JP2021129158A - Authentication system and authentication method - Google Patents

Abstract

To provide an authentication system and an authentication method that enables high security.SOLUTION: When challenge response authentication is performed between a vehicle 2 and a terminal 3, a raw value Dx0 of a random value Dx is generated on the vehicle 2 side. The raw value Dx0 is converted into a first converted random number value Dx1 in the vehicle 2, and a first authentication value R1 is generated from the first converted random number value Dx1. The first authentication value R1 on the vehicle 2 side is transmitted from the vehicle 2 to the terminal 3 and collated with the first authentication value R1 similarly generated in the terminal 3. Further, the terminal 3 converts the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx received from the vehicle 2 into a second converted random number value Dx2, and generates a second authentication value R2 from the second converted random number value Dx2. The second authentication value R2 on the terminal 3 side is transmitted from the terminal 3 to the vehicle 2 and collated with the second authentication value R2 similarly generated in the vehicle 2. When both the first authentication value R1 and the second authentication value R2 are collated, the challenge response authentication is established.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1

Description

The present invention relates to an authentication system and an authentication method for authenticating the correctness of a terminal.

Conventionally, as an authentication system for authenticating a terminal with a communication master by wireless communication, for example, a system using challenge response authentication, which is a kind of one-time authentication, is well known (see Patent Document 1 and the like). In challenge-response authentication, for example, a random number value is generated on the communication master side, the random value value is transmitted to the terminal, and the terminal side calculates the random number value. At this time, the same random number value is calculated on the communication master side, and the calculation result on the communication master side is compared with the calculation result on the terminal side to determine the correctness of the terminal.

Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. 2016-174345

In this type of challenge-response authentication, when the random number value generated by the communication master is transmitted to the terminal, the random number value is transmitted to the terminal side as it is without undergoing any processing such as being encrypted. Therefore, there is a possibility that the random number value is read out illegally outside, and there is a problem that the security is not high.

An object of the present invention is to provide an authentication system and an authentication method that can ensure high security.

An authentication system that solves the problem sends a random number value generated on one side of the communication master and the terminal to the other side, and uses the random number value and the first calculation logic on both the communication master and the terminal. Both the communication master and the terminal of the first authentication unit that calculates the first authentication value and executes the first authentication for confirming whether or not the first authentication values match on the receiving side of the random number value. The second authentication value is calculated by using the random number value and the second calculation logic, and the second authentication is executed in which the generation side of the random number value confirms whether or not the second authentication value matches. The first authentication unit includes an authentication unit, generates a first converted random number value by converting the raw value of the random number value, and calculates the first authentication value using the first converted random number value. The second authentication unit generates a second converted random value by converting the raw value of the random value, and calculates the second authentication value using the second converted random value.

The authentication method for solving the problem is to send a random number value generated on one side of the communication master and the terminal to the other side, and use the random number value and the first calculation logic on both the communication master and the terminal. The first authentication is performed by calculating the first authentication value and confirming whether or not the first authentication values match on the receiving side of the random number value, and the random number value is performed by both the communication master and the terminal. The second authentication value is calculated using the second calculation logic, and the second authentication is performed by the computer to confirm whether or not the second authentication value matches on the random number generation side. , The first converted random value is generated by converting the raw value of the random value, the first authentication value is calculated using the first converted random value, and the raw value of the random value is converted. The second conversion random number value is generated, and the second authentication value is calculated using the second conversion random number value.

According to the present invention, high security can be ensured.

The operation flow diagram which shows the authentication procedure of the mutual collation authentication of 1st Embodiment. Configuration diagram of the authentication system. The block diagram of the authentication system of the 2nd Embodiment. An operation flow diagram showing an authentication procedure for mutual verification authentication.

