JP2010121297A - Smart keyless entry system - Google Patents

Smart keyless entry system Download PDF

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Publication number
JP2010121297A
JP2010121297A JP2008293779A JP2008293779A JP2010121297A JP 2010121297 A JP2010121297 A JP 2010121297A JP 2008293779 A JP2008293779 A JP 2008293779A JP 2008293779 A JP2008293779 A JP 2008293779A JP 2010121297 A JP2010121297 A JP 2010121297A
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vehicle
signal
lf
portable device
unit
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JP2008293779A
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JP5425446B2 (en
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Yasuo Asaga
康夫 浅賀
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Calsonic Kansei Corp
カルソニックカンセイ株式会社
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Abstract

A smart keyless entry system which prevents so-called relay attack and has improved antitheft performance.
Impersonation determining means 50 and 60 for determining whether a person existing in the vicinity of a vehicle 14 is an authorized user or a first theft are provided.
The impersonation determination means 50, 60 determines that the relay device held by the person in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 is not the portable device 15 or that the authorized user U who owns the portable device 15 does not exist in the vicinity of the vehicle 14. In this case, the door unlocking is performed so that the door lock actuators 7 and 7 of the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 14 are prevented from being unlocked without transmitting the unlock signal from the door lock driving driver circuit 51. A blocking portion 52 is provided.
[Selection] Figure 1

Description

  The present invention mainly relates to a smart keyless entry system that performs two-way communication between a vehicle and a portable device that can be carried by a user and locks / unlocks the door of the vehicle after collating and confirming an identification code. In particular, the present invention relates to a smart keyless entry system with an improved anti-theft function.

  Conventionally, a smart keyless entry system as shown in FIG. 11 or FIG. 12 is known (see, for example, Patent Document 1).

  First, in terms of configuration, in this smart keyless entry system, the two-way communication is performed between the vehicle 1 and the portable device 2 carried by the user U, thereby locking and unlocking the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 1. Used in a vehicle locking device 4 for locking.

  That is, in this conventional smart keyless entry system, for the vehicle that locks and unlocks the door lock actuators 7 and 7 in accordance with a signal transmitted from the outside by the user U to the control unit 6 mounted on the vehicle 1. A locking device 4, an engine starter device 5 for starting the engine based on an engine start signal, a door request switch (request signal transmission operation means) 8 set on a door knob 10 provided on the outer surface of the door 3, and the like Is connected mainly.

  The control unit 6 of the vehicle locking device 4 is provided with a function of determining whether to start the engine in addition to permitting the locking and unlocking by storing a unique identification code of the vehicle 1. Yes.

  A vehicle antenna unit (portable device request signal transmission means) 9 is connected to the control unit 6 mounted on the vehicle 1 side.

  In the control unit 6, when the door lock actuators 7 and 7 perform locking and unlocking of the keys of the doors 3 and 3 based on the identification code placed on the received signal, Whether the identification code is the same as the unique identification code of the vehicle 1 is collated, and when the collation is matched, the unlocking is permitted.

  In addition, when the passenger rides, the engine starter device 5 is allowed to start the engine when the identification code matches.

  Furthermore, on the portable device 2 side carried by the user U, a key antenna unit (identification code signal transmitting means) 11 and a key ID storage unit 12 for storing and storing the same identification code as the unique identification code of the vehicle 1 A key-side request switch 13 that locks and unlocks the door 3 by the operation of the user U from the portable device 2 side is provided.

  And according to the request signal (LF signal: Low # Frequency; the reach distance from the vehicle antenna unit 9 is about 1 m) transmitted from the vehicle antenna unit 9, the key antenna unit 11 on the portable device 2 side is interposed. After receiving on the user U side, the identification code signal stored in the key ID storage unit 12 is placed on the long distance signal (RF signal: Radio Frequency; high frequency, long reachable range) By replying to the first side, two-way communication is performed between the vehicle 1 and the portable device 2 so that the collation can be performed.

  Next, the effect of this conventional smart keyless entry system will be described.

  That is, in this conventional smart keyless entry system, first, as the remote control operation by the one-way communication of the remote control entry function, when the key side request switch 13 is pressed by the user U, it is stored in the key ID storage unit 12. The identification code signal is placed on the RF signal and transmitted from the key antenna unit 11 on the portable device 2 side to the vehicle 1 side.

  On the vehicle 1 side, when the RF signal is received by the vehicle antenna unit 9, the RF signal is sent to the control unit 6, and a unique identification code of the vehicle 1 stored in the control unit 6 and The received identification code signal is verified.

  And when collation matches, the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 1 are unlocked by the door lock actuators 7 and 7.

  Next, a case where the door 3 is locked and unlocked by bidirectional communication in this conventional smart keyless entry system will be described.

  In this smart keyless entry system, for example, when the user U operates the door request switch 8 installed in the door knob portion 10 of the vehicle 1, an LF signal as a request signal is transmitted from the vehicle antenna portion 9 on the vehicle 1 side. .

  On the portable device 2 side, when the request signal is received by the key antenna unit 11, an identification code signal is returned to the vehicle 1 side together with a response signal (RF signal).

  Then, when the identification code of the identification code signal and the unique identification code stored in the control unit 6 on the vehicle 1 side are collated and the collation is matched, the door of the vehicle 1 is locked / unlocked. Done.

The distance that enables bidirectional communication between the vehicle 1 and the portable device 2 is within the range of about 1 m from the vehicle antenna unit 9 of the door 3 because the reach of the LF signal is limited. is there.
JP 2006-144259 A (paragraphs 0011 to 0029, FIGS. 1 and 2)

  However, in the conventional smart keyless entry system configured as described above, even if the user U does not operate the key-side request switch 13 on the portable device 2 side, the identification code is collated by a so-called relay attack method. There is a possibility that the door unlocking and engine starting may be performed.

