JP4692070B2 - Information processing system, information processing apparatus, information processing method, and program - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to an information processing system, an information processing device, an information processing method, and a program, and in particular, an information processing system, an information processing device, and information that can suppress unauthorized use of a scramble key. The present invention relates to a processing method and a program.

  In pay broadcasting, a broadcasting system called scramble broadcasting is often used. In this scrambled broadcast, the original signal is intentionally disrupted (scrambled) in a predetermined manner on the broadcast station side, so that even if a person who is not contracted with the broadcast station receives the broadcast, normal video and audio , And data cannot be used.

  In other words, a scramble key for descrambling (used for descrambling) is given to the receiving terminal of the person who has contracted with the broadcasting station, and the data scrambled by the descrambling key is converted into the original form. By scrambling, normal video, audio, data, and the like can be obtained.

  Of the contracts for viewing pay broadcasts, the contract for each channel is called flat, and the charge for the program viewed is called pay-per-view. Among pay-per-views, when viewers suddenly want to watch a given program, those that do not require prior contact, which can be viewed simply by performing a predetermined operation, are called impulse pay-per-view, and advance contact is required. This is called call-ahead pay-per-view.

  As described above, in order to descramble scrambled broadcasts, a scramble key is required. Conventionally, a scramble key is illegally acquired, and a person who does not have a viewing contract illegally views the scrambled broadcast. There was a fear.

  As a method for preventing unauthorized viewing of a program for which a scramble key has been illegally obtained and a viewing contract has not been made, for example, there is a method described in Patent Document 1.

  In the method described in Patent Document 1, for example, in an IC (Integrated Circuit) card as a security module attached to a receiving terminal, a scramble key is encrypted into an encrypted scramble key, and the decoder is built in the receiving terminal. Forward. Then, in the decoder, the encrypted scramble key is decrypted into the original scramble key and used for descrambling.

  As described above, in the method described in Patent Document 1, the scramble key is encrypted into the encrypted scramble key in the IC card, and the encrypted scramble key is decrypted into the original scramble key in the decoder. The key used for encryption and decryption is required.

  Therefore, in the method described in Patent Document 1, a card ID (Identification) is stored in the IC card, and the IC card uses the card ID as a key to encrypt a scramble key and The data is transferred to a decoder, and the decoder uses the card ID supplied from the IC card as a key to decrypt the encrypted scramble key.

  However, in this case, the card ID may be wiretapped when supplied from the IC card to the decoder, and the encrypted scramble key may be illegally decrypted using the card ID.

  Therefore, a method is conceivable in which the same key for encryption / decryption of the scramble key is stored in all IC cards and decoders, and the scramble key is encrypted and decrypted using the key.

  However, generally, an IC card has strong tamper resistance, but a decoder does not have tamper resistance as much as an IC card. Therefore, if the same key is stored in all decoders, 1 Even if a key leaks from only one decoder, the key must be changed for all decoders and all IC cards, which entails enormous costs.

  Therefore, a method of adopting a different key for each decoder as a scramble key encryption / decryption key can be considered. According to this method, even if a key leaks from one decoder, it is not necessary to change the key for other decoders.

  However, since the IC card to be installed in the decoder needs to be an IC card that stores the same key as the decoder, a different key is used for each decoder as a key for encryption / decryption of the scramble key. In this case, it is necessary to ship the decoder together with an IC card storing the same key as the key stored in the decoder, which is inconvenient.

  Furthermore, in this case, it is difficult to deal with replacement of only one of the IC card and the decoder storing the same key.

  By the way, as a method for securely exchanging messages between two modules, mutual authentication is performed to authenticate a communication partner and to identify a session key between the two modules ( There is a method of obtaining session information) and encrypting / decrypting a message with the session key.

  Here, as a method for performing mutual authentication, for example, there is a method using a symmetric key (common key) encryption method called “Mutual authentication Three pass authentication” defined in ISO / IEC9798-2.

  If a session key is obtained by performing mutual authentication between the decoder and the IC card, and the scramble key is encrypted / decrypted with the session key, the scramble key is sent from the IC card to the decoder. Can be delivered securely.

  However, in order to perform mutual authentication as described above, both the decoder that performs mutual authentication and the IC card must have a key for performing mutual authentication.

  Therefore, in order to perform encryption / decryption of the scramble key with the session key, for example, mutual authentication between the decoder and the IC card attached to the decoder (receiving terminal incorporating the decoder) It is necessary to memorize the same key.

  However, for example, when the same key for mutual authentication is stored in all the IC cards and decoders, one unit is used as in the case of the encryption / decryption key for the scramble key described above. Even if a key is leaked from only one of the decoders, the key must be changed for all the decoders and all the IC cards, which entails a huge cost.

  Also, for example, when a different key is adopted for each decoder as a key for mutual authentication, the IC card and the decoder are shipped as in the case of the scramble key encryption / decryption key described above. Or inconvenience when replacing.

JP 09-046672 A

  The present invention has been made in view of such a situation, and makes it possible to easily suppress unauthorized use of a scramble key.

  In the information processing system according to the first aspect of the present invention, the first information processing device that descrambles the program information performs a specific operation using the unique information unique to the first information processing device and the unique information. The storage means storing the secret key obtained by performing the calculation, and the second information processing apparatus that has received the supply of the unique information stored in the storage means performs a specific calculation using the unique information. Decryption that receives the supply of the encrypted scramble key obtained by encrypting the scramble key based on the private key and decrypts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the private key stored in the storage means And a descrambling means for descrambling program information using the scramble key decrypted by the decrypting means, and a second information processing apparatus having tamper resistance is provided The private information is supplied from the information processing apparatus, and the specific key is used to perform a specific calculation to obtain a secret key, and the scramble is performed based on the secret key obtained by the secret key calculation means. And encryption means for encrypting the key and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the first information processing apparatus.

  In this information processing system, a tamper-resistant second information processing apparatus receives supply of unique information from the first information processing apparatus, and performs a specific calculation using the unique information to obtain a secret key. Ask. Further, the second information processing apparatus encrypts the scramble key based on the secret key, and supplies the encrypted scramble key to the first information processing apparatus. The first information processing device receives the encrypted scramble key from the second information processing device, decrypts the encrypted scramble key into a scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means, The program information is descrambled using the scramble key.

  In the information processing apparatus, the information processing method, and the program according to the second aspect of the present invention, another information processing apparatus that receives the supply of the unique information stored in the storage unit performs a specific calculation using the unique information Is supplied with an encrypted scramble key obtained by encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained by the above, and decrypts the encrypted scramble key into a scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means And a descrambling means / step for descrambling program information using the scramble key decrypted in the decoding means / step.

