201 is switched. The value may be corrected.

  The peripheral part extracts the inspection value from the received control signal with authentication data 1020 and collates the value obtained by performing the semigroup operation on the inspection value with the expected value. Since the test values are generated using a half-group operation, if the same half-group operation is performed on all the test values generated from the divided program data, the expectation that the half-group operation was performed on the entire program data Should match the value. When the value obtained by performing the half-group operation on the inspection value matches the expected value, the peripheral unit authenticates the main control unit 201.

  Note that the semi-group operation process in the peripheral portion corresponds to a process of combining the inspection values generated from the divided program data, and is therefore referred to as “joining process”. In addition, the number of inspection values used for the combining process when authentication is established is referred to as “number of connections”. The number of connections in the peripheral part and the number of divisions in the main control unit 201 are the same.

  Here, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data based on, for example, the number of divisions obtained by generating authentication data, and transmits the dummy authentication data to the peripheral unit. Further, the peripheral unit identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (the number of combinations) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication with respect to the main control unit 201 is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values that only the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part know, a third party cannot distinguish between authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, there is a possibility that the authentication data for the number of divisions is stolen by a third party, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is combined to illegally steal a value for establishing authentication for the main control unit 201. Can be reduced. Thereby, the intensity | strength of the authentication process between the main control part 201 and a peripheral part can be improved.

  Further, the main control unit 201 may generate dummy authentication data for the number of divisions. When the peripheral portion receives dummy authentication data for the number of divisions, it can perform the same processing as when authentication data is received. As a result, the peripheral unit tentatively authenticates the main control unit 201 using dummy authentication data, with the processing time in the peripheral part or the amount of heat generated by the process being the same level as receiving normal authentication data and performing authentication. Processing (dummy authentication processing) can be performed. Therefore, since it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing at which the authentication processing is performed in the peripheral portion, the strength of authentication can be further increased.

  Further, the main control unit 201 may transmit dummy authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after transmitting authentication data for the number of divisions. Thus, the peripheral part can identify the value corresponding to the number of connections received immediately after the authentication data as dummy authentication data. As a result, the authentication process can be performed by identifying the authentication data and the dummy authentication data without increasing the processing load on the peripheral portion.

(Control signal transmission / reception processing)
Next, a control signal transmission / reception process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit will be described with reference to FIGS. 12 and 13. Hereinafter, the transmission / reception process of the control signal between the main control unit 201 and the effect control unit 202 will be described, but the transmission / reception process of the control signal between the main control unit 201 and the prize ball control unit 203 is performed in the same procedure. It is. In the following description, it is assumed that authentication data 1003 or dummy authentication data 1005 is always transmitted when transmitting a control signal. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and authentication data is transmitted only at a predetermined timing, for example, when a predetermined control command is transmitted. 1003, correction data 1004, or dummy authentication data 1005 may be added.

  FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit. In this flowchart, a process for determining a data amount every time an inspection value (authentication data) is generated will be described. In the flowchart of FIG. 12, the main control unit 201 first waits until the power of the main control unit 201 is turned on (step S1201: No loop). When the main control unit 201 is powered on (step S1201: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines whether the number of remaining dummy is 0 (step S1202). Here, the remaining dummy number is the remaining number of dummy authentication data 1005 transmitted to the peripheral part. For example, the main control unit 201 refers to the value stored in the remaining dummy number information storage area in the ROM 212 to make the determination in step S1202. If the remaining dummy number is not 0 (step S1202: No), the main control unit 201 proceeds to step S1213 in order to transmit the dummy authentication data 1005.

  On the other hand, when the number of remaining dummy is 0 (step S1202: Yes), since there is no dummy authentication data 1005 to be transmitted, the main control unit 201 transmits the authentication data 1003. The amount is determined (step S1203). The method for determining the data amount is arbitrary.

  Next, the main control unit 201 reads the amount of program data determined in step S1202, for example, from the top of the program data storage unit 1100, performs a semi-group operation on the read data, and calculates a test value. The verification value is encrypted to generate authentication data 1003 (step S1204). By this process, an inspection value and authentication data 1003 are generated. The inspection value generation method (such as the type of calculation used for generation) is determined when the main control unit 201 is shipped from the factory, when the data amount of the inspection value to be generated first after power-on is determined, or the previous authentication. It may be determined when the data 1003 is transmitted, or the test value generation method used when the power is turned off last time may be used continuously.

  Next, it waits until the transmission timing of the control command is reached (step S1205: No loop). When it is the transmission timing of the control command (step S1205: Yes), the main control unit 201 sets the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 (step S1206).

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether it is the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 (step S1207). In step S1207, when it is the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 (step S1207: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines whether it is the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 (step S1208). When it is not the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 in step S1208 (step S1208: No), the main control unit 201 controls the control signal (authentication) including the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, and the authentication data 1003 generated in steps S1204 and S1206. The control signal with data 1020) is transmitted to the effect control unit 202 (step S1209).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S1203 until the test value is generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 (step S1210: No) and repeats the subsequent processing. Here, “using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100” means that all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 is used without duplication. When generating the second and subsequent inspection values, the main control unit 201 reads, for example, the data written in the area next to the program data used for generating the previous inspection value by the amount determined in step S1203. Generate test values. Note that when the last test value is generated, the data amount determined in step S1203 may be insufficient, but the main control unit 201 generates the test value using only the program data that can be acquired. Note that the processes in steps S1203 to S1209 may be performed in advance before the transmission timing of the authentication data 1003.

  When the test value is generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 (step S1210: Yes), the main control unit 201 performs transmission processing of the dummy authentication data 1005. Specifically, the main control unit 201 stores the number of generated authentication data 1003 (inspection value), that is, the number of divisions in the remaining dummy number information storage area of the ROM 212 as the number of transmissions of the dummy authentication data 1005 (step S1211). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data 1005 (step S1212).