(First Embodiment)
Hereinafter, the first embodiment of the authentication system and the authentication method will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2.
As shown in FIG. 2, the vehicle 2 as the communication master 1 includes a key system 4 that authenticates the terminal 3 by wireless communication. The key system 4 authenticates the ID information Did registered in the terminal 3 by wireless communication, and operates the device 5 mounted on the vehicle 2 based on the authentication result. The key system 4 includes, for example, a smart system that authenticates the terminal 3 by narrow range wireless (smart communication) triggered by communication from the vehicle 2, and a terminal 3 by narrow range wireless (wireless communication) triggered by communication from the terminal 3. There are a wireless key system that authenticates the terminal 3 and an immobilizer system that authenticates the terminal 3 through short-range wireless communication. The device 5 includes, for example, a door control device for switching the locking and unlocking of the vehicle door, an engine control device for controlling the engine of the vehicle 2, and the like.

The terminal 3 includes, for example, an electronic key mainly having a key function, a high-performance mobile phone in which the key function is registered, an IC card having the key function, and the like. As the wireless communication between the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3, in addition to the above-mentioned smart communication and wireless communication, for example, short-range wireless communication and PAN (Personal Area Network) communication may be used. Short-range wireless communication includes, for example, RF-ID (Radio Frequency IDentification), NFC (Near Field Communication), and the like. Personal area network communication includes, for example, Bluetooth (Bluetooth: registered trademark), Wi-Fi (registered trademark), wireless LAN, and the like.

The vehicle 2 includes a vehicle-side control device 8 that controls the operation of the vehicle 2 side in the key system 4, and an antenna 9 that wirelessly communicates with the terminal 3. Further, the terminal 3 includes a terminal side control device 10 that controls the operation of the terminal 3 side in the key system 4, and an antenna 11 that wirelessly communicates with the vehicle 2. ID information Did is registered in each memory (not shown) of the vehicle-side control device 8 and the terminal-side control device 10. The ID information Did is preferably, for example, a unique ID code possessed by each terminal 3. The vehicle-side control device 8 executes the authentication communication of the key system 4 via its own antenna 9 and the antenna 11 of the terminal-side control device 10.

The vehicle-side control device 8 includes an ID authentication value 12 that executes authentication of the terminal 3 in the vehicle 2. The ID authentication value 12 authenticates the correctness of the terminal 3 by collating the ID information Did with the ID information Did on the vehicle 2 side when the ID information Did is received from the terminal 3 during the authentication communication of the key system 4. do. The vehicle-side control device 8 makes the establishment of collation of the ID information Did a condition for permitting or executing the operation of the device 5.

The vehicle 2 (key system 4) causes both the communication master 1 (in this example, the vehicle 2) and the terminal 3 to calculate a random number value Dx whose value is different each time it is transmitted, and determines the correctness of the terminal 3 from the calculation result. It has an authentication function (authentication system 15) for confirmation. The authentication system 15 of this example executes mutual verification authentication for confirming the calculation result of the random number value Dx on both the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3. Mutual verification authentication in this example is a type of challenge-response authentication, which is one of the one-time authentication methods. The key system 4 makes the establishment of the mutual verification authentication a condition for permitting or executing the operation of the device 5.

The authentication system 15 includes a first authentication unit 16 that authenticates the calculation result on the terminal 3 side while having both the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 calculate the random number value Dx by the first calculation logic K1. The first authentication unit 16 of this example includes a "first authentication unit 16a" provided on the vehicle 2 side and a "first authentication unit 16b" provided on the terminal 3 side. The first authentication unit 16 of this example transfers the random number value Dx generated by one of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 (in this example, the vehicle 2) to the other of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 (in this example, the terminal 3). The first authentication value R1 is calculated using the random number value Dx and the first calculation logic K1 on both the feed and the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3, and whether or not these first authentication values R1 match is determined by the receiving side of the random number value Dx. (In this example, the first authentication confirmed by the terminal 3) is executed.

At the time of the first authentication, the first authentication unit 16 generates the first converted random number value Dx1 by converting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx. The first conversion random number value Dx1 is calculated by, for example, a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f) provided in each of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3. The first authentication unit 16 executes the first authentication using the first conversion random number value Dx1.