  In this information processing apparatus, information processing method, and program, the secret obtained by another information processing apparatus that has received the supply of the specific information stored in the storage means and performing a specific calculation using the specific information Upon receipt of an encrypted scramble key obtained by encrypting the scramble key based on the key, the encrypted scramble key is decrypted into a scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means. Then, the program information is descrambled using the scramble key.

  An information processing apparatus, an information processing method, and a program according to a third aspect of the present invention receive supply of unique information from another information processing apparatus and obtain a secret key by performing a specific calculation using the unique information. A secret key calculation means / step; and an encryption means / step for encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained in the secret key calculation means / step and supplying the encrypted scramble key to another information processing apparatus. It is characterized by including.

  In this information processing apparatus, information processing method, and program, a secret key is obtained by receiving specific information from another information processing apparatus and performing a specific calculation using the specific information. Then, based on the secret key, the scramble key is encrypted, and the encrypted scramble key is supplied to another information processing apparatus.

  According to the present invention, unauthorized use of a scramble key can be easily suppressed.

  DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Embodiments of the present invention will be described below. Correspondences between the configuration requirements of the present invention and the embodiments described in the specification and the drawings are exemplified as follows. This description is for confirming that the embodiment supporting the present invention is described in the specification and the like. Therefore, even if there is an embodiment that is described in the specification and the like but is not described here as corresponding to the configuration requirement, that is because the embodiment It does not mean that it does not correspond to. Conversely, even if an embodiment is described here as corresponding to a configuration requirement, that means that the embodiment does not correspond to a configuration requirement other than the configuration requirement. It doesn't mean anything.

An information processing system according to the first aspect of the present invention includes:
A first information processing apparatus (for example, the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 1) that separates a plurality of pieces of broadcast information and descrambles information on a scrambled program among the plurality of pieces of information;
A tamper-resistant second information processing apparatus that extracts the scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling and supplies the scramble key to the first information processing apparatus (for example, In an information processing system including the security module 32) of FIG.
The first information processing apparatus includes:
Storage means (for example, EEPROM 43 in FIG. 4) storing unique information unique to the first information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
Encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the second information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information The decryption means (for example, the decryptor of FIG. 4) receives the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means. 42)
Using descrambling means (for example, descrambler 41 in FIG. 4) for descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted by the decrypting means,
The second information processing apparatus
A secret key calculation means (for example, the calculation circuit 55 in FIG. 4) that receives the supply of the unique information from the first information processing apparatus and obtains a secret key by performing the specific calculation using the unique information;
Encryption means for encrypting the scramble key and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the first information processing apparatus based on the secret key obtained by the secret key calculation means (for example, the encryptor of FIG. 4) And 54).

An information processing apparatus according to the second aspect of the present invention provides:
In an information processing apparatus (for example, the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 1) that separates a plurality of broadcast information and descrambles information on a scrambled program among the plurality of information.
The information processing apparatus extracts another scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information and supplies the information to the information processing apparatus. A device (eg, security module 32 of FIG. 1) is removable,
Storage means (for example, EEPROM 43 in FIG. 4) storing unique information unique to the information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
The other information processing apparatus that has been supplied with the unique information stored in the storage means encrypts the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. The decryption means (for example, the decoder 42 in FIG. 4) receives the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means. )When,
Descramble means (for example, a descrambler 41 in FIG. 4) for descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted by the decryption means.

In the information processing apparatus according to the second aspect,
Mutual authentication with the other information processing apparatus using the secret key stored in the storage means to obtain a session key used for encryption of information exchanged with the other information processing apparatus It further comprises authentication means (for example, the mutual authentication unit 44 in FIG. 6),
The other information processing apparatus encrypts the scramble key into the encrypted scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation. And
The decryption means can decrypt the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key stored in the storage means.

An information processing method or program according to the second aspect of the present invention includes:
The information processing apparatus (for example, the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 1) extracts the scramble key from information including the scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information, and supplies the scramble key to the information processing apparatus. Other information processing devices having tamper resistance (for example, the security module 32 in FIG. 1) are detachable,
The information processing apparatus stores storage means (for example, EEPROM 43 in FIG. 4) that stores unique information unique to the information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information. With
The other information processing apparatus that has been supplied with the unique information stored in the storage means encrypts the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. A decryption step (for example, step S3 in FIG. 5) of receiving the encrypted scramble key obtained thereby and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means When,
A descrambling step (for example, step S4 in FIG. 5) for descrambling the information of the program using the scramble key decrypted in the decrypting step.

An information processing apparatus according to the third aspect of the present invention provides:
Separating a plurality of broadcast information, and detachable from other information processing devices descrambled information of the scrambled program among the plurality of information, A tamper-resistant information processing apparatus (for example, the scramble key is extracted from information including the scramble key used for descrambling and supplied to the other information processing apparatus (for example, the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 1). In the security module 32) of FIG.
Storage means (for example, EEPROM 43 in FIG. 4) storing unique information unique to the other information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
By encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information Receiving the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means (for example, the decoder 42 in FIG. 4); ,
Supply of the unique information from the other information processing apparatus comprising descrambling means (for example, a descrambler 41 in FIG. 4) for descrambling the information of the program using the scramble key decrypted by the decrypting means And a secret key calculation means (for example, the calculation circuit 55 in FIG. 4) that obtains a secret key by performing the specific calculation using the unique information,
Based on the secret key obtained by the secret key calculation means, the scramble key is encrypted, and the encryption scramble key is supplied to the other information processing apparatus (for example, the encryptor 54 in FIG. 4). ) And.

In the information processing apparatus of the third aspect,
Session used for encryption of information exchanged with the other information processing apparatus by performing mutual authentication with the other information processing apparatus using a secret key obtained by performing the specific operation A mutual authentication means for obtaining a key (for example, the mutual authentication unit 56 in FIG. 6)
The encryption means encrypts the scramble key into the encrypted scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation. And
The decryption unit of the other information processing apparatus converts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key stored in the storage unit. Can be decrypted.