  The main control unit 201 transmits a dummy authentication data-added control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data 1005 added (step S1213), and decrements the value of the remaining dummy number information storage area of the ROM 212 by 1 (step S1214). Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the power source of the main control unit 201 is turned off (step S1215). In step S1215, when the main control unit 201 determines that the main control unit 201 is not turned off (step S1215: No), the process returns to step S1202, and the subsequent processing is repeated.

  In step S1208, when it is the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 (step S1208: Yes), the main control unit 201 generates correction data 1004 (step S1216). Then, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal (control signal with correction data 1030) including the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, and the correction data 1004 generated in steps S1206 and S1216 to the effect control unit 202 (step). S1217). At this time, the main control unit 201 transmits the control signal with correction data 1030 to the effect control unit 202 before the transmission of the control signals with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions to the effect control unit 202 is completed.

  Next, the main control unit 201 proceeds to step S1210, and determines whether or not the test values have been generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100. At this time, the main control unit 201 should not use all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 yet when generating the authentication data 1003. Therefore, the main control unit 201 returns to step S1203 without determining whether or not the test value has been generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100 in step S1210, and performs the subsequent processing. Also good.

  On the other hand, if it is not the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 in step S1207 (step S1207: No), the main control unit 201 controls the control signal (ordinary data 1002) set in step S1206 and the accompanying data 1002 (ordinary data). The control signal 1010) is transmitted to the effect control unit 202 (step S1218). Then, the main control unit 201 proceeds to step S1210, determines whether or not the test value has been generated using all the data in the program data storage unit 1100, and performs the subsequent processing. If the power is turned off in step S1215 (step S1215: Yes), the process according to this flowchart is terminated.

  In the flowchart of FIG. 12, the dummy authentication data 1005 is generated in step S1212. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and the dummy authentication data 1005 transmits a control signal (control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data) in step S1213. It may be generated every time, or may be generated for the remaining number of dummy at the timing when the number of remaining dummy is determined in step S1211. Also, an appropriate number of dummy authentication data 1005 may be generated in advance and used as necessary. In steps S1212 and S1213, dummy authentication data 1005 corresponding to the number of divisions is generated and transmitted. However, only one dummy authentication data 1005 may be generated and transmitted.

  In the flowchart of FIG. 12, the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are set in step S1206 after the transmission timing of the control command is reached in step S1205: Yes. However, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 may be set before transmitting the control signal with correction data 1030 in step S1217. Similarly, in steps S1209 and S1218, the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 may be set before transmitting the control signal with authentication data 1020 or the normal control signal 1010, respectively.

  Further, in the flowchart of FIG. 12, while performing the processing of steps S1203 to S1210 and transmitting the control data with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions, the control signal with authentication data 1020, the control signal with correction data 1030, and The normal control signal 1010 may be transmitted at random in an arbitrary order. Further, when the expected value already corrected is held in the peripheral portion, only the control signal with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions may be transmitted without transmitting the control signal with correction data 1030.

  In the flowchart of FIG. 12, the normal control signal 1010 is transmitted when it is not the transmission timing of the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 in step S1207: No, but the present invention is not limited to this. For example, when the control command transmitted this time is a jackpot command, the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 is transmitted, and when the control command transmitted this time is a command other than the jackpot command, a normal control signal 1010 is transmitted. But you can.

  As described above, the main control unit 201 adds the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 to the control command data 1001 when transmitting a control command to the peripheral unit. As a result, the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 can be randomly transmitted at an arbitrary timing. Since the number of divisions is a value that only the main control unit 201 knows, the third party cannot know the number of authentication data 1003 transmitted to the peripheral unit. Thereby, the possibility that the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 is extracted can be reduced.

  The main control unit 201 may add the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 to the control command data 1001 only when a jackpot command is transmitted to the peripheral part. In this case, since the occurrence frequency of the jackpot command is lower than that of other commands, the possibility that the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003 is extracted from the control signal can be reduced. Further, since the jackpot command is continuously transmitted for each round after shifting to the jackpot state, the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 can be continuously transmitted during one jackpot state. it can. Therefore, once the big hit state is reached, the correction data 1004, the dummy authentication data 1005, and the authentication data 1003 for the number of divisions can be transmitted continuously. Therefore, it is possible to perform the authentication process without increasing the interval after correcting the expected value, and to prevent the third party from knowing the timing for performing the correction process or the authentication process. Thereby, the possibility that an unauthorized substrate is inserted between the correction process and the authentication process is reduced, and the strength of the authentication can be improved.

  The main control unit 201 adds correction data 1004 to the control command data 1001 when transmitting a jackpot start command to the peripheral portion, and authentication data to the control command data 1001 when transmitting the jackpot command to the peripheral portion. 1003 or dummy authentication data 1005 may be added. The jackpot start command is a command for starting a jackpot state, and has a lower transmission frequency than other commands. Therefore, the possibility that the correction data 1004 is extracted from the control signal can be reduced. The jackpot command is continuously transmitted every round after the jackpot start command is transmitted and the jackpot state is entered. Therefore, once the big hit state is reached, the correction data 1003 for the number of divisions can be continuously transmitted after the correction processing is performed in the peripheral portion. Further, since the main control unit 201 transmits the dummy authentication data 1005 after transmitting the authentication data 1003 for the number of divisions, the main control unit 201 can transmit the dummy authentication data 1005 at a timing other than the correction process or the authentication process. Therefore, the authentication process can be performed without a gap after the expected value is corrected. Furthermore, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of transmitting the correction data 1004 or the authentication data 1003. Thereby, the possibility that an unauthorized substrate is inserted between the correction process and the authentication process is reduced, and the strength of the authentication can be improved.

  In this case, the peripheral part can identify the correction data and the authentication data or the dummy authentication data according to the type of the control command. Accordingly, the peripheral part can identify the correction data, the authentication data, or the dummy authentication data and perform the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process without increasing the processing load on the peripheral part. At this time, the main control unit 201 may add the dummy authentication data 1005 to a control command of a type different from the control command to which the authentication data 1003 is added.

