JP2010253104A - Electronic device, game machine, main control board, peripheral board, authentication method and authentication program - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To prevent a fraudulent act for an electronic device by preventing the connection of a fraudulent control board between a regular main control board and a peripheral part. <P>SOLUTION: The main control board 310 determines a partition number for partitioning the data stored in a data storage part 311. The main control board 310 partitions the data into the partition number, generates authentication data by performing binomial operation satisfying a combination rule for each, and generates dummy authentication data which are the dummy values of the authentication data. The peripheral board 320 receives the authentication data and dummy authentication data and authenticates the main control part using the authentication data. The peripheral board 320 carries out authentication by distinguishing the authentication data and dummy authentication data based on the number of authentication data which becomes the object of the binomial operation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2011,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that include a plurality of boards and authenticate communication between these boards.

  Conventionally, in an electronic apparatus having a plurality of substrates, various techniques have been proposed for preventing fraud on these substrates. As an electronic device provided with a plurality of substrates, for example, there is a pachinko gaming machine. The pachinko gaming machine includes a main control board that controls the operation of the entire electronic device, and a controlled board (peripheral part) that operates each part of the electronic device. The main control board outputs a control signal including a control command to the peripheral part, and the other peripheral parts have a function of executing an operation according to the control signal transmitted from the main control board.

  Examples of frauds with respect to the main control board include a method of replacing a regular main control board with an illegal control board, or altering a program code that defines processing performed by the main control board. In order to prevent such fraud, for example, a technique has been proposed in which program data recorded in a ROM mounted on the main control board is checked by a ROM checker to prevent illegal exchange of the ROM ( For example, see the following Patent Document 1.)

JP 11-333108 A

  However, according to the technique disclosed in Patent Document 1 described above, although falsification of program data can be detected, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a controlled board. Can not. For this reason, there is a problem that the controlled substrate performs unauthorized control by the control signal output from the unauthorized control substrate.

  Here, a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art will be described with reference to FIGS. 15 and 16. FIG. 15 is an explanatory diagram showing an outline of a fraud prevention technique according to the prior art. FIG. 16 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of inserting an unauthorized control board. As shown in FIG. 15, the regular main control board 1501 outputs a regular control signal RS to the peripheral board 1502 to control the operation of the peripheral board 1502. A regular main control board 1501 is provided with an inspection port 1503. The program data recorded in the ROM or the like provided inside the regular main control board 1501 is inspected from the inspection port 1503 to inspect whether the regular main control board 1501 is fraudulent.

  However, as shown in FIG. 16, an unauthorized control board 1601 may be inserted between the regular main control board 1501 and the peripheral board 1502. The unauthorized control board 1601 discards or ignores the authorized control signal RS output from the authorized main control board 1501 and outputs an unauthorized control signal FS to the peripheral board 1502 instead. Here, the peripheral board 1502 cannot determine whether the input signal is the normal control signal RS or the illegal control signal FS. For this reason, there is a problem that the peripheral board 1502 operates according to an unauthorized control signal FS.

  In addition, since the inspection port 1503 is provided only on the regular main control board 1501, even if the inspection using the inspection port 1503 is performed, the inspection result for the process in the regular main control board 1501 is returned. . For this reason, there is a problem that even if the inspection using the inspection port 1503 is performed, the unauthorized control by the unauthorized control board 1601 cannot be detected.

  In order to solve the above-described problems caused by the prior art, the present invention prevents an unauthorized control board from being connected between a regular main control board and a peripheral portion, and is applied to electronic devices such as pachinko machines. An object is to provide an electronic device, a gaming machine, a main control board, a peripheral board, an authentication method, and an authentication program that can prevent fraud.

  In order to solve the above-described problems and achieve the object, an electronic device according to the invention of claim 1 includes a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. The main control unit includes a data storage unit for storing predetermined data and a number for dividing the data stored in the data storage unit (hereinafter referred to as “division number”). ) Determining means for determining) and dividing the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions, and performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling law on each of the divided data, and authenticating the number of divisions Authentication value generation means for generating a value, dummy value generation means for generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions, transmission means for transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral part, The peripheral unit includes a receiving unit that receives the authentication value and the dummy value, and a calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the authentication value received by the receiving unit matches a predetermined expected value. Authentication means for authenticating the main control unit based on whether or not to do, the expected value is a value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means, The authentication means identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established, and performs the authentication. It is characterized by performing.