The authentication system 15 includes a second authentication unit 17 that authenticates the calculation result on the vehicle 2 side while having both the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 calculate the random number value Dx by the second calculation logic K2. The second authentication unit 17 of this example includes a "second authentication unit 17a" provided on the vehicle 2 side and a "second authentication unit 17b" provided on the terminal 3 side. The second authentication unit 17 of this example calculates the second authentication value R2 using the random number value Dx and the second calculation logic K2 on both the communication master 1 (in this example, the vehicle 2) and the terminal 3, and these second authentication values R2 are calculated. 2 The second authentication is executed in which the generation side of the random number value Dx (in this example, the vehicle 2) confirms whether or not the authentication values R2 match.

At the time of the second authentication, the second authentication unit 17 generates the second converted random number value Dx2 by converting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx. The second conversion random number value Dx2 is calculated by, for example, a predetermined conversion logic f provided in each of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3. The second authentication unit 17 executes the first authentication using the second conversion random number value Dx2. It is preferable that different logics are used for the conversion logic f used when calculating the first conversion random number value Dx1 and the conversion logic f used when calculating the second conversion random number value Dx2.

Next, the operation of the authentication system 15 and the authentication method of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The challenge-response authentication (first authentication and second authentication), which is the mutual verification authentication of this example, is a communication process in which the ID information Did registered in the terminal 3 is authenticated by wireless communication between the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3. It is preferred to be performed.

In step 101, the first authentication unit 16a (or the second authentication unit 17a) of the vehicle 2 generates the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx used for the mutual verification authentication. This random value Dx (raw value Dx0) is generated so that the value is different each time the authentication communication of the ID information Did is performed. The random value Dx (raw value Dx0) is a kind of code information composed of, for example, a combination of binary codes.

In step 102, the first authentication unit 16a of the vehicle 2 generates the first converted random number value Dx1 by calculating the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx by a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f). As the predetermined calculation method, various calculation logics, calculation formulas, functions and the like can be used.

In step 103, the first authentication unit 16a of the vehicle 2 generates the first authentication value R1 by calculating the first conversion random number value Dx1 by the first calculation logic K1 after generating the first conversion random number value Dx1. do. As described above, the first authentication value R1 is generated by using the converted value of the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx, that is, the first converted random number value Dx1.

In step 104, the first authentication unit 16a of the vehicle 2 wirelessly transmits the random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) and the first authentication value R1 to the terminal 3. The random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) and the first authentication value R1 may be transmitted at any timing as long as they are transmitted in the communication process of ID verification (smart verification, etc.) of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3.

In step 105, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 generates the second converted random number value Dx2 by calculating the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx by a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f). The generation of the second converted random number value Dx2 is preferably performed in synchronization with the generation of the first converted random number value Dx1 by the first authentication unit 16a. It is preferable that the predetermined calculation method used at this time is a calculation method in which the logic, the expression, the function, etc. are different from the calculation method when the first conversion random number value Dx1 is generated.

In step 106, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 generates the second authentication value R2 by calculating the second conversion random number value Dx2 by the second calculation logic K2 after generating the second conversion random number value Dx2. do. As described above, the second authentication value R2 is generated by using the converted value of the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx, that is, the second converted random number value Dx2.

In step 107, the terminal 3 (terminal control device 10) receives the random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) and the first authentication value R1 transmitted from the vehicle 2 side.
In step 108, the first authentication unit 16b of the terminal 3 calculates the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx received from the vehicle 2 side by a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f) to obtain the first converted random number value Dx1. Generate. The calculation method used at this time is preferably the same calculation method as in step 102 described above.

In step 109, the first authentication unit 16b of the terminal 3 generates the first authentication value R1 by calculating the first conversion random number value Dx1 by the first calculation logic K1 after generating the first conversion random number value Dx1. do. If the first authentication value R1 is calculated based on the random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) received from the legitimate vehicle 2 paired with the terminal 3, the first authentication value calculated by the vehicle 2 is calculated. It is the same value as R1.

In step 110, the second authentication unit 17b of the terminal 3 generates the second converted random number value Dx2 by calculating the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx by a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f). The generation of the second converted random number value Dx2 is preferably performed in synchronization with the generation of the first converted random number value Dx1 by the first authentication unit 16b. The calculation method used at this time is preferably the same calculation method as in step 105 described above.