  The main control unit 201 may add the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 to the control command data 1001 only when a jackpot reach command is transmitted to the peripheral part. In this case, the jackpot reach command is transmitted more frequently and randomly than the jackpot actually occurs before the jackpot state is reached. For this reason, for example, when a jackpot reach command is continuously transmitted in small numbers, any of correction processing, authentication processing, and dummy authentication processing can be performed before the jackpot state is reached.

  Further, the main control unit 201 may add the correction data 1004 to the control command data 1001 only when transmitting a power-on command to the peripheral part. The power-on command is transmitted when the pachinko gaming machine is initialized, such as when the pachinko gaming machine is turned on or reset. The initialization process is classified into a process category different from the game (game progress) related process which is the main process of the pachinko gaming machine. If the correction process is incorporated during the initialization process, the steps (man-hours) required for program design and testing can be reduced as compared with the case where the correction process is incorporated during the game-related process. That is, by incorporating the correction process during the initialization process, it is possible to obtain development merit and quality control merit.

  Further, the main control unit 201 may add the correction data 1004 to the control command data 1001 only when transmitting a customer waiting demo command to the peripheral part. When the main control unit 201 transmits an arbitrary control command to the peripheral part before the customer waiting demo is started by the customer waiting demo command and is stopped by the customer waiting demo stop command, the control command data The authentication data 1003 or the dummy authentication data 1005 may be added to 1001. The customer waiting demo command and the customer waiting demo stop command are commands for starting or stopping the customer waiting demo. The customer waiting demo is displayed when the game (game progress) related process which is the main process of the pachinko gaming machine is not performed. Thereby, the processing load due to the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process does not affect the game-related process. For this reason, even if the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part do not have a high processing capacity, or even a pachinko gaming machine with a large processing load of game-related processing, a correction processing function and an authentication processing function should be added. Can do. Moreover, since both the correction process and the authentication process can be performed in this order during the non-game state, fraud can be detected before the game state is entered. For this reason, the gaming state can be performed in a safe state without fraud. In addition, since the authentication process and the dummy authentication process can be performed during the non-game state, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing of the authentication process. As a result, the strength of the authentication process can be improved.

  The main control unit 201 may add the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data 1005 to the control command data 1001 only when transmitting a deviation command to the peripheral part. In this case, since the outbreak command has the highest occurrence frequency as the lottery result at the time of the jackpot lottery, the number of times of performing the correction process, the authentication process, or the dummy authentication process is increased, and the strength of the authentication can be increased. Further, since the occurrence frequency of the loss command is high, if the authentication data 1003 or the dummy authentication data 1005 is added after the correction data 1004 is added, the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, or the dummy authentication data is randomly added to the loss command. 1005 can be added.

  Next, control signal reception processing by the effect control unit 202 will be described. FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing a procedure of control signal reception processing by the effect control unit 202. In the flowchart of FIG. 13, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a control signal is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1301: No loop). When a control signal is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1301: Yes), it is determined whether or not the remaining dummy number is 0 (step S1302). For example, the peripheral portion refers to the value stored in the remaining dummy number information storage area in the ROMs 242 and 282 to make the determination in step S1302.

  When the number of remaining dummy is 0 (step S1302: Yes), since the received control signal includes normal (not dummy) authentication data 1003 or correction data 1004, the effect control unit 202 receives the It is determined whether or not the corrected data includes the correction data 1004 (step S1303). Whether or not the correction data 1004 is included in the control signal is determined by, for example, whether the control signal has a data amount larger than that of the normal control signal or the nth control signal after the peripheral power is turned on. This is performed by determining whether or not a flag indicating that the correction data 1004 is included is set in the control signal.

  In step S1303, when the correction data 1004 is included in the control signal (step S1303: Yes), the effect control unit 202 extracts the correction data 1004 from the control signal and uses the correction data 1004 to produce the effect control unit 202. The expected value held in is corrected (step S1304).

  In step S1303, the effect control unit 202 determines whether the control command data 1001 included in the control signal is data of a predetermined control command, not whether the received control signal includes the correction data 1004. It may be judged. In this case, when the control command data 1001 included in the control signal is data of a predetermined control command, the effect control unit 202 extracts the correction data 1004 from the control signal, and proceeds to step S1304. In step S1303, when the control command for adding the correction data 1004 is a jackpot command, for example, the effect control unit 202 stores data of the nth jackpot command after the power is turned on or the jackpot state is entered. It may be determined whether or not. In this case, the effect control unit 202 may extract the correction data 1004 from the control signal and proceed to Step S1304 when the data is the n-th jackpot command data.

  Next, processing based on the control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002 included in the control signal is performed (step S1305), the process returns to step S1301, waits until the next control signal is received, and the subsequent processing is repeated. Do it.

  If the number of remaining dummies is not 0 in step S1302 (step S1302: No), since the received control signal includes dummy authentication data 1005, the peripheral portion does not perform the authentication process and the remaining dummy is not included. The value of the number is decremented by -1 (step S1316), the process proceeds to step S1305, and processing based on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 included in the control signal is performed. In addition, after the processing in step S1316, when the peripheral portion has received the dummy authentication data 1005 for the number of divisions, that is, when the remaining dummy number = 0, the peripheral portion performs processing for temporarily authenticating the main control unit 201. It may be performed or omitted.

  On the other hand, in step S1303, when the correction data 1004 is not included in the control signal (step S1303: No), the effect control unit 202 includes authentication-related data such as authentication data 1003 in the control signal received in step S1301. It is determined whether or not it is (step S1306). The determination as to whether or not the data related to authentication is included in the control signal is made, for example, by determining whether or not the data amount of the control signal is larger than that of the normal control signal.