  That is, as shown in FIG. 12, when the user U holding the portable device 2 is away from the vehicle 1, the first thief K <b> 1 approaches the vehicle 1 and is built in the door knob unit 10. When 8 is operated, a request signal (LF signal) is transmitted from the vehicle antenna unit 9.

  The repeater J1 possessed by the first thief K1 receives this LF signal, demodulates it, modulates it to an RF signal, and transmits this RF signal.

  The repeater J2 possessed by the second thief K2 receives this RF signal, demodulates it, and remodulates it to a request signal (LF signal).

  Even if the second thief K2 possessing the relay device J2 approaches the user U, even if the user U is away from the vehicle 1, the possessed portable device 2 receives the LF signal at a short distance. Then, an RF signal is responded.

  Therefore, before the user U notices without performing the unlocking operation and the engine starting operation using the key-side request switch 13, the vehicle antenna unit 9 of the vehicle 1 is loaded with the regular identification code. When the RF signal is received, the doors 3 and 3 may be unlocked and the engine may be started.

  Therefore, the present invention has been made in view of such problems, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a smart keyless entry system in which a so-called relay attack is prevented and an antitheft property is improved.

  In order to solve such a problem, the invention described in claim 1 is such that two-way communication is performed between the vehicle and the portable device carried by the user, and the door of the vehicle is locked and unlocked. Used in a smart keyless entry system corresponding to a relay relay theft technique composed of a first thief and a second theft, and the relay thief is first used by the first thief. Using a repeater, impersonating a legitimate user, sending an RF signal obtained by converting the LF signal sent from the vehicle to the second repeater owned by the second thief, The relay machine converts the LF signal again sent to the first theft, and the second thief possessing the second repeater sends the LF signal from the vehicle to the portable device held by the authorized regular user To send A unique identification code stored in the belt is placed on an RF signal transmitted from the portable device and sent back to the vehicle, so that a person existing in the vicinity of the vehicle can obtain a normal identification code from the portable device. A smart keyless entry system that supports spoofing theft as if it is a reply, and determines whether a person in the vicinity of the vehicle is a legitimate user or a first theft Means for determining whether the repeater possessed by a person in the vicinity of the vehicle is not the portable device or that the authorized user who owns the portable device does not exist in the vicinity of the vehicle. In this case, the smart keyless entry system has a door unlocking preventing unit that does not unlock the door of the vehicle.

  Further, in the present invention, in the impersonation determination means, an LF signal reception intensity measuring circuit that measures the signal intensity of the LF signal and the measured LF signal intensity are transmitted to the portable device. A RF signal reception intensity measurement for measuring the reception intensity from the RF signal sent from the portable device in the vehicle. By providing a circuit and comparing the LF signal strength data of the LF signal measured by the portable device and the received strength of the RF signal, a person who is present in the vicinity of the vehicle and has received the LF signal 2. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising a signal intensity comparison / determination unit for determining whether or not the user is an authorized user who has transmitted an RF signal toward the vehicle.

  Further, according to a third aspect of the present invention, in the impersonation determination unit, the response time data from the reception of the LF signal added to the returned data to the portable device until the output of the RF signal is received by the impersonation determination unit. A response time measurement unit that measures the response time, and the response time measurement unit that adds the response time data measured to the RF signal and returns a portable device response time addition unit. A reply time measuring unit that measures a reply time required from when the LF signal is transmitted until the RF signal is received, the response time data, and a reply time measured by the reply time measuring unit. 2. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising a reaction time comparison / determination unit that determines whether or not the user is an authorized user.

  According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, when the impersonation determination means sends back to the portable device by an LF signal sent from the vehicle, an output value of the transmitted RF signal is set to the vehicle. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising an RF signal strength setting unit for reducing the LF signal output from the LF signal so as to reach a reachable distance.

  In the invention according to claim 1 configured as described above, when an LF signal from a vehicle is sent to the portable device held by the approaching regular user, the unique identification code stored in the portable device is: It is sent on the RF signal transmitted from the portable device and returned to the vehicle.

  For this reason, the identification code unique to the vehicle matches the unique identification code stored in the portable device, so that the door key can be locked and unlocked, or the engine can be started.

  Then, the impersonation determination means determines that the relay device held by a person in the vicinity of the vehicle is not the portable device, or that the authorized user who owns the portable device does not exist in the vicinity of the vehicle. In this case, the door unlocking block prevents the door key from being locked and unlocked or the engine is started so that the vehicle door is not unlocked.

  For this reason, in the so-called relay attack method, when the identification code is collated, the impersonation determining means determines that impersonation is being performed, and the door unlocking prevention unit performs unlocking of the door. I will not.

  Therefore, the door of the vehicle cannot be opened and the engine cannot be started, so that the anti-theft function can be improved.

  In addition, according to a second aspect of the present invention, when the signal strength of the LF signal is measured by the LF signal reception strength measurement circuit of the impersonation determination unit provided in the portable device, the measured LF signal is measured. The strength is put on the RF signal as LF signal strength data by the composite reply circuit and sent back to the vehicle.

  When the reception strength is measured from the RF signal transmitted from the portable device by the RF signal reception strength measurement circuit provided in the vehicle, LF signal strength data of the LF signal measured by the portable device, The reception intensity of the RF signal is compared by the signal intensity comparison / determination unit.

  If the comparison shows that the LF signal strength data and the received strength of the RF signal match, the transmission / reception distance is the same, and therefore the person who is in the vicinity of the vehicle and has received the LF signal. Is a legitimate user who has sent an RF signal to the vehicle.

  In addition, when the comparison shows that the LF signal strength data and the reception strength of the RF signal do not match and the LF signal strength data is stronger than the reception strength of the RF signal, It is determined that the person who is present in the vicinity and has received the LF signal is not the authorized user who sent the RF signal to the vehicle, but is the impersonating first theft person.

  Further, in the present invention, the RF signal is output after the LF signal added to the data to be returned is received by the response time measuring unit of the impersonation determining unit provided in the portable device. Response time until is measured as response time data.