  According to the first aspect of the present invention, the main control unit generates a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means and transmits it to the peripheral unit. In addition, the peripheral unit identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of authentication values (the number of combinations) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. Perform authentication. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values that only the main control unit and the peripheral part know, the unauthorized analyst cannot identify the authentication value and the dummy value. Therefore, according to the first aspect of the present invention, the possibility that the authentication value is illegally stolen can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process between the main control unit and the peripheral unit can be improved.

  The electronic device according to a second aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to the first aspect, wherein the dummy value generation means generates the same number of dummy values as the number of divisions, and the transmission means determines the number of divisions. Immediately after transmitting the authentication value, the dummy values for the number of divisions are transmitted, and the authentication means receives a value received immediately after the authentication value that is the target of the two-term operation when the authentication is established. Among them, the number of authentication values that are the targets of the binary operation are identified as the dummy values.

  According to the second aspect of the present invention, the peripheral portion can identify the value corresponding to the number of combinations received immediately after the authentication value as a dummy value. As a result, the authentication value can be identified and the dummy value can be identified and the authentication process can be performed without increasing the processing load on the peripheral portion.

  The electronic device according to a third aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to the first or second aspect, wherein the transmission means adds the authentication value or the dummy value to the control command and transmits the control command to the peripheral portion. It is characterized by.

  According to the third aspect of the present invention, an increase in communication load between the main control unit and the peripheral unit can be suppressed as compared with the case where the authentication value or the dummy value is transmitted alone. According to the invention of claim 3, the possibility that the authentication value is extracted from the communication data and analyzed can be reduced as compared with the case where the authentication value is transmitted alone.

  According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the third aspect, the authentication value generation means generates the authentication value using the control command to which the authentication value is added. Features.

  According to the fourth aspect of the present invention, the authentication value is generated using the control command to which the authentication value is added and transmitted. In general, an unauthorized control unit tries to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of a regular main control unit. If the authentication value is generated by using the control command transmitted this time as in the invention of claim 4, even if the authentication value is reused by an unauthorized control unit, the authentication value and the control command can be matched. Unable to detect fraud.

  An electronic device according to a fifth aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to fourth aspects, wherein the authentication value generating means encrypts the authentication value with a predetermined encryption method, The authentication means performs the authentication by decrypting the authentication value with a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method.

  According to the fifth aspect of the present invention, since the authentication value is encrypted and transmitted / received, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication value generation method is analyzed and the authentication value and the dummy value are reused.

  According to a sixth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to the fifth aspect, the authentication value generating means changes the authentication value encryption method based on the number of divisions, and the authentication means The authentication value decryption method is changed based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established.

  According to the invention of claim 6, the fraud analyst cannot know the switching timing of the authentication value encryption method, and the generation method of the authentication value is analyzed, or the authentication value and the dummy value are reused. Can be further reduced.

  An electronic device according to a seventh aspect of the present invention is the electronic device according to any one of the first to sixth aspects, wherein the data storage means stores program data used in the main control unit. And

  According to the seventh aspect of the invention, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of program data recorded in the main control unit, unauthorized replacement of storage means of the main control unit, and the like.

  According to an eighth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic device according to any one of the first to seventh aspects, the binary operation is an addition or exclusive OR operation.

  According to the invention of claim 8, addition and exclusive OR operation can be switched and used as the binary operation used for generating the authentication value.

  A gaming machine according to a ninth aspect of the invention includes the electronic device according to any one of the first to eighth aspects, wherein the main control unit is a main control board, and the peripheral portion is a peripheral board. It is characterized by that.

  According to the ninth aspect of the present invention, the main control unit generates a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions obtained by dividing the data in the data storage means and transmits it to the peripheral unit. In addition, the peripheral unit identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of authentication values (the number of combinations) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. Perform authentication. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values that only the main control unit and the peripheral part know, the unauthorized analyst cannot identify the authentication value and the dummy value. For this reason, according to the invention of claim 9, the possibility that the authentication value is illegally stolen can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication processing between the main control unit and the peripheral unit can be improved.

  The main control board according to the invention of claim 10 is a main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command for causing a peripheral board to perform a predetermined process, and is a data storage means for storing predetermined data. Determining means for determining the number of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “number of divisions”), and dividing the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions; Authentication value generation means for generating an authentication value corresponding to the number of divisions by performing a binary operation satisfying a coupling rule for each of the divided data, and generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions Dummy value generating means for transmitting, and transmitting means for transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral board.

  According to the invention of claim 10, the main control board generates a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions obtained by dividing the data in the data storage means and transmits it to the peripheral board. Since the number of divisions is a value known only by the main control board, the unauthorized analyst cannot distinguish between the authentication value and the dummy value. Therefore, according to the invention of claim 10, the possibility that the authentication value is illegally stolen can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process between the main control board and the peripheral board can be improved.

