JP2017026105A - Vehicle and unauthorized access determination method for vehicle - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a vehicle in which an unauthorized access can be determined by a control unit.SOLUTION: A vehicle (100) includes: drive devices (1,3) for driving the vehicle (100); two or more control units (ECU 1 to 5) for controlling the drive devices (1,3); a communication channel (70) which connects the control units (ECU 1 to 5) to one another in a communicable manner. At least one of the control units (ECU 1 to 5) determines that communication data is due to unauthorized access if the amount of communication data on the communication channel (70) exceeds a predetermined amount.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 2

Description

  The present invention relates to a vehicle and a vehicle unauthorized access determination method.

  A vehicle including a driving force source such as an engine or a motor and an automatic transmission is configured to be able to communicate between an external device such as a failure diagnosis tester and the control unit of the vehicle via an interface such as an OBD connector.

  In a vehicle configured in this way, a third party can access the control unit of the vehicle via the OBD connector, so that data necessary for vehicle development can be acquired or data related to vehicle behavior can be rewritten. The vehicle may operate unintentionally.

  In order to prevent unauthorized access by a third party in this way, an unauthorized connection detection method for detecting whether or not the monitor tool is legitimate by detecting the voltage of at least one communication line connected to the monitor tool Is disclosed (see Patent Document 1).

JP 2014-143631 A

  The conventional technique described in Patent Document 1 is configured to determine whether or not it is legitimate by changing the voltage of the communication line using a monitor tool. With this configuration, the communication line and the monitor tool require physical changes and additional hardware such as sensors, which increases the cost, and the problem that unauthorized connection cannot be determined in a vehicle that does not have a dedicated configuration. there were.

  The present invention has been made in view of such problems, and an object thereof is to provide a vehicle capable of determining unauthorized access by a control unit.

  According to an embodiment of the present invention, a drive device that drives a vehicle, two or more control units that control the drive device, and a communication path that connects the two or more control units in a communicable manner are provided. At least one is characterized in that when the amount of communication data in a specific period in the communication path exceeds a predetermined amount, it is determined that the communication data is due to unauthorized access.

  According to the above aspect, when an unintended increase occurs in communication data in the communication path, it is determined that unauthorized access has been performed, and therefore appropriate measures against unauthorized access can be taken.

It is explanatory drawing which shows an example of a structure of the vehicle centering on the automatic transmission of embodiment of this invention. It is explanatory drawing which shows the vehicle network of embodiment of this invention. It is a flowchart of the control which ECU of embodiment of this invention performs. It is a flowchart of the control which ECU of embodiment of this invention performs.

  Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram illustrating an example of a configuration of a vehicle 100 centering on an automatic transmission 3 according to an embodiment of the present invention.

  The vehicle 100 includes a drive device including the engine 1, the automatic transmission 3, the engine control unit 30 that controls the operation of the engine 1, and a transmission control unit 40 that controls the operation of the automatic transmission 3.

  The rotation of the crankshaft 11 driven by the engine 1 is transmitted to the automatic transmission 3 via the forward / reverse switching mechanism 5, the torque converter 2 and the input shaft 12. The automatic transmission 3 shifts the input rotation and outputs it to the output shaft 13. The rotation of the output shaft 13 is transmitted to the wheels 6 via the final reduction gear 4 and the axle 14 so that the vehicle 100 moves forward and backward.

  The torque converter 2 includes a lock-up clutch, and is controlled to a converter state and a lock-up state by hydraulic pressure.

  The automatic transmission 3 includes a primary pulley 31 connected to the input shaft 12, a secondary pulley 32 connected to the output shaft 13 arranged in parallel with the input shaft 12, and the primary pulley 31 and the secondary pulley 32. The belt-type continuously variable transmission mechanism includes an endless belt (V-belt) 33 that is wound around.

  The primary pulley 31 and the secondary pulley 32 are provided with a hydraulic chamber. By adjusting the hydraulic pressure supplied from the hydraulic control device 20, the width of the V groove changes, and the V belt 33, the primary pulley 31, the secondary pulley 32, The contact radius of the automatic transmission 3 changes steplessly.

