JP2014177165A - Anti-theft security system with work history preservation function - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To move a work machine by starting an engine of the work machine by a simple procedure, even when failure is caused in an authentication control device of the work machine.SOLUTION: An anti-theft security system 1 with a work history preservation function comprises a work machine control device A for preserving work history, engine operation limiting means C for limiting starting of an engine F for preventing a theft and the authentication control device B for controlling the engine operation limiting means C, and allows manual input of emergency identification information X6 from a man-machine-interface K of the work machine control device A only when the work machine control device A does not detect normal operation of the authentication control device B, and releases a starting limitation of the engine F by the engine operation limiting means C by determining a propriety of this emergency identification information X6.

Description

  The present invention relates to an improvement of an antitheft device with a work history storage function that has both a function for storing a work history of a work machine and a theft prevention function for preventing the work machine from being stolen.

  As systems for preventing theft of work machines such as construction machines, a work management system disclosed in Patent Document 1, a vehicle control system disclosed in Patent Document 2, and the like are already known.

Among these, the work management system disclosed in Patent Document 1 reads the information detected by sensors installed in each part of the work machine and stores the identification code and work set in advance in the work machine control device that saves the work history. The work implement control device determines whether the identification code recorded on the IC card carried by the machine driver matches with the identification code, and only when both match, the work implement control device closes the power supply relay and the engine. While the operation of the start switch is allowed, in other cases, the power relay is kept open, and the operation of the engine start switch is prohibited to prevent the working machine from being stolen.
However, in the work management system disclosed in Patent Document 1, when the work machine control device breaks down, it becomes impossible to release the anti-theft function of the work machine, and the engine cannot be started and repaired. There is a possibility that it may hinder the movement of the work machine to the factory or the work machine during emergency evacuation.

On the other hand, in the vehicle control system disclosed in Patent Document 2, a transponder is built in a vehicle key, and an identification code set in advance in an engine control unit constituting an immobilizer system on the vehicle side and a key carried by the driver. The engine control unit determines whether the identification code sent from the built-in transponder matches or does not match, and the engine control unit allows the operation of the fuel injection control device only when the two match. The vehicle is prevented from being stolen by prohibiting the operation of the fuel injection control device.
In addition, this vehicle control system is capable of starting a vehicle engine in response to a failure of a transponder built in the key, other control devices other than the engine control unit, modem, public telephone line network, service A backup system consisting of a center system computer, etc. is provided, and after the service center system computer determines the suitability of starting the engine based on various information, the other systems described above via the public telephone line network and modem etc. The operation of the fuel injection control device is allowed by giving a command to the control device.
However, the vehicle control system disclosed in Patent Document 2 has a disadvantage that high cost is required to construct a backup system because it is necessary to install a modem and other additional devices in addition to the engine control unit in the vehicle. Since the engine is allowed to start using a network such as a public telephone network, vehicle movement for emergency evacuation is significant in the event of a large-scale disaster that causes the network to go down. It is thought that harmful effects such as difficulty will occur.
This vehicle control system seems to be exclusively intended for ordinary vehicles, and in the case of ordinary passenger cars and commercial vehicles, it can be considered that the vehicle is towed, but in the case of cranes and other work machines, In terms of size and weight, it is difficult to move the wrecker, and the movement of the vehicle when the transponder failure and the network down overlap becomes an issue.

JP 2007-308890 A (Claim 1, paragraphs 0025 to 0028, 0031 to 0033) JP 10-35417 A (Claim 1, paragraphs 0017 to 0020, 0023 to 0031)

  It is an object of the present invention to lose a portable data storage medium storing identification information used for authentication processing for canceling the engine operation restriction when a failure occurs in the authentication control device of the work machine. Even with such a case, with a work history storage function that can start the work machine engine with a simple procedure and move the work machine to the repair shop or move the work machine during emergency evacuation, etc. The anti-theft device is to install a special additional device, that is, to provide a backup system without high cost.

The antitheft device with work history storage function of the present invention has a man-machine interface, reads information detected by a sensor group installed in each part of the work machine, and stores it as a work history. When,
Engine operation limiting means for receiving an instruction from the outside and allowing operation of the engine of the working machine;
A portable data storage medium having a data storage area for storing at least a part of the identification information of the driver that permits the operation of the work machine and the work history,
A machine-machine interface for connecting to the data storage medium so as to be able to communicate information, and reading driver identification information from the data storage medium via the machine-machine interface, and reading from the data storage medium The restriction release means for comparing the identification information of the driver with the identification information of the driver registered in advance to the driver, and outputting a signal allowing the operation of the engine to the engine operation restriction means only when they match. And at least a part of the work history stored in the work machine control device is read from the work machine control device at a predetermined timing and stored in the data storage medium via the machine-machine interface. An anti-theft device with a work history storage function comprising an authentication control device having a work history writing means In order to achieve the object, in particular,
The work machine control device comprises:
Normal operation detection means for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device, and input from the man-machine interface only when the normal operation detection means no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device Emergency restriction canceling means for comparing emergency identification information with emergency identification information pre-registered in itself and outputting a signal allowing the operation of the engine to the engine operation restricting means only when they match. It has the structure characterized by having.

In the above configuration, in a situation where the authentication control device is operating normally, first, the operator of the work machine consists of an IC card controller or the like as a portable data storage medium such as an IC card possessed by the operator. It is connected to the machine / machine interface of the authentication control device such as an IC card reader / writer so as to be able to transmit information.
The restriction release means of the authentication control device reads the driver identification information from the data storage medium via the machine-machine interface, and is registered in advance in the driver identification information read from the data storage medium and the authentication control device. Only when the two match the driver's identification information, a signal that allows the engine of the work implement to operate is output to the engine operation restricting means. Allow the engine of the machine to operate.
In addition, the work machine control device reads information detected by a sensor group installed in each part of the work machine while the work machine engine is operating, and stores it in the work machine control device as a work history of the work machine. Save it.
Then, the work history writing means of the authentication control device has a timing at which at least a part of the work history stored in the work machine control device is determined in advance, for example, an off operation timing of an engine start switch in the work machine, etc. Are read from the work machine control device and stored in a data storage medium possessed by the worker via the machine-machine interface.
On the other hand, if a failure occurs in the authentication control device, the restriction release means and the machine / machine interface of the authentication control device will not function, so a portable data storage medium possessed by the operator of the work machine may be used. Even when connected to the machine-machine interface of the authentication control device, the comparison of the identification information by the restriction release means of the authentication control device is not performed, and a signal that allows the operation of the engine of the work machine is not output. In this case, since the normal operation detecting unit of the work machine control device does not detect the normal operation of the authentication control device, the emergency restriction releasing unit of the work machine control device is automatically activated.
Further, in a situation where the operator of the work machine has lost the portable data storage medium, it becomes impossible to connect the portable data storage medium to the machine / machine interface of the authentication control device itself. Therefore, the authentication control device itself does not start. Therefore, as a result, the normal operation detecting unit of the work machine control device does not detect the normal operation of the authentication control device, and the emergency restriction releasing unit of the work machine control device is automatically activated as described above. It will be.
When the emergency restriction canceling means of the work machine control device is activated due to the above situation, that is, when the authentication control device fails or the work machine operator loses the portable data storage medium In some cases, the driver inputs emergency identification information to the work implement control device via a man-machine interface configured by a manual data input device or the like of the work implement control device.
The emergency restriction release means of the work machine control device compares the emergency identification information input from the man-machine interface with the emergency identification information pre-registered in the work machine control device, and the two match. Only in some cases, a signal permitting the operation of the engine of the work implement is output to the engine operation restricting means, and the engine operation restricting means receiving the signal permits the operation of the engine of the work implement.
Therefore, in the situation where a large-scale disaster has occurred, that is, in the situation where the system computer of the public telephone line network or service center goes down, a failure occurs in the work controller authentication control device, Furthermore, even if the driver loses a portable data storage medium that stores identification information used in the authentication process to remove the engine operation restriction, an emergency from the man-machine interface The engine of the work machine can be started with a simple procedure such as inputting the identification information for operation, and the work machine can be moved to a repair shop or moved during an emergency evacuation.
Moreover, since the backup function of the authentication control device is multiplexed using the work device control device itself which is essential for acquiring and storing the work history of the work device, the backup function is multiplexed. It is not necessary to install a special additional device, and the cost required for constructing the backup system can be reduced.
As a combination of the portable data storage medium and the machine / machine interface of the authentication control device, in addition to a combination of a normal contact IC card and an IC card reader / writer, for example, a non-contact IC card And a short-range wireless communication interface combination, a magnetic card and a magnetic head type card reader / writer, and the like.
In addition, as a man-machine interface of a work machine control device, an ordinary manual data input device such as a numeric keypad, keyboard, touch panel, handwritten character recognition pad, etc., existing numbers, characters, symbols, Those that can input a combination of codes and the like are suitable, but those that are related to biometric authentication, for example, those that input data such as a fingerprint, a palm, a retina, an iris pattern, and a face recognition are not suitable. The reason is that an unexpected third party may be used as a driver when moving work equipment during emergency evacuation, etc., and if biometric authentication information is used as emergency identification information, This is because there arises a problem that a person other than the driver whose work identification information is registered in advance in the work machine control device cannot start the engine.

  The work machine control device further includes an operation state detection means for detecting whether or not the engine is operating, and a normal operation detection means for the authentication control device in a situation where the operation state detection means detects the operation of the engine. Restriction to output a signal that allows operation of the engine from the emergency restriction release means regardless of whether emergency identification information is input from the man-machine interface of the work machine control device when normal operation is no longer detected It is desirable to provide a release state continuation means.

