JP2018023140A - Id-based control unit key fob pairing - Google Patents

Id-based control unit key fob pairing Download PDF

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Publication number
JP2018023140A
JP2018023140A JP2017176314A JP2017176314A JP2018023140A JP 2018023140 A JP2018023140 A JP 2018023140A JP 2017176314 A JP2017176314 A JP 2017176314A JP 2017176314 A JP2017176314 A JP 2017176314A JP 2018023140 A JP2018023140 A JP 2018023140A
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JP
Japan
Prior art keywords
key
key fob
cuid
control unit
fob
Prior art date
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Application number
JP2017176314A
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Japanese (ja)
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JP6549664B2 (en
Inventor
ホウ ジンメン
Jin-Meng Ho
ホウ ジンメン
ペーテルス エリック
Peeters Eric
ペーテルス エリック
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Texas Instruments Japan Ltd
Texas Instruments Inc
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Texas Instruments Japan Ltd
Texas Instruments Inc
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Publication of JP2018023140A publication Critical patent/JP2018023140A/en
Priority to JP2019119227A priority Critical patent/JP6903834B2/en
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    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
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    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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    • H04L9/3013—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
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    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
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    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
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    • H04N9/3141—Constructional details thereof
    • H04N9/315—Modulator illumination systems
    • H04N9/3167—Modulator illumination systems for polarizing the light beam
    • H—ELECTRICITY
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Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a device and a method for pairing a key fob with a control unit enabling wireless connectivity and control, being able to avoid transferring confidential information to vendors and to reduce IT requirement of manufacturers.SOLUTION: A key fob control unit pairing device 202 includes: a transceiver 306 configured to transmit and receive signals; a memory 304 configured to store a key fob identifier (KFID) and a control unit identifier (CUID); and a processor 302 coupled with the transceiver and the memory. The processor authenticates a key fob by using a key sharing program that has undergone identification (ID) authentication on the basis of the KFID, and transmits encrypted CUID to the key fob.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 3

Description

ワイヤレスキーフォブとそれぞれの車両とは、それら２つの間に生じる通信を認証するために、暗号化された動作鍵（ｏｐｅｒａｔｉｏｎａｌ ｋｅｙ）を用い得る。通信可能なキーフォブ及び車両では、キーフォブ及び車両は、製造又は販売プロセスのいずれかの或る時点でペアリングされる必要がある。ワイヤレスキーフォブとそれぞれの車両とのペアリングには、従来、車両製造業者が、各キーフォブと関連付けられる秘密鍵を種々の車両ディーラーに伝えることを必要とし、この秘密鍵は暗号鍵である。そして、或るキーフォブの秘密鍵が、そのキーフォブを或る車両と関連付けるため又はそのキーフォブと車両とをペアリングするために用いられ得る。典型的に、複数のキーフォブが各車両とペアリングされる。しかし、車両ディーラーに秘密鍵を伝えるこの工程、及びこれらのキーフォブの各々が秘密鍵をストアする必要があるという事実は、秘密鍵の盗難の手段をもたらし得、認証されていないキーフォブ及び潜在的な盗難につながり得る。   The wireless key fob and each vehicle may use an encrypted operational key to authenticate communication that occurs between the two. For communicable key fobs and vehicles, the key fob and vehicle need to be paired at some point in the manufacturing or sales process. Pairing a wireless key fob with each vehicle conventionally requires the vehicle manufacturer to communicate a secret key associated with each key fob to various vehicle dealers, which is an encryption key. A key fob's private key can then be used to associate the key fob with a vehicle or to pair the key fob with the vehicle. Typically, multiple key fobs are paired with each vehicle. However, this process of passing the secret key to the vehicle dealer, and the fact that each of these key fobs needs to store a secret key, can provide a means of secret key theft, which can lead to unauthorized key fobs and potential Can lead to theft.

上述の問題は、キーフォブ制御ユニットペアリングデバイスにより大部分解決される。このデバイスは、信号を送信及び受信するように構成されるトランシーバ、キーフォブ識別子（ＫＦＩＤ）及び制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）をストアするように構成されるメモリ、及びトランシーバとメモリとに結合されるプロセッサを含む。このプロセッサは、ＫＦＩＤに基づく識別子（ＩＤ）認証された鍵共有（ｋｅｙ ａｇｒｅｅｍｅｎｔ）プロトコルを用いてキーフォブを認証するため、及び暗号化されたＣＵＩＤをキーフォブに送信するためのものである。   The above problems are largely solved by the key fob control unit pairing device. The device includes a transceiver configured to transmit and receive signals, a memory configured to store a key fob identifier (KFID) and a control unit identifier (CUID), and a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory. Including. The processor is for authenticating the key fob using an identifier (ID) authenticated key agreement protocol based on KFID and for transmitting the encrypted CUID to the key fob.