  The hydraulic control device 20 includes an oil pump, and supplies hydraulic pressure to the hydraulic chambers of the primary pulley 31 and the secondary pulley 32 of the automatic transmission 3 as indicated by dotted lines in FIG. The hydraulic control device 20 also supplies hydraulic oil to the torque converter 2 and the bearings and gears of the automatic transmission 3.

  The engine control unit 30 receives and receives an ignition ON signal sent from the ignition switch 54, an accelerator opening signal (AOP signal) sent from the accelerator pedal 52, and a brake signal (BRK signal) sent from the brake pedal 53. Based on the signal, the engine 1 is driven.

  The transmission control unit 40 controls the operation of the automatic transmission 3 by controlling the hydraulic pressure supplied by the hydraulic control device 20. The transmission control unit 40 is an automatic transmission based on a range signal sent from an inhibitor switch 51 that outputs a signal in conjunction with an operation of the shift lever 50 by a driver and an engine operation signal sent from the engine control unit 30. 3 is determined and a control signal is transmitted to the hydraulic control device 20.

  The engine control unit 30 and the transmission control unit 40 are also connected to other control units (ABS control unit 41, instrument panel module control unit 42, communication control unit 43, etc.) via a CAN (CONTROLLER AREA NETWORK) 70. . The ABS control unit 41 controls the state of the ABS during braking.

  The instrument panel module control unit 42 controls the display of the status of the speedometer, tachometer fuel gauge, water temperature gauge, etc. in the instrument panel module. The communication control unit 43 includes, for example, an OBD connector and controls communication with a diagnostic device connected to the OBD connector. These control units and CAN 70 constitute a vehicle network 10.

  Next, the vehicle network 10 of this embodiment is demonstrated.

  FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing the vehicle network 10 of the present embodiment.

  The vehicle 100 includes a vehicle network 10 to which a plurality of control units are connected.

  In the vehicle network shown in FIG. 2, the function and type of the control unit are not distinguished, and are indicated as ECU (ELECTRIC CONTROL UNIT). A plurality of ECUs (ECU1 to ECU5) are connected by a CAN 70 so as to communicate with each other.

  The CAN 70 is configured by a set of wirings including a CAN-H line 71 and a CAN-L line 72. The ECUs 1 and 5 located at the end of the CAN 70 are provided with terminal resistors 61 and 62, respectively.

  Next, the operation of the vehicle network 10 configured as described above will be described.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart of control executed by the ECU 1 of the vehicle network 10 of the present embodiment.

  The process shown in FIG. 3 is executed in the ECU 1 at predetermined intervals (for example, 10 ms).

  The processing shown in FIG. 3 is executed by the ECU 1 having a function capable of acquiring the load of the CAN 70 among the plurality of ECUs (ECUs 1 to 5) shown in FIG.

  ECU1 has acquired the communication data amount transmitted / received by CAN70 (step S10). Then, it is determined whether the communication data amount has changed and the load on the CAN 70 has increased (step S20).

  The load is determined based on whether or not the amount of communication data transmitted / received by the CAN 70 per specific time exceeds a predetermined amount. The predetermined amount is, for example, a case where the communication data amount per minute is increased by 50% from the average value at the normal time.

  If the load has not increased, the process returns to step S10 and is repeated. When it determines with the load rising, it progresses to step S30, and ECU1 determines the identifier (for example, CAN_ID) of communication in CAN70 which caused the fluctuation | variation of load.

  Next, in step S <b> 40, the ECU 1 determines whether or not the load variation is caused by an event or the like generated in the ECUs 1 to 5 connected to the CAN 70 based on the determined identifier.