When such a configuration is applied, as long as the engine continues to operate after the authentication control device that is operating normally allows the engine of the work machine to start operation, The operation state detection means of the control device continues to detect the operation of the engine.
Therefore, if a failure occurs in the authentication control device after the engine is started and the normal operation detecting means of the work machine control device does not detect the normal operation of the authentication control device, the man-machine interface of the work machine control device Regardless of whether or not emergency identification information is input from the machine, a signal that allows the engine to operate is output from the emergency limit release means of the work machine control device in response to a command from the restriction release state continuation means of the work machine control device Thus, the operating state of the engine once started is maintained as it is.
Therefore, even if the authentication control device breaks down while the work machine is traveling or working, the engine will not stop carelessly and the shift lever will not be locked. Guaranteed.

  The engine operation limiting means includes a shift lever relay that allows manual operation of a shift lever and a select lever of a transmission provided on the power transmission path of the engine, and a shift lever and a select lever when receiving a signal allowing the operation of the engine. It is desirable that a neutral relay that allows application of drive power from the engine starting power source to the engine starting motor when receiving a signal that permits the operation of the engine in the neutral position or the parking position is desirable.

When such a configuration is applied, the shift lever relay receives a signal allowing the operation of the engine, and allows manual operation of the transmission shift lever (in the case of manual) and the select lever (in the case of automatic). In addition, the shift lever and select lever that are allowed to be manually operated are moved to the neutral position (in the case of manual operation) and the parking position (in the case of automatic operation) by the driver's manual operation. This is an essential requirement when driving power is applied from the starting power source to the engine starting motor.
Even if the neutral relay is improperly operated and the upstream and downstream sides of the neutral relay are bypassed so that the part can be energized, the shift lever relay will not operate unless it receives a signal that allows the engine to operate. Since manual operation of the shift lever and select lever is not allowed, the engine can be started if the initial position of the shift lever or select lever of the left working machine is at the neutral position or the parking position. Since the shift lever and select lever cannot be moved to the driving position, the work implement cannot be run.
Also, if the initial position of the shift lever or select lever of the left working machine is in the driving position, the shift lever or select lever cannot be moved to the neutral position or parking position. Is prohibited.
Therefore, even if the neutral relay is tampered with and the upstream side and the downstream side of the neutral relay are bypassed, the work implement cannot be run.
Therefore, compared with the conventional antitheft device with a work history storage function that relies on only the neutral relay to prevent the work machine from being stolen, the safety against theft itself is improved.

The anti-theft device with work history storage function of the present invention is an information that is detected by an engine operation restricting means that allows an operation of the engine of the work machine in response to an external command, and a sensor group installed in each part of the work machine. Is read and stored as a work history, and the driver's identification information is read from the portable data storage medium possessed by the driver and compared with the driver's identification information pre-registered to the driver. A work history record for reading a work history stored in the control device for the work implement and a restriction release means for outputting a signal permitting the operation of the engine to the engine operation restricting means only when both coincide with each other and storing the work history in the data storage medium In a working machine having an authentication control device with a built-in means,
Normal operation detection means for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device, and input from the man-machine interface of the work equipment control device when the normal operation detection means no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device The emergency restriction canceling means that outputs the signal that permits the operation of the engine to the engine operation restricting means only when the emergency identification information is compared with the emergency identification information registered in advance and the two coincide with each other. By configuring with the control device,
By simply inputting appropriate emergency identification information into the man-machine interface of the work machine control device, a signal that allows the operation of the work machine engine is sent from the emergency restriction release means of the work machine control device. Since it can be input to the engine operation restricting means, it is possible to authenticate work equipment in situations where a large-scale disaster has occurred, that is, in situations where the public telephone network or system computer of the service center goes down. When the driver has lost the portable data storage medium storing the identification information used for the authentication process for releasing the engine operation restriction. However, it is possible to start the engine of the work machine with a simple procedure and move the work machine to the repair shop or move the work machine during an emergency evacuation.
In addition, since the backup function of the authentication control device is multiplexed using the work device control device itself, which is essential for acquiring and storing the work history of the work device, the backup function is multiplexed. It is not necessary to install a special additional device, and the cost required for constructing the backup system can be reduced.

Furthermore, when the operation state detection means for detecting the presence or absence of the operation of the engine and the operation state detection means detects the operation of the engine, the normal operation detection means no longer detects the normal operation of the authentication control device. In addition, the restriction release state continuation means that outputs a signal that allows the engine to operate is output from the emergency restriction release means regardless of whether emergency identification information is input from the man-machine interface of the work machine control device. When the configuration provided for the control device is applied, the authentication control device that is operating normally allows the engine of the work machine to operate and the authentication control device fails in a situation where the engine is started. When the normal operation detection means of the work machine control device does not detect the normal operation of the authentication control device, an emergency from the man-machine interface of the work machine control device occurs. Regardless of whether or not the identification information is input, a signal that allows the operation of the engine is output from the emergency limit release means of the work machine control device according to a command from the restriction release state continuation means of the work machine control device. Therefore, it becomes possible to maintain the operating state of the engine once started.
Therefore, even if the authentication control device breaks down while the work machine is traveling or working, the engine will not stop carelessly and the shift lever will not be locked. Guaranteed.

In addition, when a signal that allows the engine to operate is received, a shift lever relay that allows manual operation of the shift lever and select lever of the transmission provided on the power transmission system of the engine, and the shift lever and select lever are in the neutral position and parking. If the engine operation limiting means is constituted by a neutral relay that allows the application of drive power from the engine starting power source to the engine starting motor when receiving a signal that allows the engine to operate in the position, the shift lever The relay receives a signal that allows the engine to operate, and allows manual operation of the shift lever and select lever of the transmission, and the shift lever and select lever that are allowed to operate manually are manually operated by the driver. That in a state of being moved to Le position or parking position, it can be an essential requirement for the application of driving power from the engine start power supply to the engine starting motor.
Although it may be possible to energize the part by improperly operating the neutral relay and bypassing the upstream and downstream sides of the neutral relay, the shift lever relay should be used as long as it does not receive a signal that allows the engine to operate. Does not allow manual operation of the shift lever and select lever, so if the initial position of the shift lever or select lever of the left working machine is in the neutral position or parking position, the engine can be started. However, since the shift lever and the select lever cannot be moved to the driving position, the work machine cannot be driven.
Also, if the initial position of the shift lever or select lever of the left working machine is in the driving position, the shift lever or select lever cannot be moved to the neutral position or parking position. Is prohibited.
Therefore, even if the neutral relay is tampered with and the upstream side and the downstream side of the neutral relay are bypassed, the work implement cannot be run.
Therefore, compared with the conventional antitheft device with a work history storage function that relies on only the neutral relay to prevent the work machine from being stolen, the safety against theft itself is improved.

It is the functional block diagram shown about the outline of the structure of the antitheft device with a work history preservation | save function of one Embodiment to which this invention is applied. It is the system block diagram which showed an example about the Example which further actualized the structure of the antitheft device with a work history preservation | save function of the embodiment. It is the flowchart which showed the outline | summary of the process of the microprocessor of the control apparatus for authentication which functions as a restriction | limiting cancellation | release means and a work history writing means. It is the continuation of the flowchart which showed the outline of the process of the microprocessor of the control apparatus for authentication. It is the continuation of the flowchart which showed the outline of the process of the microprocessor of the control apparatus for authentication. It is the continuation of the flowchart which showed the outline of the process of the microprocessor of the control apparatus for authentication. It is the flowchart which showed the outline | summary of the process of the microprocessor of the control apparatus for work machines which functions as a normal operation | movement detection means, an emergency restriction release means, an operation state detection means, and a restriction release state continuation means.

  Next, an embodiment for carrying out the antitheft device with work history storage function of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a functional block diagram showing an outline of the configuration of an antitheft device 1 with a work history storage function according to an embodiment to which the present invention is applied.

  The main parts of the anti-theft device 1 with work history storage function are roughly composed of a work machine control device A, an authentication control device B connected to the work machine control device A so as to be able to transmit information, and a work machine. The engine operation restriction means C that operates in response to signals X1 and X2 that allow the operation of the engine F from the control device A and the authentication control device B, and the work machine equipped with the antitheft device 1 with the work history storage function It is constituted by a portable data storage medium D provided with a data storage area for storing at least a part of the identification information of the driver who permits driving and the work history of the work implement.

  The authentication control device B includes a machine-machine interface E for connecting to the data storage medium D so that information can be transmitted, and the driver identification information X3 from the data storage medium D via the machine-machine interface E. The driver identification information X3 read from the data storage medium D is compared with the driver identification information pre-registered in the driver, and a signal X2 that allows the engine F to operate only when the two coincide with each other. The restriction release means g output to the engine operation restriction means C and at least a part X4 of the work history stored in the work machine control device A are determined at a predetermined timing, for example, the timing of turning off the engine start switch. Work resume that is read from the work machine controller A and stored in the data storage medium D via the machine-machine interface E It has the means h.

  The authentication control device B includes a microprocessor 2 for arithmetic processing, a ROM storing a control program for the microprocessor 2, a RAM used for temporary storage of arithmetic data, and reading and writing for storing various data and parameters. A memory unit 3 having a possible non-volatile memory is provided, and the functions of the restriction releasing means g and the work history writing means h are realized by the microprocessor 2 of the authentication control device B and its control program. ing.

  In the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3, a number of drivers' identification information permitting the operation of the work machine to which the anti-theft device 1 with the work history storage function is attached is registered in advance. The microprocessor 2 functioning as g reads the driver identification information X3 read from the data storage medium D via the machine-machine interface E and displays the driver's identification information X3 registered in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3 in advance. Compared with all of the identification information, only when any of the identification information registered in advance does not match the identification information of the driver read from the data storage medium D, the determination of mismatch is made.