  In step S1306, the effect control unit 202 determines whether the control command data 1001 included in the control signal is data of a predetermined control command, not whether the received control signal includes data related to authentication. It may be judged. In this case, when the control command data 1001 included in the control signal is data of a predetermined control command, the effect control unit 202 determines that the data related to authentication is included in the control signal, and proceeds to step S1307. In step S1306, for example, when the control command for adding the correction data 1004 is a jackpot command, the effect control unit 202 performs the nth operation after the power is turned on (or reset) or the jackpot state is reached. It may be determined whether the data is a jackpot command data other than. In this case, the effect control unit 202 includes data related to authentication in the control signal when the power is turned on (or reset) or the data of the jackpot command other than the nth after the jackpot state is reached. You may decide that

  When the data related to authentication is included in the control signal (step S1306: Yes), the effect control unit 202 extracts the authentication data 1003 from the control signal, and further performs a decoding process to obtain the inspection value (step S1307). ). The effect control unit 202 stores the acquired inspection value in the inspection value memory (step S1308), and performs a semi-group operation (joining process) on all inspection values in the inspection value memory (step S1309). . Note that the type of half-group operation performed in step S1309 is determined when the previous authentication data 1003 is received. If there is one inspection value in the inspection value memory, the process proceeds to step S1310 without performing the combining process.

  Next, the corrected expected value is acquired (step S1310). Then, it is determined whether or not the calculation result (combination result) of the inspection values stored in the inspection value memory matches the expected value (step S1311). At this time, the effect control unit 202 may determine whether the calculation result of the inspection value and the expected value have a predetermined relationship, not whether the calculation result of the inspection value matches the expected value. Good. The predetermined relationship is, for example, a relationship in which a value obtained by performing a predetermined calculation on the inspection value calculation result matches an expected value.

  When the calculation result of the inspection value matches the expected value (step S1311: Yes), the effect control unit 202 authenticates the validity of the main control unit 201 that has transmitted the control signal. Then, the data in the inspection value memory is erased (step S1312), and the number of pieces of authentication data 1003 subjected to the combination process when authentication is established, that is, the number of combinations is set as the number of remaining dummy, and the remaining dummy in the ROM 212 is set. The number of connections is stored in the number information storage area (step S1313). In step S1305, processing based on the control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002 included in the control signal is performed.

  On the other hand, in step S1311, when the inspection value calculation result does not match the expected value (step S1311: No), the production control unit 202 receives a predetermined number or more of inspection values (step S1314: No). Returning to S1301, the combining process is repeated. When the inspection value of a predetermined number or more is received (step S1314: Yes), the effect control unit 202 discards the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 without authenticating the validity of the main control unit 201 that transmitted the control signal. At the same time, a notification signal is output from the notification signal output unit 335 (see FIG. 3) (step S1315), and the processing according to this flowchart ends. Although the predetermined number is an arbitrary number, for example, it can be the number of data that can be stored in the program data storage unit 1100 (maximum number of divisions). When the authentication is not established, in step S1315, either the data discard or the notification may be performed.

  In step S1306, if the control signal does not include data related to authentication (step S1306: No), that is, if the control signal is the normal control signal 1010, the effect control unit 202 performs collation with the expected value. Instead, the process proceeds to step S1305, and processing based on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 is performed.

  In the flowchart of FIG. 13, when the effect control unit 202 does not hold the expected value in advance and the expected value is transmitted from another component, the expected value is not corrected in step S1304, and the correction data 1004 is stored. Extracted and stored in the data storage unit 312 or the like. Then, after the expected value is acquired from another component in step S1310, the expected value is corrected using the stored correction data 1004, and the process proceeds to step S1311. Whether the corrected expected value matches the authentication data 1003. It may be determined whether or not.

(Example of control signal flow between control units)
Next, the flow of control signals between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit will be described with reference to the sequence diagrams of FIGS. 14 and 15. Here, the peripheral portion is, for example, the effect control unit 202 or the prize ball control unit 203 (FIG. 2). 14 and 15 are sequence diagrams illustrating an example of the flow of control signals between the control units. In FIGS. 14 and 15, a portion surrounded by a dotted line A is a step of correction processing for one time, and a portion surrounded by a dotted line B is a step of authentication processing for one time. In the sequence diagrams of FIGS. 14 and 15, the correction process (the part surrounded by the dotted line A) and the authentication process (the part surrounded by the dotted line B) are processed separately. The correction process may be performed while the process is being performed. 14 and 15, for convenience of explanation, the data amount used for generating the inspection value is collectively determined. However, every time the inspection value is generated as shown in the flowchart of FIG. The amount may be determined.

  As shown in FIG. 14, when the control command data 1001 is a predetermined control command, the main control unit 201 generates a correction value (step S1401). The correction value is a value for correcting the expected value for collation of the main control unit 201, and is a value that is the basis of the correction data 1004. The correction value is preferably a calculation result value of an actual correction value and a salt value. Note that the generation of the correction value in step S1401 may be performed before the correction data 1004 is generated in step S1403 described later.

  If the control command data 1001 is a predetermined control command, the main control unit 201 sets the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 (step S1402). Further, the main control unit 201 generates correction data 1004 using the correction value generated in step S1401 (step S1403). In step S1403, for example, correction data 1004 is generated by an encryption arithmetic expression. Note that the encryption processing by the encryption operation may be performed twice or more.

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with correction data 1030 including control command data 1001, accompanying data 1002, and correction data 1004 to the peripheral part (step S1404). In step S1404, control command data 1001 in which accompanying data 1002 is set in a predetermined command and correction data 1004 may be separately transmitted to the peripheral portion. In this case, the transmission order may be out of order.

  The peripheral part receives the control signal with correction data 1030 transmitted in step S1404 (step S1405). Next, the peripheral part restores the correction data 1004 (step S1406). In step S1406, the correction data 1004 is restored by the decryption arithmetic expression corresponding to the encryption arithmetic expression used in step S1403, and the correction value is acquired.

  Next, an expected value correction process is performed using the correction value acquired in step S1406 (step S1407). For example, if the expected value is not held in advance in the peripheral portion, in step S1407, the peripheral portion acquires the expected value from another control unit, and performs the expected value correction process on the acquired expected value. Then, the peripheral part performs processing based on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 (step S1408).