この問題に対する解決策はまた、信号を受信及び送信するように構成されるトランシーバ、キーフォブ識別子（ＫＦＩＤ）をストアするように構成されるメモリ、及びトランシーバとメモリとに結合されるプロセッサを含むキーフォブに関与し得る。プロセッサは、ペアリングデバイスを認証するため及びプロセッサとペアリングデバイスとによってのみ既知である共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成するために、ＫＦＩＤに基づく識別子（ＩＤ）認証された鍵共有プロトコルを、ペアリングデバイスと共に、実行するためのものである。このプロセッサは更に、ペアリングデバイスから、共通の秘密暗号化鍵でペアリングデバイスにより暗号化された制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）を受信するためのものであり、制御ユニットを認証するため及びプロセッサと制御ユニットとによってのみ既知である第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成するために、ＣＵＩＤに基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを、ＣＵＩＤと関連付けられる制御ユニットと共に、実行するためのものであり、また、制御ユニットから、第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵で制御ユニットにより暗号化された動作鍵を受信するためのものである。   A solution to this problem also includes a transceiver configured to receive and transmit signals, a memory configured to store a key fob identifier (KFID), and a key fob including a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory. Can be involved. The processor uses an identifier (ID) authenticated key agreement protocol based on KFID to authenticate the pairing device and to generate a common secret encryption key that is known only by the processor and the pairing device. For execution with a ring device. The processor is further for receiving from the pairing device a control unit identifier (CUID) encrypted by the pairing device with a common secret encryption key, for authenticating the control unit and for controlling with the processor. For executing an ID-authenticated key sharing protocol based on a CUID, together with a control unit associated with the CUID, to generate a second common secret encryption key known only by the unit; In addition, the operation key encrypted by the control unit with the second common secret encryption key is received from the control unit.

また、更に別の解決策は、キーフォブを車両とペアリングするための方法であって、この方法は、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ１を生成するためにＫＦＩＤに基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを、ペアリングデバイス及びキーフォブにより実行すること、ペアリングデバイスにより、制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）をＤＨＫｅｙ１で暗号化すること、暗号化されたＣＵＩＤをペアリングデバイスによりキーフォブに送信すること、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ２を生成するためにＣＵＩＤに基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを、キーフォブ及び制御ユニットにより実行すること、制御ユニットにより、動作鍵をＤＨＫｅｙ２で暗号化すること、及び、暗号化された動作鍵を制御ユニットによりキーフォブに送信することを含む。   Yet another solution is a method for pairing a key fob with a vehicle, which is ID-authenticated key sharing based on KFID to authenticate each other and to generate a cryptographic key DHKey1. The protocol is executed by the pairing device and the key fob, the control unit identifier (CUID) is encrypted with DHKey1 by the pairing device, the encrypted CUID is transmitted to the key fob by the pairing device, An ID-authenticated key sharing protocol based on CUID is executed by the key fob and the control unit to authenticate and generate the encryption key DHKey2, the operation unit encrypts the operation key with DHKey2 and the encryption The operation key is converted into a key by the control unit. Including that to be sent to the drive.

本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った、識別子（ＩＤ）ベースの認証ペアリングアプローチのための例示の調整プロセスを図示する。FIG. 4 illustrates an example coordination process for an identifier (ID) based authentication pairing approach in accordance with various examples described herein.

ＩＤベースの認証を用い、本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った、キーフォブ及び制御ユニットの例示の初期ペアリングプロセスを図示する。FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary initial pairing process of a key fob and control unit using ID-based authentication and in accordance with various examples described herein.

本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った例示のペアリングデバイスのブロック図である。2 is a block diagram of an exemplary pairing device in accordance with various examples described herein. FIG.

本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った例示のキーフォブのブロック図である。2 is a block diagram of an example key fob in accordance with various examples described herein. FIG.

本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った例示の制御ユニットのブロック図である。2 is a block diagram of an example control unit in accordance with various examples described herein. FIG.

本明細書に記載されるような種々の例に従ったペアリング後のペアリングされたキーフォブ及び制御ユニットの例示のオペレーションを示す。FIG. 6 illustrates exemplary operation of a paired key fob and control unit after pairing according to various examples as described herein.

本明細書に記載されるような種々の例に従ったＣＵによる動作鍵変更の一例を示す。FIG. 6 illustrates an example of an operation key change by a CU according to various examples as described herein. FIG.

本明細書に記載される種々の例に従ったＩＤベースの認証のための例示の方法のフローチャートである。4 is a flowchart of an exemplary method for ID-based authentication in accordance with various examples described herein.

キーフォブと車両（例えば、車両、オートバイ、ボート、スクーターなど）のペアリングは、偽のキーフォブが車両とペアリングされないことを確実とするようにセキュア情報の搬送及び利用を必然的に必要とし得、これは盗難につながり得る。最大限の従来のプロセスは、車両の安全性を確実にするために車両製造業者により秘密のままとされ得る。しかし、このプロセスは、製造業者が、秘密鍵を生成しそれらの安全性を維持するために高価で且つ専用のＩＴシステムを開発することを必要とし得る。それでも、車両が販売業者（ｄｅａｌｅｒｓｈｉｐ）に送達されるとき、複数のキーフォブが最終宛先でペアリングされ得るように秘密鍵も送られる。秘密鍵の製造業者からディーラーまでの搬送は、秘密鍵が盗まれる機会を提供し得、不正で偽のキーフォブにつながる。   Pairing a key fob with a vehicle (e.g., vehicle, motorcycle, boat, scooter, etc.) may necessarily require the transport and use of secure information to ensure that no fake key fob is paired with the vehicle, This can lead to theft. Maximum conventional processes can be kept secret by vehicle manufacturers to ensure vehicle safety. However, this process may require manufacturers to develop expensive and dedicated IT systems to generate secret keys and maintain their security. Nevertheless, when the vehicle is delivered to a dealership, a secret key is also sent so that multiple key fobs can be paired at the final destination. Transporting the secret key from the manufacturer to the dealer may provide an opportunity for the secret key to be stolen, leading to fraudulent and fake key fobs.