  In the portable device response time adding unit of the portable device, the response time data measured by the response time measuring unit is added to the RF signal and returned to the vehicle.

  In the vehicle, the reply time measuring unit measures the time required from when the LF signal is transmitted until the RF signal is received.

  Then, the response time data and the time measured by the response time measurement unit are compared by the response time comparison and determination unit, and the response time data and the time measured by the response time measurement unit are compared. In the case of coincidence, since the theft relay device does not intervene, it is determined that the user is an authorized user, and the time measured by the response time measurement unit is longer than the response time data. In the case of a significant difference, it is determined that the theft relay device is present and is not a legitimate user.

  Further, in the present invention, when the RF signal strength setting unit of the impersonation determination unit returns a response to the portable device by the LF signal sent from the vehicle, The output value is set low so as to be an arrival distance that is about the arrival distance of the LF signal output from the vehicle.

  For this reason, even if a person in the vicinity of the vehicle impersonates a regular user, an RF signal that does not have a reachable distance to the vehicle is output from the portable device of the regular user at a long distance, and the vehicle side It cannot be received.

  Therefore, the impersonation theft technique cannot be unlocked to open the door, so-called relay attack is prevented, and the anti-theft property is improved.

  Next, a smart keyless entry system according to the best mode for carrying out the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  The same or equivalent parts as those in the conventional example will be described with the same reference numerals.

  1 to 10 show a smart keyless entry system according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention.

  First, the overall configuration will be described. In the smart keyless entry system of this embodiment, two-way communication is performed between the vehicle 14 and the portable device 15 carried by the user U, and the door 3 of the vehicle 14 is The doors 3 and 3 are configured to be locked and unlocked by door lock actuators 7 and 7 provided inside the door 3.

  That is, in the smart keyless entry system of this embodiment, the smart keyless ECU 16 as a control unit mounted on the vehicle 14 determines whether to lock or unlock according to a signal transmitted from the outside by the user U. A CPU 17 having a door lock drive function for performing the lock / unlock operation of the door lock actuators 7 and 7 by sending a lock / unlock signal and an engine start permission function for determining whether to start the engine. , Provided.

  Further, the smart keyless ECU 16 of this embodiment includes an engine starter device 5 for starting the engine based on an engine start signal, a door request switch (set on the door knob portion 10 provided on the outer surface of the door 3), and the like. Request signal transmission means) 8 is connected.

  An EEPROM 18 as a storage unit is connected to the CPU 17 of the smart keyless ECU 16. The EEPROM 18 stores a unique identification code of the vehicle 14 and can be read out by the CPU 17.

  An RF tuner device 20 as a vehicle antenna unit is connected to the smart keyless ECU 16 mounted on the vehicle 14 side via an interface unit 19.

  The RF tuner device 20 includes a data line 20d and an RSSI line 20e with respect to the interface unit 19, a tuner side interface unit 20c connected via a data line 20a and an RSSI line 20b, and the tuner side interface unit 20c. And an RF demodulation IC 20f that demodulates an RF signal received by the RF antenna unit 23.

  Further, in the smart keyless ECU 16 mounted on the vehicle 14 side, an LF antenna driver 21 that outputs a transmission signal to the LF antenna unit 22 is provided connected to the CPU 17, and the portable device 15 as a portable device is provided. An LF antenna unit 26 that transmits a request signal is connected to the side.

  In the smart keyless ECU 16, when the doors 3 and 3 are locked and unlocked by the door lock actuators 7 and 7, the identification code placed on the received RF signal is displayed on the vehicle. Whether the identification code is the same as the unique identification code stored in the EEPROM 18 is checked.

  And when collation matches, it is judged that it is a regular user U and permission of unlocking is performed.

  Further, when the occupant is in the vehicle, the RF signal is received by the antenna in the passenger compartment and the coincidence of the identification code is determined so that the engine starter device 5 is permitted to start the engine. It is configured.

  Further, on the portable device 15 side carried by the user U, an LF demodulation circuit 25 that performs demodulation is connected to the LF antenna unit 26 that receives the request signal.

  The LF demodulation circuit 25 is connected to a CPU 27 as a portable device side control unit via a data line 25a and an RSSI line 25b.

  The CPU 27 of this embodiment is connected to an RF transmission circuit 29 that transmits an RF signal from an RF antenna unit (identification code signal transmission means) 28.

  Further, the CPU 27 is provided with a key ID storage unit 12 including a memory for storing and storing the same identification code as the unique identification code of the vehicle 14, and from the portable device 15 side, the user U's A key-side request switch 13 for performing the locking and unlocking operations of the door lock actuators 7 and 7 of the door 3 by operation is connected and provided.

  Next, the operational effects associated with the general operation of the smart keyless entry system of this embodiment will be described.

  In this embodiment, when the door request switch 8 provided on the vehicle 14 side is turned on, an LF signal is transmitted from the RF antenna unit 23 via the LF antenna driver 21.

  In the key antenna unit 11 on the portable device 15 side, when this LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26, it is demodulated by the LF demodulation circuit and sent to the CPU 27.

  In the CPU 27, the identification code signal stored in the key ID storage unit 12 is placed on the LF signal received on the user U side and sent to the RF transmission circuit 29.

  In the RF transmission circuit 29, bidirectional communication is performed between the vehicle 14 and the portable device 15 by returning an RF signal from the RF antenna unit 28 to the vehicle 14 side. Configured to be done.

  For this reason, in such a smart keyless entry system, as shown in FIG. 3, a relay theft comprising a first thief K1 having a first repeater J1 and a second thief K2 having a second repeater J2. Possible tricks.

  The first repeater J1 used for the relay relay theft technique is provided with an LF receiving antenna unit 31 connected to the CPU 32 and receiving the request signal, whereby an LF demodulation circuit 30 for demodulating the request signal is provided. , Provided.