  Specifically, in step S1407, the expected value (old expected value) held in advance becomes the expected value (new expected value) corrected by the correction process. Then, the peripheral unit holds the corrected expected value (new expected value) as an expected value for collation of the main control unit 201.

  Next, the main control unit 201 performs transmission processing of the authentication data 1003 and the dummy authentication data 1005. In FIG. 14, the initial remaining dummy number is zero. Therefore, the main control unit 201 first determines the amount of data used for generating authentication data used for the current authentication process by an arbitrary method. For example, if the total amount of data is 12 bytes, and the amount of data used to generate inspection values is 7 bytes and 5 bytes, respectively, two inspection values are generated, and the current number of divisions = 2 (step) S1411). The main control unit 201 reads out 7-byte and 5-byte data in order from the top of the program data storage unit 1100, calculates two inspection values (first inspection value and second inspection value) using each data, Further, encryption processing is performed to generate two authentication data 1003 (first authentication data and second authentication data) (step S1412). Then, the control signal with the first authentication data including the first authentication data is transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1413).

  The peripheral unit receives the control signal (the control signal with first authentication data) transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1414). The peripheral unit determines whether the received data is the control signal with authentication data 1020 or the control signal with dummy authentication data 1040 based on whether or not the number of remaining dummy is zero. At this time, since the remaining dummy number is 0, the peripheral portion determines that the received data is the control signal with authentication data 1020 (step S1415), and decrypts the first authentication data in the control signal with first authentication data. The first inspection value is acquired and collated with the expected value. In this case, since the expected value and the inspection value do not match, the authentication is not established (step S1416).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with second authentication data including the second authentication data (step S1417), and the peripheral unit receives the control signal (control signal with second authentication data) (step S1418). . The peripheral unit decodes the second authentication data in the control signal with the second authentication data to obtain a second inspection value, performs a combining process on the first inspection value and the second inspection value (step S1419), and combines them. Check the result against the expected value. In this case, since the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1420).

  After transmitting the control signal with the second authentication data, the main control unit 201 determines the transmission number of the dummy authentication data 1005 based on the division number (step S1421). In this case, since the number of divisions is 2, two dummy authentication data 1005 are transmitted after the transmission of the control signal with authentication data 1020 this time. That is, the number of remaining dummy = 2.

  In addition, the peripheral unit recognizes the number of dummy authentication data 1005 to be received from now on the basis of the number of inspection values when the authentication of the main control unit 201 is established, that is, the number of combinations (step S1422). In this case, since the number of combinations is 2, it is determined that the two dummy authentication data 1005 are received after the reception of the control signal with authentication data 1020 this time. That is, the number of remaining dummy = 2.

  After determining the number of remaining dummy, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data 1005 for the number of remaining dummy (step S1423), and transmits a control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data to the peripheral portion. In this case, the main control unit 201 generates two dummy authentication data 1005 and transmits two control signals with dummy authentication data (a control signal with first dummy authentication data and a control signal with second dummy authentication data). As described above, the generation timing of the dummy authentication data 1005 is arbitrary. That is, the dummy authentication data 1005 may be generated every time a control signal (control signal with dummy authentication data 1040) is transmitted, or may be generated for the remaining number of dummy at the timing when the number of remaining dummy is determined. . Also, an appropriate number of dummy authentication data 1005 may be generated in advance and used as necessary.

  When the main control unit 201 transmits the control signal with the first dummy authentication data (step S1424), the main control unit 201 sets the remaining dummy number to −1 and sets the remaining dummy number = 1 (step S1425). When the peripheral portion receives the control signal (the control signal with the first dummy authentication data) (step S1426), since the number of remaining dummy is 2 at this time, the received data is the control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data at the peripheral portion. Judgment is made (step S1427), and the added data (dummy authentication data) is discarded (step S1428). Then, the remaining number of dummy is decremented by 1, so that the number of remaining dummy is 1 (step S1429).

  Subsequently, when the main control unit 201 transmits the control signal with the second dummy authentication data (step S1430), the remaining dummy number is set to −1 and the remaining dummy number = 0 (step S1431). When the peripheral portion receives the control signal (the control signal with the second dummy authentication data) (step S1432), since the number of remaining dummy is 1 at this time, the received data is the control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data at the peripheral portion. Judgment is made (step S1433), and the added dummy authentication data is discarded (step S1434). Then, the remaining dummy number is decremented by 1, and the remaining dummy number = 0 (step S1435). In step S1435, when the peripheral unit has received the dummy authentication data 1005 for the number of divisions, the peripheral unit may perform a process of temporarily authenticating the main control unit 201 or may be omitted.

  This is the transmission / reception processing of a series of authentication data 1003 and dummy authentication data 1005. Thereafter, since the remaining dummy number is 0, the main control unit 201 determines the number of divisions by an arbitrary method as in step S1411, and performs the same processing as the subsequent steps. By repeating the above procedure, the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit transmit and receive the authentication data 1003 and the dummy authentication data 1005, and continue the authentication process.

  In the above-described authentication process, when the calculation method for generating authentication data is different for each generation of authentication data 1003, after the authentication data is generated (step S1412), the inspection result combination result and the expected value are collated. Before (step S1420), the control signal with correction data 1030 may be transmitted to the peripheral portion to correct the expected value.

  In the sequence diagrams of FIGS. 14 and 15, as an example, a normal control signal 1010 is transmitted when a command other than the jackpot command is received, and a control signal with correction data 1030 and a control signal with authentication data 1020 are received when the command is a jackpot command. Alternatively, a control signal 1040 with dummy authentication data may be transmitted. Specifically, for example, a normal control signal 1010 to which no correction data 1004 or authentication data 1003 is added is transmitted at a time other than the jackpot command until the transmission of the control signals with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions. May be. In addition, the normal control signal 1010 may be transmitted a plurality of times or may not be performed until the transmission of the control data with authentication data 1020 for the number of divisions.