An information processing method or program according to the third aspect of the present invention includes:
A storage unit (for example, a storage device for storing unique information unique to another information processing apparatus (for example, the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 1) and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information (for example, EEPROM 43) in FIG.
Based on the secret key obtained by the information processing apparatus (for example, the security module 32 in FIG. 1) receiving the supply of the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. Decryption means (for example, receiving the supply of the encrypted scramble key obtained by encrypting the scramble key, and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means (for example, , Decoder 42) of FIG.
Supply of the unique information from the other information processing apparatus comprising descrambling means (for example, a descrambler 41 in FIG. 4) for descrambling the information of the program using the scramble key decrypted by the decrypting means A secret key calculation step for obtaining a secret key by performing the specific calculation using the unique information (for example, steps S11 and S12 in FIG. 5);
An encryption step for encrypting the scramble key and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the other information processing apparatus based on the secret key obtained in the secret key calculation step (for example, step S13 in FIG. 5 and And S14).

  Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 shows a pay broadcasting system to which the present invention is applied (a system is a logical collection of a plurality of devices, regardless of whether or not each component device is in the same housing). It is a block diagram which shows the structure of an Example.

  The encoder 1 (1A to 1E) of the transmission side system 21 digitizes and compresses video signals and audio signals for 5 channels, for example, in accordance with the control signal supplied from the program control system 5 and sends it to the multiplexer 2. Output. The multiplexer 2 packetizes the output of the plurality of encoders 1 (for 5 channels in FIG. 1) and related information, multiplexes them, and outputs them to the scrambler 3.

  Here, the related information is information other than the contents constituting the program such as video and audio in the information (data) broadcast by the pay broadcasting system of FIG. 1, for example, for information on the program and descrambling "Individual information (program information)" including the scramble key of the individual, "Individual" including the contract type for each subscriber (viewer) (for example, contract form such as flat and pay-per-view) and the contract key for decrypting the common information Information ".

  The scrambler 3 selectively scrambles a predetermined one of the output signals of the multiplexer 2 using the scramble key supplied from the related information transmitting device 4, and the resulting signal is, for example, Distribution (broadcasting) is performed via terrestrial waves, satellite lines, the Internet, CATV (Cable Television) networks, and other transmission paths 23.

  The related information transmission device 4 supplies the scramble key to the scrambler 3. The related information transmitting device 4 encrypts the scramble key using the contract key (work key) supplied from the scramble control system 6, and the program ID (Identification) supplied from the program control system 5 and the corresponding channel. Together with the channel ID (service-id) and the like as part of the common information (program information).

  The program control system 5 generates a predetermined control signal and controls the encoder 1 according to the program. That is, the program control system 5 controls the digitization and compression methods in the encoder 1. In addition, the program control system 5 generates a program ID of a program encoded by the encoder 1 and a channel ID of a corresponding channel, and supplies the program ID to the related information transmission device 4.

  The scramble control system 6 supplies a contract key used to encrypt (decrypt) the scramble key to the related information transmitting apparatus 4. The scramble control system 6 stores an individual key unique to the security module 32 in a built-in database (not shown), and encrypts a contract key (work key) using the individual key. This is supplied to the multiplexer 2 as part of the information.

  The viewing information collection processing system 7 receives viewing information (for example, a viewed program ID, a corresponding channel ID, and a viewing time) uploaded from a number of receiving terminals 22 via a network 24 such as the Internet or a telephone line. Etc.). The viewing information collection processing system 7 stores contract information, which is the content of the contract, for each user who has contracted to view the program, and supplies the contract information to the scramble control system 6 as necessary.

  The receiving terminal 22 has a built-in decoder 31, and the security module 32 can be attached and detached. The decoder 31 scrambled program (information), individual information (added to the program) or common information (program information) from a signal (plural information) broadcast (transmitted) via the transmission path 23. ) And supply individual information and common information to the security module 32 as necessary. The decoder 31 receives the scramble key supplied from the security module 32, descrambles the scrambled program using the scramble key, and supplies the scrambled program to a display or the like (not shown) for display.

  The security module 32 is a tamper-resistant module (device) that is detachably attached to the receiving terminal 22 and is, for example, an IC card.

  Here, the security module 32 is provided (distributed) to, for example, a user who has contracted to view a program from the operator of the transmission system 21. Alternatively, the security module 32 is sold, for example, as a set with the receiving terminal 22 or alone.

  The security module 32 stores an individual key unique to the security module 32, and decrypts the individual information supplied from the decoder 31 using the individual key. Furthermore, the security module 32 extracts and stores the contract key and contract information included in the individual information decrypted using the individual key. Further, the security module 32 decrypts the common information (attached to the program) supplied from the decoder 31 using the contract key extracted from the individual information. Then, the security module 32 extracts and encrypts the scramble key included in the common information, and supplies the encrypted scramble key obtained by the encryption to the decoder 31.

  Next, FIG. 2 shows an example of the format (part) of the individual information.

  The individual information includes, for example, as shown in FIG. 2, an 8-bit contract key number (for identifying the contract key) corresponding to the contract key, a 64-bit contract key, and a 16-bit channel corresponding to the contracted channel. It includes ID (service-id) and 4-bit contract type. The individual information also includes a card ID (Card ID) for identifying a security module (from other security modules) that should decrypt the individual information (receive individual information).

  Here, there are various contracts for contracts for viewing programs, and contract keys used for the respective contracts are different. The contract type represents flat, pay-per-view, or the like. Further, in FIG. 2, the contract type and channel ID (service-id) are the contract information described above.

  When the card ID of the security module 32 is included in the individual information, the individual information includes a contract key used for a contract made by the user who owns the security module 32 and a contract key number corresponding to the contract key. The channel ID corresponding to the channel of the program that can be viewed with the contract made by the user, the contract type representing the content of the contract made by the user, and the like are included.

  Next, FIG. 3 shows an example of the format (part) of the common information (program information).

  For example, as shown in FIG. 3, the program information includes a 4-bit contract type, an 8-bit contract key number, a 64-bit encryption scramble key, a 16-bit channel ID (Service_id), and 16 for identifying a program. Contains the program ID of the bit.

  The program information is information related to a program (program corresponding to the program information) represented by the program ID included in the program information among programs broadcast on the channel represented by the channel ID included in the program information. Yes, the contract type included in the program information represents, for example, the content of a contract necessary for viewing a program corresponding to the program information.

  The contract key number included in the program information is a contract key number of a contract key used for decrypting a scramble key necessary for descrambling the scramble applied to the program corresponding to the program information. Further, the encrypted scramble key included in the program information is obtained by encrypting the scramble key necessary for descrambling the scramble applied to the program corresponding to the program information using the contract key.

  Next, the operation of the transmission side system 21 of the pay broadcast system in FIG. 1 will be described.