開示される方法は、キーフォブを、車両のほかに、ワイヤレス接続性及び制御を可能にする任意のタイプの制御ユニットとペアリングするためにも用いられ得る。例えば、開示される手法及びデバイスは、ガレージドアシステム、ホテルエントランスシステム、又は家への遠隔エントリの一部とし得る。このように、本開示の範囲は車両の制御ユニットに限定されない。車両、及び車両の１つの又は全ての制御ユニットとのキーフォブのペアリングは、主として説明の目的で用いられている。   The disclosed method can also be used to pair a key fob with any type of control unit that allows wireless connectivity and control in addition to the vehicle. For example, the disclosed techniques and devices may be part of a garage door system, a hotel entrance system, or a remote entry to the house. Thus, the scope of the present disclosure is not limited to a vehicle control unit. Key fob pairing with the vehicle and one or all control units of the vehicle is used primarily for illustrative purposes.

本明細書に開示されるのは、秘密情報の販売業者への搬送を避けることができ、車両製造業者のＩＴ要件を低減することができる、キーフォブを車両とペアリングするためのデバイス及び方法である。キーフォブと制御ユニットのペアリングを達成する一つの方法は、認証のためのパスワードとして働くＩＤを用いる識別子（ＩＤ）認証された鍵共有プロトコルに関与し得る。ＩＤベースの認証アプローチでは、キーフォブ及び制御ユニットはいずれも、それら自体の固有の関連付けられたＩＤを有し得る。これらのＩＤは、キーフォブと制御ユニットがペアリングされるようにデバイス間で情報を渡すために用いられ得る共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成するために鍵共有プロトコルにおいて用いられ得る。ペアリングデバイスが、まずキーフォブのＩＤを用いてキーフォブで秘密鍵を生成し得る。この秘密鍵はその後、制御ユニットのＩＤを暗号化するためにペアリングデバイスにより用いられ得る。暗号化された制御ユニットＩＤはその後、キーフォブに送信され得るため、キーフォブは、どの制御ユニットがどれとペアリングするべきかを知っている。キーフォブ及び制御ユニットはその後、それらのみに既知の第２の秘密鍵を生成するために制御ユニットＩＤを用い得る。第２の秘密鍵はその後、動作鍵を暗号化するために制御ユニットにより用いられ得、動作鍵は、プロセスを完了するためにキーフォブペアリングに送信され得る。   Disclosed herein is a device and method for pairing a key fob with a vehicle that can avoid conveying confidential information to a seller and reduce the vehicle manufacturer's IT requirements. is there. One way to achieve key fob and control unit pairing may involve an identifier (ID) authenticated key sharing protocol that uses an ID that acts as a password for authentication. In an ID-based authentication approach, both the key fob and the control unit can have their own unique associated ID. These IDs can be used in a key sharing protocol to generate a common secret encryption key that can be used to pass information between devices so that the key fob and control unit are paired. The pairing device may first generate a secret key with the key fob using the key fob ID. This secret key can then be used by the pairing device to encrypt the ID of the control unit. Since the encrypted control unit ID can then be sent to the key fob, the key fob knows which control unit should pair with which. The key fob and control unit can then use the control unit ID to generate a second secret key known only to them. The second secret key can then be used by the control unit to encrypt the operation key, which can be sent to key fob pairing to complete the process.

認証のためのパスワードとして働くＩＤを用いるＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルは、楕円曲線ディフィー・ヘルマン鍵共有プロトコルなどの楕円曲線暗号（ＥＣＣ）に基づき得る。   An ID-authenticated key sharing protocol that uses an ID that acts as a password for authentication may be based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), such as the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key sharing protocol.

ＩＤベースの手法のあり得る利点の一つは、それがコストのかかる公開鍵インフラストラクチャー及び認証機関を必要としない可能性がある点である。   One possible advantage of an ID-based approach is that it may not require costly public key infrastructure and certificate authorities.