In step 111, the second authentication unit 17b of the terminal 3 generates the second authentication value R2 by calculating the second conversion random number value Dx2 by the second calculation logic K2 after generating the second conversion random number value Dx2. do. If the second authentication value R2 is calculated based on the random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) received from the legitimate vehicle 2 paired with the terminal 3, the second authentication value calculated by the vehicle 2 is calculated. It is the same value as R2.

In step 112, the first authentication unit 16b of the terminal 3 determines whether or not the first authentication value R1 received from the vehicle 2 and the first authentication value R1 calculated by itself are the same value. At this time, if the first authentication values R1 are the same value, the process proceeds to step 113, and if the first authentication values R1 are not the same value, the process proceeds to step 114.

In step 113, if the first authentication value R1 on the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side is the same, the second authentication unit 17b of the terminal 3 transmits the second authentication value R2 obtained on the terminal 3 side to the vehicle 2. do. That is, if the first authentication value R1 of the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side is the same, the communication is continued, and the second authentication value R2 obtained by the terminal 3 side is notified to the vehicle 2. The second authentication value R2 may be transmitted at any timing as long as it is transmitted in the communication process of ID verification (smart verification or the like) of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3.

In step 114, the first authentication unit 16b of the terminal 3 interrupts the process if the first authentication value R1 is not the same on the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side. That is, when the first authentication value R1 is different between the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side, the operation of transmitting the second authentication value R2 calculated on the terminal 3 side to the vehicle 2 is not taken, and the communication is not established. As a result, for example, even if a third party attempts to illegally establish mutual verification authentication with the vehicle 2 on another terminal, the communication can be interrupted on the way.

In step 115, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 receives the second authentication value R2 transmitted from the terminal 3 side.
In step 116, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 determines whether or not the second authentication value R2 received from the terminal 3 and the second authentication value R2 calculated by itself are the same value. Here, if these second authentication values R2 are the same value, the process proceeds to step 117, and if these second authentication values R2 are not the same value, the process proceeds to step 118.

In step 117, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 establishes the communication if the second authentication value R2 between the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side is the same value. That is, if the second authentication values R2 of the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side are the same, the mutual verification authentication is processed as established.

In step 118, the second authentication unit 17a of the vehicle 2 interrupts the process if the second authentication value R2 is not the same on the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side. That is, when the second authentication value R2 is different between the vehicle 2 side and the terminal 3 side, the mutual verification authentication is not established and the authentication communication of the terminal 3 is forcibly terminated.

The key system 4 permits or executes the operation of the in-vehicle device 5 when the ID information Did verification is established and the mutual verification authentication (challenge response authentication) is also established. Therefore, under the condition that the authentication of the key system 4 is established, for example, when the vehicle door is unlocked, if the lock button provided on the door handle is operated, the vehicle door is locked. On the other hand, when the key system 4 is certified, the vehicle door is unlocked when the touch operation to the door handle is detected by the touch sensor of the door handle when the vehicle door is locked. Further, if the engine switch in the driver's seat is operated while depressing the brake pedal under the condition that the certification of the key system 4 is established, the engine of the vehicle 2 is started.

According to the authentication system 15 and the authentication method of the above embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.
(1) The random number value Dx generated on one side of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 is sent to the other side, and the first authentication value R1 is used on both the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 using the random number value Dx and the first calculation logic K1. Is calculated, and the authentication system 15 is provided with a first authentication unit 16 that executes the first authentication for confirming whether or not the first authentication values R1 match with the terminal 3 that is the receiving side of the random number value Dx. The second authentication value R2 is calculated using the random number value Dx and the second calculation logic K2 on both the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3, and whether or not the second authentication value R2 matches is determined by the generation side of the random number value Dx. The authentication system 15 is provided with a second authentication unit 17 that executes the second authentication confirmed by a certain vehicle 2. The first authentication unit 16 generates the first converted random number value Dx1 by converting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx, and calculates the first authentication value R1 using the first converted random number value Dx1. The second authentication unit 17 generates the second converted random number value Dx2 by converting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx, and calculates the second authentication value R2 using the second converted random number value Dx2.