  For example, when the ECU 1 includes a sensor that detects opening / closing of the door of the vehicle, the communication data amount of the CAN 70 temporarily increases when the door is opened / closed. In addition, when a diagnostic device is connected to the communication control unit 43, the amount of communication data by a diagnostic command or the like from the diagnostic device increases. Since these communication data include an identifier such as CAN_ID, the cause of the increase in the amount of communication data can be determined by determining the identifier.

  If it is determined in step S40 that the cause of the increase in the communication data is that the event that the ECUs 1 to 5 generate or the diagnosis device is connected and the diagnosis command is generated, the process returns to step S10. If the increase in communication data is not one of these causes, for example, if CAN_ID cannot be determined, or if it is not an assumed CAN_ID, the process proceeds to step S50, and ECU 1 determines that unauthorized access is being performed.

  In step S60, the ECU 1 notifies the other ECUs 2 to 5 through the CAN 70 that it has been determined that unauthorized access is being performed.

  Next, in step S <b> 70, the ECU 1 determines whether or not a notification has been received from the other ECUs 2 to 5 that unauthorized access has been performed. If the notification has not been received, the process of step S70 is repeated.

  If it is determined that the notification has been received from the other ECUs 2 to 5, the process proceeds to step S80, and the ECU 1 determines that the vehicle is currently being illegally accessed. And it transfers to step S90 and transfers a vehicle to a safe state.

  The safety state in step S90 performs control to prevent the behavior of the vehicle from being affected by unauthorized access. For example, when the ECU 1 is a transmission control unit 40 that controls the automatic transmission 3, the clutch of the forward / reverse switching mechanism 5 is released, and control is performed so that the driving force of the engine 1 is not transmitted (power control state). . Such control prevents the behavior of the vehicle from being affected even if an unauthorized access is made to the ECU that operates the drive device including the engine 1.

  The safe state is not limited to the release of the clutch of the forward / reverse switching mechanism 5, and control such as the release of the lockup clutch of the torque converter 2 and the change of the transmission ratio of the automatic transmission 3 may be performed. Further, when the ECU 1 is the engine control unit 30 that controls the engine 1, control may be performed so as to reduce the driving force of the engine 1 to prevent the vehicle behavior from being affected. . Moreover, it is good also as a power control state by ECU1 transmitting instruction | command to other ECU2-5, and controlling transmission of the driving force of a vehicle.

  As described above, by executing the control shown in FIG. 3, it is determined that an unauthorized access has been performed when an unintended increase occurs in the communication data of the CAN 70, and further, the plurality of ECUs 1 to 5 perform unauthorized access. When the determination is made, it is possible to perform control to prevent unauthorized access from affecting the behavior of the vehicle.

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart of control executed by the ECU 5 of the vehicle network 10 of the present embodiment.

  The process shown in FIG. 4 is executed in the ECU 5 at predetermined intervals (for example, 10 sm).

  The process shown in FIG. 4 is executed by the ECU 5 that does not have the function of acquiring the load of the CAN 70 among the plurality of ECUs (ECUs 1 to 5) shown in FIG.

  In step S110, the ECU 2 determines whether or not it has received a notification from another ECU (ECU1 to ECU4) that unauthorized access has been performed. If the notification has not been received and if the notification has been received only once, step S110 is repeated to wait.

  In step S110, when two notifications are received from other ECUs 2 to 5 that it is determined that unauthorized access is being performed, the process proceeds to step S120, where ECU 5 currently performs unauthorized access to the vehicle. It is confirmed that it is in the state. And it transfers to step S130 and ECU1 transfers a vehicle to a safe state.

  The processing in step S130 is the same as the processing in step S90 in FIG. That is, when the ECU 1 is a transmission control unit 40 that controls the automatic transmission 3, the clutch of the forward / reverse switching mechanism 5 is released so that the driving force of the engine 1 is not transmitted.

  By executing the control as shown in FIG. 4, even in the ECU 5 that does not have a function of detecting the communication data amount of the CAN 70, when a plurality of ECUs 1 to 4 determine unauthorized access, Control that prevents the vehicle behavior from being affected can be performed.