  The peripheral board according to the invention of claim 11 is a peripheral board that is mounted on an electronic device and performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board, and is transmitted by the main control board. A receiving unit that receives an authentication value and a dummy value of the authentication value; and whether or not a calculation result obtained by performing the two-term operation on the authentication value received by the receiving unit matches a predetermined expected value. Authentication means for authenticating the main control board based on the authentication means, wherein the authentication means is based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board is established. The authentication is performed by identifying the authentication value and the dummy value.

  According to the eleventh aspect of the present invention, the peripheral board is configured such that when the authentication for the main control board is established, the authentication value and the dummy value And authenticate the main control board. Since the number of couplings is a value that only the peripheral board knows, the unauthorized analyst cannot identify the authentication value and the dummy value. Therefore, according to the eleventh aspect of the invention, the possibility that the authentication value is illegally stolen can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process between the main control board and the peripheral board can be improved.

  An authentication method according to a twelfth aspect of the present invention is an authentication method in an electronic device comprising a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit. A determination step of determining a number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means for storing predetermined data (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) in the main control unit; An authentication value generating step of dividing the data into the number of divisions, performing a binomial operation satisfying a combining rule for each of the divided data, and generating authentication values for the number of divisions; and A dummy value generating step of generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the above, and a transmitting step of transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral portion. A reception step of receiving the value and the dummy value, and whether the calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the authentication value received in the reception step matches a predetermined expected value. An authentication step for authenticating the control unit, wherein the expected value is a value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means, and in the authentication step, the main control unit The authentication is performed by identifying the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation when the authentication is established.

  According to the twelfth aspect of the invention, the main control board generates a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions obtained by dividing the data in the data storage means and transmits it to the peripheral board. In addition, the peripheral board identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of authentication values (the number of combinations) subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board is established. Perform authentication. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control board and the peripheral board, the unauthorized analyst cannot distinguish between the authentication value and the dummy value. Therefore, according to the twelfth aspect of the present invention, the possibility that the authentication value is illegally stolen can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process between the main control board and the peripheral board can be improved.

  An authentication program according to a thirteenth aspect of the present invention causes a computer to execute the authentication method according to the twelfth aspect.

  According to the invention of claim 13, the computer can execute the authentication method of claim 12.

  According to the electronic device, the gaming machine, the main control board, the peripheral board, the authentication method and the authentication program according to the present invention, it is possible to prevent an unauthorized control board from being connected between the authorized main control board and the peripheral portion. Thus, fraud to electronic devices such as pachinko machines can be prevented.

It is a front view which shows an example of the game board of the pachinko game machine of this invention. It is a block diagram which shows the internal structure of the control part of a pachinko game machine. It is a block diagram which shows the functional structure of a main control board and a peripheral board | substrate. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the control process of the production | presentation control part by the main control part. It is a time chart which shows the transmission timing of a jackpot related command. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the symbol variation process by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the process at the time of the big hit by an effect control part. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the lamp control process at the time of the symbol variation by a lamp control part. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the data format of the control signal which a main control part outputs. It is explanatory drawing which shows typically the production | generation method of the authentication data (inspection value) in a main control part. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit 201. It is a flowchart which shows the procedure of the reception process of the control signal by a peripheral part. It is a sequence diagram which shows an example of the flow of data between control parts. It is explanatory drawing which shows the outline | summary of the fraud prevention technique by a prior art. It is explanatory drawing which shows the example of insertion of an unauthorized control board.

(Embodiment)
Referring to the accompanying drawings, control signals between a pachinko gaming machine having the function of an electronic device according to the present invention and a plurality of boards (main control board and peripheral board) mounted on the pachinko gaming machine will be described below. A preferred embodiment of an authentication method and an authentication program for authenticating an included control command will be described in detail.

(Basic configuration of pachinko machine)
FIG. 1 is a front view showing an example of a game board of a pachinko gaming machine according to the present invention. A game ball launched by driving a launching unit (see FIG. 2) arranged at a lower position of the game board 101 ascends between the rails 102a and 102b and reaches an upper position of the game board 101, and then the game area 103 Fall inside. A plurality of nails (not shown) are provided in the game area 103, and the game ball is dropped in various directions, and a windmill or a prize opening that changes the fall direction of the game ball is placed in the middle of the fall. Is arranged.