According to the configuration of this example, instead of calculating the first authentication value R1 from the raw value Dx0 of the random value Dx, the first converted random number value Dx1 obtained by converting the raw value Dx0 and the first calculation logic K1 are used. The first authentication is executed by obtaining the first authentication value R1. The same applies to the second authentication value R2. Therefore, even if the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx is illegally acquired by a third party, if the calculation method used for generating the first converted random number value Dx1 and the second converted random number value Dx2 is not known, the first conversion is performed. It is not possible to shift the certification or the second certification to the establishment. Therefore, high security in authentication can be ensured.

(2) The first authentication and the second authentication are executed in the communication course in which the ID information Did registered in the terminal 3 is authenticated by wireless communication between the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3. In this case, if the ID information Did registered in the terminal 3 is correct and the first authentication and the second authentication are not established, the authentication between the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3 is not established. Therefore, it is possible to accurately determine whether or not the terminal is a legitimate terminal 3.

(3) Different logics are used between the conversion logic f used when calculating the first conversion random number value Dx1 and the conversion logic f used when calculating the second conversion random number value Dx2. In this case, if the conversion logic f used in the operation of the first conversion random value Dx1 and the operation of the second conversion random value Dx2 is not known, the authentication cannot be transferred to the establishment, so that the authentication is high. Further contributes to ensuring security.

(4) The first authentication unit 16 transmits the random value Dx from the vehicle 2 which is the generating side of the random value Dx to the terminal 3 which is the receiving side of the random value Dx at the raw value Dx0, and the raw value Dx0 on the receiving side of the random value Dx. The first authentication is executed by comparing the first authentication value R1 calculated from the above with the first authentication value R1 received from the generation side of the random number value Dx. When the random value Dx is transmitted from the generation side of the random value Dx to the receiving side with the raw value Dx0, the raw value Dx0 may be read illegally from the outside, but the first conversion random value Dx1 or the second conversion random value If the calculation method for generating Dx2 is not known, the first authentication and the second authentication cannot be transferred to the establishment. Therefore, even when the random value Dx is transmitted to the other party at the raw value Dx0, high security in authentication can be ensured.

(Second Embodiment)
Next, the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4. The second embodiment is an embodiment in which a part of the mutual verification authentication process described in the first embodiment is modified. Therefore, the same parts as those in the first embodiment are designated by the same reference numerals, detailed description thereof will be omitted, and only different parts will be described in detail.

As shown in FIG. 3, the authentication system 15 of this example does not transmit the raw value Dx0 as the random value Dx from the vehicle 2 to the terminal 3 at the time of mutual verification authentication, but transmits the first converted random number value Dx1. As described above, in the case of this example, the first converted random number value Dx1 encrypted by the calculation is transmitted as the random number value Dx to be transmitted from the vehicle 2 to the terminal 3. As a result, even if the first converted random number value Dx1 transmitted from the vehicle 2 is read out, the raw value Dx0 cannot be illegally acquired, thereby ensuring security against illegal cryptographic analysis.

Next, the operation of the authentication system 15 and the authentication method of the present embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. Since steps 101 to 103, 105, 106, and 111 to 118 of this example shown in the figure are the same as those of the first embodiment, only different steps will be described.

As shown in FIG. 4, in step 201, the first authentication unit 16a of the vehicle 2 wirelessly transmits the first conversion random number value Dx1 and the first authentication value R1 to the terminal 3. The first converted random number value Dx1 and the first authentication value R1 may be transmitted at any timing as long as they are transmitted in the communication process of ID verification (smart verification or the like) of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3.

In step 202, the terminal 3 (terminal control device 10) receives the first converted random number value Dx1 and the first authentication value R1 transmitted from the vehicle 2 side.
In step 203, the first authentication unit 16b of the terminal 3 generates the first authentication value R1 by calculating the received first conversion random number value Dx1 by the first calculation logic K1. That is, the first authentication unit 16a of the terminal 3 directly generates the first authentication value R1 from the first conversion random number value Dx1 received from the vehicle 2.