  Further, in the sequence diagrams of FIGS. 14 and 15, the peripheral portion may not hold the corrected expected value (final expected value) itself as a fixed value after performing the expected value correction in step S1407. In this case, for example, if the correction process (A) based on the correction data 1004 is not performed from the time of manufacture, authentication is established in the process (B) for temporarily authenticating the main control unit 201, and authentication is performed in the authentication process (B). You may design so that it may not be materialized. By doing in this way, the person who can know the final expected value can be limited, and the risk of leakage of information related to the expected value can be reduced.

  Further, in the specific examples in the sequence diagrams of FIGS. 14 and 15, the exclusive OR is used for the encryption arithmetic expression and the decryption arithmetic expression, but other arithmetic expressions such as four rules and the cryptographic arithmetic may be used. Good. That is, the authentication method or the arithmetic expression determined in advance may be used in the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  Further, the authentication process using the authentication data may not be performed every time the authentication data is received, but may be performed when the authentication data corresponding to the number of divisions is received a plurality of times. In this case, for example, when the peripheral unit receives the first authentication data together with the first control command data and the first control data, the peripheral unit performs the first control command data and the first control without performing the authentication process. Perform processing based on data. When the peripheral unit receives the second authentication data together with the second control command data and the second control data, the peripheral unit performs the process based on the second control command data and the second control data before performing the process based on the second control command data and the second control data. The authentication process using the authentication data of 1 is performed. At this time, the peripheral part may perform the authentication process using both the first authentication data and the second authentication data. In this way, if authentication processing is performed at the time when a plurality of authentication data is received, it is possible to prevent erroneous authentication processing when extra data is added to the control signal due to an error. it can.

  In the above description, the correction data 1004, the authentication data 1003, and the dummy authentication data 1005 may be transmitted when the jackpot command is transmitted, or the correction data 1004 and the authentication data are transmitted when another control command is transmitted. 1003 and dummy authentication data 1005 may be transmitted. Specifically, for example, the authentication data 1003 is transmitted when any one or more of a power-on command, a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, a jackpot end command, a customer waiting demo command, a miss command, etc. are transmitted. It is good also as transmitting. In this way, it is possible to further prevent the third party from seeing the timing at which the correction data 1004 and the authentication data 1003 are transmitted, and to further prevent the correction data 1004 and the authentication data 1003 from being stolen.

  As described above, in the electronic device (for example, pachinko gaming machine) according to the present embodiment, when transmitting a predetermined control command, correction for correcting an expected value used for verification of the main control unit in the peripheral part The expected value correction process is performed using the data. The correction data is generated by a value unique to the main control unit or program data stored in the main control unit. For example, when the main control unit is changed, the correction data is generated by a difference between a value unique to the main control unit before the change and a value unique to the main control unit after the change. As a result, the final expected value used for verification of the main control unit (expected expected value after correction) itself is not transmitted from the main control unit to the peripheral part, so that the final expected value used for verification is stolen by a third party. Can be prevented.

  In the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the main control unit transmits the correction data at an arbitrary timing before transmitting the authentication data transmitted last in the authentication data for the number of divisions. Therefore, since the correction data and the authentication data for the number of divisions can be transmitted at random, the timing at which the correction data is transmitted, that is, the point where the correction process is performed can be prevented from being overlooked by a third party. Therefore, it is possible to further reduce risks such as leakage of information regarding expected values.

  Further, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the main control unit generates dummy authentication data based on the number of divisions obtained by generating authentication data and transmits the dummy authentication data to the peripheral unit. In addition, the peripheral part identifies authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data (number of connections) that has been subjected to binary operation when authentication with respect to the main control part is established. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control unit and the peripheral unit, a third party cannot distinguish between authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, the authentication data for the number of divisions is stolen by a third party, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is combined, so that the value for establishing authentication for the main control unit may be illegally stolen. Can be reduced. Thereby, the intensity | strength of the authentication process between a main control part and a peripheral part can be improved.

  Further, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the authentication data is generated by dividing the data stored in the main control unit. Since the division number is a value that only the main control unit knows, the third party cannot know the division number. For this reason, even if one authentication data is known to a third party, for example, it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing a value calculated by combining the authentication data for the number of divisions. Therefore, it is possible to further reduce risks such as leakage of information related to authentication.

  In the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the peripheral unit receives the same number of dummy authentication data as the authentication data, and performs the same processing as when the authentication data is received. As a result, the peripheral unit is tentatively authenticated to the main control unit (dummy authentication process) in which the processing time in the peripheral part or the amount of heat generated by the process is the same as that for receiving normal authentication data and performing the authentication process. ) Can be performed. Therefore, since it is possible to prevent a third party from knowing the timing at which the authentication processing is performed in the peripheral portion, the strength of authentication can be further increased.

  Further, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the peripheral unit can identify the value corresponding to the number of combinations received immediately after the authentication data as dummy authentication data. As a result, the authentication process can be performed by identifying the authentication data and the dummy authentication data without increasing the processing load on the peripheral portion.

  Further, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the authentication data is generated by program data stored in a regular main control unit. When the value calculated using the authentication data matches the expected value corrected using the correction data, the main control unit can be authenticated as a regular main control unit. For this reason, it can be detected that the authorized main controller is replaced with an unauthorized substrate, or that an unauthorized substrate is attached between the authorized main controller and the peripheral portion. Further, when the main control unit is changed to another regular main control unit, it is possible to prevent the changed main control unit from being erroneously authenticated as an unauthorized substrate. Furthermore, if correction data and authentication data including control command data and accompanying data to be transmitted this time are generated, the reuse of correction data and authentication data by an illegal control board is prevented, and unauthorized use of electronic devices is prevented. Can be prevented.

