EP0891670B1 - Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method - Google Patents

Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0891670B1
EP0891670B1 EP97916402A EP97916402A EP0891670B1 EP 0891670 B1 EP0891670 B1 EP 0891670B1 EP 97916402 A EP97916402 A EP 97916402A EP 97916402 A EP97916402 A EP 97916402A EP 0891670 B1 EP0891670 B1 EP 0891670B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
decoder
access module
key
means
encrypted message
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP97916402A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0891670B2 (en
EP0891670A1 (en
Inventor
Donald Watts Davies
Andrew Glasspool
Simon Paul Ashley Rix
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Irdeto Access BV
Original Assignee
Digco BV
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Family has litigation
Priority to EP96200907 priority Critical
Priority to EP96200907 priority
Application filed by Digco BV filed Critical Digco BV
Priority to PCT/EP1997/001557 priority patent/WO1997038530A1/en
Priority to EP19970916402 priority patent/EP0891670B2/en
Publication of EP0891670A1 publication Critical patent/EP0891670A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0891670B1 publication Critical patent/EP0891670B1/en
First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=8223844&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=EP0891670(B1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Publication of EP0891670B2 publication Critical patent/EP0891670B2/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Application status is Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/43Processing of content or additional data, e.g. demultiplexing additional data from a digital video stream; Elementary client operations, e.g. monitoring of home network, synchronizing decoder's clock; Client middleware
    • H04N21/436Interfacing a local distribution network, e.g. communicating with another STB or inside the home ; Interfacing an external card to be used in combination with the client device
    • H04N21/4367Establishing a secure communication between the client and a peripheral device or smart card
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N21/00Selective content distribution, e.g. interactive television or video on demand [VOD]
    • H04N21/40Client devices specifically adapted for the reception of or interaction with content, e.g. set-top-box [STB]; Operations thereof
    • H04N21/41Structure of client; Structure of client peripherals
    • H04N21/418External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access
    • H04N21/4181External card to be used in combination with the client device, e.g. for conditional access for conditional access
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00Television systems
    • H04N7/16Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/162Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing
    • H04N7/163Authorising the user terminal, e.g. by paying; Registering the use of a subscription channel, e.g. billing by receiver means only
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04NPICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION
    • H04N7/00Television systems
    • H04N7/16Analogue secrecy systems; Analogue subscription systems
    • H04N7/167Systems rendering the television signal unintelligible and subsequently intelligible
    • H04N7/1675Providing digital key or authorisation information for generation or regeneration of the scrambling sequence
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/60Digital content management, e.g. content distribution
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication
    • H04L9/30Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy

Abstract

In a method for providing a secure communication between two devices, a first device generates a random key (Ci) and transfers this key to a second device in a first message encrypted using a plublic key. The second device decrypts the first encrypted message by means of a corresponding secret key to obtain the random key (Ci) and this random key is used to encrypt and decrypt all transmissions between these devices. In a decoder for a pay TV system, comprising a conditional access module and a smart card, this method is applied to provide a secure communication between the control access module and the smart card and/or between the decoder and the conditional access module.