On the other hand, in step 204, the second authentication unit 17b of the terminal 3 generates a random number value Dx (raw value Dx0) by decoding the received first converted random number value Dx1 by a predetermined calculation method. As this calculation method, various logics, expressions, and functions that can return the first conversion random number value Dx1 to the original raw value Dx0 can be used.

In step 205, the second authentication unit 17b of the terminal 3 generates the second converted random number value Dx2 by calculating the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx generated by the decoding by a predetermined calculation method (conversion logic f). do. The calculation method used at this time is preferably the same calculation method as in step 105 described above. Then, in the next step 111, the second conversion random number value Dx2 is calculated to generate the second authentication value R2. Since the subsequent processing is the same as that of the first embodiment, the description thereof will be omitted.

According to the authentication system 15 and the authentication method of the above embodiment, the following effects can be obtained in addition to (1) to (3) of the first embodiment.
(5) The first authentication unit 16 converts the first converted random number value Dx1 obtained by converting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx from the vehicle 2 which is the generating side of the random number value Dx to the terminal 3 which is the receiving side thereof. By comparing the first authentication value R1 calculated from the first conversion random value Dx1 on the receiving side of the random number value Dx with the first authentication value R1 received from the generating side of the random number value Dx. 1 Execute authentication. The second authentication unit 17 generates a raw value Dx0 in the terminal 3 by decoding the first converted random number value Dx1 received by the terminal 3 that is the receiving side of the random value Dx, and the second authentication unit 17 is based on the raw value Dx0. The converted random number value Dx2 is obtained, and the second authentication value R2 in the terminal 3 is calculated. In this case, since the encrypted first converted random number value Dx1 is transmitted instead of transmitting the raw value Dx0 of the random number value Dx as it is, security against unauthorized reading from the outside can be ensured.

In addition, this embodiment can be implemented by changing as follows. The present embodiment and the following modified examples can be implemented in combination with each other within a technically consistent range.
[About random number value Dx]
-In each embodiment, the random number value Dx is not limited to being generated on the vehicle 2 side, but may be generated on the terminal 3 side.

-In each embodiment, the random number value Dx (raw value Dx0, first transformation random value Dx1) transmitted to the other party is not limited to all data of the random number value Dx being transmitted, but only a part of the random number value Dx. It may be transmitted. This also applies to the first authentication value R1 transmitted from the vehicle 2 to the terminal 3 and the second authentication value R2 transmitted from the terminal 3 to the vehicle 2.

[About the 1st certification unit 16 and the 1st certification]
-In each embodiment, the first authentication unit 16 may be a functional block provided on one of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3.

-In each embodiment, various logics, expressions, functions, and the like can be applied to the calculation method of the first authentication value R1.
[About the 2nd certification unit 17 and the 2nd certification]
-In each embodiment, the second authentication unit 17 may be a functional block provided on one of the vehicle 2 and the terminal 3.

-In each embodiment, various logics, expressions, functions, and the like can be applied to the calculation method of the second authentication value R2.
[About the first conversion random value Dx1 and the second conversion random value Dx2]
-In each embodiment, the first conversion random number value Dx1 and the second conversion random number value Dx2 may be generated by the same calculation method (conversion logic f).

-In each embodiment, various logics, expressions, functions and the like can be applied to the calculation method of the first converted random number value Dx 1 and the second converted random number value Dx 2 as long as the raw value Dx 0 can be converted into a predetermined value.
[others]
-In each embodiment, the authentication system 15 and the computer that realizes the authentication method are not limited to those that perform software processing for all the processing executed by themselves. For example, a computer may include a dedicated hardware circuit (eg, a special purpose integrated circuit: ASIC) that performs hardware processing for at least a part of the processing performed by the computer. That is, a computer is 1) one or more processors that operate according to a computer program (software), 2) one or more dedicated hardware circuits that perform at least some of the various processes, or 3) theirs. The combination may be configured as a circuitry containing. The processor includes a CPU and a memory such as a RAM and a ROM, and the memory stores a program code or an instruction configured to cause the CPU to execute a process. Memory or computer readable media includes any available medium accessible by a general purpose or dedicated computer.

