JP2013147849A - Electronic key device and master unit to be used for the same - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an electronic key device capable of preventing theft through relay attack relaying an authentication communication without impairing the responsiveness to the authentication communication between a master unit and a slave unit.SOLUTION: The electronic key device actuates control equipment when the master unit succeeds in the authentication of an ID code of the slave unit through a communication between the master unit and the slave unit possessed by a user. The master unit transmits a request signal of a first radio frequency for performing the authentication between the slave unit and itself on the basis of external input, while transmitting an interference radio signal of a third radio frequency which interferes with a fourth radio frequency and does not interfere with the first radio frequency, during transmitting the request signal, for preventing the transmission of the request signal at a communication distance prolonged by converting the first radio frequency used for the transmission of the request signal into the fourth radio frequency for the purpose of unauthorized use.

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic key device that performs authentication by collating an ID code by communication between a parent device and a child device, and a parent device used in the electronic key device.

  Conventional techniques for locking and unlocking a door of a vehicle and starting an engine include a technique in which a user inserts a key into a keyhole and rotates it, and an electronic key device for a vehicle using a so-called FOB key. . The latter electronic key device for a vehicle performs wireless communication between an in-vehicle (parent) device and a portable (child) device without touching the key at all in a user's pocket or bag. The ID code from is collated with the code stored in the in-vehicle device.

  If the matching result matches, simply touching the sensor attached to the door knob, the in-vehicle device locks and unlocks the door, and the engine can be started simply by pressing the button attached to the driver's seat (for example, , See Patent Document 1).

  Further, when opening a door of a house or a room, it is possible to apply the FOB key, and there is an electronic key device for entry / exit management using the FOB key (for example, see Patent Document 2). In Patent Document 2, the person who has the FOB key (child device) approaches the key reading device (parent device) provided near the door, so that the key reading device stores the ID code stored in the FOB key. read. Furthermore, the key reading device collates whether or not the read ID code is an ID permitted to enter the room, and if it matches, the door can be unlocked without touching the key at all.

JP 2010-121297 A JP 2010-185186 A

However, the prior art has the following problems.
The keyless entry system described in Patent Document 1 has the following various processing functions in order to determine whether the user is a legitimate user or a theft.
The transmission signal strength of the LF (Low Frequency) signal is compared with the signal strength received by measuring the signal.
-Response time of RF (Radio Frequency: high frequency) signal is determined from LF signal transmission.
The output value of the transmitted RF signal is lowered so as to be an arrival distance that is about the arrival distance of the LF signal output from the vehicle.

However, each of the three processing functions described above has the following problems.
-Depending on the distance between the authorized user and the theft, it may not be possible to determine the theft by the determination of the signal reception strength.
-With regard to the RF response time, normal operation may be hindered due to errors in electronic parts and the environment unless the allowable time is determined with a margin.
-Even if the output of the RF signal is reduced, there is no effect if the RF signal is also relayed.

  In addition, the keyless entry system described in Patent Document 2 is a change in which the strength of a request signal is changed stepwise from a transmitting antenna in order to detect a relay attack and prevent theft. Are compared with the change in the intensity of the transmitted request signal.

  Therefore, in the keyless entry system according to Patent Document 2, it is necessary to transmit a signal having a plurality of strengths, and it is necessary to measure the signal strength to be transmitted a plurality of times. For this reason, the time is increased, and extra time is required for authentication, so that the operation is delayed, and the time for supplying power to the portable device is increased, so that the battery is consumed quickly.

  Here, FIG. 9 is an explanatory diagram regarding theft by a relay attack that relays authentication communication. More specifically, even when a legitimate user carrying a portable device is at a place away from the vehicle, communication between the in-vehicle device and the portable device can be performed by performing a relay attack using two repeaters. This is an example of a case where the door can be unlocked and the engine can be started.

  In general, the range of the communication distance in which the door can be locked and unlocked by smart entry is within about 2 m from the vehicle, and only the region in the vehicle when starting the engine. However, through the procedure as shown in FIG. 9, it is usually possible to relay a distance of about 2 m from the vehicle up to several kilometers. Therefore, this procedure will be described.

  Procedure 1: The thief 1 converts the LF signal [1] from the vehicle-mounted device into the RF signal [2] in the area of about 2 m that is the transmission area of the LF signal, and simultaneously brings the first repeater to be amplified closer . As a result, the communication distance can be extended to the second repeater possessed by the thief 2 located at a position several kilometers away.

  Procedure 2: The thief 2 receives the RF signal [2] and again brings the second repeater that converts it into the LF signal [3] that can communicate with the portable device close to the authorized user. As a result, it is usually possible to relay a distance of about 2 m from the vehicle up to several kilometers. Then, the portable device possessed by the authorized user misrecognizes the LF signal [3] from the second repeater as the LF signal [1] transmitted from the own vehicle, and responds with the RF signal [4]. To do. Then, the second repeater amplifies the RF signal [4] and relays it to the first repeater as an RF (RF amplification) signal [5].

  Procedure 3: The first repeater transmits the RF (RF amplification) signal [5] received from the second repeater to the vehicle as the RF signal [6] of the portable device.