Further, the microprocessor 2 of the authentication control device B has a self-diagnosis function for diagnosing whether or not there is a failure in the restriction releasing means g, the work history writing means h, and the machine / machine interface E. If there is not, an operation confirmation signal X5 signifying that there is no abnormality is transmitted to the work machine control device A at predetermined intervals.
Further, in this embodiment, the microprocessor 2 of the authentication control device B constantly monitors the operating state of the engine F, and when the operating state of the engine F changes, the microprocessor 2 stores the memory unit. The value 0 or 1 indicating the operation state of the engine F is updated and set in the operation state confirmation flag F1 configured using a part of the storage area of the RAM 3. The value 0 is a value indicating that the engine F is stopped, and the value 1 is a value indicating that the engine F is operating.
Further, the microprocessor 2 of the authentication control device B refers to the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 and determines the current value of the operation state confirmation flag F1, that is, the operation state of the engine F together with the above-described operation confirmation signal. Send to.

The work machine control device A reads information detected by the sensor group I installed in each part of the work machine to which the work anti-theft device 1 with work history storage function is attached, and uses it as a work history in the same manner as before. save.
For example, if the work implement is a crane truck, the information detected by the sensor group I includes information such as the lifting load, the boom length at that time, the boom angle, the boom working radius, and the operation history of the overload prevention device. It is various information necessary for preparation of daily work reports.

  In the working machine control device A in this embodiment, the normal operation detecting means j for detecting the normal operation of the authentication control device B and the normal operation detecting means j do not detect the normal operation of the authentication control device B. Only when the emergency identification information X6 input from the man-machine interface K of the work machine control device A is compared with the emergency identification information pre-registered with itself, and the two match. The emergency limit canceling means m for outputting the signal X1 permitting the operation of the engine F to the engine operation restricting means C, the operating state detecting means n for detecting whether the engine F is operating, and the operating state detecting means n are the engine Emergency identification information from the man-machine interface K when the normal operation detecting means j no longer detects the normal operation of the authentication control device B under the situation where the operation of F is detected. It comprises a restriction release state continuation means p from emergency limit release means m regardless of the presence or absence of an input to output the signal X1 to permit operation of the engine F.

  The work machine control apparatus A stores a microprocessor 4 for arithmetic processing, a ROM storing a control program for the microprocessor 4, a RAM used for temporary storage of arithmetic data, and various data and parameters. A memory unit 5 having a readable / writable nonvolatile memory or the like is provided, and the functions of the normal operation detecting means j, the emergency restriction releasing means m, the operation state detecting means n, and the restriction releasing state continuation means p It is realized by the microprocessor 4 of A and its control program.

  The microprocessor 4 functioning as the normal operation detecting means j constantly monitors whether or not the operation confirmation signal X5 is inputted from the authentication control device B, and the time when the input of the operation confirmation signal X5 is interrupted. Thus, it is determined that a failure has occurred in the restriction release means g, the work history writing means h, or the machine-machine interface E of the authentication control device B.

  In the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5, emergency identification information unique to the antitheft device with work history storage function 1 is registered in advance, and the microprocessor 4 functioning as the emergency restriction releasing means m -Compare the emergency identification information X6 input by the driver at that time via the machine interface K with the emergency identification information registered in advance in the non-volatile memory. Make a decision. The emergency identification information registered in advance in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5 is basically one.

  The microprocessor 4 functioning as the operation state detection means n constantly monitors the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 transmitted from the authentication control device B, and detects the presence or absence of the operation of the engine F with reference to this value. To do. That is, the engine F is stopped under the situation where the value 0 is sent as the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1, and the engine F is under the situation where the value 1 is sent as the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1. Is determined to be operating.

  Information detected by the sensor group I is sequentially stored in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5 as the work history of the working machine via the microprocessor 4. Since the acquisition and storage of the work history is already known, a detailed description is not given here.

  When a command requesting the download of work history is input from the authentication control device B, the microprocessor 4 reads the work history from the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5 and uses this work history X4 as the authentication control device. To B's work history writing means h.

  FIG. 2 is a system block diagram showing an example of an example in which the configuration of the antitheft device 1 with a work history storage function of the embodiment is embodied.

  In this embodiment, a contact type IC card 6 (hereinafter referred to as an operation card 6) is adopted as a portable data storage medium D for storing the identification information of the driver and the work history of the work machine. The control device B is composed of the IC card controller 8 and the machine / machine interface E is composed of the IC card reader & writer 7. The combination of the portable data storage medium D and the machine / machine interface E For example, in addition to a combination of a normal contact IC card 6 and an IC card reader & writer 7, for example, a combination of a non-contact IC card and a short-range wireless communication interface, a magnetic card and a magnetic head card read & write A combination of writers may be used.

The system card 9 is constituted by a contact type IC card that can be connected to the IC card reader & writer 7 of the IC card controller 8 that functions as the authentication control device B, and identification information of the driver that permits the operation of the work machine. Is newly registered in the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3 in the IC card controller 8 or the identification information of the driver who has lost the qualification to operate the working machine is deleted from the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3 in the IC card controller 8 It is used as an authentication means when doing so.
In this embodiment, authentication information for determining the authenticity of the system card 9 is stored in the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3 in the IC card controller 8 in addition to the identification information of some drivers who permit the operation of the work machine. Registered in advance.
Further, the IC card controller 8 includes several LEDs on the panel for visually displaying the status of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B and the status of internal processing to the driver.

In this embodiment, the man-machine interface K of the work machine control device A is constituted by a normal manual data input device 10 having a numeric keypad. In addition, the configuration of the man-machine interface K is not particularly limited as long as a combination of existing numbers, letters, symbols, codes, and the like can be input to the work machine control device A, but those related to biometric authentication, For example, it is not suitable to input data such as a fingerprint, a palm shape, a retina, an iris pattern, and a face recognition.
The reason for this is that an unexpected third party may be used as a driver when moving the work equipment during an emergency evacuation. This is because the emergency identification information X6 needs to be input to A.

  Further, the engine operation restricting means C in this embodiment receives the signal X2 for permitting the operation of the engine F from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B or the engine from the work machine control device A. A shift lever relay 11 that allows manual operation of a shift lever (not shown) of a transmission (not shown) provided on the power transmission path of the engine F when receiving a signal X1 for allowing the operation of F When the signal X2 for permitting the operation of the engine F is received from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B in a state where the shift lever is at the neutral position, or the engine F from the work implement control device A When the signal X1 for permitting the operation of the engine is received, the engine starting motor is supplied from the engine starting power source 12. Constituted by the neutral relay 14 to allow the application of drive power to 13.

More specifically, the signal X2 shown in the functional block diagram of FIG. 1, that is, the signal X2 output to allow the operation of the engine F from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B is shown in FIG. 2 corresponds to the relay drive current X2a output from the output circuit of the IC card controller 8, and when the relay drive current X2a is applied from the IC card controller 8 to the shift lever relay 11, the shift lever relay 11 is closed and the shift lever is closed. The manual operation is allowed. In this state, when the shift lever is in the neutral position, that is, only when the position switch SW1 for detecting the neutral position of the shift lever is closed, the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V is the shift lever relay. 11 and the position switch SW1 are applied to the input side terminal of the neutral relay 14, and the neutral relay 14 is closed. At this time, the input / output circuit is switched inside the IC card controller 8 so that the line L1 connecting the other terminal of the neutral relay 14 and the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 functions as a ground line. In this state, when the engine start switch SW2 is further operated by the driver, the start signal output from the engine start switch SW2 is input to the engine start power source 12 via the neutral relay 14 in the closed state, and the engine start is started. The engine starting motor 13 is actuated by the drive current from the power source 12 to start the engine F.
Further, the signal X1 shown in the functional block diagram of FIG. 1, that is, the signal X1 output from the work implement control device A to allow the operation of the engine F is output from the work implement control device A in FIG. When the relay drive current X1a is applied from the work implement control device A to the shift lever relay 11, the shift lever relay 11 is closed, and the shift lever is manually operated. Become. In this state, when the shift lever is in the neutral position, that is, only when the position switch SW1 for detecting the neutral position of the shift lever is closed, the drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V is changed to the shift lever relay 11. Is applied to the terminal on the input side of the neutral relay 14 via the position switch SW1, and the neutral relay 14 is closed. At this time, the switching operation of the input / output circuit is performed inside the work implement control apparatus A so that the line L2 connecting the other terminal of the neutral relay 14 and the work implement control apparatus A functions as a ground line. In this state, when the engine start switch SW2 is further operated by the driver, the start signal output from the engine start switch SW2 is input to the engine start power source 12 via the neutral relay 14 in the closed state, and the engine start is started. The engine starting motor 13 is actuated by the drive current from the power source 12 to start the engine F.

  Therefore, the manual operation of the shift lever of the transmission is permitted by the shift lever relay 11 because the signal X2 (relay that is output to allow the operation of the engine F from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B) is relayed. Only when the driving current X2a) is input or when the signal X1 (relay driving current X1a) output to allow the operation of the engine F from the work machine control device A is input. The application of drive power from the engine starting power supply 12 to the engine starting motor 13 is permitted because the shift lever is in the neutral position and the position switch SW1 is closed, and the operation of the engine F from the IC card controller 8 is permitted. Signal X2 (relay drive current X If the signal output from a) or the working machine controller A to permit operation of the engine F X1 (relay drive current X1a) is input only.

Here, the description is made on the assumption that the transmission of the work implement is a manual, but the transmission of the work implement may be automatic.
If the shift lever is replaced with a selector lever and the neutral position is replaced with a parking position, the above configuration can be applied to an automatic transmission as it is.

  3 to 6 are flowcharts showing an outline of the processing of the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the restriction releasing means g and the work history writing means h, and FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an outline of main processes of the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A that functions as the restriction release means m, the operation state detection means n, and the restriction release state continuation means p.