Description

  • The present invention relates to a method for providing a secure communication between two devices, in particular between devices used in a pay TV system.
  • In a pay TV system each subscriber generally has a decoder for descrambling the source component signal, wherein said decoder comprises a conditional access module and a smart card for decrypting entitlement control messages and entitlement management messages. In order to prevent unauthorized operation of the decoder for descrambling a source component signal it is important to prevent switching between an authorized and an unauthorized smart card for example.
  • EP-A-0 428 252 discloses a method for providing a secure communication between two devices and an application of this method in a pay TV system. In this known method the authenticity of a second device, i.e. a smart card, is checked by a first device.
  • US-A-5 029 207 discloses a method for providing a secure communication between two devices and an application of this method in a pay TV system. In this known method a first key is transmitted in an encrypted message from an encoder to a decoder and the decoder decrypts this message to obtain the first key to decrypt the program signal. A secret serial number is used for encryption and decryption. There are no transmissions from the decoder to the encoder.
  • The invention aims to provide a method of the above-mentioned type wherein the communication between two devices, such as the control access module and the smart card or the decoder and the conditional access module, is arranged in such a manner that switching between authorized and unauthorized devices is not possible.
  • According to the invention a method is provided, wherein a first device generates a random key (Ci) and transfers said key to a second device in a first message encrypted using a public key, wherein said second device decrypts the first encrypted message by means of a corresponding secret key to obtain said random key (Ci), wherein said random key is used to encrypt and decrypt further transmissions from said second to said first device.
  • According to the invention this method can be applied in a decoder for a pay TV system, wherein said decoder comprises a conditional access module and a smart card, wherein said method is applied to provide a secure communi-cation between the control access module and the smart card or between the decoder and the conditional access module.
  • The invention further provides a decoder for a pay TV system, comprising a conditional access module and a smart card, said conditional access module comprising means for generating a random key (Ci), means for encrypting said key in a first encrypted message using a public key encryption method, means for transfering said first encrypted message to the smart card, said smart card comprising means for receiving and decrypting said first encrypted message to obtain said random key, means for encrypting transmissions to the conditional access module under said random key, said conditional access module having means to decrypt said transmissions received from the smart card.
  • In a further embodiment of the invention, said decoder comprises a conditional access module and a smart card, wherein said decoder comprises means for generating a random key (Ci), means for encrypting said key in a first encrypted message using a public key encryption method, means for transfering said first encrypted message to the conditional access module, said conditional access module comprising means for receiving and decrypting said first encrypted message to obtain said random key, means for encrypting transmissions to the decoder under said random key, said decoder having means to decrypt said transmissions received from the conditional access module.
  • The invention will be further explained by reference to the drawings in which an embodiment of the method of the invention is explained as applied in a decoder for a pay TV system.
  • Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of an embodiment of the decoder according to the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 shows a sequence of steps of an embodiment of the method of the invention.
  • Referring to fig. 1 there is shown in a very schematical manner a block diagram of a decoder for a pay TV system, wherein digital information signals are scrambled using a control word in accordance with the Eurocrypt standard for example. In this embodiment the decoder comprises a demodulator 1, a demultiplexer 2 and a decompression unit 3. The decoder further comprises a conditional access module or CAM 4 and a smart card 5 which can be inserted into a connection slot of the conditional access module 4. Further the decoder is provided with a microprocessor 6 for configuration and control purposes.
  • The conditional access module 4 is provided with a descrambler unit 7 and a microprocessor 8 having a memory 9. The smart card 5 comprises a microprocessor 10 having a memory 11.
  • As the operation of the above-mentioned parts of the decoder is not a part of the present invention, this operation will not be described in detail. Typically, the signal received by the demodulator 1 is a modulated data stream between 950 MHz and 2050 MHz. The output of the demodulator 1 is a scrambled digital data stream which is provided to the CAM 4 and the descrambler 7 will be allowed to descramble this scrambled data stream assuming that an authorized smart card has been inserted and the subscriber is entitled to receive the program. The descrambled data stream is demultiplexed by the demultiplexer 2 and decompressed and converted into the original analogue audio and video signal by the decompression unit 3.
  • In a pay TV system the control word required for descrambling, is transferred to the subscribers in so-called entitlement control messages containing the control word encrypted using a service key. This service key is downloaded in the memory 11 of the smart card 5 by means of a so-called entitlement management message for example. During operation the CAM 4 transfers the entitlement control messages towards the microprocessor 10 of the smart card 5 so that the microprocessor 10 can process the entitlement control message and extract the control word. Thereafter the smart card 5 returns the decrypted control word towards the CAM 4 so that the descrambler 7 is allowed to descramble the digital data stream received from the demodulator 1.
  • In order to prevent the use of an unauthorized smart card 5 in combination with the CAM 4 it is important to provide a secure communication between the CAM 4 and the smart card 5. According to the present invention the following method is used to provide such a secure communication. The steps of this method are shown in fig. 2. When a smart card is inserted into the decoder, the microprocessor 8 of the CAM 4 will generate two random numbers Ci and A. The microprocessor 8 will encrypt in a first message the random numbers Ci and A under a public key of the CAM 4. The thus obtained first message is transferred to the smart card 5 and the microprocessor 10 will decrypt this first message using the secret key of the CAM 4. Thereafter the microprocessor 10 will return a second message to the CAM 4, said second message being the random number A encrypted under the number Ci used as encryption key. The microprocessor 8 of the CAM 4 decrypts this second message and verifies whether the random number A is correct. Assuming that the random number A is indeed correct, so that it may be assumed that the inserted smart card 5 is an authorized smart card, the CAM 4 will then forward entitlement control messages containing the encrypted control word to the smart card 5 which will process the entitlement control message and extract the control word in a conventional manner. However, in the return message towards the CAM 4, the smart card will forward the extracted control word encrypted under the key Ci and these encrypted control words are decrypted by the microprocessor 8 using the same key Ci. As soon as one tries to replace the inserted smart card 5 by an other smart card, for example by switching from the authorized smart card 5 to an unauthorized smart card, the CAM 4 will immediately establish such change as the key Ci will not be known to the new smart card, so that the CAM will no longer be able to descramble the return messages containing the control word. Thereby the descrambler unit 7 will be disabled.
  • The method described can be used in the same manner for providing a secure communication between the CAM 4 and the decoder, wherein the same protocol as shown in fig. 2 is followed.
  • In summary it will be understood that if a new CAM 4 is connected to the other decoder parts, the microprocessor 6 of the decoder will generate the two random numbers Ci and A and as soon as the microprocessor 6 has decrypted the second message received from the microprocessor 8 of the CAM 4, and has verified that the random number A is correct, the key Ci will be used in all transmissions between the CAM 4 and the microprocessor 6.
  • The invention is not restricted to the above-described embodiments which can be varied in a number of ways within the scope of the claims. As an example for a further embodiment the CAM (i.e. the descrambler) may be part of the decoder. The decoder would now challenge the smart card to authenticate itself to obtain a secure communication between the smart card and the decoder.