  In this way, by relaying the RF signal using two repeaters (the first repeater and the second repeater), it is possible to communicate far beyond the normal communicable area. Become. As a result, the door locks and unlocks without being noticed by a legitimate user located a few kilometers away from the vehicle due to the cooperation of the two thieves (theft people 1 and 2).

  Further, by pressing the engine start button by the same method, the engine start authentication is also relayed, the engine is started, and the vehicle is easily stolen without being noticed by an authorized user or those around.

  The same applies to the electronic key device for entry / exit management. For this reason, when authentication communication is relayed, there exists a problem that it will be in the state which can enter / exit easily in the place which an authorized user does not notice.

  The present invention has been made to solve such problems, and an electronic device capable of preventing theft by a relay attack that relays authentication communication without impairing responsiveness in authentication communication between the parent device and the child device. An object of the present invention is to obtain a master device used for a key device and an electronic key device.

  The electronic key device according to the present invention operates the control device when the parent device succeeds in authenticating the ID code of the child device by communicating between the parent device and the child device owned by the user. An electronic key device that allows a parent device to perform unauthorized use when transmitting a request signal using a first radio frequency in order to perform authentication with a child device based on an external input. In order to prevent the request signal from being transmitted by extending the communication distance by converting the first radio frequency used for transmitting the request signal into the fourth radio frequency, the request signal is transmitted. In the meantime, an interfering radio signal is transmitted at a third radio frequency that interferes with the fourth radio frequency and does not interfere with the first radio frequency.

  According to the electronic key device and the parent device used in the electronic key device according to the present invention, a request is issued from the parent device to prevent a request signal from being transmitted by extending the communication distance for the purpose of unauthorized communication. By transmitting an interference radio signal having a radio frequency that interferes with this request signal at the time when the signal is transmitted, by using a relay attack that relays the authentication communication without impairing the responsiveness in the authentication communication between the master unit and the slave unit An electronic key device that can prevent theft and a parent device used in the electronic key device can be obtained.

It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system including the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 1 of this invention. It is explanatory drawing regarding the communication processing at the time of relay attack in the electronic key device of Embodiment 1 of this invention, and the time chart of each signal. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 2 of this invention. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 3 of this invention. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 4 of this invention. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 5 of this invention. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 6 of this invention. It is a conceptual diagram of the whole system containing the electronic key apparatus in Embodiment 7 of this invention. It is explanatory drawing regarding theft by the relay attack which relays authentication communication.

  Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the electronic key device of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

Embodiment 1 FIG.
FIG. 1 is a conceptual diagram of an entire system including an electronic key device according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention. The electronic key device in FIG. 1 includes an in-vehicle device 10, a first portable device 100, and a second portable device 110. FIG. 1 also shows a first repeater 200 used by the burglar 1 and a second repeater 210 used by the burglar 2.

  The in-vehicle device 10 corresponding to the parent device includes an RF signal receiving antenna 11 (1), an LF signal transmitting antenna 11 (2), an RF signal transmitting antenna 11 (3), an RF signal receiver 12, and a first radio frequency transmitting means. 13, a second radio frequency receiving means 14, a third radio frequency transmitting means 15, a control means 16, and a driving means 17.

  Note that external components connected to the vehicle-mounted device 10 include a control device 1 and a switch 2. The control device 1 corresponds to a control device for locking and unlocking the door and starting the engine, and the control unit 16 in the in-vehicle device 10 controls the control device 1 via the drive unit 17. The switch 2 is a switch (or sensor) disposed at a predetermined position of the vehicle for requesting locking / unlocking of the door or engine start, and corresponds to an external input.

  On the other hand, the portable device 100 as a slave unit includes an LF signal receiving antenna 101, an LF signal receiving IC 102, a first radio frequency receiving means 103, an RF signal transmitting antenna 104, a second radio frequency transmitting means 105, and a control means 106. It is configured with. Note that the portable device 110 in FIG. 1 has the same function as the portable device 100, and is one or more portable devices that differ only in the ID code that is held, and registers a plurality of portable devices for one vehicle. Is possible. Therefore, hereinafter, the portable device will be described using one portable device 100.

  The first repeater 200 possessed by the theft 1 includes an RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 201, an RF signal transmitting antenna 202, an RF signal transmitting means 203, an RF signal converting means 204, an LF signal receiving antenna 205, and an LF signal. The receiving unit 206 and the RF signal converting unit 207 are provided.

  Further, the second repeater 210 possessed by the theft 2 includes an RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 211, an RF signal receiving antenna 212, an RF signal amplifying unit 213, an RF signal transmitting unit 214, an LF signal transmitting antenna 215, and an LF signal. A transmission unit 216 and an LF signal conversion unit 217 are provided.

  Next, functions and a series of operations of each component of the in-vehicle device 10, the portable device 100, the first repeater 200, and the second repeater 210 having these components will be described.