  As described above, the embodiment of the present invention includes an engine 1 that drives a vehicle, a drive device that includes an automatic transmission 3, two or more control units (ECUs 1 to 5) that control the drive device, and two or more drive units. When the amount of communication data in the CAN 70 exceeds a predetermined amount, the ECU 1 determines that the communication data is due to unauthorized access.

  By performing such control, when an unintentional increase occurs in the communication data of the CAN 70, it is possible to take measures against unauthorized access by determining that unauthorized access has been performed. This effect corresponds to claims 1 and 5.

  In the embodiment of the present invention, even if the amount of communication data in the CAN 70 exceeds a predetermined amount, the ECU 1 is caused by an event that occurs in the other control units (ECUs 2 to 5). In the case, it is determined that the communication data is legitimate.

  By performing such control, when the operation is based on the normal operation of the ECUs 1 to 5, unauthorized access and communication other than that can be accurately determined by not performing unauthorized access. This effect corresponds to claim 2.

  Further, in the embodiment of the present invention, when the ECU 1 determines that it is due to unauthorized access, and when the other ECUs 2 to 5 determine that it is due to unauthorized access, that is, two or more. If the ECUs 1 to 5 determine that the access is due to unauthorized access, the vehicle is controlled to a safe state. By controlling in this way, it is possible to reliably determine that the access is unauthorized by the plurality of ECUs 1 to 5, and it is possible to perform control that prevents the unauthorized access from affecting the behavior of the vehicle. . This effect corresponds to the third aspect.

  Further, in the embodiment of the present invention, the safe state includes a power control state that controls transmission of power by the drive device, so that the behavior of the vehicle is affected by controlling the drive device against unauthorized access. It can prevent giving. This effect corresponds to claim 4.

  The embodiment of the present invention has been described above, but the above embodiment is merely one example of application of the present invention, and the technical scope of the present invention is limited to the specific configuration of the above embodiment. is not.

  In the present embodiment, the automatic transmission 3 has been described as an example of a belt-type continuously variable transmission that is configured by belting a set of pulleys, but is not limited thereto. The automatic transmission 3 may be a stepped transmission or a combination of a continuously variable transmission and a stepped transmission.

  Moreover, although this embodiment demonstrated the vehicle which the drive device consists of the engine 1 to the example, it is not restricted to this. The vehicle may be an HEV (Hybrid Electric Vehicle) driven by an engine and a motor, or an EV (Electric Vehicle) driven by a motor.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Engine 3 Automatic transmission 5 Forward / reverse switching mechanism 10 Vehicle network 20 Hydraulic control device 30 Engine control unit 40 Transmission control unit 41 ABS control unit 42 Instrument panel module control unit 43 Communication control unit 61 Terminal resistance 70 CAN (communication path)
100 Vehicle ECU1-5 Control unit

Claims (5)

A driving device for driving the vehicle;
Two or more control units for controlling the drive device;
A communication path connecting the two or more control units in a communicable manner;
With
At least one of the control units determines that the communication data is due to unauthorized access when the amount of communication data for a predetermined period in the communication path exceeds a predetermined amount. The vehicle according to claim 1,
When the amount of communication data in the communication path exceeds a predetermined amount, the control unit is legitimate if the communication data is due to an event that has occurred in another control unit. It is determined that the vehicle. In the vehicle according to claim 1 or claim 2,
When the control unit determines that the communication data is due to unauthorized access, and when the other control unit determines that the communication data is due to unauthorized access, A vehicle characterized by controlling to a safe state. The vehicle according to claim 3, wherein
The vehicle in which the safety state includes a power control state for controlling transmission of driving force by the driving device. A vehicle unauthorized access determination method comprising: a drive device that drives a vehicle; two or more control units that control the drive device; and a communication path that connects the two or more control units so that they can communicate with each other.
An unauthorized access determination method for a vehicle, wherein when the amount of communication data per unit time in the communication path exceeds a predetermined amount, it is determined that the communication data is due to unauthorized access.

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