  A symbol display unit 104 is arranged at the center of the game area 103 of the game board 101. As the symbol display unit 104, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD) is used. The symbol display unit 104 is not limited to the LCD, and a CRT or the like can also be used. Below the symbol display unit 104, a start winning port 105 for starting winning is arranged. Winning gates 106 are arranged on the left and right of the symbol display unit 104, respectively.

  The winning gate 106 is provided to detect the passing of the game ball and perform a lottery to open the start winning opening 105 for a predetermined time. A normal winning opening 107 is disposed on the side of the symbol display unit 104 or below. When a game ball wins the normal winning opening 107, the number of winning balls (for example, 10) at the time of the normal winning is paid out. At the bottom of the game area 103, there is provided a collection port 108 for collecting game balls that have not won any winning ports.

  The symbol display unit 104 described above starts a variation in the display of a plurality of symbols when a game ball is won at a specific winning opening (at the time of starting winning), and the symbol stops after a predetermined time. When the specific symbols (for example, “777”) are aligned at the time of the stop, a big hit state is obtained. In the big hit state, the big winning opening 109 located below repeats opening for a predetermined period for a predetermined round (for example, 15 rounds), and pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning game balls.

  FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the internal configuration of the control unit of the pachinko gaming machine. The control unit 200 includes a plurality of control units. In the example of illustration, it has the main control part 201 and the peripheral part (The effect control part 202, the prize ball control part 203). The main control unit 201 controls basic operations related to the game of the pachinko gaming machine. The production control unit 202 controls the production operation during the game. The prize ball control unit 203 controls the number of prize balls to be paid out.

  Based on the program data stored in the ROM 212, the main control unit 201 executes a CPU 211 that performs basic processing as the game content progresses, a RAM 213 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 211 performs arithmetic processing, and each detection unit 221- An interface (I / F) 214 that receives various data from the H.224 and transmits various data to the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 is configured. The main control unit 201 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called main control board.

  On the input side of the main control unit 201, a start winning port detection unit 221 that detects a winning ball that has won a winning winning port 105, a gate detection unit 222 that detects a game ball that has passed through the winning gate 106, and a normal win An ordinary winning opening detection unit 223 that detects a game ball won in the mouth 107 and a large winning opening detection unit 224 that detects a winning ball won in the big winning opening 109 are connected via the I / F 214. These detection units can be configured using proximity switches or the like.

  A prize winning opening / closing part 231 is connected to the output side of the main control part 201, and the opening / closing of the prize winning opening / closing part 231 is controlled. The special prize opening / closing unit 231 has a function of opening the special prize opening 109 for a certain period of time when a big hit is made, and is configured using a solenoid or the like. This jackpot is programmed in advance to occur with a predetermined probability (for example, 1/300, etc.) based on the generated random number (random number for jackpot determination).

  The effect control unit 202 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 242 based on these commands to perform effect control during the game. The effect control unit 202 includes a CPU 241 that executes effect processing, a RAM 243 that functions as a data work area during the calculation processing of the CPU 241, a VRAM 244 that writes image data to be displayed on the symbol display unit 104, and various types from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 245 for receiving data and transmitting various data to the lamp control unit 251 and the voice control unit 252 is provided. The effect control unit 202 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called effect board. In addition, the above-described symbol display unit (LCD) 104, lamp control unit 251, and voice control unit 252 are connected to the output side of the effect control unit 202 via the I / F 245.

  The winning ball control unit 203 receives control signals including various control commands from the main control unit 201, and executes program data stored in the ROM 282 based on these commands to perform winning ball control. The prize ball control unit 203 includes a CPU 281 that executes prize ball control processing, a RAM 283 that functions as a data work area when the CPU 281 performs arithmetic processing, and various data reception and emission units 292 from the main control unit 201. An interface (I / F) 284 that transmits and receives various data is provided. The prize ball control unit 203 realizes its function by, for example, a so-called prize ball substrate.

  The winning ball control unit 203 performs control for paying out the number of winning balls at the time of winning a prize to the connected paying unit 291. In addition, an operation of launching a game ball with respect to the launch unit 292 is detected, and the launch of the game ball is controlled. The payout unit 291 includes a motor for paying out a predetermined number from the game ball storage unit. The winning ball control unit 203 controls the paying unit 291 to pay out the number of winning balls corresponding to the game balls won in each winning port (start winning port 105, normal winning port 107, large winning port 109). Do it.

  The launcher 292 launches a game ball for a game, and includes a sensor that detects a game operation by the player, a solenoid that launches the game ball, and the like. When the prize ball control unit 203 detects a game operation by the sensor of the launch unit 292, the prize ball control unit 203 intermittently fires a game ball by driving a solenoid or the like in response to the detected game operation, thereby playing the game area 103 of the game board 101. A game ball is sent out.