図１は、本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った、識別子（ＩＤ）ベースの認証ペアリングアプローチのための例示の調整プロセス１００を図示する。調整プロセス１００は、キーフォブ及びＣＵを用意し得、これら２つのペアリングを促進し得る。この調整プロセスは、車両ディーラー１１２、車両製造業者１１０、キーフォブ１０６、及びＣＵ１０４に関与し得る。代替として、調整プロセス１００における車両ディーラー１１２の部分は、キーフォブ及びＣＵがペアリングされるときに生じてもよく、必ずしも図１に示すように実行される必要はない。調整プロセス１００は、固有のＩＤをＣＵ１０４（ＣＵＩＤ）及びキーフォブ１０６（ＫＦＩＤ）に挿入することに関与し得る。ＣＵ１０４に対する固有のＩＤは、秘密のままとされ得、車両製造業者１１０又は車両製造業者１１０へのＣＵ１０４供給者によりＣＵ１０４に挿入され得る。キーフォブ及びＣＵ両方に対する固有のＩＤは、例えば、８文字の１６進法ワードとし得る。代替として、ＩＤは、用いられるＩＤ内の冗長性を避けるために多数の置換を可能にするシステムに基づき得る。ＩＤは、次のペアリングにおいてディーラー１１２がどのキーフォブ１０６（及びその関連付けられたＫＦＩＤ）を用い得るかを詐称者／敵対者が予測することができないように、選択され得る。８文字の１６進法ＩＤは４０億ほどの候補を生成し得る。   FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary coordination process 100 for an identifier (ID) based authentication pairing approach in accordance with various examples described herein. The reconciliation process 100 may provide a key fob and CU and may facilitate these two pairings. This adjustment process may involve the vehicle dealer 112, the vehicle manufacturer 110, the key fob 106, and the CU 104. Alternatively, the portion of the vehicle dealer 112 in the adjustment process 100 may occur when the key fob and CU are paired and does not necessarily have to be performed as shown in FIG. The reconciliation process 100 may involve inserting a unique ID into the CU 104 (CUID) and key fob 106 (KFID). The unique ID for the CU 104 may remain secret and may be inserted into the CU 104 by the vehicle manufacturer 110 or a CU 104 supplier to the vehicle manufacturer 110. The unique ID for both the key fob and CU can be, for example, an eight character hexadecimal word. Alternatively, the ID may be based on a system that allows multiple substitutions to avoid redundancy in the ID used. The ID may be selected such that the spoofer / adversary cannot predict which key fob 106 (and its associated KFID) the dealer 112 may use in the next pairing. An 8-character hexadecimal ID can generate as many as 4 billion candidates.

車両製造業者１１０は、関連付けられたＣＵ１０４のＣＵＩＤを、それらのＣＵ１０４を含む車両を受け取る車両販売業者１１２に送り得る。ＣＵＩＤのディーラー１１２への搬送は、ＣＵＩＤが秘密のままであるように実行されるべきである。ＣＵＩＤが傍受されると偽のキーフォブが生成され得、偽のキーフォブは、ディーラー１１２の助けなしにＣＵにペアリングされ得、盗難につながる恐れがある。   The vehicle manufacturer 110 may send the CUIDs of the associated CUs 104 to the vehicle dealer 112 that receives the vehicles that contain those CUs 104. Transport of the CUID to the dealer 112 should be performed so that the CUID remains secret. If a CUID is intercepted, a fake key fob can be generated and the fake key fob can be paired with a CU without the help of the dealer 112, which can lead to theft.

キーフォブ１０６は固有のＩＤ（ＫＦＩＤ）を有し得、ＫＦＩＤは、秘密にされる必要はなく、キーフォブ製造業者１０２、キーフォブ組み立て業者、又は車両製造業者１１０により挿入され、キーフォブ１０６から読み取り可能である。   The key fob 106 may have a unique ID (KFID), which does not need to be kept secret and can be inserted and read from the key fob 106 by the key fob manufacturer 102, key fob assembler, or vehicle manufacturer 110. .

図２は、ＩＤベースの認証を用い、本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った、キーフォブと制御ユニットの例示の初期ペアリングプロセス２００を図示する。初期ペアリング２００は、（ディーラー１１２における）ペアリングデバイス２０２、キーフォブ１０６、及びＣＵ１０４に関与し得る。上述の証明書ベースの認証アプローチと同様に、ペアリングデバイス２０２は、他の構成要素に接続するために用いられる構成要素の一つに識別情報を安全に搬送することにより、キーフォブ１０６とＣＵ１０４のペアリングを促進し得る。   FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary initial pairing process 200 for a key fob and control unit using ID-based authentication and in accordance with various examples described herein. Initial pairing 200 may involve pairing device 202 (at dealer 112), key fob 106, and CU 104. Similar to the certificate-based authentication approach described above, the pairing device 202 allows the key fob 106 and the CU 104 to be securely transported to one of the components used to connect to the other components. Pairing can be facilitated.

ペアリングプロセス２００は、ディーラー１１２が、在庫の中の多くのものから１つのキーフォブ１０６を選択する工程１ａで始まり得る。選択の際及びペアリングプロセスを通して、キーフォブ１０６のＫＦＩＤは秘密のままとされるべきである。ディーラー１１２はその後、工程１ｂで、関連付けられたキーフォブ１０６のＫＦＩＤ及びＣＵ１０４のＣＵＩＤをペアリングデバイス２０２に秘密裏に入れ得る。   The pairing process 200 may begin at step 1a where the dealer 112 selects one key fob 106 from many in inventory. During selection and through the pairing process, the KFID of the key fob 106 should be kept secret. Dealer 112 may then secretly associate the associated key fob 106 KFID and CU 104 CUID to pairing device 202 in step 1b.