  The LF demodulation circuit 30 is configured to generate an RF signal having a relatively long reach by the RF transmission circuit 33 and transmit the demodulated request signal from the RF transmission antenna unit 34 as an RF signal. Yes.

  The second repeater J2 used for the relay relay theft technique is provided with an RF receiving antenna unit 44 that receives the RF signal transmitted from the first repeater J1.

  The RF receiving antenna unit 44 is connected to the CPU 42 via the RF receiving circuit 43.

  In the CPU 42, when the RF receiving antenna unit 44 receives the RF signal transmitted from the first repeater, an LF signal is generated.

  And it is comprised so that this LF signal may be transmitted from LF antenna part 41 of LF drive circuit 40 to which this CPU42 is connected.

  Next, a so-called relay attack theft technique assumed in this embodiment will be described.

  In this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 2, the first thief K1 uses the first repeater J1 to impersonate a legitimate user U and approaches the vehicle 14 to be stolen.

  An RF signal obtained by converting the LF signal sent from the vehicle to the second repeater J2 held by the second thief K2 approaching the user who is away from the vehicle 14, Send it out.

  In the second repeater J2 that has received this RF signal by the RF receiving antenna unit 44, the RF signal is converted so that it becomes the same signal as the LF signal sent from the vehicle 14 to the first thief K1 again. The

  Then, the second thief K2 possessing the second repeater J2 transmits the LF signal to the portable device 15 possessed by the close authorized user U, by imitating the LF signal from the vehicle 14 to the LF antenna unit. 41.

  The portable device 15 that has received the LF signal by the LF antenna unit 26 places the unique identification code stored in the key ID storage unit 12 on the RF signal transmitted from the RF antenna unit 28 of the portable device 15. To the vehicle 14.

  For this reason, as if a person (first theft person K1) existing in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 is returning a proper identification code from the portable device 15, it is impersonated and the door lock of the vehicle 14 is unlocked. Or you can start the engine.

  With respect to such a so-called relay attack theft technique, in the smart keyless entry system of this embodiment, the vehicle 14 is provided in at least one of the CPU 17 of the smart keyless ECU 16 or the CPU 27 of the portable device 15. Impersonation determination means for determining whether a person existing in the vicinity of the person is a regular user or a theft is provided.

  The impersonation determination means of this embodiment has a door unlocking prevention unit 52.

  In this door unlocking prevention unit 52, the relay device held by the person in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 is not the portable device 15, or the authorized user U who owns the portable device 15 exists in the vicinity of the vehicle 14. If it is determined not to be unlocked, the door lock actuators 7 and 7 of the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 14 are prevented from being unlocked without transmitting the unlock signal from the door lock drive driver circuit 51. The door unlocking prevention part 52 is provided.

  In this embodiment, the CPU 17 of the vehicle 14 is provided with an engine start blocking unit 56 that blocks engine start by the engine starter device 5.

  The engine start prevention unit 56 permits the engine start by the engine starter device 5 when the determination by the impersonation determination unit is a regular user U, and when the determination by the impersonation determination unit is not a regular user U, An engine start by the starter device 5 is prevented.

  In the smart keyless entry system according to Example 1 of this embodiment, the CPU 27 on the vehicle 14 side has a spoof determination unit 50, and the CPU 17 on the portable device 15 side has a pair with the spoof determination unit 50. Spoofing determination means 60 is provided for each.

  Among these, as the impersonation determination means 50, the CPU 17 of the vehicle 14 is provided with an RF signal reception intensity measurement circuit 53 for measuring the reception intensity of the RF signal transmitted from the portable device 15.

  A data extraction unit 54 is provided for extracting LF signal strength data included in the RF signal received by the RF antenna unit 23 of the vehicle 14.

  A signal strength comparison / determination unit 55 is provided for comparing the LF signal strength data of the LF signal measured by the portable device 15 and the received strength of the RF signal measured by the RF signal received strength measuring circuit 53. Yes.

  This signal strength comparison / determination unit 55 pays attention to the fact that the signal strength of transmission / reception is inversely proportional to the transmission / reception distance, compares the signal strength of transmission / reception, and receives the LF signal in the vicinity of the vehicle. It is configured to determine whether or not the person is a legitimate user U who has transmitted an RF signal toward the vehicle 14.

  If the user is an authorized user U, the door lock driving driver circuit 51 permits the door unlocking prevention unit 52 to release the lock by the door lock actuators 7 and 7, and the authorized user U. When it is not U, the door lock driving driver circuit 51 is configured to block the door unlocking prevention unit 52 from being unlocked by the door lock actuators 7 and 7.

  Further, the impersonation determination means 60 on the portable device 15 side has an LF signal reception intensity measurement circuit 61 for measuring the signal intensity of the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26 in the CPU 27, and the measured LF. A synthesis reply circuit 62 is provided which places the signal strength on the RF signal as LF signal strength data and sends the signal strength back to the vehicle.

  Next, the effect of the smart keyless entry system of the first embodiment will be described with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG.

  When the vehicle-side on-board device control is started in Step 1, the request signal wait state is entered in Step 2.

  In this request signal waiting state, it is determined whether or not the door request switch 8 provided in the door knob 10 has been pressed.

  That is, in Step 3, when the door request switch 8 is turned on, the process proceeds to the next Step 4. When the door request switch 8 is not turned on but remains OFF, the process returns to Step 2, and is in a standby state. The request signal waiting state is maintained.

  In Step 4, the LF antenna driver 21 transmits an LF signal as a challenge signal from the LF antenna unit 22.

  Then, at Step 5, the RF signal reception wait state is entered.

  On the other hand, on the portable device 15 side, when portable device control is started at Step 6, at Step 7, the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 15 side, or the key side request switch It will be in the state which waits for 13 to be input ON.

  In Step 8, it is determined whether or not an LF signal has been received.

  When the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 15 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 9, and when not received, the process returns to Step 7 to maintain the standby state.