  Next, processing operations of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B and the work machine control device A will be specifically described with reference to FIGS.

  When the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B is turned on, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 starts processing according to the control program stored in the memory unit 3 of the IC card controller 8 First, it is determined whether or not the operation card 6 or the system card 9 functioning as the data storage medium D is inserted into the IC card reader & writer 7 functioning as the machine / machine interface E (step a1 in FIG. 3). ) If no card is inserted in the IC card reader & writer 7, only the determination processing in step a1 is repeatedly executed to enter a standby state waiting for any card to be inserted.

Similarly to the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A also has the memory unit 5 of the work machine control device A when the power is supplied to the work machine control device A. The process according to the control program stored in is started, and first, the value of the alternative process confirmation flag F2 is initialized to 0 (step b1 in FIG. 7).
The alternative process confirmation flag F2 is a flag configured by using a part of the storage area of the RAM of the memory unit 5 in the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B. When the value is 1, Indicates that the work machine control device A is executing processing for allowing the operation of the engine F in place of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B, and when the value is 0, This indicates that the work machine control device A is not executing processing in place of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B.

  Next, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A determines whether or not the value 1 is set in the substitute process confirmation flag F2 (step b2). Since the value is 0 and the determination result is inevitably false, the microprocessor 4 further determines whether or not the operation confirmation signal X5 is transmitted from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B. Is determined (step b3).

  At this stage, since the operation card 6 and the system card 9 are not yet inserted into the IC card reader & writer 7 of the IC card controller 8 that still functions as the authentication control device B, the substantial processing operation on the IC card controller 8 side is as follows. The operation check signal X5 is not transmitted from the IC card controller 8 since it has not started.

Therefore, the determination result of step b3 is inevitably false, and the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A further indicates a value indicating the operating state of the engine F in the operating state confirmation flag F1 ′ indicating the operating state of the engine F. It is determined whether 1 is set (step b4).
The operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is a flag configured by using a part of the storage area of the RAM of the memory unit 5 in the work machine control apparatus A, and the operation confirmation signal X5 from the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8. The flag is set by the microprocessor 4 with reference to the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 transmitted to the work machine control device A (see step b17), and this value is used when the work machine control device A is shut down. In addition, it is automatically initialized to 0 by the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A (see step b16).

  Therefore, immediately after the power is turned on, the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 'is held at the initial value 0, and the determination result in step b4 is necessarily false.

  Therefore, the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A further receives emergency identification information X6 (password) by manual operation from the manual data input device 10 that functions as the man-machine interface K of the work implement control apparatus A. It is determined whether or not it has been input (step b5), and if the emergency identification information X6 (password) is not input, only the determination processing of step b2 to step b5 is repeatedly executed and the process waits. Become.

  Under special circumstances such as the driver losing the operation card 6 that functions as the portable data storage medium D, the driver can use the process of step b6 to obtain appropriate emergency identification information. The engine F of the work implement can be started by inputting X6 (password) to the work implement control device A via the manual data input device 10, but such a situation frequently occurs. Since it is not a thing, the description about operation, such as a case where a driver | operator loses the driving card 6, will be turned later, and here, processing operation in a normal state will be described first.

  Now, while the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B repeatedly executes only the determination processing at step a1 in FIG. 6 and the system card 9 are inserted into the IC card reader & writer 7, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 detects this operation in the determination process of step a1 (step a1), and indicates the stop state of the engine F. The represented value 0 is initially set in the operation state confirmation flag F1 (step a2), the red LED installed on the panel of the IC card controller 8 is blinked to indicate that the card has been inserted. (Step a3).

  Next, the microprocessor 2 self-diagnoses the presence / absence of an abnormality in the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B and the IC card reader / writer 7 functioning as the machine / machine interface E (step a4), It is determined whether or not there is a failure (step a5).

  If a failure is not detected in the IC card controller 8 or the IC card reader / writer 7 and the determination result in step a5 is false, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 is installed on the panel of the IC card controller 8. The red LED is turned off to indicate to the driver or administrator that the IC card controller 8 or IC card reader & writer 7 has no fault (step a6), and the IC card controller 8 or IC card reader & writer 7 The operation confirmation signal X5 indicating normal operation and the current value of the operation state confirmation flag F1, that is, the value indicating the operation state of the engine F are transmitted to the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A at predetermined intervals. Is started (step a7).

  On the other hand, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control apparatus A that repeatedly executes only the determination process of step b2 to step b5 performs the operation confirmation signal X5 from the IC card controller 8 and the operation in the determination process of step b3 of FIG. By detecting the input of the current value of the state confirmation flag F1 and referring to the value of the transmitted operation state confirmation flag F1, a part of the storage area of the RAM of the memory unit 5 of the work machine control device A is used. The value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ configured as described above is updated in accordance with the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 (step b17).

At this stage, the engine F is not started, and the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 transmitted from the IC card controller 8 to the work implement control device A is 0. Therefore, the work implement control device A side The value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is also 0, but when the engine F is started, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B updates the value 1 to the operation state confirmation flag F1. After that, since the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 transmitted from the IC card controller 8 to the work machine control device A is 1, the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ on the work machine control device A side is also set. In conjunction with this, the setting is updated from 0 to 1. Therefore, unless a failure occurs in the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B, the control of the work device control device A is performed. The processor 4 repeatedly executes only the determination processing of step b2 to step b5 at the time before the substantial processing operation on the IC card controller 8 side is started and before the transmission of the operation confirmation signal X5 and the operation state confirmation flag F1 starts. In addition, at the time point after the substantial processing operation on the IC card controller 8 side is started and the transmission of the operation confirmation signal X5 and the operation state confirmation flag F1 is started, the determination process of step b2 to step b3 and the step b17 Only the update process of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is repeatedly executed.
Further, when a failure occurs in the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B, transmission processing of the operation confirmation signal X5 and the operation state confirmation flag F1 from the IC card controller 8 to the work machine control device A is performed. Therefore, the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ on the work machine control device A side holds the same value as the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 immediately before the failure of the IC card controller 8. Will be.

  Next, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 determines whether or not the operation card 6 or the system card 9 is inserted in the IC card reader / writer 7 that functions as the machine-machine interface E. (Step a8 in FIG. 3) If the inserted state of the card is maintained, first, information on this card is referred to (Step a9), and it is determined whether or not this card is the system card 9 (Step S9). a10).

  If the inserted card is not the system card 9 but the operation card 6, the microprocessor 2 functioning as the restriction release means g in the IC card controller 8 serving as the authentication control device B uses the IC card reader & writer 7. The driver's identification information X3 is read from the driving card 6 and the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3 is searched based on the identification information X3 (step a11), and is registered in advance in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3 It is determined whether or not any of the identification information present matches the identification information X3 read this time, that is, whether or not the driver holding the operation card 6 is permitted as an appropriate driver of the work implement. (Step a12).

  Here, the identification information X3 of the operation card 6 inserted this time is pre-registered in the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3, that is, the driver possessing the operation card 6 is an appropriate driver of the work implement. When the microprocessor 2 that functions as the restriction release means g in the IC card controller 8 serving as the authentication control device B is detected from the output circuit of the IC card controller 8, the relay drive current X2a (see FIG. 2), and an input / output circuit switching operation is performed inside the IC card controller 8 to connect the other terminal of the neutral relay 14 and the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 (see FIG. 2). ) Function as a ground line (step a13).

  Thus, when the relay drive current X2a is applied from the IC card controller 8 to the shift lever relay 11, the shift lever relay 11 constituting a part of the engine operation restricting means C is closed, and the manual operation of the shift lever is allowed. It becomes a state.

  Next, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 turns on the green LED installed on the panel of the IC card controller 8 to indicate to the driver that the engine F can be started (step a14). It is determined whether or not a value 0 indicating the stop state of the engine F is set in an operation state confirmation flag F1 configured using a part of the storage area of the RAM of the unit 3 (step a15).

  At this time, since the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 is held at the initialized value 0, the determination result in step a15 is true.

  Therefore, the microprocessor 2 further moves the neutral position of the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V via the shift lever relay 11 and the position switch SW1 by positioning the shift lever in the neutral position and closing the position switch SW1. An operation to be applied to a terminal on the input side of the relay 14, that is, an operation to close the neutral relay 14 constituting the other part of the engine operation restriction means C, and a start signal from the engine start switch SW2 to send from the engine start power source 12 It is determined whether or not an operation for applying the drive current to the engine starting motor 13 is performed by the driver (step a16).

  If the operation by the driver is not performed, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 waits for the operation by the driver while repeatedly executing the processing of step a7 to step a16 in the same manner as described above.

  Then, the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V is supplied to the input terminal of the neutral relay 14 via the shift lever relay 11 and the position switch SW1 by closing the position switch SW1 by positioning the shift lever at the neutral position. , That is, an operation for closing the neutral relay 14 constituting the other part of the engine operation restricting means C, and a start signal is sent from the engine start switch SW2 to drive the drive current from the engine start power source 12 to the engine start motor. When an operation to be applied to the driver 13 is executed by the driver, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 detects this operation in the determination process at step a16, and further, based on a change in the drive current of the engine starting motor 13, and the like. And start engine F After (Step a17), the engine F the operating state confirmation flag F1 indicating the operating state of the engine F is set to value 1 indicating that it is operating (step a18).

  Next, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 confirms the operation state of the engine start switch SW2 (step a19), and whether or not the engine start switch SW2 is in the operating position (so-called accessory position), that is, the engine F It is determined whether or not the operating state continues (step a20).