ペアリングデバイス２０２はその後、工程２ａで、キーフォブ１０６との通信を確立し得る。ＫＦＩＤを用いて、ペアリングデバイス及びキーフォブ１０６はその後、認証のためのパスワードとして働くＩＤを用いて、ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを実行し得る。ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルは、下記の２つの機能を実行し得る。即ち、これら２つの構成要素を互いに認証すること、及び、これら２つの構成要素が暗号化されたメッセージを互いの間で送信するために用い得る共通の秘密鍵を生成することである。そのため、ペアリングデバイス２０２及びキーフォブが、ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルをＫＦＩＤを用いて実行するとき、ペアリングデバイス２０２及びキーフォブは、互いを認証し得、互いとの通信を確実にするために用いるために共通の秘密鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ１を生成し得る。工程２ｂで、ペアリングデバイス２０２は、ＤＨＫｅｙ１を用いてＣＵＩＤを暗号化し得、暗号化されたＣＵＩＤをキーフォブ１０６に送信し得る。   The pairing device 202 may then establish communication with the key fob 106 in step 2a. Using the KFID, the pairing device and key fob 106 may then execute an ID-authenticated key sharing protocol using the ID that serves as a password for authentication. An ID-authenticated key sharing protocol can perform the following two functions. That is, authenticating these two components to each other and generating a common secret key that can be used by these two components to transmit encrypted messages between each other. Therefore, when the pairing device 202 and the key fob execute an ID-authenticated key sharing protocol using the KFID, the pairing device 202 and the key fob can authenticate each other and ensure communication with each other. A common secret key DHKey1 may be generated for use. In step 2b, the pairing device 202 may encrypt the CUID using DHKey1, and may send the encrypted CUID to the key fob 106.

キーフォブ１０６はＣＵＩＤを得るためにメッセージを解読することが可能であり得、ＣＵＩＤはその後、受信したＣＵＩＤと関連付けられるＣＵ１０４との通信を確立するために用いられ得る。工程３ａで、キーフォブ１０６及びＣＵ１０４はその後、上述したものに類似して、互いを認証するため及び共通の秘密鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ２を生成するためにＣＵＩＤを用いてＩＤベースの暗号化認証を実行し得る。ＣＵ１０４はその後、工程３ｂで、キーフォブ１０６に送信するためＯｐＫｅｙを暗号化するためにＤＨＫｅｙ２を用い得る。付加的に又は代替として、キーフォブ１０６は、ＣＵ１０４との初期ペアリングの後ＣＵＩＤを消去し得る。   Key fob 106 may be able to decrypt the message to obtain a CUID, which may then be used to establish communication with CU 104 associated with the received CUID. In step 3a, the key fob 106 and CU 104 may then perform ID-based encryption authentication using the CUID to authenticate each other and to generate a common secret key DHKey2 similar to that described above. The CU 104 may then use DHKey2 to encrypt the OpKey for transmission to the key fob 106 in step 3b. Additionally or alternatively, key fob 106 may erase the CUID after initial pairing with CU 104.

図３、図４、及び図５は、本明細書に記載される種々の例に従った、それぞれ、例示のペアリングデバイス２０２、キーフォブ１０６、及びＣＵ１０４のブロック図である。これら３つのデバイス／構成要素、即ち、ペアリングデバイス、キーフォブ、及びＣＵ、はいずれも、プロセッサ（３０２、４０２、５０２）、メモリ（３０４、４０４、５０４）、及びトランシーバ（３０６、４０６、５０６）を含み得る。これら３つのデバイス／構成要素のプロセッサは、証明書ベースの認証ペアリング及びＩＤベースの認証ペアリングと関連付けられる、認証演算及び共通の秘密キー生成演算を実行するために用いられ得る。プロセッサは、標準的なＣＰＵ、マイクロコントローラ、低電力デジタルシグナルプロセッサなどとし得、短時間で複雑な演算を実行することが可能とし得る。   FIGS. 3, 4, and 5 are block diagrams of exemplary pairing device 202, key fob 106, and CU 104, respectively, according to various examples described herein. All three of these devices / components, the pairing device, key fob, and CU, are processor (302, 402, 502), memory (304, 404, 504), and transceiver (306, 406, 506). Can be included. These three device / component processors can be used to perform authentication operations and common secret key generation operations associated with certificate-based authentication pairing and ID-based authentication pairing. The processor may be a standard CPU, microcontroller, low power digital signal processor, etc., and may be able to perform complex operations in a short time.

これら３つのデバイスのメモリは、証明書ベースの認証ペアリングのためそれらのそれぞれのデバイスと関連付けられる、公開及び秘密鍵ペア、及び真正性の証明書をストアするために用いられ得る。代替として又は付加的に、これら３つのデバイスのメモリは、それら自体の又は他のデバイスのＩＤをストアするために用いられ得る。例えば、ＩＤベースの認証ペアリングにおいて、ペアリングデバイス２０２は、ペアリングシーケンスを開始する前にＫＦＩＤ及びＣＵＩＤ両方をストアし得る。これら２つの関連付けられたデバイスのためのＫＦＩＤ及びＣＵＩＤは、ペアリングデバイス２０２のメモリ３０４にストアされ得る。メモリは、フラッシュメモリ又はＥＥＰＲＯＭなどの不揮発性ストレージデバイスとし得る。   The memory of these three devices can be used to store public and private key pairs and authenticity certificates associated with their respective devices for certificate-based authentication pairing. Alternatively or additionally, the memory of these three devices can be used to store their own or other device IDs. For example, in ID-based authentication pairing, the pairing device 202 may store both KFID and CUID before initiating the pairing sequence. The KFID and CUID for these two associated devices may be stored in the memory 304 of the pairing device 202. The memory may be a non-volatile storage device such as flash memory or EEPROM.