  In Step 9, the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26 is demodulated by the LF demodulation circuit 25, and a unique identification code of the vehicle 14 placed on the LF demodulated signal is stored on the portable device 15 side. It is verified whether or not it matches the identification code.

  In Step 10, when the unique identification code of the vehicle 14 included in the LF demodulated signal matches the identification code stored on the portable device 15 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 11, and if not, the process returns to Step 7. .

  In Step 11, the electric field strength of the received LF signal is set to RSSI (received power) by the LF signal reception strength measuring circuit 61 provided in the CPU 27 for measuring the signal strength of the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26. Is calculated from the signal level).

  In Step 12, the measured LF signal strength is synthesized by the synthesis reply circuit 62 as LF signal strength data including the LF reception RSSI level and response data including the identification code ID on the portable device 15 side. From the RF antenna unit 28 of the RF transmission circuit 29, it is placed on the RF signal and sent back to the vehicle 14.

  In Step 13, when the RF signal is received by the RF antenna unit 23 on the vehicle 14 side, in Step 14, the RF demodulation IC 20f demodulates the RSSI level of the LF signal from the RF signal as an RSSI level.

  The RSSI level is transmitted from the tuner-side interface unit 20c connected via the data line 20d and the RSSI line 20e to the interface unit 19 on the smart keyless ECU 16 side through the data line 20a and the RSSI line 20b.

  In Step 15, the RF signal reception intensity measurement circuit 53 provided in the impersonation determination means 50 of the smart keyless ECU 16 causes the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 15 side to receive the electric field intensity of the LF signal from the RSSI level of the LF signal. Is calculated.

  In Step 16, the data extraction unit 54 extracts the electric field strength of the LF signal received by the portable device 15, and the distance between the LF antenna unit 22 on the vehicle 14 side and the portable device 15 is calculated from the electric field strength.

  In Step 17, the RF electric field strength is calculated from the RSSI level of the RF signal received by the RF antenna unit 23 on the vehicle 14 side.

  In Step 18, the distance between the portable device 15 and the RF antenna unit of the vehicle 14 is calculated from the RF electric field strength.

  In Step 19, the signal strength comparison / determination unit 55 of the impersonation determination unit 50 determines whether or not there is a significant difference between the distance calculated from the LF signal and each distance calculated from the RF signal.

  If there is a difference, the process returns to Step 2 to maintain the request signal standby state, and if there is no difference, the process proceeds to the next Step 20.

  In Step 20, it is checked whether or not the unique identification code stored in the EEPROM 18 provided in the smart keyless ECU 16 of the vehicle 14 matches the identification code stored on the portable device 15 side.

  If they match as a result of the collation, the process proceeds to Step 21 and permits the door unlocking prevention unit 52 to release the door lock, and the engine start prevention unit 56 uses the engine starter device 5 as an engine start control. License to be able to

  As described above, when the signal strength of the LF signal is measured by the LF signal reception strength measurement circuit 61 of the impersonation determination means 60 provided in the portable device 15, the measured LF signal strength is converted into the synthesized signal. The reply circuit 62 places the RF signal as LF signal strength data on the RF signal and sends it back to the vehicle 14 from the RF antenna unit 28.

  When the reception intensity is measured from the RF signal transmitted from the portable device 15 by the RF signal reception intensity measurement circuit 53 provided in the vehicle 14, the LF of the LF signal measured by the portable device 15 is measured. The signal strength data and the received strength of this RF signal are compared by the signal strength comparison / determination unit 55.

  As a result of this comparison, if the LF signal strength data matches the received strength of the RF signal, the transmission / reception distance is the same.

  When a legitimate user U owns the portable device 15 and presses the door request switch 8 or presses the key side request switch in the vicinity of the vehicle 14, the distance of the RF signal and the distance of the LF signal are Match.

  For this reason, it is determined that the person who is present in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 and has received the LF signal is the authorized user U who has transmitted the RF signal toward the vehicle 14.

  Further, when the first thief K1 exists in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 and the authorized user U is away from the vehicle 14, the distance of the RF signal and the distance of the LF signal do not match. , Signal strength is different.

  Thus, as shown in FIG. 1, the LF from the vehicle 14 is transferred to the portable device 15 held by the authorized user U approaching the vehicle 14 when there is no first theft user K1 and the second theft user K2. When the signal is transmitted, the unique identification code stored on the portable device 15 side is put on the RF signal transmitted from the portable device 15 side and returned to the vehicle 14.

  In the vehicle 14, the unique identification code stored in the EEPROM 18 matches the unique identification code stored in the portable device 15, so that the doors 3 and 3 via the door lock drive driver circuit 51, The door lock actuators 7 and 7 are locked and unlocked, and engine start control using the engine starter device 5 can be performed.

  In addition, if the LF signal strength data does not match the reception strength of the RF signal and the LF signal strength data is stronger than the reception strength of the RF signal, the LF signal is The received first repeater J1 is in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 and the person who has received the LF signal having a strong signal strength impersonates the user U who has sent the RF signal toward the vehicle 14 at a distance. It is determined that it is not the authorized user U who is the first thief K1 who is close to the second thief K2 who owns the second repeater J2 at a distance.

  In this manner, the impersonation determination means 50 on the vehicle 14 side is such that the first relay device J1 possessed by a person in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 is not the portable device 15 or is a regular user U who owns the portable device 15. However, when it is determined that it does not exist in the vicinity of the vehicle 14 based on a difference in signal strength, the door unlocking prevention unit 52 is prevented so that the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 14 are not unlocked. However, the door lock drive driver circuit 51 prevents locking and unlocking of the key using the door lock actuators 7 and 7, and the engine start blocking unit 56 blocks engine start using the engine starter device 5. .

  For this reason, in the so-called relay attack method, when the identification code is collated, it is determined by the impersonation determination means 50 and 60 that impersonation is being performed, and the door 3 by the door unlocking prevention unit 52 is determined. , 3 is not unlocked.