  When the continuous operation state of the engine F is confirmed, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 receives an operation confirmation signal X5 indicating that the IC card controller 8 and the IC card reader / writer 7 are operating normally. The current value 1 of the operation state confirmation flag F1 is transmitted to the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A (step a7). After the processing of steps a8 to a14 is executed in the same manner as described above, the operation state confirmation flag F1 It is determined whether or not the value 0 representing the stop state of the engine F is set in (step a15).

  At this time, since the value 1 representing the operating state of the engine F has already been set in the operation state confirmation flag F1, the determination result of step a15 is false, the processing of step a16 to step a18 is not executed, and step a15 Subsequent to the determination process of step a19 to step a20, the process is executed.

  Therefore, if the engine F is allowed to start by inserting the appropriate operation card 6, a failure occurs in the IC card controller 8 and the operation confirmation signal X5 or the operation state confirmation flag to the work machine control device A is detected. It is impossible to transmit the current value of F1 (see step a7), the operation card 6 being inserted is pulled out (see step a8), or the operation of the engine F is activated by operating the engine start switch SW2. Unless stopped (see step a20), the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 repeatedly executes only the processing of step a7 to step a15 and step a19 to step a20.

  After the engine F is started, the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A receives signals from the sensor group I installed in each part of the work implement and detects the operation status of each work implement unit, and at predetermined intervals or Each time an additional device such as a boom is operated, data that is the basis of the work history is extracted. These data, for example, lifting load, boom length at that time, boom angle, boom working radius, and overload prevention device Although the operation status and the like are sequentially stored in time series in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5 in correspondence with the time including the date, the processing related to the acquisition and storage of the work history is already known. In particular, it is not shown in the flowchart.

  On the other hand, in the determination process of step a10 that is executed first after the card is inserted, that is, the determination process of step a10 that is executed through the process of steps a1 to a9, it is determined that the card being inserted is the system card 9. In such a case, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 first reads the authentication information for determining the authenticity of the system card 9 from the inserted system card 9 via the IC card reader & writer 7. (Step a23), it is determined whether or not the authentication information matches the authentication information registered in advance in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3 in the IC card controller 8 (Step a24).

  If the authentication information matches and it is determined that the system card 9 is appropriate, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 replaces the blue and green LEDs installed on the panel of the IC card controller 8 with each other. Alternately flashing, the driver identification information allowing the operation of the work machine is newly registered in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3, or the identification information of the driver who has lost the qualification to operate the work machine is stored in the memory unit. 3 indicates that the processing for deleting from the non-volatile memory 3 is permitted (step a25), and the IC card controller 8 is driven to eject the system card 9 once (step a25). a26) A set time such as 5 seconds is set to a timer for limiting the waiting time for waiting for insertion of the operation card 6 to be newly registered or deregistered. To start (step a27).

  Next, the microprocessor 2 determines whether or not the set time of the timer has passed (step a28). If the set time of the timer has not passed, the operation card 6 is further loaded into the IC card reader / writer 7. It is determined whether or not it has been inserted (step a29).

  Hereinafter, the microprocessor 2 detects that the set time of the timer has elapsed in the determination process in step a28, or detects the insertion of the operation card 6 into the IC card reader & writer 7 in the determination process in step a29. In the meantime, the determination process of step a28 to step a29 is repeatedly executed to wait for the operation card 6 to be inserted into the IC card reader & writer 7.

  If the insertion of the driving card 6 is detected before the passage of the set time of the timer is detected, that is, the determination result in step a29 is true, and the driving card 6 is inserted within a predetermined time. If it has become clear, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 receives a command from the driver or administrator based on the operating state of the key switch installed on the front panel of the IC card controller 8. It is determined whether the request is new registration of identification information or deletion of identification information. If the request is new registration, driver identification information is inserted from the inserted operation card 6 via the IC card reader & writer 7. Is newly written in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3 as one of the identification information of the driver who permits the operation of the work machine, while the request is registered. If it is off, the driver's identification information is read from the inserted driving card 6 through the IC card reader & writer 7, and the identification information that matches the identification information is obtained by searching the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3. Then, the corresponding identification information is deleted from the non-volatile memory of the memory unit 3 to disable the currently inserted operation card 6 (step a30).

  Next, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 determines whether or not the operation executed in the process of step a30 was related to new registration of identification information (step a31).

  If the processing of step a30 is new registration of identification information, insertion of the operation card 6 into the IC card controller 8 has already been completed at this point, and this operation card 6 is appropriate. Since this has already become clear as a result of the new registration, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 has the driver identification information X3 read from the driving card 6 in the processing of step a11 to step a12 described above. When it is determined that the card is appropriate, that is, in the same manner as when the operation card 6 in which insertion into the IC card reader & writer 7 is detected in the process of the initial step a1 is appropriate, step a13. Subsequent processing is continued and engine F is started by manual operation of the shift lever or operation of engine start switch SW2. Tolerated.

  When the process of step a30 is not a new registration of identification information but the determination result of step a31 is false, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 further performs the operation executed in the process of step a30. It is determined whether or not the identification information was deleted (step a32).

  When the process of step a30 is the deletion process of identification information, the identification information of the operation card 6 inserted in the IC card controller 8 at this time has already been deleted from the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 3, This means that the currently inserted operation card 6 is inappropriate. Therefore, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 flashes the red LED installed on the panel of the IC card controller 8 and is inappropriate. After indicating to the driver, manager, etc. that the correct operation card 6 has been inserted and that the identification information deletion process has been performed properly (step a21), the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 Output of the relay drive current X2a (see FIG. 2) from the IC card controller 8 and the switching operation of the input / output circuit within the IC card controller 8 The shift which constitutes a part of the engine operation restricting means C by releasing the function of the line L1 (see FIG. 2) connecting the other terminal of the neutral relay 14 and the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 as a ground line. After the lever relay 11 is opened and the start of the engine F is prohibited by manual operation of the shift lever or operation of the engine start switch SW2 (step a22), the process proceeds to step a19.

  Similarly to this, when it is determined that the driver identification information X3 read from the driving card 6 in step a11 to step a12 described above is inappropriate, that is, in the initial step a1, the IC card Even when the operation card 6 detected to be inserted into the lead & writer 7 is inappropriate and the determination result in step a12 is false, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 After flashing the red LED installed on the panel to indicate to the driver that an inappropriate driving card 6 has been inserted (step a21), the relay driving current X2a from the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 (FIG. 2) and the input / output circuit switching operation is performed inside the IC card controller 8 A shift lever relay that constitutes part of the engine operation restricting means C by canceling the function of the line L1 (see FIG. 2) connecting the other terminal of the relay 14 and the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 as a ground line. 11 is opened to prohibit the start of the engine F by manual operation of the shift lever or the operation of the engine start switch SW2 (step a22), and then the process proceeds to step a19.

  Therefore, if an inappropriate operation card 6 is inserted into the IC card reader / writer 7 in any way, even if the engine start switch SW2 is operated, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 Only the processing of a7 to step a12, step a21 to step a22, and step a19 to step a20 is repeatedly executed.

  In the situation where an inappropriate operation card 6 is inserted in the IC card reader / writer 7, the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V is cut off by the shift lever relay 11 in the open state, so that the shift lever relay 11 is closed to allow manual operation of the shift lever, and the relay drive current is applied to the neutral relay 14 via the shift lever relay 11 and the position switch SW1, whereby the engine is operated by operating the engine start switch SW2. F is not permitted to start.

  Here, even if the neutral relay 14 is illegally operated and the upstream side and the downstream side of the neutral relay 14 are bypassed so that the portion can be energized, the shift lever relay 11 is not closed and the manual operation of the shift lever is performed. Therefore, if the initial position of the shift lever of the left working machine is in the neutral position, the engine F can be started by the engine start switch SW2 even though it can be started. Cannot be moved to the driving position (1st speed, 2nd speed, 3rd speed,..., Reverse, etc.), so the work machine cannot be run. If the initial position was at the driving position, move the shift lever to the neutral position. It can not be, so that the start itself of the engine F is inhibited.

  Accordingly, even if the neutral relay 14 is tampered with and the upstream side and the downstream side of the neutral relay 14 are bypassed, the work machine cannot be run, and the conventional type that only relies on the neutral relay to prevent the work machine from being stolen. Compared with the anti-theft device with a work history storage function, the security against theft itself can be improved.

  Even if the set time of the timer elapses, the insertion of the driving card 6 is not detected and the determination result in step a28 is true, and the inserted system card 9 is inappropriate. If the determination result at step a24 is false, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 shifts to the process at step a7, and then repeatedly executes the processes at step a7 to step a10 and step a23 to step a24. Therefore, it is necessary to pull out the operation card 6 and the system card 9 from the IC card reader & writer 7 to finish the series of processes, and insert the operation card 6 and the system card 9 again.

  Further, when the engine F is started in an appropriate procedure by the processing of the steps a1 to a18 already described, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 does not stop the operation of the engine F by the operation of the engine start switch SW2. When the operation of step a7 to step a15 and step a19 to step a20 is repeatedly executed and the manual operation of the shift lever is allowed, the operation card 6 being inserted is pulled out during this time. This operation is detected by the determination process in step a8.

  When the withdrawal of the operation card 6 is detected, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 repeatedly executes the processing of step a7 to step a8 and step a19 to step a20. During this time, the card type determination (step a9 to step a10), determination of identification information (step a11 to step a12), processing relating to prohibition of energization to the shift lever relay 11 (step a21 to step a22), etc. are all skipped. The state at the time when the shift lever operation and the engine F start operation are first permitted by an appropriate procedure according to the processing, that is, the relay drive current X2a (see FIG. 2) is output from the output circuit of the IC card controller 8, and is neutral. The other terminal of the relay 14 and the IC card controller 8 Since the state where the line L1 (see FIG. 2) connecting to the output circuit of FIG. 2 functions as a ground line continues to be maintained, the operation card 6 may be pulled out during the operation of the work machine or during the operation. Even if it comes off, the engine F will not stop carelessly and the shift lever will not be locked, ensuring the safety of traveling and the safety of work.