これら３つのデバイスのためのトランシーバは、有線（図示せず）、ワイヤレス、或いは両方可能とし得る。トランシーバは、いずれかの認証アプローチのための調整工程及び初期ペアリング工程の間、ＩＤ、公開鍵、及び／又は真正性の証明書を通信するためにデバイスにより用いられ得る。車両の遠隔エントリ及び制御を可能にするキーフォブは、それらの送信のためにブルートゥース、ＬＦ、又はＵＨＦなどのワイヤレス技術を用い得るが、また、初期ペアリングプロセスの間ワイヤを介してペアリングデバイス及び／又はＣＵと通信することも可能である。   The transceivers for these three devices may be wired (not shown), wireless, or both. The transceiver may be used by the device to communicate ID, public key, and / or authenticity certificate during the coordination and initial pairing steps for any authentication approach. Key fobs that allow remote entry and control of vehicles may use wireless technologies such as Bluetooth, LF, or UHF for their transmission, but also via a pairing device and wires over the initial pairing process It is also possible to communicate with the CU.

図６は、本明細書に記載されるような種々の例に従った、ペアリングされたキーフォブ及びＣＵの例示の通常オペレーションを図示する。図６に示す通常オペレーションは、プロセス２００（ＩＤベース）による初期ペアリング後のキーフォブ１０６とＣＵ１０４との間の相互作用を示す。キーフォブ及びＣＵは、例えばキーフォブとのユーザーの相互作用の際に互いに通信するとき、例えば、ＡＥＳ−１２８に基づくＯｐＫｅｙ認証されたチャレンジレスポンスプロトコルを実行することにより互いをまず認証し得る。キーフォブによるＣＵのオペレーションは、レスポンスが有効であるときにのみ許容され得る。無効レスポンスは不正のキーフォブを知らせ得、ＣＵは、無効なキーフォブから送られる命令を実行しない可能性がある。   FIG. 6 illustrates exemplary normal operation of a paired key fob and CU according to various examples as described herein. The normal operation shown in FIG. 6 illustrates the interaction between the key fob 106 and the CU 104 after initial pairing by the process 200 (ID-based). The key fob and the CU may first authenticate each other, for example, by executing an OpKey authenticated challenge response protocol based on AES-128, for example when communicating with each other during user interaction with the key fob. The CU's operation with a key fob can only be allowed when the response is valid. An invalid response may indicate an invalid key fob, and the CU may not execute instructions sent from the invalid key fob.

図７は、本明細書に記載されるような種々の例に従ったＣＵによるＯｐＫｅｙ変更の一例を図示する。ＣＵ１０４は、キーフォブ２０６が置き忘れられた又は盗まれたとき、ＯｐＫｅｙを変更し得る。ＯｐＫｅｙを変更することにより、ＣＵは、無くなった又は盗まれたキーフォブ２０６がＣＵ１０４にアクセスすることを防ぐことができる。ＣＵ１０４は、新たなＯｐＫｅｙが所望される外部信号により開始され得る。外部信号は、キーフォブ及び車両を用いてプリセットシーケンスを実行することにより残存キーフォブ１０６の所有者から来る場合があり、或いは、外部信号は、ディーラー１１２のペアリングデバイス２０２から来る場合もある。外部信号を受け取ると、ＣＵ１０４は、古いＯｐＫｅｙを用いて新たなＯｐＫｅｙを暗号化し得、その後、暗号化された新たなＯｐＫｅｙを残存キーフォブ１０６に送信し得る。新たなＯｐＫｅｙを受信した後、古いＯｐＫｅｙは、全てのＣＵ２０２、２０４、及び残存キーフォブ１０６により消去され得る。その後、デバイス間の通常オペレーションが、不正のキーフォブがＣＵと相互作用することを心配することなく継続し得る。   FIG. 7 illustrates an example of OpKey change by a CU according to various examples as described herein. The CU 104 may change the OpKey when the key fob 206 is misplaced or stolen. By changing the OpKey, the CU can prevent the lost or stolen key fob 206 from accessing the CU 104. The CU 104 may be initiated by an external signal where a new OpKey is desired. The external signal may come from the owner of the remaining key fob 106 by performing a preset sequence using the key fob and the vehicle, or the external signal may come from the pairing device 202 of the dealer 112. Upon receipt of the external signal, the CU 104 may encrypt the new OpKey using the old OpKey, and then send the new encrypted OpKey to the remaining key fob 106. After receiving a new OpKey, the old OpKey can be erased by all CUs 202, 204 and the remaining key fob 106. Thereafter, normal operation between the devices may continue without worrying about the rogue key fob interacting with the CU.