  Accordingly, the doors 3 and 3 of the vehicle 14 cannot be opened and the engine cannot be started, so that the anti-theft function can be improved.

  Other configurations and operational effects are the same as or equivalent to those of the above-described embodiment, and thus description thereof is omitted.

  5 to 7 show a smart keyless entry system according to the second embodiment of the present invention.

  In addition, the same code | symbol is attached | subjected and demonstrated about the same thru | or equivalent part as the said embodiment and Example 1. FIG.

  First, the configuration will be described focusing on the differences from the first embodiment. In the smart keyless entry system for the vehicle 114 according to the second embodiment, the CPU 127 on the portable device 115 side as a portable device is used as the impersonation determination means 160. The response time measuring unit 161 is provided.

  The response time measuring unit 161 is configured to measure the response time from the reception of the LF signal added to the returned data to the portable device 115 until the output of the RF signal as response time data. .

  Further, the CPU 127 on the portable device 115 side is provided with a portable device response time adding unit 162 as an impersonation determining means 160.

  The portable device response time adding unit 162 is configured to add the response time data measured by the response time measuring unit 161 to the RF signal and send it back.

  In addition, the impersonation determination means 150 on the vehicle 114 side of the second embodiment is provided with a timer unit 153 as a reply time measuring unit and a reply time measuring unit 151.

  The reply time measuring unit 151 is configured to measure the reply time required from when the LF signal is transmitted until the RF signal is received.

  Furthermore, the impersonation determination means 150 on the vehicle 114 side of the second embodiment is provided with a reaction time comparison determination unit 152.

  The reaction time comparison / determination unit 152 is configured to determine whether or not the user is a regular user U by comparing the response time data with the response time measured by the response time measuring unit 151. ing.

  Next, the operation and effect of the smart keyless entry system of the second embodiment will be described.

  In the second embodiment, as shown in Step 101 in FIG. 7, when control of the vehicle-mounted device on the vehicle 114 side is started, Step 102 waits for a request signal.

  In the request signal waiting state, in Step 103, it is determined whether or not the door request switch 8 provided in the door knob unit 10 has been pressed.

  That is, in Step 103, when the door request switch 8 is turned ON, the process proceeds to the next Step 104. When the door request switch 8 is not turned ON but remains OFF, the process returns to Step 102 and is in a standby state. A request signal waiting state is maintained.

  In Step 104, the LF antenna driver 21 transmits an LF signal as a challenge signal from the LF antenna unit 22.

  From this point, in Step 105, the timer unit 153 starts time measurement.

  At Step 106, the RF signal reception wait state is entered.

  On the other hand, on the portable device 115 side, when portable device control is started in Step 104, in Step 108, the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 115 side, or the key-side request is received. Whether the switch 13 is turned ON is in a standby state.

  In Step 109, it is determined whether or not an LF signal has been received.

  When the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 115 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 110, and when not received, the process returns to Step 108 to maintain the standby state.

  In Step 110, the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26 is demodulated by the LF demodulation circuit 25, and a unique identification code of the vehicle 114 placed on the LF demodulated signal is stored on the portable device 115 side. It is verified whether or not it matches the identification code.

  In Step 111, if the unique identification code of the vehicle 114 placed on the LF demodulated signal matches the identification code stored on the portable device 115 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 112, and if not, the process returns to Step 108.

  In Step 112, the response time measured by the response time measurement unit 161 of the impersonation determination means 160 provided in the CPU 127 is added by the portable device response time addition unit 162, and the response data includes an identification code ID. Are combined, put on the RF signal from the RF antenna unit 28 of the RF transmission circuit 29, and returned to the vehicle 114.

  In Step 113, when the RF signal is received by the RF antenna unit 23 on the vehicle 114 side, the RF demodulation IC 20f demodulates the identification code from the RF signal and demodulates the synthesized response time data.

  In Step 114, the time measurement value of the timer unit 153 is read.

  In Step 115, the demodulated timer value is compared with the measured timer value to determine whether or not the time measured by the timer unit 153 is appropriate.

  That is, when the time until the RF signal is transmitted from the RL antenna unit 28 on the portable device 115 side matches the time measured by the timer unit 153 on the vehicle 114 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 115, If they are different, return to Step 102.

  In Step 116, it is verified whether or not the unique identification code stored in the EEPROM 18 provided in the smart keyless ECU 116 of the vehicle 114 matches the identification code stored on the portable device 115 side.

  If they match as a result of the collation, the process proceeds to Step 117, the door unlocking prevention unit 52 is permitted to release the door lock, and the engine start prevention unit 56 uses the engine starter device 5 for the engine start control. License to be able to

  If they do not match, the process returns to Step 102 and the request signal waiting state is maintained.

  As described above, in the second embodiment, the response time measurement unit 161 of the impersonation determination unit 160 on the portable device 115 side receives the LF signal added to the returned data until the RF signal is output. Response time is measured as response time data.

  In the portable device response time adding unit 162 of the portable device 115, the response time data measured by the response time measuring unit 161 is added to the RF signal and returned to the vehicle 114 side.

  In the vehicle 114, the timer unit 153 measures the time required from when the LF signal is transmitted until the RF signal is received.

  Then, as shown in FIG. 6, the response time comparison unit 152 compares the response time data with the time measured by the timer unit 153, and the response time data and the timer unit 153 If the measured times coincide with each other, the relay device of the thief is not present, so that it is determined that the user is an authorized user, and is measured by the timer unit 153 rather than the response time data. If the time is significantly different, such as a long time, the first repeater J1 and the second repeater J2 of the first theft user K1 and the second theft person K2 are interposed. It is determined that the response signal is transmitted from the portable device 115 in a state of being away from the mobile device 115, and it is determined that the user U is not in the vicinity of the vehicle 114.

  Other configurations and operational effects are the same as or equivalent to those of the above-described embodiment and Example 1, and thus description thereof is omitted.

  8 to 10 show a smart keyless entry system according to the third embodiment of the present invention.