  When the operation card 6 is pulled out from the IC card reader / writer 7 after the engine F is started, in addition to processing related to card type determination, identification information determination, and energization prohibition to the shift lever relay 11, the engine Since the processing of step a16 to step a17 required for starting F is also not executed, when the engine F is stopped with the operation card 6 pulled out, the IC card lead is again read. It is necessary to insert an appropriate operation card 6 into the & writer 7 and restart the engine F according to the initial procedure.

  In some cases, the engine F is started by an appropriate procedure according to the processing of steps a1 to a18 already described, and the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 performs the processing of steps a7 to a15 and steps a19 to a20. There is a possibility that a failure occurs in the IC card controller 8 itself during repeated execution.

In such a case, the operation confirmation signal X5 and the operation state confirmation flag F1 cannot be transmitted from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B to the work implement control device A. Therefore, the determination process in steps b2 to b3 is performed. The microprocessor 4 of the work machine control apparatus A that repeatedly executes only the update process of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ in step b17 performs the operation from the IC card controller 8 in the determination process in step b3 (see FIG. 7). The disappearance of the confirmation signal X5 is detected.
At this time, since the engine F has already been started, the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 on the IC card controller 8 side is 1, and the operation state confirmation flag F1 on the work machine control device A side. The value of 'is also updated to a value 1 reflecting the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 by the process of step b17 immediately before the failure occurs in the IC card controller 8.

  In this way, when the microprocessor 4 functioning as the normal operation detecting means j of the work machine control device A does not detect the normal operation of the IC card controller 8, and the determination result in step b3 is false, the operation state detecting means. The microprocessor 4 functioning as n refers to the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′, and determines whether or not the failure detection of the IC card controller 8 in step b3 occurs during the operation of the engine F ( Step b4).

  When the determination result of step b4 becomes true, the microprocessor 4 functioning as the restriction release state continuation means p is in a state where the normal operation detection means j is in a situation where the operation state detection means n detects the operation of the engine F. Regardless of whether or not there is an input operation from the manual data input device 10 that functions as the man-machine interface K, assuming that the normal operation of the IC card controller 8 as the authentication control device B is no longer detected. The processing of step b9 that functions as an emergency limit canceling means m according to the conditions is started to start the output of the relay drive current X1a (see FIG. 2) from the work implement control device A, and the work implement control device A The line L2 (see FIG. 2) connecting the other terminal of the neutral relay 14 and the work equipment control device A is switched to the ground. To function as a (Step b9).

  Next, the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A determines whether or not the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is set to 0, that is, whether or not the engine F is operating (step b10). At this time, since the value 1 is already set in the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′, the determination result in step b10 is false.

  Therefore, the microprocessor 4 substitutes the value 1 indicating that the work machine control device A is executing the process allowing the operation of the engine F in place of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B. The confirmation flag F2 is set (step b13), and it is determined whether or not the engine start switch SW2 is in the operating position (so-called accessory position) (step b14).

  When the engine start switch SW2 is in the operating position and the continuous operation state of the engine F is confirmed, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A further sets a value 1 to the alternative process confirmation flag F2. Whether or not (step b2) is determined, but as a result of the value 1 being set in the alternative process confirmation flag F2 in the process of step b13 in the immediately preceding process cycle, the determination result of step b2 is necessarily true.

  Therefore, from now on, unless the operation of the engine F is stopped by the operation of the engine start switch SW2 (see step b14), the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A repeatedly executes only the determination processing of step b2 and step b14. Then, the output state of the relay drive current X1a (see FIG. 2) from the work machine control device A and the state in which the line L2 (see FIG. 2) from the work machine control device A functions as a ground line are held. To do.

  In this way, the relay drive current X1a from the work machine controller A instead of the relay drive current X2a from the IC card controller 8 is continuously applied to the shift lever relay 11, and the ground line L1 from the IC card controller 8 is applied. Since the line L2 from the work machine control device A instead of the above continues to function as a ground line, even if a failure occurs in the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B during the operation of the engine F, The closed state of the shift lever relay 11 constituting a part of the engine operation restricting means C and the allowable state of manual operation of the shift lever are continuously maintained.

  Therefore, even if the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B is operating during the operation of the work machine or in the middle of the work, the engine F is inadvertently stopped or the shift lever is locked. The safety of driving and the safety of work are guaranteed.

  In this way, even when the engine F is stopped in a situation where the work machine control device A is executing a process allowing the operation of the engine F instead of the IC card controller 8, the IC card controller 8 is As in the case of executing the processing that allows the operation of the engine F, the processing of step b11 to step b12 required for starting the engine F is not executed, so the engine F is stopped for some reason. Needs to re-enter emergency identification information X6 (password) from the manual data input device 10 and restart the engine F in accordance with the initial procedure.

  In addition, when the driver loses the operation card 6 that functions as the portable data storage medium D, the operator wants to move the work machine to the repair shop, or the original driver is not present at the time of emergency evacuation, etc. The IC card controller 8 that functions as the control device B for authentication or the IC card reader & writer 7 that functions as the machine / machine interface E is used from the beginning to move the work machine to a safe place. If a special situation occurs, such as when you want to move the work machine to a repair shop under a faulty situation, as described above, use the process of step b6 (see FIG. 7) or the driver The agent inputs the appropriate emergency identification information X6 (password) from the manual data input device 10 to the work implement control device A, so that the engine F of the work implement is It can be a moving state.

  However, in this case, the driver or his / her representative can refer to the work manual stored in the office where the work equipment is deployed, or communicate with the work equipment manufacturer by telephone, wireless communication, or email. It is necessary to obtain emergency identification information X6 (password) corresponding to the working machine in advance by some means such as.

  An IC that functions as a machine / machine interface E in the first place when the driver has lost the driving card 6 or when the agent who is not the original driver tries to operate the work machine Since an appropriate operation card 6 cannot be inserted into the card reader / writer 7 itself, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B repeats only the determination process of step a1 (see FIG. 3). In the situation where the IC card controller 8 or the IC card reader / writer 7 has failed from the beginning, even if the appropriate operation card 6 is inserted into the IC card reader / writer 7, the IC Since the card controller 8 itself does not start, it functions as the authentication control device B in any case. C card controller 8 operation confirmation signal X5 and the operating status confirmation flag F1 to the working machine controller A from will not be sent.

  Even in such a situation, the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A starts processing according to the control program stored in the memory unit 5 of the work implement control apparatus A when the power is turned on. Then, the value of the alternative process confirmation flag F2 is initialized to 0 (step b1 in FIG. 7).

  Next, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A determines whether or not the value 1 is set in the substitute process confirmation flag F2 (step b2). The value is 0, and the determination result is necessarily false.

  Therefore, the microprocessor 4 further determines whether or not the operation confirmation signal X5 is transmitted from the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B (step b3).

  In this case, the operation confirmation signal X5 cannot be input from the IC card controller 8 because of the absence of the operation card 6 or the failure of the IC card controller 8 or the IC card reader / writer 7.

  Therefore, the determination result of step b3 is inevitably false, and the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control apparatus A further determines whether or not the value 1 is set in the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ (step b4). ).

The operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is a flag configured by using a part of the storage area of the RAM of the memory unit 5 in the work machine control apparatus A, and the value is set when the work machine control apparatus A is shut down. In addition, it is automatically initialized to 0 by the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A (see step b16).
Therefore, immediately after the power is turned on, the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is held at the initial value 0, and the determination result in step b4 is necessarily false.

  Therefore, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A further receives emergency identification information X6 (password) from the manual data input device 10 functioning as the man-machine interface K by the driver or his / her agent. It is determined whether or not it has been input (step b5), and if the emergency identification information X6 (password) has not been input, only the determination processing of step b2 to step b5 is repeatedly executed, and the process stands by.

  In this way, the manual data input device 10 in which the driver or its agent functions as the man-machine interface K of the work machine control device A while only the determination processing of step b2 to step b5 is repeatedly executed. Is manually operated to input emergency identification information X6 (password), the microprocessor 4 functioning as the emergency restriction release means m of the work machine control device A performs emergency identification information by manual input in the process of step b5. The value of X6 (password) is read and temporarily stored in the buffer (step b6), and the emergency identification information X6 inputted with the emergency identification information of the working machine registered in advance in the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5 (Password) is compared (step b7), and a match / mismatch is determined (step b8).

  Only when the registered emergency identification information and the input emergency identification information X6 (password) match and the determination result of step b8 becomes true, the micro that functions as the emergency restriction release means m. The processor 4 starts the output of the relay drive current X1a (see FIG. 2) from the work machine control device A, and also performs a circuit switching operation inside the work machine control device A to perform the other operation of the neutral relay 14. A line L2 (see FIG. 2) connecting the terminal and the work machine control device A is caused to function as a ground line (step b9).

  When the relay drive current X1a is applied to the shift lever relay 11 from the industrial machine control device A in this way, the shift lever relay 11 constituting a part of the engine operation limiting means C is closed, and the shift lever is manually operated or The engine F is allowed to start by operating the engine start switch SW2.

  Next, the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control apparatus A determines whether or not the value 0 is set in the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ (step b10). Under this circumstance, the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ is set. Since the value is constantly held at 0, the determination result in step b10 is inevitably true, and the microprocessor 4 of the work implement control device A positions the shift lever at the neutral position and closes the position switch SW1. Thus, the operation of applying the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power supply V to the input side terminal of the neutral relay 14 via the shift lever relay 11 and the position switch SW1, that is, the other part of the engine operation restricting means C is configured. Operation to close the neutral relay 14 and the engine start switch SW2 By sending a start signal and waits until an operation for applying a driving current from the engine start power supply 12 to the engine starter motor 13 is performed by the driver or its agent (step b11).