  First, when individual information is transmitted from the transmission side system 21 to the receiving terminal 22, the individual information is encrypted in the scramble control system 6 using an individual key specific to the security module 32 that should receive the individual information. .

  That is, the scramble control system 6 stores an individual key unique to each security module in association with the card ID of the security module for a security module that has been distributed (provided) to a user who has subscribed to view. Then, the scramble control system 6 generates individual information (FIG. 2) to be received by the security module 32 based on, for example, contract information of the user who owns the security module 32 supplied from the viewing information collection processing system 7. This individual information includes the card ID of the security module 32.

  The scramble control system 6 generates the individual information to be received by the security module 32, and then encrypts the contract key portion of the individual information using the individual key associated with the card ID of the security module 32. To the multiplexer 2.

  In the multiplexer 2, the digitized and compressed video signal and audio signal corresponding to the predetermined program supplied from the encoder 1 and the individual information supplied from the scramble control system 6 are packetized, and time-divisionally performed. After being multiplexed, it is supplied to the scrambler 3. The scrambler 3 scrambles only the program portion (video data and audio data) of the digital signal from the multiplexer 2 using the scramble key supplied from the related information sending device 4, and sends it to the transmission line 23. At the same time, the individual information portion is sent to the transmission path 23 without being scrambled.

  The transmission (transmission) of the individual information is performed as needed when the individual information needs to be updated.

  Next, when program information related to a program (components of common information) is transmitted from the transmission-side system 21 to the receiving terminal 22, the related information generating device 4 displays program information related to the broadcast program (FIG. 3). Is supplied to the multiplexer 2. The multiplexer 2 packetizes the digitized and compressed video signal and audio signal corresponding to the predetermined program supplied from the encoder 1 and the program information supplied from the related information transmitting device 4 and performs time division multiplexing. Then, the digital signal obtained as a result is supplied to the scrambler 3.

  Further, the related information transmitting device 4 supplies the scrambler 3 with the scramble key before encrypting the encrypted scramble key included in the program information (FIG. 3) supplied to the multiplexer 2.

  The scrambler 3 relates a program portion corresponding to program information including an encrypted scramble key obtained by encrypting a scramble key supplied from the related information transmission device 4 in the digital signal from the multiplexer 2. The scramble key supplied from the information sending device 4 is scrambled and sent to the transmission path 23, and the program information portion is sent to the transmission path 23 without being scrambled.

  In this way, a predetermined program and program information related to the program are transmitted from the transmission side system 21 to the receiving terminal 22.

  Next, FIG. 4 shows a configuration example of the receiving terminal 22 of FIG. 1 and the security module 32 attached to the receiving terminal 22.

  4, the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 includes a demultiplexer 40, a descrambler 41, a decoder 42, and an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) 43. The security module 32 includes decoders 51 and 52. , EEPROM 53, encryptor 54, and arithmetic circuit 55.

  A scrambled program transmitted from the transmission side system 21 via the transmission path 23, or a digital signal (a plurality of information) in which individual information and program information not scrambled are time-division multiplexed are received by the receiving terminal 22. It is received by a tuner (not shown) and supplied to the demultiplexer 40.

  In the decoder 31, the demultiplexer 40 separates the digital signal from the tuner into a scrambled program, unscrambled individual information and program information, etc., and supplies the scrambled program to the descrambler 41. Information and program information are supplied to the security module 32.

  The descrambler 41 descrambles the scrambled program supplied from the demultiplexer 40 using the scramble key supplied from the decoder 42 and outputs the scrambled program.

The decryptor 42 receives the encrypted scramble key from the security module 32 (encryptor 54 thereof), and converts the encrypted scramble key into the original scramble key using the secret key K _sac stored in the EEPROM 43. Decode and supply to the descrambler 41.

The EEPROM 43 stores a terminal ID (ID _r ) as unique information unique to the receiving terminal 22 and a secret key K _sac obtained by performing a specific calculation using the terminal ID.

In the security module 32, the decoder 51 receives the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40, and the security module stored in the EEPROM 53 and the card ID (ID _c ) included in the individual information (FIG. 2). Compare 32 card IDs. Then, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 converts the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 into the security module. 32 is recognized as the individual information to be received, and contract information (contract type and channel ID (service-id) etc.) included in the individual information (FIG. 2) is extracted and supplied to the EEPROM 53 for storage. Here, the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53 recognizes (determines) whether the program information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 to the decoder 52 is program information related to a program permitted to be viewed by the contract. Used to do.

  Furthermore, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 is included in the individual information (FIG. 2) from the demultiplexer 40. The contract key number and the encrypted contract key are extracted, and the encrypted contract key is decrypted using the individual key stored in the EEPROM 53. Then, the decryptor 51 associates the contract key obtained by the decryption with the contract key number of the contract key, supplies it to the EEPROM 53, and stores it.

  The decoder 52 receives the program information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 and stores, for example, the contract information (contract type and channel ID (service-id), etc.) included in the program information (FIG. 3) and the EEPROM 53. Compare the contract information. Then, when the contract information included in the program information from the demultiplexer 40 is included in the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 52 determines that the program corresponding to the program information from the demultiplexer 40 is determined by the contract. If the program is permitted to be viewed, the contract key number and the encrypted scramble key included in the program information (FIG. 3) are extracted. Further, the decoder 52 reads the contract key stored in association with the contract key number that matches the contract key number extracted from the program information from the EEPROM 53, and uses the contract key to encrypt the program extracted from the program information. The encrypted scramble key is decrypted into the original scramble key and supplied to the encryptor 54.

The encryptor 54 encrypts the scramble key supplied from the _decryptor 52 into the encrypted scramble key using the secret key K _sac obtained in the arithmetic circuit 55, and decrypts the decoder 31 (decryptor 42 thereof) of the receiving terminal 22. ).

The arithmetic circuit 55 is supplied with the terminal ID of the receiving terminal 22 from the decoder 31 (EEPROM 43) built in the receiving terminal 22, and performs a specific calculation using the terminal ID to thereby obtain a secret key K _sac Is supplied to the encryptor 54.

Here, as described above, the secret key K _sac is a key (value) obtained by performing a specific calculation using the terminal ID of the receiving terminal 22, but is a specification for _{obtaining the} secret key K _sac. The method (contents) of the above is kept secret and is implemented only in the regular security module 32. Accordingly, only the security module 32 can obtain the secret key K _sac using the terminal ID of the receiving terminal 22. Since the security module 32 has tamper resistance, a specific calculation method is externally provided. The possibility of leakage is extremely low.