  In addition, the same code | symbol is attached | subjected and demonstrated about the same thru | or equivalent part as the said embodiment and Example 1 and 2. FIG.

  First, the configuration will be described focusing on the differences from the first and second embodiments. In the smart keyless entry system for the vehicle 214 according to the third embodiment, the smart keyless ECU 216 on the vehicle 214 side is configured as an impersonation determination means 250. An LF signal strength setting unit 251 is provided.

  The LF signal strength setting unit 251 keeps the strength of the LF signal transmitted from the LF antenna unit 22 constant and attenuates the LF signal strength setting unit 251 in response to an increase in the separation distance from the LF antenna unit 22. A signal is sent to the driver 21.

  In the smart keyless entry system for the vehicle 214 of the third embodiment, the CPU 227 on the portable device 215 side as a portable device is provided with an RF signal intensity setting unit 261 as impersonation determination means 260.

  When the RF signal strength setting unit 261 sends a response by an LF signal sent from the vehicle, the output value of the RF signal to be transmitted is an arrival distance that is about the reach of the LF signal output from the vehicle 214. It is comprised so that it may become.

  Further, the impersonation determination means 260 of the third embodiment is provided with a distance calculation unit 262.

  The distance calculation unit 262 is configured to calculate the distance between the LF antenna unit 22 on the vehicle 214 side and the portable device 215 from the measured LF signal strength and generate distance data. Yes.

  Further, in the third embodiment, when the RF request signal is output when the key-side request switch 13 is turned on, the output value of the transmitted RF signal is output as it is without decreasing. Has been.

  In the third embodiment, when the reach distance of the LF signal is about 0.5 m, the reach distance of the RF signal is also set to be about 0.5 m.

  Next, the effect of the smart keyless entry system of the third embodiment will be described with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG.

  When vehicle-side onboard control is started at Step 201, a request signal wait state is entered at Step 202.

  In this request signal waiting state, it is determined whether or not the door request switch 8 provided in the door knob 10 has been pressed.

  That is, in Step 203, when the door request switch 8 is turned ON, the process proceeds to the next Step 204. When the door request switch 8 is not turned ON but remains OFF, the process returns to Step 202 and is in a standby state. The request signal waiting state is maintained.

  In Step 204, the LF antenna driver 21 transmits an LF signal as a challenge signal from the LF antenna unit 22.

  Then, in step 205, the RF signal reception wait state is entered.

  On the other hand, on the portable device 215 side, when portable device control is started in Step 206, in Step 207, the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 215 side, or the key side request switch Whether or not 13 is input is in a standby state.

  In Step 208, it is determined whether or not an LF signal has been received.

  If the LF signal is received by the LF antenna unit 26 on the portable device 215 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 209. If not received, the process returns to Step 207 to maintain the standby state.

  In Step 209, the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26 is demodulated by the LF demodulation circuit 25, and the unique identification code of the vehicle 214 placed on the LF demodulated signal is stored on the portable device 215 side. It is verified whether or not it matches the identification code.

  In Step 210, if the unique identification code of the vehicle 214 placed on the LF demodulated signal matches the identification code stored on the portable device 215 side, the process proceeds to the next Step 211, and if not, the process returns to Step 207. .

  In Step 211, the electric field strength of the received LF signal is set to RSSI (reception power) by the LF signal reception strength measurement circuit 261 that is provided in the CPU 227 and measures the signal strength of the LF signal received by the LF antenna unit 26. Is calculated from the signal level).

  In Step 212, the distance between the LF antenna unit 22 on the vehicle 214 side and the portable device 215 is calculated from the measured LF signal intensity by the distance calculation unit 262.

  The distance calculated by the distance calculation unit 262 is used as distance data, and is used for setting the signal strength of the RF signal returned from the RF antenna unit 28 of the RF transmission circuit 29.

  That is, in Step 213, the distance data calculated and generated by the distance calculation unit 262 is used by the RF signal intensity setting unit 261 to set the output of the RF signal to be set, and according to a predetermined distance. The RF signal output value is set.

  In Step 214, the RF signal is transmitted as response data from the RF antenna unit 28 of the RF transmission circuit 29.

  In Step 215, if the RF signal can be received, the process proceeds to Step 216, and the unique identification code stored in the EEPROM 18 provided in the smart keyless ECU 16 of the vehicle 14 matches the identification code stored in the portable device 215 side. It is verified whether or not.

  If they match as a result of the collation, the process proceeds to Step 214, the door unlocking prevention unit 52 is permitted to release the door lock, and the engine start prevention unit 56 uses the engine starter device 5 for engine start control. License to be able to

  In step 216, if the collation results do not match, the process returns to step 202, and the request signal waiting state is maintained.

  Also, if the RF signal cannot be received at Step 215, the first thief K1 near the door 3 of the vehicle 214 has received the LF signal at a short distance, so the output of the returned RF signal is also weak. Thus, it is considered that the RF antenna unit 23 of the vehicle 214 was not reached by the output from the portable device possessed by the authorized user U away from the door 3.

  Therefore, the door unlocking prevention unit 52 is not permitted to release the door lock, and the engine start prevention unit 56 is prevented from performing the engine start control using the engine starter device 5.

  As described above, in the third embodiment, when the RF signal strength setting unit 261 of the impersonation determination unit 260 replies to the portable device 215 by the LF signal transmitted from the vehicle 214, the vehicle 214 The output value of the transmitted RF signal is set low so that the reachable distance is about the reachable distance of the output LF signal.

  For this reason, even if a person in the vicinity of the vehicle 214 impersonates the authorized user U, an RF signal that does not have a reachable distance to the vehicle 214 is transmitted from the portable device 215 side of the authorized user U existing at a long distance. It is output, does not reach, and cannot be received on the vehicle 214 side.

  Therefore, the impersonation theft technique cannot be unlocked to open the door, so-called relay attack is prevented, and the anti-theft property is improved.