  Then, the relay drive current supplied from the relay drive power source V is supplied to the input terminal of the neutral relay 14 via the shift lever relay 11 and the position switch SW1 by closing the position switch SW1 by positioning the shift lever at the neutral position. , That is, an operation for closing the neutral relay 14 constituting the other part of the engine operation restricting means C, and a start signal is sent from the engine start switch SW2 to drive the drive current from the engine start power source 12 to the engine start motor. When the operation to be applied to 13 is executed by the driver or his / her agent, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A detects this operation in the determination process of step b11, and further, the engine start motor 13 Engine based on changes in drive current, etc. After confirming the start of the engine (step b12), a value indicating that the work machine control device A is executing processing for allowing the operation of the engine F in place of the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B 1 is set in the alternative process confirmation flag F2 (step b13), and it is determined whether or not the engine start switch SW2 is in the operating position (so-called accessory position) (step b14).

  When the engine start switch SW2 is in the operating position and the continuous operation state of the engine F is confirmed, the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A further sets a value 1 to the alternative process confirmation flag F2. Whether or not (step b2) is determined, but as a result of the value 1 being set in the alternative process confirmation flag F2 in the process of step b13 in the immediately preceding process cycle, the determination result of step b2 is necessarily true.

  Therefore, from now on, unless the operation of the engine F is stopped by the operation of the engine start switch SW2 (see step b14), the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A repeatedly executes only the determination processing of step b2 and step b14. Then, the output state of the relay drive current X1a (see FIG. 2) from the work machine control device A and the state in which the line L2 (see FIG. 2) from the work machine control device A functions as a ground line are maintained. To do.

  In this way, the relay drive current X1a from the work machine controller A instead of the relay drive current X2a from the IC card controller 8 is continuously applied to the shift lever relay 11, and the ground line L1 from the IC card controller 8 is applied. Since the line L2 from the work machine controller A instead of the machine continues to function as a ground line, if the driver loses the operation card 6, or if the original driver is not present, the authentication controller B In any situation where the IC card controller 8 functioning as the functioning IC card controller 8 or the IC card reader & writer 7 functioning as its machine-machine interface E has failed from the beginning, appropriate emergency identification information X6 ( As long as the password is input from the manual data input device 10 of the work machine control device A, the repair shop The starting of the engine F required for mobile work of the working machine to a secure location can be carried out easily.

  When the operation of the engine F is stopped by operating the engine start switch SW2 after the use of the work machine is finished, the IC card controller 8 that functions as the authentication control device B or its machine / machine interface E functions. Under the situation where the IC card reader & writer 7 is operating normally, this operation is detected by the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 by the determination process in step a20 (see FIG. 4).

  The microprocessor 2 that has detected the off operation of the engine start switch SW2 determines whether or not the operation card 6 is inserted in the IC card reader & writer 7 (step a33 in FIG. 6), and the operation card 6 is inserted. Then, the microprocessor 2 functioning as the work history writing means h in the IC card controller 8 serving as the authentication control device B transmits a command requesting the download of the work history to the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A. The microprocessor 4 that has received this command reads the work history from the nonvolatile memory of the memory unit 5, and transmits this work history X4 to the microprocessor 2 that functions as the work history writing means h (step a34). Work history writing means h that received X4 is machine / machine interface E Via the IC card reader and writer 7 to ability, written together with identification information for identifying the working machine its contents in the data storage area of the driver card 6 (step a35).

  Finally, the microprocessor 2 of the IC card controller 8 initializes the operation state confirmation flag F1 to a value 0 indicating the stop state of the engine F (step a36), and relay drive from the output circuit of the IC card controller 8 A process for stopping the output of the current X2a is executed (step a37), and the series of processes is terminated.

The work history of the work machine written in the data storage area of the operation card 6 is read by a terminal device such as a personal computer or a work station installed in a work management office or the like and displayed on a display as a work daily report. Or as a file in the hard disk of the terminal device or other external storage device.
In addition, by analyzing the daily work report stored in the terminal device using identification information for identifying the work implement, driver identification information, time information including date, etc., the operation state and operation for each work implement are analyzed. It is also possible to grasp the work status for each person.

  On the other hand, if the IC card controller 8 that functions as the authentication control device B or the IC card reader / writer 7 that functions as the machine / machine interface E has a failure, the driver loses the operation card 6. In such a case, when the work implement is used in a situation where the original driver is not present, in short, in the situation where 1 is set as the value of the alternative process confirmation flag F2 in the work implement control device A. In other words, the turning-off operation of the engine start switch SW2 is detected by the microprocessor 4 of the work machine control device A in the determination process of step b14 (see FIG. 7).

  The microprocessor 4 that has detected the off operation of the engine start switch SW2 stops the output of the relay drive current X1a from the work machine control device A (step b15), and then sets the value of the operation state confirmation flag F1 ′ of the engine F. A value 0 representing the stop state is initialized, and the value of the substitute process confirmation flag F2 is initialized to 0 indicating the end of the substitute process replacing the IC card controller 8 functioning as the authentication control device B (step a36). Terminate the process.

  When the operation card 6 is not inserted or when the IC card controller 8 or the IC card reader & writer 7 has a failure, the process of writing the work history to the data storage area of the operation card 6 is not performed.

  A part or all of the embodiment disclosed above can be appropriately expressed by the description shown in the following supplementary notes, but the form for carrying out the invention and the technical idea of the invention are not limited to these. Absent.

[Appendix 1]
A work machine control device (A) that has a man-machine interface (K), reads information detected by a sensor group (I) installed in each part of the work machine, and stores it as a work history;
An engine operation limiting means (C) for receiving an instruction from the outside and allowing the operation of the engine (F) of the work implement;
A portable data storage medium (D) having a data storage area for storing identification information (X3) of a driver that permits operation of the work implement and at least a part of the work history (X4);
A machine-machine interface (E) for connecting to the data storage medium (D) so that information can be transmitted, and a driver from the data storage medium (D) via the machine-machine interface (E) And the driver identification information (X3) read from the data storage medium (D) is compared with the driver identification information pre-registered with the driver, and the two match. Limit release means (g) for outputting a signal (X2) permitting the operation of the engine (F) to the engine operation limit means (C), and work history stored in the work machine control device (A) At least a part (X4) of the data storage medium is read from the work machine control device (A) at a predetermined timing and the data storage medium is transmitted via the machine-machine interface (E). A work history writing means to be stored in (D) (h) authentication control device having a (B) work history storage function antitheft device provided with (1),
The work machine control device (A)
Normal operation detecting means (j) for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device (B), and when the normal operation detecting means (j) no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device (B). As long as the emergency identification information (X6) input from the man-machine interface (K) is compared with the emergency identification information pre-registered in itself, the engine (F) only if both match An antitheft device with work history storage function (1), characterized in that it comprises emergency limit release means (m) for outputting a signal (X1) permitting the operation of the engine to the engine operation restriction means (C).

[Appendix 2]
The work machine control device (A) further detects an operation state detection means (n) for detecting whether or not the engine (F) is operated, and the operation state detection means (n) is an operation of the engine (F). Emergency detection information from the man-machine interface (K) when the normal operation detection means (j) no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device (B) There is provided a restriction release state continuation means (p) for outputting a signal (X1) permitting the operation of the engine (F) from the emergency restriction release means (m) regardless of whether or not (X6) is input. The antitheft device (1) with a work history storage function according to appendix 1.
This configuration is particularly intended to prevent inadvertent stopping of the engine (F) and lock of the shift lever when a failure occurs in the authentication control device (B) while the work machine is traveling or working. Yes.

[Appendix 3]
A work machine control device (A) that has a man-machine interface (K), reads information detected by a sensor group (I) installed in each part of the work machine, and stores it as a work history;
An engine operation limiting means (C) for receiving an instruction from the outside and allowing the operation of the engine (F) of the work implement;
A portable data storage medium (D) having a data storage area for storing identification information (X3) of a driver that permits operation of the work implement and at least a part of the work history (X4);
A machine-machine interface (E) for connecting to the data storage medium (D) so that information can be transmitted, and a driver from the data storage medium (D) via the machine-machine interface (E) And the driver identification information (X3) read from the data storage medium (D) is compared with the driver identification information pre-registered with the driver, and the two match. Limit release means (g) for outputting a signal (X2) permitting the operation of the engine (F) to the engine operation limit means (C), and work history stored in the work machine control device (A) At least a part (X4) of the data storage medium is read from the work machine control device (A) at a predetermined timing and the data storage medium is transmitted via the machine-machine interface (E). A work history writing means to be stored in (D) (h) authentication control device having a (B) work history storage function antitheft device provided with (1),
By the microprocessor (4) included in the work machine control device (A),
Normal operation detecting means (j) for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device (B), and when the normal operation detecting means (j) no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device (B). As long as the emergency identification information (X6) input from the man-machine interface (K) is compared with the emergency identification information pre-registered in itself, the engine (F) only if both match An anti-theft device (1) with a work history storage function, characterized in that it comprises emergency restriction releasing means (m) for outputting a signal (X1) permitting the operation of the engine to the engine operation restricting means (C).
This configuration is particularly suitable for the authentication control device (B) using the work device control device (A) and its own microprocessor (4), which is essential for obtaining and storing the work history of the work device. A normal operation detecting means (j) and an emergency restriction releasing means (m) required for realizing the backup function are constructed, and a special additional device (hardware) for multiplexing the backup function. This is effective in reducing the cost required to construct a backup system.