First, normal operations by the in-vehicle device 10 and the portable device 100 will be described.
[Normal Procedure 1] When the authorized user presses the switch 2 provided on the door of the vehicle, the in-vehicle device 10 checks whether there is a registered portable device 100 near the vehicle. 100 authentication starts.
[Normal Procedure 2] The control means 16 in the in-vehicle device 10 sends the LF signal [1] based on the first radio frequency for the authentication request, the first radio frequency transmission means 13 and the LF transmission antenna 11 (2). To send through.

[Normal Procedure 3] On the other hand, the first radio frequency receiving means 103 in the portable device 100 receives the LF signal [1] via the LF signal receiving antenna 101 and the LF receiving IC 102.
[Normal Procedure 4] Next, the control means 106 uses a unique ID code that it has in advance according to the LF signal [1] corresponding to the authentication request received via the first radio frequency receiving means 103. A response signal including is generated.

[Normal Procedure 5] Next, the control means 106 transmits the generated response signal as the RF signal [4] via the second radio frequency transmission means 105 and the RF signal transmission antenna 104.
[Normal Procedure 6] On the other hand, the second radio frequency receiving means 14 in the in-vehicle device 10 receives the RF signal [response signal] via the RF signal receiving antenna 11 (1) and the RF signal receiver 12. 4] is received.

[Normal Procedure 7] Then, the control means 16 determines whether or not the ID code included in the RF signal [4] obtained via the second radio frequency receiving means 14 matches the ID code stored in advance. Authenticate.
[Normal Procedure 8] Further, when the control means 16 determines that the authentication is successful, the control means 16 determines that the operation of the switch 2 in the normal procedure 1 is an operation by the authorized user, and the drive means 17 The door is unlocked by operating the control device 1.

  [Normal Procedure 9] On the other hand, if it is determined that the authentication has failed, the control means 16 determines that the operation of the switch 2 in the normal procedure 1 is not an operation by the authorized user, and activates the control device 1. Without processing.

  In addition, although the normal procedures 1-9 mentioned above demonstrated unlocking | locking of a door, the same process is performed also when a legitimate user opens a door and pushes an engine start button in the state which got into the vehicle after that. By doing so, it is possible to easily start the engine. In this case, the engine start button corresponds to the switch 2 in FIG. That is, in FIG. 1, the switch 2 is illustrated as one switch as an example, but a plurality of buttons may be provided for each function, such as a door opening / closing switch and an engine start / stop switch.

Next, a procedure in which a thief relays a communication signal to carry out the theft using the first repeater 200 and the second repeater 210 will be described.
[Unauthorized Procedure 1] When the thief 1 presses the switch 2 provided on the door of the vehicle when the authorized user carrying the portable device 100 is away from the vehicle, the in-vehicle device 10 In order to confirm whether or not there is a registered portable device 100 in the vicinity, authentication of the portable device 100 is started.

[Unauthorized Procedure 2] Also in this case, the control means 16 in the in-vehicle device 10 sends the LF signal [1] based on the first radio frequency for requesting authentication to the first radio frequency transmission means 13 and the LF transmission. Transmit via antenna 11 (2).
[Unauthorized Procedure 3] At this time, the thief 1 possesses the first repeater 200, and the first repeater 200 receives the LF signal via the LF signal receiving antenna 205 and the LF signal receiving means 206. [1] is received.

  [Unauthorized Procedure 4] Furthermore, the RF signal converting means 207 in the first repeater 200 converts the frequency of the received LF signal [1] (converts from the first radio frequency to the fourth radio frequency). Thus, the signal is converted into an RF signal [2] capable of long-distance communication, and the RF signal [2] is transmitted via the RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 201.

  [Unauthorized Procedure 5] On the other hand, there is a thief 2 who owns the second repeater 210 in the vicinity of an authorized user who has the portable device 100 at a location away from the vehicle. The LF signal converting means 217 in the second repeater 210 reconverts the frequency of the RF signal [2] received via the RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 211 (from the fourth radio frequency to the first radio frequency). LF signal [3] equivalent to LF signal [1] is generated by re-conversion, and transmitted to portable device 100.

[Unauthorized Procedure 6] On the other hand, the first radio frequency receiving means 103 in the portable device 100 uses the LF signal receiving antenna 101 and the LF receiving IC 102 to improperly replace the regular LF signal [1]. The LF signal [3] generated for the purpose is received.
[Unauthorized Procedure 7] Next, the control means 106 responds in advance to the LF signal [3] equivalent to the LF signal [1] corresponding to the authentication request received via the first radio frequency receiving means 103. A response signal including a unique ID code is generated.

  [Unauthorized Procedure 8] Next, the control means 106 transmits the generated response signal as the RF signal [4] via the second radio frequency transmission means 105 and the RF signal transmission antenna 104.

[Unauthorized Procedure 9] In response to this, the RF signal amplification means 213 in the second repeater 210 sends the RF signal [4] received via the RF signal receiving antenna 212 to the first repeater 200. To amplify for long distance transmission and generate an RF (RF amplification) signal [5].
[Unauthorized Procedure 10] Further, the RF signal transmitting means 214 transmits the generated RF (RF amplification) signal [5] via the RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 211.