  In addition, the electronic device according to the present embodiment does not hold the fixed value, which is the final expected value (corrected expected value) itself used for verification of the main control unit, in the peripheral portion, thereby obtaining the final expected value used for verification. The person who can know can be limited. In this case, specifically, for example, if the expected value correction process is not performed from the time of manufacture, the authentication is established in the process of temporarily authenticating the main control unit, and the authentication is not established in the authentication process. May be. As a result, it is possible to reduce risks such as leakage of information regarding expected values.

  Further, in the electronic apparatus according to the present embodiment, the main control unit can add dummy authentication data when transmitting a predetermined control command except for the timing of performing the correction process and the authentication process. The dummy authentication data is data that is not used in the authentication process. For example, the peripheral part can perform the dummy authentication process even before the authentication process is performed. Therefore, it is possible to prevent a third party from seeing the timing at which the authentication data is transmitted, that is, the point where the authentication process is performed, and to further reduce the risk of leakage of information related to authentication.

  In the electronic device according to the present embodiment, when the main control unit transmits a jackpot command to the peripheral unit, the peripheral unit performs expected value correction processing for collating the main control unit, and the main control unit Authentication processing to authenticate the validity of Therefore, by changing only the timing design during the jackpot state, it is possible to cause the existing pachinko gaming machine to execute the correction process and the authentication process. In addition, compared to the case where correction processing and authentication processing are performed at the time of transmission of all control commands, authentication processing and correction processing are only performed during the period when the jackpot command is transmitted (period in which the jackpot state is in effect). The processing load on the control unit and the peripheral unit can be reduced.

  Further, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, when the control command for adding the authentication data or the correction data is a jackpot command, the jackpot command is transmitted for each round of jackpot, so that the jackpot is in a certain period of time During this, correction processing and authentication processing are performed. In this way, since the interval between the correction process and the authentication process is small, the accuracy of the authentication process can be improved, and fraud to the main control unit and the peripheral part can be detected more reliably.

  Also, in the electronic device according to the present embodiment, the main control unit does not determine the number of divisions itself but determines the amount of data used for generating authentication data. For this reason, the possibility that the number of divisions is illegally stolen can be reduced.

  The control method for the main control unit and the peripheral units described in the present embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a personal computer or a workstation. This program is stored in a computer-readable storage medium such as a hard disk, flexible disk, CD-ROM, MO, and DVD, and is executed by being read from the storage medium by the computer. The program may be a transmission medium that can be distributed via a network such as the Internet.

  As described above, the present invention is useful for an electronic device in which fraud to the control unit is concerned and a control board mounted on the electronic device, and in particular, a pachinko gaming machine, a slot gaming machine, and other various gaming machines. Suitable for

310 main control board 311 control command storage unit 312 data storage unit 313 correction data generation unit 314 determination unit 315 authentication data generation unit 316 dummy authentication data generation unit 317 addition unit 318 transmission unit 330 peripheral board 331 reception unit 332 correction unit 333 calculation value Storage unit 334 Authentication unit 335 Notification signal output unit

Claims (26)