[Appendix 4]
The microprocessor (4) of the work machine control device further includes an operation state detection means (n) for detecting whether the engine (F) is operated, and the operation state detection means (n) is the engine ( F) When the normal operation detecting means (j) no longer detects the normal operation of the authentication control device (B) under the situation where the operation of F) is detected, the man-machine interface (K) Regardless of whether emergency identification information (X6) is input or not, it functions as a restriction release state continuation means (p) that outputs a signal (X1) that permits operation of the engine (F) from the emergency restriction release means (m). The anti-theft device (1) with a work history storage function according to appendix 3, characterized by:
This configuration is particularly intended to prevent inadvertent stopping of the engine (F) and lock of the shift lever when a failure occurs in the authentication control device (B) while the work machine is traveling or working. Yes.
In addition, the work machine controller (A), which is indispensable for acquiring and storing the work history of the work machine, uses the microprocessor (4) of the work machine itself to stop the engine (F) inadvertently or shift lever. The operation state detection means (n) and the restriction release state continuation means (p) required to prevent the engine from being locked are constructed to prevent inadvertent engine stop (F) and shift lever lock. Therefore, there is no need to install a special additional device (hardware), which is effective in reducing the cost required to prevent the engine (F) from being stopped unintentionally or from locking the shift lever.

[Appendix 5]
When the engine operation restricting means (C) receives signals (X1a, X2a) permitting the operation of the engine (F), the shift lever and select lever of the transmission provided on the power transmission path of the engine (F) When the shift lever relay (11) allowing manual operation and a signal permitting the operation of the engine (F) in a state where the shift lever and the select lever are in the neutral position or the parking position, the engine start power source (12) receives the engine. It is comprised by the neutral relay (14) which accept | permits application of the drive electric power to a starting motor (13), It is comprised in any one of the supplementary notes 1, the supplementary notes 2, the supplementary notes 3, or the supplementary notes 4. Anti-theft device with work history storage function (1).
This configuration is particularly intended to improve the effect itself of preventing the working machine from being stolen.

[Appendix 6]
The authentication control device (B) comprises an IC card controller (8), the data storage medium (D) is constituted by an IC card (6), and the machine / machine interface (E) is an IC card reader / writer. (7)
The man-machine interface (K) includes a manual data input device (10) for inputting information other than biological information. The antitheft device (1) with a work history storage function according to any one of appendix 5.
In particular, this configuration is intended to facilitate an authentication operation when an unexpected third party is used as a driver when the work machine is moved during an emergency evacuation.

[Appendix 7]
7. The apparatus according to any one of appendix 1, appendix 2, appendix 3, appendix 4, appendix 5 or appendix 6, wherein the predetermined timing is an off operation timing of the engine start switch (SW2). Anti-theft device with work history storage function (1).
This configuration is one embodiment item, and information detected by the sensor group (I) installed in each part of the work machine is used to control the work machine control device (A), the authentication control device (B), and the machine / machine. When information is written to the data storage medium (D) in real time via the interface (E), or information detected by the sensor group (I) installed in each part of the work implement is transmitted to the work implement control device (A ) Are temporarily stored in the memory unit 5 of the authentication control device (B), and the stored data are collectively written to the data storage medium (D) via the machine-machine interface (E). There is also a case.

[Appendix 8]
A work machine control device (A) that has a man-machine interface (K), reads information detected by a sensor group (I) installed in each part of the work machine, and stores it as a work history; An engine operation restriction means (C) that accepts the command and permits the operation of the engine (F) of the work machine, identification information (X3) of the driver that allows the work machine to operate, and at least a part of the work history ( A portable data storage medium (D) having a data storage area for storing X4), and a machine-machine interface (E) for connecting to the data storage medium (D) so that information can be transmitted The anti-theft device control for controlling the anti-theft device (1) with work history storage function comprising the authentication control device (B) connected to the work machine control device (A) so as to be able to transmit information. A program,
The microprocessor (2) included in the authentication control device (B) reads the driver identification information (X3) from the data storage medium (D) and reads the driver identification information read from the data storage medium (D). (X3) is compared with the driver's identification information pre-registered with itself, and a signal (X2) that permits the operation of the engine (F) is sent to the engine operation restriction means (C) only when they match. The restriction release means (g) to output and at least a part (X4) of the work history stored in the work machine control device (A) from the work machine control device (A) at a predetermined timing. Control program for authentication controller for reading and functioning as work history writing means (h) for storing in the data storage medium (D) via the machine-machine interface (E) And no,
The microprocessor (4) included in the work machine control device (A) includes normal operation detection means (j) for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device (B), and normal operation detection means (j). Emergency identification information (X6) input from the man-machine interface (K) and emergency identification information pre-registered to itself only when normal operation of the authentication control device (B) is no longer detected And when the two coincide with each other, the signal (X1) for allowing the operation of the engine (F) is output as the emergency limit release means (m) for outputting to the engine operation restriction means (C). An anti-theft device control program comprising a work machine control device control program.
This configuration is particularly suitable for the authentication control device (B) using the work device control device (A) and its own microprocessor (4), which is essential for obtaining and storing the work history of the work device. This is for constructing a normal operation detecting means (j) and an emergency restriction releasing means (m) required for realizing the backup function, and a special additional device (hardware) for multiplexing the backup function. There is no need to install hardware), which is effective in reducing the cost required to construct a backup system.

[Appendix 9]
The control program for the work machine control device further includes a microprocessor (4) included in the work machine control device (A), and further an operation state detection means (n) for detecting whether the engine (F) is operating. And the normal operation detection means (j) detects the normal operation of the authentication control device (B) under the situation where the operation state detection means (n) detects the operation of the engine (F). A signal that permits the operation of the engine (F) from the emergency limit canceling means (m) regardless of whether or not the emergency identification information (X6) is input from the man-machine interface (K) when there is no more ( The anti-theft device control program according to appendix 8, wherein the control program is made to function as a restriction release state continuation means (p) for outputting X1).
This configuration is particularly intended to prevent inadvertent stopping of the engine (F) and lock of the shift lever when a failure occurs in the authentication control device (B) while the work machine is traveling or working. Yes.
In addition, the work machine controller (A), which is indispensable for acquiring and storing the work history of the work machine, uses the microprocessor (4) of the work machine itself to stop the engine (F) inadvertently or shift lever. The operation state detection means (n) and the restriction release state continuation means (p) necessary for preventing the lock of the engine are constructed, and the engine (F) is stopped unexpectedly or the shift lever is locked. There is no need to install a special additional device (hardware) in order to prevent the problem, and it is effective in reducing the cost required to prevent the engine (F) from being stopped carelessly and the shift lever locked.

1 Anti-theft device with work history storage function 2 Microprocessor (restriction release means, work history writing means)
3 Memory unit 4 Microprocessor (Normal operation detection means, emergency restriction release means, operation state detection means, restriction release state continuation means)
5 Memory unit 6 IC card (Operation card (data storage medium))
7 IC card reader & writer 8 IC card controller (authentication controller)
9 System card 10 Manual data input device (man machine interface)
11 Shift lever relay 12 Engine starting power source 13 Engine starting motor 14 Neutral relay A Work machine controller B Authentication controller C Engine operation restriction means D Data storage medium E Machine-machine interface F Engine g Restriction release means h Work history Write means I Sensor group j Normal operation detection means K Man-machine interface m Emergency restriction release means n Operation state detection means p Restriction release state continuation means F1 Operation state confirmation flag F1 'Operation state confirmation flag F2 Alternative process confirmation flag X1, X2 Signal allowing engine operation X3 Driver identification information X4 Part of work history X5 Operation confirmation signal X6 Emergency identification information SW1 Position switch SW2 Engine start switch X1a Relay drive current X2a Relay drive current V Relay drive power supply L1 group Command line L2 ground line

Claims (3)

A work machine control device that has a man-machine interface, reads information detected by a group of sensors installed in each part of the work machine, and stores the information as a work history;
Engine operation limiting means for receiving an instruction from the outside and allowing operation of the engine of the working machine;
A portable data storage medium having a data storage area for storing at least a part of the identification information of the driver that permits the operation of the work machine and the work history,
A machine-machine interface for connecting to the data storage medium so as to be able to communicate information, and reading driver identification information from the data storage medium via the machine-machine interface, and reading from the data storage medium The restriction release means for comparing the identification information of the driver with the identification information of the driver registered in advance to the driver, and outputting a signal allowing the operation of the engine to the engine operation restriction means only when they match. And at least a part of the work history stored in the work machine control device is read from the work machine control device at a predetermined timing and stored in the data storage medium via the machine-machine interface. An anti-theft device with a work history storage function comprising an authentication control device having a work history writing means Te,
The work machine control device comprises:
Normal operation detection means for detecting normal operation of the authentication control device, and input from the man-machine interface only when the normal operation detection means no longer detects normal operation of the authentication control device Emergency restriction canceling means for comparing emergency identification information with emergency identification information pre-registered in itself and outputting a signal allowing the operation of the engine to the engine operation restricting means only when they match. An anti-theft device with a work history storage function characterized by comprising   The work machine control device further includes an operation state detection unit that detects whether or not the engine is operating, and the normal operation detection unit is in a state where the operation state detection unit detects the operation of the engine. When the normal operation of the authentication control device is no longer detected, the emergency restriction canceling means outputs a signal that allows the engine to operate regardless of whether emergency identification information is input from the man-machine interface. The antitheft device with work history storage function according to claim 1, further comprising restriction release state continuation means.   When the engine operation restricting means receives a signal permitting operation of the engine, a shift lever relay that permits manual operation of a shift lever and a select lever of a transmission provided on the power transmission path of the engine, the shift lever, A neutral relay that allows application of drive power from the engine starting power source to the engine starting motor when receiving a signal that allows the operation of the engine when the select lever is in the neutral position or the parking position. The antitheft device with a work history storage function according to any one of claims 1 and 2.

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