As a result, the security module 32 encrypts the scramble key using the secret key K _sac obtained by such a specific calculation method and supplies it to the decoder 31 so that the scramble key is illegally used. Can be easily suppressed.

That is, the security module 32 receives the supply of the terminal ID unique to the receiving terminal 22 stored in the EEPROM 43 of the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22, and uses the terminal ID to obtain the secret key K _sac . It is not necessary to store the same key for encrypting / decrypting the scramble key in all the receiving terminals and the security module.

Therefore, even if the secret key K _sac used in a certain receiving terminal or security module leaks, the leakage does not affect other receiving terminals or security modules.

  Further, it is not necessary to ship the receiving terminal 22 and the security module 32 as a set, and no problem occurs even if only one of the receiving terminal 22 or the security module 32 is replaced.

The specific operation is not particularly limited, and for example, an operation using a linear function, an operation using a non-linear function, or the like can be employed. However, a specific operation cannot be easily recognized (analyzed) even if it refers to the terminal ID used for the operation and the secret key K _sac obtained by the specific operation using the terminal ID. It is desirable to calculate as follows.

  Next, the operation of the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 4 will be described with reference to FIG.

For example, when the security module 32 is attached to the receiving terminal 22, the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 reads out the terminal ID (ID _r ) stored in the EEPROM 43 in step S 1, and the arithmetic circuit of the security module 32. 55.

In step S11, the arithmetic circuit 55 of the security module 32 receives the terminal ID from the decoder 31, proceeds to step S12, and obtains the secret key K _sac by performing a specific operation using the terminal ID. To the encryptor 54.

  After that, a scrambled program transmitted from the transmission side system 21 via the transmission path 23, and a digital signal in which individual information and program information that are not scrambled are time-division multiplexed are not illustrated in the receiving terminal 22. When received by the tuner and supplied to the demultiplexer 40 of the decoder 31, the demultiplexer 40 separates the digital signal from the tuner into a scrambled program, unscrambled individual information and program information, and the like. The supplied program is supplied to the descrambler 41, and the individual information and the program information are supplied to the security module 32.

Here, the demultiplexer 40 receives and stores the card ID (ID _c ) stored in the EEPROM 53 from the security module 32 when the power of the receiving terminal 22 is turned on, for example. The card ID (ID _c ) included in the individual information (FIG. 2) separated from the digital signal from the tuner is compared with the card ID from the security module 32. The demultiplexer 40 then separates the individual information separated from the digital signal from the tuner only when the card ID included in the individual information separated from the digital signal from the tuner matches the card ID from the security module 32. To the security module 32.

In the security module 32, the decoder 51 receives the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40, and the security module stored in the EEPROM 53 and the card ID (ID _c ) included in the individual information (FIG. 2). By comparing with the card ID of 32, it is confirmed as a precaution that the card IDs match. Then, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 determines the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 (FIG. 2). The contract information (contract type and channel ID (service-id), etc.) included in is extracted and supplied to the EEPROM 53 for storage.

  Furthermore, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 is included in the individual information (FIG. 2) from the demultiplexer 40. The contract key number and the encrypted contract key are extracted, and the encrypted contract key is decrypted using the individual key stored in the EEPROM 53. Then, the decryptor 51 associates the contract key obtained by the decryption with the contract key number of the contract key, supplies it to the EEPROM 53, and stores it.

  On the other hand, the decoder 52 receives the program information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 and compares the contract information included in the program information (FIG. 3) with the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53. When the contract information included in the program information from the demultiplexer 40 is included in the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 52 includes the contract key included in the program information (FIG. 3) from the demultiplexer 40. The number and the encryption scramble key are extracted. Further, the decoder 52 reads the contract key stored in association with the contract key number that matches the contract key number extracted from the program information from the EEPROM 53, and uses the contract key to encrypt the program extracted from the program information. The encrypted scramble key is decrypted into the original scramble key and supplied to the encryptor 54.

When the scramble key is supplied from the decryptor 52 as described above, the encryptor 54 encrypts the scramble key using the secret key K _sac supplied from the arithmetic circuit 55 in step S13. The scramble key is encrypted, and the process proceeds to step S 14, where the encrypted scramble key is supplied to the decoder 42 of the decoder 31.

In step S 2, the decryptor 42 receives the encrypted scramble key supplied from the encryptor 54 of the security module 32, proceeds to step S 3, and uses the encrypted scramble key as the secret key K stored in the EEPROM 43. _{Using sac} , the original scramble key is decrypted and supplied to the descrambler 41.

  In step S4, the descrambler 41 receives the scrambled program (the program corresponding to the program information including the contract information included in the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53) supplied from the demultiplexer 40. The data is descrambled using the scramble key supplied from the decoder 42 and output.

  Next, FIG. 6 shows another configuration example of the receiving terminal 22 of FIG. 1 and the security module 32 attached to the receiving terminal 22.

  6, the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 is common to the decoder 31 of FIG. 4 in that it includes a demultiplexer 40, a descrambler 41, a decoder 42, and an EEPROM 43, but further includes a mutual authentication unit 44. This is different from the decoder 31 of FIG. The security module 32 of FIG. 6 is also common to the security module 32 of FIG. 4 in that it includes decryptors 51 and 52, an EEPROM 53, an encryptor 54, and an arithmetic circuit 55, but further includes a mutual authentication unit 56. 4 differs from the security module 32 of FIG.

The mutual authentication unit 44 of the decoder 31 performs mutual authentication using the secret key K _sac stored in the EEPROM 43. Further, the mutual authentication unit 44 supplies the decryption 42 with a session key obtained by performing the mutual authentication. Here, in FIG. 6, the decryptor 42 decrypts the encrypted scramble key using the session key supplied from the mutual authentication unit 44.

The mutual authentication unit 56 of the security module 32 performs mutual authentication using the secret key K _sac supplied from the arithmetic circuit 55. Further, the mutual authentication unit 56 supplies a session key obtained by performing the mutual authentication to the encryptor 54. Here, in FIG. 6, the encryptor 54 encrypts the scramble key using the session key supplied from the mutual authentication unit 56.

  The method of mutual authentication performed by the mutual authentication units 44 and 56 is not particularly limited, but here, for example, a method using a symmetric key cryptosystem is adopted.

  Accordingly, mutual authentication using a symmetric key encryption method will be described with reference to FIG.

  In FIG. 7, modules A and B each incorporate a mutual authentication key used for mutual authentication.

  Module B then generates a random number Rb as plain text and transmits it to module A.