[Unauthorized Procedure 11] On the other hand, the RF signal conversion means 204 in the first repeater 200 receives the RF (RF amplification) signal [5] via the RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna 201 and sends it to the in-vehicle device 10. Conversion to a corresponding RF signal [6] (conversion from the fourth radio frequency to the second radio frequency).
[Unauthorized Procedure 12] Further, the RF signal transmitting means 203 transmits the converted RF signal [6] via the RF signal transmitting antenna 202.

[Unauthorized Procedure 13] Meanwhile, the second radio frequency receiving means 14 in the in-vehicle device 10 is transmitted by the portable device 100 near the vehicle via the RF signal receiving antenna 11 (1) and the RF signal receiver 12. The RF signal [6] is received as a signal corresponding to the RF signal [4].
[Unauthorized Procedure 14] Then, the control means 16 determines whether or not the ID code included in the RF signal [6] obtained via the second radio frequency receiving means 14 matches the ID code stored in advance. If it is determined that the authentication is successful, the operation of the switch 2 by the thief 1 in the unauthorized procedure 1 is erroneously determined to be an operation by an authorized user, and the control is performed via the driving unit 17. The door is unlocked by operating the device 1.

  As described above, when the thief 1 confirms that a legitimate user has locked the door by smart keyless control in a parking lot or the like, the thief 2 possessing the second relay 210 is a portable device possessed by the legitimate user. When the authorized user moves away from the vehicle to a distance where the door unlocking and answerback buzzer cannot be heard, the thief 1 possessing the first repeater 200 moves to the door button (switch 2). By pressing the engine start button after unlocking the door first, then opening the door and getting into the vehicle, the same authentication is established and the engine can be started and stolen. End up. At this time, since the authorized user is not near the vehicle, the user is unaware that the vehicle has been stolen until he / she returns to the vehicle to get on the vehicle again.

Therefore, next, the electronic key device according to the first embodiment for preventing such theft will be described with reference to FIGS.
FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram relating to communication processing at the time of relay attack and a time chart of each signal in the electronic key device according to the first embodiment of the present invention. More specifically, when a legitimate user carrying the portable device 100 is away from the vehicle and attempts to perform a relay attack using two repeaters, the door is opened. Examples of locks and cases where engine start is impossible and theft is prevented are illustrated.

  The explanatory diagram shown in the upper part of FIG. 2 is an in-vehicle device 10 as a signal that interferes with the RF signal [2] between the two repeaters as compared with FIG. 9 used in the description of the prior art of the relay attack. Thus, the RF signal [7] is output at the same timing as the LF signal [1] is output.

  Each signal [1] to [6] in the time chart shown in the lower part of FIG. 2 is the same as that described with reference to FIG. 9, and the following description is focused on the RF signal [7] as a difference. Explained. The first repeater 200 possessed by the thief 1 starts transmission of the RF signal [2] toward the second repeater immediately after the transmission of the LF signal [1].

  In contrast, the in-vehicle device 10 according to the first embodiment transmits the RF signal [7] simultaneously when transmitting the RF signal [1] having the first radio frequency. Here, the radio frequency (third radio frequency) possessed by the RF signal [7] does not interfere with the radio frequency (first radio frequency) possessed by the LF signal [1]. It interferes with the radio frequency (fourth radio frequency) of the RF signal [2] used for the purpose.

  As a result, the RF signal [2] interferes with the RF signal [7]. As a result, the request signal corresponding to the LF signal [1] is transmitted to the portable device 100 with an extended communication distance. This makes it possible to prevent unauthorized authentication by the theft. That is, the first repeater 200 cannot correctly relay the RF signal [2], and the second repeater 210 cannot correctly receive the RF signal [2] and cannot respond. It is possible to prevent the in-vehicle device 10 from performing recognition by an illegal act by a relay attack.

  The transmission of the RF signal [7] will be described based on the specific configuration of the in-vehicle device 10 shown in FIG. The in-vehicle device 10 used in the electronic key device according to the first embodiment shown in FIG. 1 transmits an RF signal [7] and an RF signal transmitting antenna 11 (3) and third radio frequency transmitting means. 15 is further provided.

  With such a configuration, the control unit 16 transmits the LF signal [1] having the first radio frequency via the first radio frequency transmission unit 13 and the LF signal transmission antenna 11 (2). The RF signal [7] having the third radio frequency can be transmitted via the third radio frequency transmitting means 15 and the RF signal transmitting antenna 11 (3).

  As described above, according to the first embodiment, in order to prevent the request signal from being transmitted by extending the communication distance, the request signal has a radio frequency that interferes with the request signal at the time. A configuration for transmitting an interference radio wave signal is provided. As a result, theft by a relay attack that relays authentication communication can be prevented.

  Further, various additional information is not required as a communication protocol, and the authentication time does not become long. For this reason, responsiveness is not impaired and the effect that the consumption of the battery of a portable device is not increased can also be acquired.

  In general, an LF (for example, 125 kHz long wave) signal is used to determine the operation range in the area inside the vehicle or the outside area of the door lock due to the characteristics of the radio wave frequency. For operation, an RF (eg, 315 MHz high frequency) signal is used.