図８は、本明細書に記載される種々の例に従ったＩＤベースの認証のための例示の方法８００のフローチャートである。方法８００は、図２に関して説明した初期ペアリングプロセス２００の１つの実装であり得る。方法８００は、ペアリングデバイス２０２及びキーフォブ１０６が、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ１を生成するためにＫＦＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを実行する工程８０２で始まる。工程８０４が、ペアリングデバイス２０２がＣＵ１０４のＣＵＩＤをＤＨＫｅｙ１で暗号化することで方法８００を継続し、その後工程８０６で、ペアリングデバイスが、暗号化されたＣＵＩＤをキーフォブ１０６に送信することで継続する。   FIG. 8 is a flowchart of an example method 800 for ID-based authentication in accordance with various examples described herein. The method 800 may be one implementation of the initial pairing process 200 described with respect to FIG. The method 800 begins at step 802 where the pairing device 202 and the key fob 106 execute a KFID authenticated key agreement protocol to authenticate each other and to generate the encryption key DHKey1. Step 804 continues with the method 800 by the pairing device 202 encrypting the CUID of the CU 104 with DHKey1, and then at step 806, the pairing device continues by sending the encrypted CUID to the key fob 106. To do.

方法８００は、キーフォブ１０６及びＣＵ１０４が、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ２を生成するためにＣＵＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを実行する工程８０８で継続する。方法８００はその後、ＣＵ１０４がＯｐＫｅｙをＤＨＫｅｙ２で暗号化し、暗号化されたＯｐＫｅｙをキーフォブ１０６に送信する、工程８１０及び８１２で終了する。ＯｐＫｅｙがキーフォブ１０６と共有された後、ＣＵ１０４及びキーフォブ１０６はペアリングされていると考えられ得る。   The method 800 continues at step 808 where the key fob 106 and the CU 104 execute a CUID-authenticated key agreement protocol to authenticate each other and to generate the encryption key DHKey2. The method 800 then ends at steps 810 and 812, where the CU 104 encrypts the OpKey with DHKey2 and sends the encrypted OpKey to the key fob 106. After OpKey is shared with key fob 106, CU 104 and key fob 106 may be considered paired.

当業者であれば、本発明の特許請求の範囲内で、説明した例示の実施例に変形が成され得ること、及び多くの他の実施例が可能であることが分かるであろう。   Those skilled in the art will appreciate that variations can be made to the described exemplary embodiments and that many other embodiments are possible within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims (20)