  The module A receives the random number Rb from the module B, generates a random number Ra as plain text, and concatenates the random number Ra and the random number Rb from the module B (for example, arranges the random number Rb after the random number Ra). ). Further, the module A encrypts the concatenation result of the random numbers Ra and Rb using the mutual authentication key built in the module A, and transmits the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb) obtained as a result to the module B.

  Module B receives the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb) from module A and decrypts it into plaintext using the mutual authentication key built in module B. Then, the module B determines whether or not the random number Rb previously transmitted to the module A is connected to the plaintext obtained by the decryption. When the random number Rb is not concatenated with the plaintext obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb) from the module A, that is, the mutual authentication key identical to the mutual authentication key built in the module B An unauthorized module that does not contain a key (a module that module B should not communicate with), and therefore, in module B, the ciphertext from module A is If the plaintext cannot be decrypted, module B terminates communication with module A.

  On the other hand, when the random number Rb is connected to the plaintext obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb) from the module A, that is, the module A is the same as the mutual authentication key built in the module B. When the module A is a valid module containing a mutual authentication key (module B may communicate) and the module A is successfully authenticated, the module B identifies a session key ( As the session information), for example, the random number Text is generated, while the plaintext random number sequence Ra, Rb obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb) is rearranged into the reverse sequence Rb, Ra, and the session key Concatenate random numbers as Further, the module B encrypts the connection result using the mutual authentication key built in the module B, and transmits the ciphertext Enc (Rb, Ra, Text) obtained as a result to the module A.

  Module A receives the ciphertext Enc (Rb, Ra, Text) from module B and decrypts it into plaintext using the mutual authentication key built in module A. Then, the module A determines whether or not the random number Ra previously transmitted to the module B is connected to the plaintext obtained by the decryption. When the random number Ra is not concatenated with the plaintext obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Rb, Ra, Text) from the module B, that is, the module B is the same as the mutual authentication key built in the module A. The module is an unauthorized module that does not contain a mutual authentication key, and therefore, in module A, the ciphertext from module B cannot be decrypted into the original plaintext using the mutual authentication key built in module A. Module A ends communication with module B.

  On the other hand, when the random number Ra is connected to the plaintext obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Rb, Ra, Text) from the module B, the module B is identical to the mutual authentication key built in the module A. When the module B is successfully authenticated, the module A and B start secure communication by encrypting data using the session key Text.

  Here, whether or not the random number Ra is connected to the plaintext obtained by the module B decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Ra, Rb, Text) from the module B after the module B generates the random number Rb. The process until confirmation (verification) is mutual authentication.

  As described above, when the authentication of the module A is successful in the module B and the authentication of the module B is successful in the module A, that is, if the mutual authentication is successful between the modules A and B, the module A The data a to be transmitted to is encrypted into ciphertext using the session key Text concatenated with plaintext obtained by decrypting the ciphertext Enc (Rb, Ra, Text) and transmitted to the module B. Module B receives the ciphertext from module A and decrypts the ciphertext into data a as plaintext using session key Text.

  Further, the module B encrypts the data b to be transmitted to the module A into ciphertext using the session key Text, and transmits it to the module A. Module A receives the ciphertext from module B and decrypts the ciphertext into data b as plaintext using session key Text.

  The session key Text is a random number generated in the mutual authentication, and since only the modules A and B that have succeeded in the mutual authentication can be known, the modules A and B encrypt the data using the session key Text. Thus, secure communication can be performed.

  Next, the operation of the receiving terminal 22 in FIG. 6 will be described with reference to FIG.

For example, when the security module 32 is attached to the receiving terminal 22, the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 reads the terminal ID (ID _r ) stored in the EEPROM 43 in step S 51, and the arithmetic circuit of the security module 32. 55.

In step S61, the arithmetic circuit 55 of the security module 32 receives the terminal ID from the decoder 31, proceeds to step S62, and obtains the secret key K _sac by performing a specific operation using the terminal ID. To the mutual authentication unit 56.

  In step S52, the mutual authentication unit 44 of the decoder 31 and the mutual authentication unit 56 of the security module 32 perform the mutual authentication process as described with reference to FIG.

That is, the mutual authentication unit 44 of the decoder 31 performs a mutual authentication process using the secret key K _sac stored in the EEPROM ₄₃ as a mutual authentication key, and the mutual authentication unit 56 of the security module 32 Mutual authentication processing is performed using the supplied secret key K _sac as a mutual authentication key.

Therefore, since mutual authentication is performed between the mutual authentication units 44 and 56 using the same secret key K _sac as the mutual authentication key, the mutual authentication is successful. Then, as described in FIG. 7, the mutual authentication units 44 and 56 obtain a session key that can be known only by the mutual authentication units 44 and 56 that have succeeded in the mutual authentication.

  The mutual authentication unit 44 supplies the session key to the decryptor 42, and the mutual authentication unit 56 supplies the session key to the encryptor 54.

  After that, a scrambled program transmitted from the transmission side system 21 via the transmission path 23, and a digital signal in which individual information and program information that are not scrambled are time-division multiplexed are not illustrated in the receiving terminal 22. When received by the tuner and supplied to the demultiplexer 40 of the decoder 31, the demultiplexer 40 separates the digital signal from the tuner into a scrambled program, unscrambled individual information and program information, and the like. The supplied program is supplied to the descrambler 41, and the individual information and the program information are supplied to the security module 32.

Here, as described with reference to FIG. 5, the demultiplexer 40 receives the card ID (ID _c ) stored in the EEPROM 53 from the security module 32 when the power of the receiving terminal 22 is turned on. The card ID (ID _c ) included in the individual information (FIG. 2) separated from the digital signal from the tuner is compared with the card ID from the security module 32. The demultiplexer 40 then separates the individual information separated from the digital signal from the tuner only when the card ID included in the individual information separated from the digital signal from the tuner matches the card ID from the security module 32. To the security module 32.

In the security module 32, the decoder 51 receives the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40, and the security module stored in the EEPROM 53 and the card ID (ID _c ) included in the individual information (FIG. 2). By comparing with the card ID of 32, it is confirmed just in case that the card ID matches. Then, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 determines the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 (FIG. 2). The contract information included in is extracted and supplied to the EEPROM 53 for storage.

  Furthermore, when the card ID included in the individual information supplied from the demultiplexer 40 matches the card ID stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 51 is included in the individual information (FIG. 2) from the demultiplexer 40. The contract key number and the encrypted contract key are extracted, and the encrypted contract key is decrypted using the individual key stored in the EEPROM 53. Then, the decryptor 51 associates the contract key obtained by the decryption with the contract key number of the contract key, supplies it to the EEPROM 53, and stores it.