An electronic apparatus comprising: a main control unit that transmits a control command; and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on the control command transmitted by the main control unit,
The main control unit
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining an amount of the data used for generating authentication data for authenticating the main control unit (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”);
Dividing the data in the data storage means into the amount of data, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on the divided data, respectively, and dividing the number of the data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) Authentication data generating means for generating the authentication data for a minute,
Correction data generation means for generating correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value used for collation of the authentication data held in the peripheral portion and transmitted from the main control unit;
Dummy authentication data generating means for generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions;
When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral part is a predetermined control command, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation unit is added to the control command, and the authentication for the number of divisions is performed. If the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral portion is a predetermined control command before adding the data, the correction data generated by the correction data generating means is added to the control command and When the control command to be transmitted is a predetermined control command, the adding means for adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generating means to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added When,
The control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), the control command to which the authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”), or the dummy authentication data. Transmission means for transmitting the control command to which the control command is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) to the peripheral portion,
The peripheral portion is
Receiving means for receiving the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control unit;
When the control command with correction data is received by the receiving means, the correction means for correcting the expected value held in the peripheral part using the control command with correction data;
A binary operation is performed on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and based on whether or not the value calculated by the binary operation matches the expected value corrected by the correction unit, Authenticating means for authenticating the main control unit,
The authentication means identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication with respect to the main control unit is established. An electronic device characterized by   The determining means determines the data amount for each of the authentication data, and the authentication data generating means generates the authentication data using the data for the data amount determined for each of the authentication data. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein:   The authentication means performs two or more types of binary operations that satisfy a combining law on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and any one of two or more values calculated by the binary operations is the expected value. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the main control unit is authenticated based on whether or not the value matches the value. The dummy authentication data generating means generates the same number of dummy authentication data as the number of divisions,
2. The authentication unit performs the authentication by identifying, as dummy authentication data, a value corresponding to the number of the authentication data subjected to the two-term operation when the authentication is established. Electronic device as described in any one of -3. The adding means adds the control command with dummy authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after adding the control command with authentication data for the number of divisions,
The authentication means includes a value corresponding to the number of the authentication data that is the target of the two-term calculation among values received immediately after the authentication data that is the target of the two-term calculation when the authentication is established. The electronic apparatus according to claim 4, wherein the authentication is performed by identifying the data as the dummy authentication data.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the adding unit adds the correction data, the authentication data, or the dummy authentication data to a similar type of control command.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the adding unit adds the correction data to a control command of a type different from a control command for adding the authentication data or the dummy authentication data.   When the main control unit is changed to another main control unit, the correction data generation unit uses the expected value held in the peripheral unit to collate data transmitted from the other main control unit. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein correction data for correcting the expected value to be used is generated.   9. The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the correction data generation unit generates the correction data using a unique value stored in the data storage unit.   When the main control unit is changed to another main control unit, the correction data generating unit stores a unique value stored in the data storage unit and set in the main control unit before being changed. The electronic device according to claim 9, wherein a difference between the value and a specific value set in the other main control unit after being changed is generated as the correction data.   The electronic device according to claim 9, wherein the correction data generation unit generates the correction data by using the control command that adds the correction data together with the unique value.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the correction data generation unit generates the correction data using program data stored in the data storage unit.   13. The electronic apparatus according to claim 12, wherein the correction data generation unit generates the correction data using the control command that adds the correction data together with the program data.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the authentication data generation unit generates the authentication data using program data stored in the data storage unit.   15. The electronic apparatus according to claim 14, wherein the authentication data generation unit generates the authentication data using the control command that adds the authentication data together with the program data. The authentication data generation means encrypts the authentication data by a predetermined encryption method,
16. The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the authentication unit performs the authentication by decrypting the authentication data with a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method.   The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the two or more binary operations are addition and exclusive OR operations.   When the control command transmitted from the main control unit is the control command with correction data, the correction unit corrects the expected value held in the peripheral portion using the control command with correction data. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein:   The correction means corrects the expected value held in the peripheral portion using the control command with correction data when the control command transmitted from the main control unit is the predetermined control command. The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein: The peripheral portion is
20. The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, further comprising an output unit that outputs a notification signal when the main control unit is not authenticated by the authentication unit. The electronic apparatus according to any one of claims 1 to 20, comprising:
A main control unit transmits the control command with authentication data, and a peripheral unit performs an authentication process based on the control command with authentication data transmitted by the main control unit. A main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command to perform a predetermined process on a peripheral board,
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining an amount of the data used for generating authentication data for authenticating the main control board (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”);
Dividing the data in the data storage means into the amount of data, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining law on the divided data, respectively, and dividing the number of the data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”) Authentication data generating means for generating the authentication data for a minute,
Correction data generation means for generating correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value used for collation of the authentication data held by the peripheral board and transmitted from the main control board;
Dummy authentication data generating means for generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions;
When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation unit is added to the control command, and the authentication for the number of divisions is performed. When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command before data transmission is completed, the correction data generated by the correction data generation means is added to the control command, and When the control command to be transmitted is a predetermined control command, the adding means for adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generating means to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added When,
The control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), the control command to which the authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”), or the dummy authentication data. Transmitting means for transmitting the control command to which the information is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) to the peripheral board;
A main control board comprising: The amount of data used to generate authentication data for authenticating the main control board (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”) is determined, the stored data is divided into the data amount, and the divided data are respectively Performing a binary operation satisfying the coupling law, generating the authentication data for the number of divided data (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”), holding the authentication data on the peripheral board, and transmitting the authentication data from the main control board Generating correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value used for data collation, generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the division number, and the peripheral board When the control command to be transmitted is a predetermined control command, the generated authentication data for the number of divisions is added to the control command, and the authentication data for the number of divisions is transmitted. When the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command before finishing, the generated correction data is added to the control command, and the control command to be transmitted to the peripheral board is a predetermined control command The control command to which the generated dummy authentication data is added and the correction data is added to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), From the main control board that transmits a control command to which authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”) or a control command to which the dummy authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”). a the peripheral board that performs processing corresponding to the transmitted control command,
Receiving means for receiving the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control board;
When receiving the control command with correction data by the receiving means, correction means for correcting the expected value held on the peripheral board using the control command with correction data;
A binary operation is performed on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and based on whether or not the value calculated by the binary operation matches the expected value corrected by the correction unit, Authenticating means for authenticating the main control board,
The authentication means identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board is established. Do
The authentication means performs two or more types of binary operations that satisfy a combining law on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and any one of two or more values calculated by the binary operations is the expected value. A peripheral board, wherein the main control board is authenticated based on whether or not the value matches. An authentication method in an electronic device comprising: a main control unit that transmits a control command; and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on the control command transmitted by the main control unit,
In the main control unit,
A determination step of determining an amount of data used for generating authentication data for authenticating the main control unit (hereinafter referred to as “data amount”);
The predetermined data stored in the main control unit is divided into the data amount, and a binary operation satisfying a coupling law is performed on each of the divided data, and the number of the divided data (hereinafter referred to as “divided”). An authentication data generation step for generating the authentication data for a number)
A correction data generating step for generating correction data for correction processing for correcting an expected value that is held in the peripheral portion and used for collation of the authentication data transmitted from the main control unit;
A dummy authentication data generation step of generating dummy data of the authentication data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions;
When the control command transmitted to the peripheral part is a predetermined control command, the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation step is added to the control command, and the authentication for the number of divisions is performed. If the control command transmitted to the peripheral portion is a predetermined control command before adding the data, the correction data generated by the correction data generation step is added to the control command, and the peripheral portion is When the control command to be transmitted is a predetermined control command, an additional step of adding the dummy authentication data generated by the dummy authentication data generation step to the control command to which the authentication data or the correction data is not added When,
The control command to which the correction data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with correction data”), the control command to which the authentication data is added (hereinafter referred to as “control command with authentication data”), or the dummy authentication data. Transmitting the control command (hereinafter referred to as “control command with dummy authentication data”) added to the peripheral part,
In the periphery,
Receiving the control command with correction data, the control command with authentication data or the control command with dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control unit;
When the control command with correction data is received by the receiving step, a correction step of correcting the expected value held in the peripheral portion using the control command with correction data;
A binary operation is performed on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and based on whether the value calculated by the binary operation matches the expected value corrected by the correction step, An authentication step of authenticating the main control unit,
The authentication step identifies the authentication data and the dummy authentication data by identifying the authentication data and the dummy authentication data based on the number of the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. An authentication method characterized by performing authentication.   In the authentication step, two or more types of binary operations satisfying a coupling law are performed on the authentication data for the number of divisions, and any one of two or more values calculated by the binary operation is the expectation 25. The authentication method according to claim 24, wherein the main control unit is authenticated based on whether the value matches the value.   An authentication program causing a computer to execute the authentication method according to claim 24 or 25.

Images