  The first radio frequency used in the LF signal [1] is different in frequency band from the third radio frequency used in the RF signal [7] generated for the purpose of interference with the RF signal [2]. For this reason, when normal use is carried out by an authorized user possessing the portable device 100, authentication communication is possible even when the RF signal [7] is output. The function of requesting authentication operates without impairing the responsiveness in the authentication communication of the slave unit.

  In the above-described embodiment, the example in which the first radio frequency is the LF signal and the third radio frequency is the RF signal has been described, but each radio frequency is not limited to this. The first radio frequency and the third radio frequency need only be set to frequencies that do not interfere with each other and can secure a necessary area.

Embodiment 2. FIG.
FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. Compared to the configuration of FIG. 1 in the first embodiment, the configuration of FIG. 3 in the second embodiment is different in that a notification unit 107 is further provided in the portable device 100.

  There are the following differences in terms of communication control. In the first embodiment, the case where the in-vehicle device 10 transmits the RF signal [7] while transmitting the RF signal [1], thereby making unauthorized authentication by the thief unsuccessful. did. On the other hand, in the second embodiment, after authentication is not established, whether authentication is possible is confirmed by performing authentication again without transmitting the third radio frequency. When the third radio frequency is transmitted, the authentication is not established, but when the third radio frequency is not transmitted thereafter, the authentication is established. The notification means 107 is used to notify the user that the authentication is inconsistent.

Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference between the configuration surface and the communication control surface.
The notification unit 107 is a unit for notifying the user that the authentication is not matched, for example, by vibrating the portable device 100 by vibration that generates vibration.

Next, a communication procedure performed for utilizing the notification unit 107 will be described below as a notification procedure.
[Notification Procedure 1] The control means 16 in the vehicle-mounted device 10 transmits the interference RF signal [7] while transmitting the LF signal [1] as an authentication request, within a predetermined period of time. If the RF signal [4] cannot be received as a response signal from the portable device 100 and authentication fails, the LF signal [1] is retransmitted without transmitting the RF signal [7].

  [Notification Procedure 2] When the response signal is received and the authentication is successful as a result of retransmitting the LF signal [1], the control means 16 corresponds to the normal signal. Therefore, it is determined that there is a high possibility that it is not the RF signal [4] from the portable device 100 but the RF signal [6] from the first repeater 200 corresponding to an unauthorized signal by the theft. That is, if the authentication request fails in the first authentication request that transmits the RF signal [7], and the authentication succeeds in the second authentication request that does not transmit the RF signal [7], the control means 16 It is determined that there is a high possibility that the response signal is received from the portable device 100 via another route that is not a regular route.

  [Notification Procedure 3] In this case, the control means 16 succeeds in the authentication, but does not operate the control device 1 via the drive means 17 to unlock the door. The unauthorized use notification with the first radio frequency is transmitted through the first radio frequency transmission means 13 and the LF signal transmission antenna 11 (2). This unauthorized use notification can be retransmitted in such a manner that the unauthorized use notification information is included in the LF signal [1].

  [Notification Unit 4] On the other hand, the portable device 100 transmits the LF signal [1] including the information on the unauthorized use notification to the LF signal [3] via the first repeater 200 and the second repeater 210. ] Can be received.

  [Notification Unit 5] Therefore, the control unit 106 in the portable device 100 includes information on unauthorized use notification in the LF signal [3] received via the LF signal receiving antenna 101 and the LF receiving IC 102. If it is determined, the notifying means 107 generates a vibration to notify an authorized user possessing the portable device 100 that there is a high possibility that authentication by unauthorized use has been performed.

  Through such a series of procedures, even when the authorized user who owns the portable device 100 is away from the vehicle-mounted device 10, the first repeater 200 and the first repeater 200 possessed by the theft users 1 and 2. By interposing the second repeater 210, it is possible to notify that there is a high possibility that authentication by unauthorized use has been performed.

  By using the vibration, even if the portable device 100 is usually in a pocket or bag, the authorized user can notice the notification information by the notification means 107. And the authorized user notices that unauthorized communication is being performed by notifying that the inconsistency of authentication from the in-vehicle device 10 occurred despite being away from the in-vehicle device 10, and more In order to prevent unauthorized communication, communication control is stopped by taking out the portable device 100 and turning off a switch (not shown) provided in the portable device 100, thereby preventing subsequent unauthorized communication.

  For this reason, it is possible to prevent the door from being unlocked even when authentication is performed by unauthorized use of the theft, and for unauthorized users who are away from the vehicle-mounted device 10, authentication by unauthorized use is possible. It is possible to immediately notify that there is a high possibility that the Furthermore, since the authorized user who has received the notification once turns off the switch provided in the portable device 100, the communication function can be stopped until the switch is turned on. Can be prevented.

  As described above, according to the second embodiment, it is detected that unauthorized communication is being performed by notification to an authorized user during unauthorized communication and a communication stop operation by the authorized user, thereby preventing theft more reliably. It becomes possible.

  Furthermore, by notifying by vibration such as a vibrator, even if the portable device is put in a pocket or bag, an authorized user can detect unauthorized communication.

  Furthermore, there is a possibility that the function may be activated only by detection. At the detection stage, the authorized user turns off a switch (for example, a power switch) attached to the portable device to communicate with the in-vehicle device. Can be stopped and the operation after the stop can be prohibited.