  On the other hand, the decoder 52 receives the program information supplied from the demultiplexer 40, and compares the contract information included in the program information (FIG. 3) with the channel ID in the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53. . Then, when the program information from the demultiplexer 40 is included in the contract information stored in the EEPROM 53, the decoder 52 includes the contract key number and encryption scramble included in the program information from the demultiplexer 40 (FIG. 3). Extract the key. Further, the decoder 52 reads the contract key stored in association with the contract key number that matches the contract key number extracted from the program information from the EEPROM 53, and uses the contract key to encrypt the program extracted from the program information. The encrypted scramble key is decrypted into the original scramble key and supplied to the encryptor 54.

  When the scramble key is supplied from the decryptor 52 as described above, the encryptor 54 uses the session key supplied from the mutual authentication unit 56 to encrypt the scramble key in step S63. The key is encrypted, and the process proceeds to step S 64, where the encrypted scramble key is supplied to the decoder 42 of the decoder 31.

  In step S53, the decryptor 42 receives the encrypted scramble key supplied from the encryptor 54 of the security module 32, proceeds to step S54, and uses the encrypted scramble key as the session key from the mutual authentication unit 44. Using this, the original scramble key is decrypted and supplied to the descrambler 41.

  In step S55, the descrambler 41 descrambles the scrambled program supplied from the demultiplexer 40 using the scramble key supplied from the decoder 42 and outputs the scrambled program.

  The decoder 31 is configured so that, for example, when this is disassembled, the internal circuit does not operate normally. When the disassembly is performed, the disassembly is stored in the EEPROM 53 as viewing information, and is further stored in the viewing information collection processing system 7. It can be configured to be transferred.

As described above, the arithmetic circuit 55 of the security module 32 receives the supply of the terminal ID from the EEPROM 43 built in the receiving terminal 22, obtains the secret key K _sac by performing a specific calculation using the terminal ID, and performs encryption. The device 54 encrypts the scramble key based on the secret key K _sac , that is, using the secret key K _sac itself or using a session key obtained by mutual authentication using the secret key K _sac. The encrypted scramble key obtained as a result is supplied to the receiving terminal 22. On the other hand, the decoder 42 of the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 has the secret key obtained by the security module 32 receiving the supply of the terminal ID stored in the memory of the EEPROM 43 performing a specific operation using the terminal ID. The encryption scramble key obtained by encrypting the scramble key based on K _sac is supplied, and the encrypted scramble key is supplied based on the secret key K _sac stored in the EEPROM ₄₃ , that is, the secret key K _sac It is decrypted into the original scramble key using itself or using a session key obtained by mutual authentication using the secret key K _sac . Then, the descrambler 41 descrambles the program information using the scramble key.

  Therefore, unauthorized use of the scramble key can be easily suppressed.

  Next, a series of processing performed by the decoder 31 incorporated in the receiving terminal 22 and the security module 32 described above can be performed by dedicated hardware or can be performed by software. When the series of processing is performed by software, a program constituting the software is built in the receiving terminal 22 or the security module 32 and installed in a microcomputer or the like that controls the receiving terminal 22 or the security module 32.

  Therefore, FIG. 9 shows a configuration example of an embodiment of a microcomputer in which a program for executing the above-described series of processing is installed.

  The program can be installed in advance in the memory 103 built in the microcomputer.

  Alternatively, the program is stored temporarily on a removable recording medium 111 such as a flexible disk, a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read Only Memory), a MO (Magneto Optical) disk, a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc), a magnetic disk, or a semiconductor memory. It can be stored permanently (recorded). Such a removable recording medium 111 can be provided as so-called package software.

  The program is installed on the microcomputer from the removable recording medium 111 as described above, or transferred from the download site to the microcomputer wirelessly via a digital satellite broadcasting artificial satellite, or a LAN (Local Area Network). The program can be transferred to the microcomputer via a network such as the Internet. The microcomputer can receive the program transferred in this way by the communication interface 110 and install it in the built-in memory 103.

  The microcomputer incorporates a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 102. The CPU 102 executes a program installed in the memory 103 via the bus 101. Thus, the CPU 102 performs processing according to the above-described flowchart or processing performed by the configuration of the above-described block diagram.

  Here, in the present specification, the processing steps for describing a program for causing the microcomputer (CPU) to perform various processes do not necessarily have to be processed in time series in the order described in the flowchart, It also includes processing that is executed manually or individually (for example, parallel processing or object processing).

  When the security module 32 is configured as an IC card or the like, the exchange between the decoder 31 and the security module 32 may be performed by wired communication (contact communication) or non-contact communication (proximity communication). ).

  Further, the security module 32 can be configured as a program module to be executed by the receiving terminal 22.

  Further, the mutual authentication method is not limited to the method described with reference to FIG.

  In this embodiment, the security module 32 is a device that can be attached to and detached from the receiving terminal 22. However, the security module 32 can be built in the receiving terminal 22 in advance.

Here, in the present embodiment, the security module 32 receives a terminal ID specific to the receiving terminal 22 from the decoder 31 and performs a specific calculation using the terminal ID, thereby obtaining the secret key K _sac . On the contrary, the decoder 31 receives the card ID of the security module 32 from the security module 32 and performs a specific calculation using the card ID in the decoder 31 to obtain the secret key K _sac. It is also possible to make it.

  However, while the security module 32 has tamper resistance, the decoder 31 built in the receiving terminal 22 generally does not have tamper resistance as the security module 32 has. If it does, compared with the case where a specific calculation is performed in the security module 32, possibility that the content of a specific calculation will leak becomes high. If the content of a specific operation is leaked, it is necessary to change the content of the specific operation performed by all the receiving terminals. Therefore, the specific operation is performed by the security module 32 having tamper resistance. desirable.

That is, in the security module 32 having tamper resistance, the secret key K _sac is obtained by performing a specific calculation. In the decoder 31 having no tamper resistance as the security module 32 has, the result of the specific calculation is obtained. By storing a certain secret key K _sac and not performing a specific operation, the content of the specific operation is concealed in the security module 32 having tamper resistance. Leakage is prevented, thereby improving security.