  As described above, this embodiment and Examples 1 to 3 have been described in detail with reference to the drawings. However, the specific configuration is not limited to this embodiment and Examples 1 to 3, and does not depart from the gist of the present invention. A degree of design change is included in the present invention.

  That is, in the embodiment and Examples 1 to 3, the door request switch 8 is provided as the request signal transmission means. However, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, a proximity sensor is connected to the smart keyless ECU 16. When the user U approaches, the request signal may be transmitted.

  Furthermore, in the second embodiment, the response time from when the response time measuring unit 161 of the impersonation determination unit 160 on the portable device 115 side receives the LF signal added to the returned data until the RF signal is output. Is measured as response time data. However, the present invention is not limited to this. For example, in the portable device response time adding unit 162 of the portable device 115, the response time data measured by the response time measuring unit 161 is used. May not be added to the RF signal and returned to the vehicle 114 side, and the RF signal is received after the LF signal is transmitted by the timer unit 153 on the vehicle 114 side. The time required for the operation is measured, and when the authorized user U is in the authorized door unlocking position near the door 3 and using the portable device 115 in advance. By comparison with between, it may be configured to perform the determination.

  In this case, since the impersonation determination means 160 on the portable device 115 side can be simplified or omitted, an increase in manufacturing cost can be further suppressed.

1 is a schematic side view of a vehicle showing a smart keyless entry system according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a typical perspective view explaining the relay attack theft technique of the smart keyless entry system of Example 1 of the best embodiment of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the smart keyless entry system of Example 1 of the best mode of this invention. It is a flowchart figure explaining operation | movement of the smart keyless entry system of Example 1 of the best mode of this invention. It is a typical perspective view explaining the relay attack theft technique of the smart keyless entry system of Example 2 of the best embodiment of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the smart keyless entry system of Example 2 of the best mode of this invention. It is a flowchart figure explaining operation | movement of the smart keyless entry system of Example 2 of the best mode of this invention. It is a typical perspective view explaining the relay attack theft technique of the smart keyless entry system of Example 3 of the best mode of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the structure of the smart keyless entry system of Example 3 of the best mode of this invention. It is a flowchart figure explaining operation | movement of the smart keyless entry system of Example 3 of the best mode of this invention. It is a typical vehicle side view which shows the smart keyless entry system of a prior art example. It is a typical perspective view explaining the whole structure in the smart keyless entry system of a prior art example.

Explanation of symbols


14, 114, 214 Vehicle
15, 115, 215 portable device
16, 116, 216 Smart keyless ECU (key side control unit)
17, 117, 217 CPU (vehicle-side control unit)
50, 60, 150, 160, 250, 260
Impersonation determination means
52 Door unlocking prevention part
53 RF signal reception strength measurement circuit
54 Data Extraction Department
55 Signal strength comparison / determination unit
56 Engine start prevention part
61 LF signal reception strength measurement circuit
62 Composite reply circuit
151 Response time measurement unit
152 Reaction time comparison / determination unit
153 Timer section
161 Response time measurement unit
162 Mobile device response time adding section
261 RF signal strength setting section
262 Distance calculator
U Regular user
J1 first repeater
J2 Second repeater
K1 first theft
K2 Second theft

Claims (4)

  1. A smart keyless entry system in which two-way communication is performed between the vehicle and the portable device carried by the user to lock and unlock the door of the vehicle. Used in smart keyless entry systems that support relay relay theft techniques,
    The relay relay theft technique is that the first thief impersonates an authorized user using the first repeater, and sends the LF signal sent from the vehicle to the second repeater owned by the second thief. The RF signal obtained by the conversion is sent out, and the second repeater converts it again into the LF signal sent to the first theft, and the second theft who owns the second repeater approaches The mobile phone owned by the authorized user is sent out in a manner similar to the LF signal from the vehicle, and the unique identification code stored in the mobile device is placed on the RF signal transmitted from the mobile device, and the vehicle Is a smart keyless entry system that supports spoofing theft as if a person in the vicinity of the vehicle is returning a legitimate identification code from the mobile device,
    A spoof determination unit is provided for determining whether a person existing in the vicinity of the vehicle is a regular user or a first theft, and a relay device possessed by a person in the vicinity of the vehicle is provided by the spoof determination unit. And a door unlocking prevention unit that does not unlock the door of the vehicle when it is determined that the authorized user who is not the portable device or does not exist in the vicinity of the vehicle. Smart keyless entry system characterized by
  2.   In the impersonation determination means, an LF signal reception strength measurement circuit for measuring the signal strength of the LF signal is placed on the portable device, and the measured LF signal strength is placed on the RF signal as LF signal strength data. And an RF signal reception intensity measurement circuit for measuring reception intensity from an RF signal transmitted from the portable device, and the LF measured by the portable device. By comparing the LF signal strength data of the signal and the received strength of the RF signal, the authorized user who is present in the vicinity of the vehicle and has received the LF signal sends the RF signal toward the vehicle. 2. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising a signal intensity comparison / determination unit that determines whether or not
  3.   In the impersonation determination means, a response time measuring unit that measures response time from reception of an LF signal added to data to be returned to output of an RF signal as response time data to the portable device, and the response time A measuring unit that adds the measured response time data to the RF signal and returns a portable device response time adding unit, and transmits the LF signal to the vehicle before the RF signal A response time measurement unit that measures the response time required until receiving the response time, the response time data and the response time measured by the response time measurement unit are compared to determine whether or not the user is a legitimate user. 2. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising a reaction time comparison / determination unit for determining.
  4.   In the impersonation determination means, when returning to the portable device by the LF signal sent from the vehicle, the output value of the transmitted RF signal is set to reach the reach of the LF signal output from the vehicle. 2. The smart keyless entry system according to claim 1, further comprising an RF signal intensity setting unit for reducing the distance so as to be a distance.
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JP2013147849A (en) * 2012-01-19 2013-08-01 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Electronic key device and master unit to be used for the same
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