Embodiment 3 FIG.
In the second embodiment, when unauthorized communication is detected, an authorized user needs to take out the portable device 100 and turn off a switch such as a power switch in order to stop the communication function. However, in this case, it may take time to take out the portable device 100, and it may take time to actually stop the communication function. Therefore, in the third embodiment, a configuration for realizing communication stop earlier will be described.

  FIG. 4 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention. Compared with the configuration of FIG. 3 in the previous second embodiment, the configuration of FIG. 4 in the present third embodiment further includes motion sensing means 108 in the portable device 100 and communication stop in the control means 106. The difference is that it further comprises means 106 (1).

Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference in configuration.
The motion detection unit 108 is, for example, a motion sensor, and can detect vibration applied to the portable device 100 even in a pocket or bag.

  On the other hand, the communication stop unit 106 (1) in the control unit 106, when being notified by the notification unit 107, when the vibration value detected by the motion detection unit 108 becomes a predetermined vibration or more, the portable device 100. The communication function can be stopped quickly.

  As described above, according to the third embodiment, during the detection of unauthorized communication, the mobile device equipped with the motion sensor is shaken to take out the device even in a pocket or bag. Without. The communication mechanism can be stopped quickly.

Embodiment 4 FIG.
In the second and third embodiments, the case where the communication function is stopped by the switch operation or the operation of the communication stop unit 106 (1) has been described. However, it is conceivable that the convenience is deteriorated if the communication function is stopped. Therefore, in the fourth embodiment, a case will be described in which the communication function is automatically restored after a certain period has elapsed since the communication function has been stopped.

  FIG. 5 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention. Compared to the configuration of FIG. 4 in the previous third embodiment, the configuration of FIG. 5 in the fourth embodiment further includes a communication return means 106 (2) in the control means 106 of the portable device 100. Is different.

  Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference in configuration. The communication return means 106 (2) in the control means 106 has a function of automatically returning after a certain period of time has elapsed after the communication is stopped by the communication stop means 106 (1). As a result, it is possible to prevent the function from becoming inoperable during normal use. Moreover, since it returns automatically, the convenience improves.

  Such automatic recovery can also be performed for the second embodiment. Specifically, instead of the motion sensing means 108 in the previous third embodiment, the communication stop means 106 (1) reads the trigger signal generated by the manual user's manual switch operation, so that the communication function that has been temporarily stopped can be obtained. The communication can be automatically restored by the communication return means 106 (2).

  As described above, according to the fourth embodiment, even after the communication function is stopped once, the communication function can be automatically recovered after a predetermined time has elapsed. As a result, it is possible to both prevent unauthorized communication by the theft and improve convenience by authorized users.

Embodiment 5 FIG.
In the first to fourth embodiments, the case where the third radio frequency used for the RF signal [7] is fixed has been described. On the other hand, in the fifth embodiment, a plurality of third radio wave frequencies used for the RF signal [7] for causing interference with the RF signal [2] are preliminarily set based on the frequency used as theft in the past. A case will be described in which a pattern is prepared and the value of the third radio frequency can be selected and switched according to the usage environment, usage history, or the like.

  FIG. 6 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention. Compared to the configuration of FIG. 5 in the previous fourth embodiment, the configuration of FIG. 6 in the fifth embodiment is different in that the in-vehicle device 10 further includes an interference radio wave selecting means 18.

Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference in configuration.
It is not known what radio frequency is set for the repeater used by the theft. For this reason, referring to repeaters used in the past in advance, the interference radio wave selecting means 18 uses a plurality of radio wave frequencies as the third radio wave frequency used for transmitting the RF signal [7] so as to be compatible with a plurality of frequencies. It has a function that can switch the frequency setting. By providing such a function, it is possible to cope with various repeaters according to the use environment or the progress of use.

  As described above, according to the fifth embodiment, by selecting and switching the radio frequency used for the interference radio signal, the radio frequency interfering with the radio frequency used for communication between the repeaters used by the theft can be reduced. As a result, it is possible to appropriately select and switch. As a result, it is possible to appropriately prevent unauthorized communication in accordance with the use environment or the progress of use.

  6 shows a configuration in which an interference radio wave selection means 18 is further added to the in-vehicle device 10 in the configuration of FIG. 5, but the in-vehicle device 10 in each configuration of FIGS. On the other hand, it is possible to further add the interference radio wave selecting means 18, and the same effect can be obtained.

Embodiment 6 FIG.
In the previous fifth embodiment, the configuration has been described in which the third radio frequency used for transmission of the RF signal [7] can be selected from a plurality of preset frequencies. On the other hand, in the sixth embodiment, a configuration in which a plurality of radio frequency values can be arbitrarily rewritten by an external operation will be described.

  FIG. 7 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention. Compared with the configuration of FIG. 6 in the previous embodiment 5, the configuration of FIG. 7 in the present embodiment 6 is further provided with a customization setting means 16 (1) in the control means 16 of the in-vehicle device 10. Is different.

Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference in configuration.
The customization setting means 16 (1) is connected to the setting rewriting tool 3 that is an external setting tool. The customization setting unit 16 (1) has a function of individually rewriting a plurality of radio frequencies set in advance in the interference radio wave selection unit 18 in accordance with the set values by the setting rewriting tool 3.

  By providing such a function, it becomes possible to select a plurality of patterns of frequencies prepared in advance and make customization changes by a user or a dealer even after shipment. As a result, even when there are repeaters having different frequencies used for theft, the selection can be changed, so that the response can be made relatively easily.

  Also, in the car function, when there is a request to switch the operation mode according to the environment used by the authorized user (to change the third radio frequency), the setting rewriting tool 3 is set by the car dealer. It is possible to switch the operation mode by using it. As a result, the third radio frequency setting can be switched at the dealer without replacing the unit even after the vehicle is sold.

  As described above, according to the sixth embodiment, the radio frequency used for the interference radio signal can be arbitrarily set and switched using an external tool, so that it can be used for communication between repeaters used by the theft. It is possible to appropriately set the radio frequency that interferes with the radio frequency. As a result, it is possible to appropriately prevent unauthorized communication in accordance with the use environment or the course of use.

Embodiment 7 FIG.
In the first to sixth embodiments, the case where the third radio frequency used for transmitting the RF signal [7] is constant during the transmission has been described. On the other hand, in the seventh embodiment, a case will be described in which the third radio frequency is temporally changed during transmission of the RF signal [7].

  FIG. 8 is a conceptual diagram of the entire system including the electronic key device according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention. Compared with the configuration of FIG. 7 in the previous sixth embodiment, the configuration of FIG. 8 in the seventh embodiment is different in that the in-vehicle device 10 further includes an interference radio wave changing means 19.

Therefore, the following description will be focused on the difference in configuration.
The interference radio wave changing unit 19 has a function of changing the value of the third radio wave frequency used when transmitting the RF signal [7] as the transmission time elapses.

  The frequency used for theft depends on the repeater used and is unknown. For this reason, in the seventh embodiment, the RF signal [7] is transmitted by changing the third radio wave frequency over time. Accordingly, the RF signal [2] is correctly transmitted to the second repeater 210 by causing the RF signal [7] to interfere with a part of the RF signal [2] used in communication between the repeaters. Can be prevented.

  As a result, even when the fourth radio frequency used for communication between repeaters by the theft is unknown, the RF signal [7] using a wide range of radio frequencies is generated, thereby generating the RF signal [7]. 2] can be transmitted to the second repeater 210 correctly.

  As described above, according to the seventh embodiment, it is possible to transmit an interference radio wave signal while changing the radio frequency over time over a wide range without setting or changing the radio frequency used for the interference radio wave signal. it can. As a result, even when the radio frequency used in the signal used for communication between repeaters by the theft is unknown, it is possible to cause interference in a part of the signal and prevent unauthorized communication. It becomes possible.

  8 shows a configuration in which interference radio wave changing means 19 is further added to the in-vehicle device 10 in the configuration of FIG. 7, but the in-vehicle device 10 in each configuration of FIGS. On the other hand, the interference radio wave changing means 19 can be further added, and the same effect can be obtained.

  Further, in the above-described first to seventh embodiments, as a specific application example of the electronic key device, a case where the electronic key device is applied to on-vehicle door opening and closing and engine start / stop has been described. However, the application range of the electronic key device of the present invention is not limited to this. For example, the parent machine that also serves as the office lock is on the office side (door), and the child machine (key) is a portable machine held by the occupant. In the same manner as in Embodiment 7), the present invention can be applied to an entrance / exit management system for a house or office.

  In addition to the first to seventh embodiments, it goes without saying that the same effect can be obtained by applying the present invention to an electronic key by communication between a parent device and a child device.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 Control apparatus, 2 switch (external input), 3 setting rewriting tool, 10 vehicle equipment (parent machine), 11 (1) RF signal receiving antenna, 11 (2) LF signal transmitting antenna, 11 (3) RF signal transmitting antenna , 12 RF signal receiver, 13 First radio frequency transmission means, 14 Second radio frequency reception means, 15 Third radio frequency transmission means, 16 Control means, 17 Driving means, 18 Interference radio wave selection means, 19 Interference Radio wave changing means, 100 portable device (child device), 101 LF signal receiving antenna, 102 LF signal receiving IC, 103 first radio frequency receiving means, 104 RF signal transmitting antenna, 105 second radio frequency transmitting means, 106 control Means, 107 notification means, 108 motion sensing means, 200 first repeater, 201 RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna, 202 RF signal transmitting antenna, 203 RF signal transmitting means, 204 RF signal converting means, 205 LF signal receiving antenna, 206 LF signal receiving means, 207 RF signal converting means, 210 second repeater, 211 RF signal transmitting / receiving antenna, 212 RF Signal receiving antenna, 213 RF signal amplifying means, 214 RF signal transmitting means, 215 LF signal transmitting antenna, 216 LF signal transmitting means, 217 LF signal converting means.