キーフォブを車両とペアリングするための方法であって、
ペアリングデバイス及びキーフォブにより、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ１を生成するためにキーフォブ識別子（ＫＦＩＤ）に基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有（ｋｅｙ ａｇｒｅｅｍｅｎｔ）プロトコルを実行すること、
前記ペアリングデバイスにより、制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）をＤＨＫｅｙ１で暗号化すること、
前記ペアリングデバイスにより、前記暗号化されたＣＵＩＤをキーフォブに送信すること、
前記キーフォブ及び制御ユニットにより、互いを認証するため及び暗号鍵ＤＨＫｅｙ２を生成するために前記ＣＵＩＤに基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを実行すること、
前記制御ユニットにより、動作鍵（ｏｐｅｒａｔｉｏｎ ｋｅｙ）をＤＨＫｅｙ２で暗号化すること、及び
前記制御ユニットにより、前記暗号化された動作鍵を前記キーフォブに送信すること、
を含む、方法。 A method for pairing a key fob with a vehicle,
Performing an ID-authenticated key agreement protocol based on a key fob identifier (KFID) to authenticate each other and to generate a cryptographic key DHKey 1 by a pairing device and a key fob;
Encrypting a control unit identifier (CUID) with DHKey1 by the pairing device;
Sending the encrypted CUID to the key fob by the pairing device;
Executing an ID-authenticated key sharing protocol based on the CUID to authenticate each other and to generate a cryptographic key DHKey2 by the key fob and control unit;
Encrypting an operation key with DHKey2 by the control unit; and transmitting the encrypted operation key to the key fob by the control unit;
Including a method. 請求項１に記載の方法であって、
前記ＣＵＩＤを前記制御ユニットのストレージデバイスに挿入すること、及び前記ＣＵＩＤを車両ディーラーに送信することを更に含む、方法。 The method of claim 1, comprising:
Inserting the CUID into a storage device of the control unit; and transmitting the CUID to a vehicle dealer. 請求項１に記載の方法であって、
固有のＩＤをキーフォブに挿入すること（ＫＦＩＤ）を更に含む、方法。 The method of claim 1, comprising:
The method further comprising inserting a unique ID into the key fob (KFID). 請求項１に記載の方法であって、
前記キーフォブの前記ＫＦＩＤを読むことを更に含む、方法。 The method of claim 1, comprising:
The method further comprising reading the KFID of the key fob. キーフォブ制御ユニットペアリングデバイスであって、
信号を送信及び受信するように構成されるトランシーバ、
キーフォブ識別子（ＫＦＩＤ）及び制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）をストアするように構成されるメモリ、及び
前記トランシーバ及び前記メモリに結合されるプロセッサ、
を含み、
前記プロセッサが、
前記ＫＦＩＤに基づく識別子（ＩＤ）認証された鍵共有プロトコルを用いて前記キーフォブを認証するように、及び
暗号化されたＣＵＩＤを前記キーフォブに送信するように、
構成される、
デバイス。 A key fob control unit pairing device,
A transceiver configured to transmit and receive signals;
A memory configured to store a key fob identifier (KFID) and a control unit identifier (CUID), and a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory;
Including
The processor is
To authenticate the key fob using an identifier (ID) authenticated key sharing protocol based on the KFID and to send an encrypted CUID to the key fob,
Composed,
device. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記プロセッサによって成される前記ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルが更に、前記キーフォブと前記ペアリングデバイスとの間で共有される共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成する、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
The device wherein the ID-authenticated key sharing protocol made by the processor further generates a common secret encryption key shared between the key fob and the pairing device. 請求項６に記載のデバイスであって、
前記プロセッサが、前記共通の秘密暗号化鍵を備えた前記暗号化されたＣＵＩＤを生成する、デバイス。 The device of claim 6, comprising:
The device, wherein the processor generates the encrypted CUID with the common secret encryption key. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルが、楕円曲線暗号法に基づく、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
A device wherein the ID-authenticated key agreement protocol is based on elliptic curve cryptography. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルが、ディフィー・ヘルマン鍵共有プロトコルに基づく、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
A device wherein the ID-authenticated key sharing protocol is based on a Diffie-Hellman key sharing protocol. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記ＫＦＩＤ及び前記ＣＵＩＤが８文字の１６進法ワードである、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
The device, wherein the KFID and the CUID are 8-character hexadecimal words. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記ＫＦＩＤが、認証のためのパスワードとして用いられる、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
A device in which the KFID is used as a password for authentication. 請求項５に記載のデバイスであって、
前記ＫＦＩＤが、前記キーフォブから前記トランシーバを介して前記プロセッサにより受信される、デバイス。 The device of claim 5, comprising:
The device, wherein the KFID is received by the processor from the key fob via the transceiver. キーフォブであって、
信号を受信及び送信するように構成されるトランシーバ、
キーフォブ識別子（ＫＦＩＤ）をストアするように構成されるメモリ、及び
前記トランシーバ及び前記メモリに結合されるプロセッサ、
を含み、
前記プロセッサが、
ペアリングデバイスを認証するため、及び前記プロセッサと前記ペアリングデバイスとによってのみ既知である共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成するために、前記ＫＦＩＤに基づく識別子（ＩＤ）認証された鍵共有プロトコルを、ペアリングデバイスと共に、実行するように、
前記ペアリングデバイスから、前記共通の秘密暗号化鍵を備えた前記ペアリングデバイスにより暗号化された制御ユニット識別子（ＣＵＩＤ）を受信するように、
前記ＣＵＩＤと関連付けられる前記制御ユニットと共に、前記制御ユニットを認証するため、及び前記プロセッサと前記制御ユニットとによってのみ既知である第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵を生成するために、前記ＣＵＩＤに基づくＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルを実行するように、及び
前記制御ユニットから、前記第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵を備えた前記制御ユニットにより暗号化された動作鍵を受信するように、
構成される、キーフォブ。 A key fob,
A transceiver configured to receive and transmit signals;
A memory configured to store a key fob identifier (KFID), and a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory;
Including
The processor is
In order to authenticate the pairing device and to generate a common secret encryption key known only by the processor and the pairing device, an identifier (ID) authenticated key sharing protocol based on the KFID is To run with a pairing device,
Receiving from the pairing device a control unit identifier (CUID) encrypted by the pairing device with the common secret encryption key;
Based on the CUID to authenticate the control unit with the control unit associated with the CUID and to generate a second common secret encryption key known only by the processor and the control unit To execute an ID-authenticated key sharing protocol, and to receive from the control unit an operation key encrypted by the control unit with the second common secret encryption key,
Configured, key fob. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
ＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルが楕円曲線暗号法に基づく、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
Key fob whose ID-authenticated key sharing protocol is based on elliptic curve cryptography. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記ＫＦＩＤ及び前記ＣＵＩＤ認証された鍵共有プロトコルが、ディフィー・ヘルマン鍵共有プロトコルに基づく、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob in which the KFID and CUID authenticated key sharing protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman key sharing protocol. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記プロセッサが前記第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵で前記動作鍵を解読するためのものである、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob for the processor to decrypt the operating key with the second common secret encryption key. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記ＫＦＩＤ及び前記ＣＵＩＤが８文字の１６進法ワードである、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob in which the KFID and the CUID are 8-character hexadecimal words. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記暗号化された動作鍵がワイヤレスに受信される、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob in which the encrypted operating key is received wirelessly. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記プロセッサが、前記共通の秘密暗号化鍵を用いて前記暗号化されたＣＵＩＤを解読する、キーフォブ。 A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob in which the processor decrypts the encrypted CUID using the common secret encryption key. 請求項１３に記載のキーフォブであって、
前記プロセッサが、前記第２の共通の秘密暗号化鍵を用いて前記オペレーションキーを解読する、キーフォブ。

A key fob according to claim 13,
A key fob in which the processor decrypts the operation key using the second common secret encryption key.

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