-In the second embodiment, various logics, expressions, functions and the like can be applied to the decoding method.
-In each embodiment, the generation side of the random number value Dx is not limited to the vehicle 2, and may be the terminal 3.

-In each embodiment, the receiving side of the random number value Dx is not limited to the terminal 3, and may be the vehicle 2.
-In each embodiment, the mutual verification authentication is not limited to being carried out in the process of the authentication communication of the ID information Did, and may be carried out at a timing different from this.

-In each embodiment, the communication master 1 and the terminal 3 may execute only mutual collation authentication when wirelessly authenticating the correctness of the terminal 3.
-In each embodiment, the communication master 1 is not limited to being applied to the vehicle 2, and may be used for other devices and devices.

1 ... Communication master, 2 ... Vehicle, 3 ... Terminal, 15 ... Authentication system, 16 ... 1st authentication unit, 17 ... 2nd authentication unit, Dx ... Random value, Dx0 ... Raw value, Dx1 ... 1st conversion random value, Dx2 ... 2nd conversion random value, K1 ... 1st calculation logic, K2 ... 2nd calculation logic, R1 ... 1st authentication value, R2 ... 2nd authentication value, Did ... ID information, f ... conversion logic.

Claims (6)

A random number value generated on one side of the communication master and the terminal is sent to the other side, and both the communication master and the terminal calculate the first authentication value using the random number value and the first calculation logic. The first authentication unit that executes the first authentication that confirms whether or not the first authentication values match on the receiving side of the random number value, and
The second authentication value is calculated by both the communication master and the terminal using the random value and the second calculation logic, and whether or not the second authentication value matches is confirmed on the generation side of the random value. It is equipped with a second authentication unit that executes the second authentication.
The first authentication unit generates a first converted random number value by converting the raw value of the random number value, and calculates the first authentication value using the first converted random number value.
The second authentication unit is an authentication system that generates a second converted random number value by converting the raw value of the random number value and calculates the second authentication value using the second converted random number value. The authentication system according to claim 1, wherein the first authentication and the second authentication are executed in a communication process of authenticating the ID information registered in the terminal by wireless communication between the communication master and the terminal. The authentication according to claim 1 or 2, wherein different logics are used between the conversion logic used when calculating the first conversion random value and the conversion logic used when calculating the second conversion random value. system. The first authentication unit transmits the random value from the generation side of the random value to the receiving side with the raw value, and the first authentication value calculated from the raw value on the receiving side of the random value and the said first authentication value. The authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the first authentication is executed by comparing with the first authentication value received from the generation side of the random number value. The first authentication unit transmits the first converted random number value obtained by converting the raw value of the random number value from the generation side of the random number value to the receiving side, and the first authentication unit receives the random number value. 1 The first authentication is executed by comparing the first authentication value calculated from the converted random number value with the first authentication value received from the generation side of the random number value.
The second authentication unit generates the raw value on the receiving side of the random number value by decoding the first converted random number value received on the receiving side of the random number value, and the second authentication unit is based on the raw value. The authentication system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, which obtains a converted random number value and calculates the second authentication value on the receiving side of the random number value. A random number value generated on one side of the communication master and the terminal is sent to the other side, and both the communication master and the terminal calculate the first authentication value using the random number value and the first calculation logic. Performing the first authentication to confirm whether or not the first authentication values match on the receiving side of the random number value, and
The second authentication value is calculated by both the communication master and the terminal using the random number value and the second calculation logic, and whether or not the second authentication value matches is confirmed on the generation side of the random number value. Performing the second authentication by computer,
The first conversion random value is generated by converting the raw value of the random value, the first authentication value is calculated using the first conversion random value, and the raw value of the random value is converted to the first. 2 An authentication method in which a converted random number value is generated and the second authentication value is calculated using the second converted random number value.

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