It is a block diagram which shows the structural example of one Embodiment of the pay broadcasting system to which this invention is applied. It is a figure which shows a part of individual information. It is a figure which shows a part of program information. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration example of a receiving terminal 22 and a security module 32. FIG. FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining operations of the receiving terminal 22 and the security module 32. It is a block diagram which shows the other structural example of the receiving terminal 22 and the security module 32. FIG. It is a figure for demonstrating the process of mutual authentication. FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining operations of the receiving terminal 22 and the security module 32. It is a block diagram which shows the structural example of one Embodiment of the computer to which this invention is applied.

Explanation of symbols

  1A to 1E encoder, 2 multiplexer, 3 scrambler, 4 related information transmission device, 5 program control system, 6 scramble control system, 7 viewing information collection processing system, 21 transmitting side system, 22 receiving terminal, 23 transmission path, 24 network, 31 decoder, 32 security module, 40 demultiplexer, 41 descrambler, 42 decoder, 43 EEPROM, 44 mutual authentication unit, 51, 52 decoder, 53 EEPROM, 54 encryption, 55 arithmetic circuit, 56 mutual authentication Part, 101 bus, 102 CPU, 103 memory, 110 communication interface, 111 removable recording medium

Claims (9)

A first information processing apparatus that separates a plurality of broadcasted information and descrambles information of a scrambled program among the plurality of information;
A tamper-resistant second information processing apparatus that extracts the scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information and supplies the scramble key to the first information processing apparatus; In an information processing system that includes
The first information processing apparatus includes:
Storage means storing unique information unique to the first information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
Encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the second information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information Decryption means for receiving the encrypted scramble key obtained by decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means;
Descrambling means for descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted by the decryption means,
The second information processing apparatus
A secret key calculating means for obtaining a secret key by receiving the specific information from the first information processing apparatus and performing the specific calculation using the specific information;
Encryption means for encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained by the secret key calculation means, and for supplying the encrypted scramble key to the first information processing apparatus. Information processing system. In an information processing apparatus that separates a plurality of broadcasted information and descrambles information on a scrambled program among the plurality of information,
The information processing apparatus extracts another scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information and supplies the information to the information processing apparatus. The device is removable,
Storage means storing unique information unique to the information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
The other information processing apparatus that has been supplied with the unique information stored in the storage means encrypts the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. Decryption means for decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on a secret key stored in the storage means;
An information processing apparatus comprising: descrambling means for descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted by the decrypting means. Mutual authentication with the other information processing apparatus using the secret key stored in the storage means to obtain a session key used for encryption of information exchanged with the other information processing apparatus An authentication means,
The other information processing apparatus encrypts the scramble key into the encrypted scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation. And
The decryption means decrypts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key stored in the storage means. The information processing apparatus according to claim 2. In an information processing method of an information processing apparatus that separates a plurality of broadcasted information and descrambles information on a scrambled program among the plurality of information,
The information processing apparatus extracts another scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information and supplies the information to the information processing apparatus. The device is removable,
The information processing apparatus includes storage means for storing unique information unique to the information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information,
The other information processing apparatus that has been supplied with the unique information stored in the storage means encrypts the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. A decryption step of decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on a secret key stored in the storage means;
A descrambling step of descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted in the decrypting step. In a program that causes a computer that controls an information processing device that descrambles information of a scrambled program among the plurality of information to be executed by a computer that separates the plurality of information that has been broadcast,
The information processing apparatus extracts another scramble key from information including a scramble key used for descrambling among the plurality of information and supplies the information to the information processing apparatus. The device is removable,
The information processing apparatus includes storage means for storing unique information unique to the information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information,
The other information processing apparatus that has been supplied with the unique information stored in the storage means encrypts the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation using the unique information. A decryption step of decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on a secret key stored in the storage means;
And a descrambling step for descrambling the program information using the scramble key decrypted in the decryption step. Separating a plurality of broadcast information, and detachable from other information processing devices descrambled information of the scrambled program among the plurality of information, In the information processing apparatus having tamper resistance, the scramble key is extracted from information including the scramble key used for descrambling and supplied to the other information processing apparatus.
Storage means for storing unique information unique to the other information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
By encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information Decryption means for receiving the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means;
Using the scramble key decrypted by the decryption means, descramble means for descrambling the program information is received from the other information processing apparatus, and the unique information is used to supply the specific information. A secret key calculation means for obtaining a secret key by performing a specific calculation;
And encryption means for encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained by the secret key calculation means and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the other information processing apparatus. Processing equipment. Session used for encryption of information exchanged with the other information processing apparatus by performing mutual authentication with the other information processing apparatus using a secret key obtained by performing the specific operation A mutual authentication means for obtaining a key;
The encryption means encrypts the scramble key into the encrypted scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key obtained by performing the specific calculation. And
The decryption unit of the other information processing apparatus converts the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key using a session key obtained by performing mutual authentication using a secret key stored in the storage unit. The information processing apparatus according to claim 6, wherein decoding is performed. Separating a plurality of broadcast information, and detachable from other information processing devices descrambled information of the scrambled program among the plurality of information, In the information processing method of the information processing apparatus having tamper resistance, the scramble key is extracted from information including the scramble key used for descrambling and supplied to the other information processing apparatus.
Storage means for storing unique information unique to the other information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
By encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information Decryption means for receiving the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means;
Using the scramble key decrypted by the decryption means, descramble means for descrambling the program information is received from the other information processing apparatus, and the unique information is used to supply the specific information. A secret key calculation step for obtaining a secret key by performing a specific calculation; and
An encryption step of encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained in the secret key calculation step and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the other information processing apparatus. Processing method. Separating a plurality of broadcast information, and detachable from other information processing devices descrambled information of the scrambled program among the plurality of information, In the program for causing the computer that controls the information processing device having tamper resistance to extract the scramble key from information including the scramble key used for descrambling and supplying the information to the other information processing device,
Storage means for storing unique information unique to the other information processing apparatus and a secret key obtained by performing a specific calculation using the unique information;
By encrypting the scramble key based on a secret key obtained by the information processing apparatus receiving the unique information stored in the storage means by performing the specific calculation using the unique information Decryption means for receiving the supplied encrypted scramble key and decrypting the encrypted scramble key into the scramble key based on the secret key stored in the storage means;
Using the scramble key decrypted by the decryption means, descramble means for descrambling the program information is received from the other information processing apparatus, and the unique information is used to supply the specific information. A secret key calculation step for obtaining a secret key by performing a specific calculation; and
An encryption step of encrypting the scramble key based on the secret key obtained in the secret key calculation step and supplying the encrypted scramble key to the other information processing apparatus. A program that causes a computer to execute.

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