Claims (9)

An electronic key device that activates a control device when communication between a parent device and a child device held by a user succeeds in authenticating the ID code of the child device. ,
The master unit transmits the request signal for the purpose of unauthorized use when transmitting a request signal using a first radio frequency in order to perform the authentication with the slave unit based on an external input. The request signal is transmitted in order to prevent the request signal from being transmitted with an extended communication distance by converting the first radio frequency used in the transmission to a fourth radio frequency. An electronic key device characterized by transmitting an interfering radio signal having a third radio frequency that interferes with the fourth radio frequency and does not interfere with the first radio frequency. The electronic key device according to claim 1,
The base unit is
First radio frequency transmission means for transmitting a signal at a first radio frequency;
Second radio frequency receiving means for receiving a signal by a second radio frequency that does not interfere with the first radio frequency;
In order to perform the authentication based on an external input, a request signal based on the first radio frequency is transmitted through the first radio frequency transmission means, and the slave unit responds to the request signal from the slave unit. A response signal including the ID code according to the second radio frequency is received via the second radio frequency receiving means, and the ID code included in the response signal matches the ID code stored in advance. In this case, it is determined that the authentication is successful, and has a master unit control unit that operates the control device,
The slave is
First radio frequency receiving means for receiving a signal of the first radio frequency;
Second radio frequency transmission means for transmitting a signal at the second radio frequency;
In response to the request signal from the base unit received via the first radio frequency receiving means, the response signal including a unique ID code that is previously held is generated, and the second radio frequency is generated. A slave unit control unit that transmits the response signal via a transmission unit,
The base unit is
And further comprising third radio frequency transmission means for transmitting a signal of the third radio frequency,
For the purpose of unauthorized use, the master control unit converts the first radio frequency used for transmitting the request signal into the fourth radio frequency, so that the request signal extends a communication distance. In order to prevent transmission, the first radio frequency transmission means interferes with the fourth radio frequency and does not interfere with the first radio frequency while transmitting the request signal. An electronic key device characterized in that an interference radio wave signal by a third radio frequency is transmitted via the third radio frequency transmission means. The electronic key device according to claim 2,
The base unit control unit
While the request signal is transmitted by the first radio frequency transmission means, the second radio frequency reception is performed within a predetermined period after the interference radio signal is transmitted by the third radio frequency transmission means. If the response signal cannot be received by the means, the request signal is retransmitted by the first radio frequency transmission means without transmitting the interference radio signal by the third radio frequency transmission means,
As a result of retransmission, a retransmission response signal as a response signal to the retransmitted request signal is received via the second radio frequency receiving means, and the ID code included in the retransmission response signal is stored in advance. If it matches the ID code, it is determined that the retransmission response signal is not a response signal from the slave unit but a response signal due to unauthorized use via another route, and without operating the control device, Sending an unauthorized use notification by the first radio frequency via the first radio frequency transmission means;
The slave is
Informing means for informing the user that the unauthorized use notification has been received;
A switch for switching ON / OFF states of communication functions by the first radio frequency receiving means and the second radio frequency transmission means;
The slave unit control unit receives the unauthorized use notification via the notification unit when the unauthorized use notification is received via the first radio frequency receiving unit via the different route. The electronic key device is characterized in that the user is informed and the user is prompted to turn off the switch. The electronic key device according to claim 3.
The slave unit further includes a motion detection means for detecting that a vibration of a predetermined level or more has occurred,
The slave unit control unit turns off the switch and stops the communication function when the motion sensing unit detects the vibration more than the predetermined during the notification by the notification unit. Electronic key device to play. The electronic key device according to claim 3 or 4,
The electronic key device, wherein the slave unit control unit returns the switch to an ON state after a predetermined time has elapsed since the switch was turned OFF during notification by the notification unit. The electronic key device according to any one of claims 2 to 5,
The electronic key device, wherein the base unit further includes interference radio wave selection means capable of setting and switching a plurality of frequencies as the third radio wave frequency used for transmission of the interference radio wave signal. The electronic key device according to claim 6.
The base unit control unit reads a set value from an external tool, and individually rewrites each value of the plurality of frequencies in the interference radio wave selection means according to the set value. apparatus. The electronic key device according to any one of claims 2 to 5,
The base unit further includes interference radio wave changing means for changing the third radio wave frequency used for transmission of the interference radio wave signal according to a lapse of time from the start of transmission of the interference radio wave signal,
The base unit control unit transmits an interference radio wave signal based on a third radio frequency that is temporally changed by the interference radio wave changing unit via the third radio frequency transmitting unit. apparatus. Used for an electronic key device that activates a control device when the parent device succeeds in authenticating the ID code of the child device by communicating between the parent device and the child device owned by the user. A master unit,
In order to perform the authentication with the slave unit based on an external input, the first signal used for transmission of the request signal for the purpose of unauthorized use when transmitting a request signal with a first radio frequency. In order to prevent the request signal from being transmitted by extending a communication distance by converting the radio frequency of 1 to the fourth radio frequency, the first radio frequency is transmitted while the request signal is being transmitted. 4. A base unit used in an electronic key device, wherein an interfering radio signal is transmitted at a third radio frequency that interferes with radio frequency 4 and does not interfere with the first radio frequency.

Images