Claims (12)

  1. Method for providing a secure communication between two devices (4, 5), wherein a first device (4) generates a random key (Ci) and transfers said key to a second device (5) in a first message encrypted using a public key, wherein said second device (5) decrypts the first encrypted message by means of a corresponding secret key to obtain said random key (Ci), wherein said random key is used to encrypt and decrypt transmissions from said second to said first device.
  2. Method according to claim 1, wherein after decrypting said encrypted message, said second device (5) first returns said random key (Ci) in a second encrypted message with an authentication to said first device (4).
  3. Method according to claim 2, wherein for providing said authentication said first device (4) further generates a random number (A) and transfers this random number (A) together with said random key (Ci) in said first encrypted message to the second device (5), wherein the second device uses said random number (A) for authentication in the second encrypted message.
  4. Method according to claim 3, wherein said second device (5) encrypts said random number (A) under said random key (Ci) to obtain said second encrypted message.
  5. Application of the method of anyone of the preceding claims in a decoder for a pay TV system, wherein said decoder comprises a conditional access module (CAM) (4) and a smart card (SC) (5), wherein said method is applied to provide a secure communication between the control access module (4) and the smart card (5).
  6. Application of the method of anyone of claims 1-4 in a decoder for a pay TV system, wherein said decoder comprises a conditional access module (CAM) (4) and a smart card (SC) (5), wherein said method is applied to provide a secure communication between the decoder and the conditional access module (4).
  7. Decoder for a pay TV system, comprising a conditional access module (4) and a smart card (5), said conditional access module comprising means (8) for generating a random key (Ci), means (8) for encrypting said key in a first encrypted message using a public key encryption method, means (8) for transfering said first encrypted message to the smart card, said smart card (5) comprising means (10) for receiving and decrypting said first encrypted message to obtain said random key, means (10) for encrypting transmissions to the conditional access module under said random key, said conditional access module (4) having means (8) to decrypt said transmissions received from the smart card.
  8. Decoder according to claim 7, wherein said smart card (5) comprises means (10) for returning said random key to the conditional access module in a second encrypted message with an authentication.
  9. Decoder according to claim 8, wherein said generating means (8) of the conditional access module (4) further generates a random number which is included in said first encrypted message, wherein the smart card (5) is adapted to use said random number as authentication in the second encrypted message.
  10. Decoder for a pay TV system, comprising a conditional access module (4) and a smart card (5), wherein said decoder comprises means (6) for generating a random key (Ci), means (6) for encrypting said key in a first encrypted message using a public key encryption method, means (6) for transfering said first encrypted message to the conditional access module (4), said conditional access module comprising means (8) for receiving and decrypting said first encrypted message to obtain said random key, means (8) for encrypting transmissions to the decoder under said random key, said decoder having means (6) to decrypt said transmissions received from the conditional access module.
  11. Decoder according to claim 10, wherein said conditional access module (4) comprises means (8) for returning said random key to the decoder in a second encrypted message with an authentication.
  12. Decoder according to claim 11, wherein said generating means (6) of the decoder further generates a random number which is included in said first encrypted message, wherein the conditional access module (4) is adapted to use said random number as authentication in the second encrypted message.
EP19970916402 1996-04-03 1997-03-21 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method Expired - Lifetime EP0891670B2 (en)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP96200907 1996-04-03
EP96200907 1996-04-03
PCT/EP1997/001557 WO1997038530A1 (en) 1996-04-03 1997-03-21 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method
EP19970916402 EP0891670B2 (en) 1996-04-03 1997-03-21 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP19970916402 EP0891670B2 (en) 1996-04-03 1997-03-21 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method
GR20000402082T GR3034392T3 (en) 1996-04-03 2000-09-13 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method

Publications (3)

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EP0891670A1 EP0891670A1 (en) 1999-01-20
EP0891670B1 true EP0891670B1 (en) 2000-06-14
EP0891670B2 EP0891670B2 (en) 2008-05-14

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EP19970916402 Expired - Lifetime EP0891670B2 (en) 1996-04-03 1997-03-21 Method for providing a secure communication between two devices and application of this method

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US (2) US6385317B1 (en)
EP (1) EP0891670B2 (en)
JP (1) JP4633202B2 (en)
CN (1) CN1134161C (en)
AT (1) AT193963T (en)
AU (1) AU2506397A (en)
BR (1) BR9708500A (en)
DE (2) DE69702310T3 (en)
DK (1) DK0891670T3 (en)
ES (1) ES2149585T5 (en)
GR (1) GR3034392T3 (en)
HK (1) HK1019683A1 (en)
HR (1) HRP970160A2 (en)
PT (1) PT891670E (en)
TW (1) TW369778B (en)
WO (1) WO1997038530A1 (en)
ZA (1) ZA9702786B (en)

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US6385317B1 (en) 2002-05-07
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AU2506397A (en) 1997-10-29
US20020126844A1 (en) 2002-09-12
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TW369778B (en) 1999-09-11
CN1215528A (en) 1999-04-28

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