  The main control unit 201, the effect control unit 202, and the prize ball control unit 203 configured as described above are provided on different printed circuit boards (main control board, effect board, and prize ball board). For example, the prize ball control unit 203 can be provided on the same printed circuit board as the main control unit 201.

(Functional configuration of main control board and peripheral board)
FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a main control board (main control unit) and peripheral boards (effect control unit, prize ball control unit). First, a functional configuration of the main control board 310 having a function as the main control unit 201 will be described. As shown in FIG. 3, the main control board 310 is a functional unit that transmits a control command for operating the peripheral board 320, and includes a data storage unit 311, a determination unit 312, an authentication data generation unit 313, and a dummy data generation unit. 314 and the transmission unit 315.

  The data storage unit 311 stores predetermined data. The predetermined data is program data used in the main control board 310, for example. As the data storage unit 311, for example, a part of the ROM 212 (see FIG. 2) of the main control unit 201 can be used.

  The determination unit 312 determines the number of data to be divided (hereinafter referred to as “division number”) stored in the data storage unit 311. For example, the determination unit 312 uses a value generated by a random number generation circuit or a random number generation program as a division number, refers to a value generated in another process of the main control board 310 at a predetermined timing, and divides the value. Or a number.

  The authentication data generation unit 313 divides the data in the data storage unit 311 into the number of divisions, performs a binary operation that satisfies the combining rule for each of the divided data, and generates authentication data for the number of divisions. The binary operation satisfying the combining rule is, for example, addition or exclusive OR operation. In this case, the authentication data generation unit 313 selects either addition or exclusive OR operation, performs the selected operation on each of the divided data, and generates authentication data for the number of divisions.

  Further, the authentication data generation unit 313 may encrypt the generated authentication data by a predetermined encryption method. In this case, the authentication data encryption method may be changed based on the number of divisions. Specifically, for example, when the division number is an odd number, the encryption method is changed to an encryption method different from the encryption method used this time, and when the division number is an even number, the encryption method is the same as the encryption method used this time. Further, the authentication data generation unit 313 may generate authentication data using a control command in a control signal described later.

  The dummy data generation unit 314 generates authentication data dummy data (hereinafter referred to as “dummy authentication data”) based on the number of divisions. For example, the dummy data generation unit 314 generates the same number of dummy authentication data as the number of divisions. Specifically, for example, when the number of divisions when generating authentication data is 2, the dummy data generation unit 314 generates two dummy authentication data. As will be described later, the two dummy authentication data are transmitted to the peripheral board 320 immediately after the authentication data is transmitted, for example. The number of divisions is a value known only by the main control board 310, and is generated in a format in which the authentication data and the dummy authentication data cannot be identified. For this reason, a person other than the main control board 310 cannot distinguish between the authentication data and the dummy authentication data, and the authentication data can be prevented from being stolen illegally by an unauthorized analyst or the like.

  The dummy authentication data is data that is transmitted in order to prevent the transmission timing of regular authentication data from being analyzed by an unauthorized analyst. For this reason, the dummy authentication data and the authentication data are generated so that they cannot be distinguished from at least an unauthorized analyst. The dummy authentication data may be, for example, authentication data used for another authentication process different from the authentication process performed between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 320.

  The number of generations of the dummy authentication data described above is merely an example, and may be appropriately determined between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 320. For example, dummy authentication data may be generated for the number of values obtained by performing a predetermined calculation on the number of divisions. Further, the arrangement of the number of generations of dummy authentication data may be switched depending on the number of divisions.

  Further, in the peripheral board 320, if the amount of processing when the regular authentication data is received is different from the amount of processing when the dummy authentication data is received, the fraud analyst knows when the authentication data is transmitted. There is a possibility that. For this reason, for example, processing for temporarily authenticating the main control board 310 using dummy authentication data may be performed so that the processing amount in the peripheral board 320 does not fluctuate.

  The transmission unit 315 transmits authentication data and dummy authentication data to the peripheral unit 320. For example, the transmission unit 315 transmits dummy authentication data for the number of divisions immediately after transmitting the authentication data for the number of divisions generated by the authentication data generation unit 313. For example, the transmission unit 315 transmits the control signal transmitted from the main control board 310 to the peripheral board 320 with authentication data or dummy authentication data added thereto.

  Note that the transmission timing of the dummy authentication data described above is merely an example, and may be appropriately determined between the main control board 310 and the peripheral board 320. For example, when the number of divisions is 2, dummy authentication data may be added every two control signals to be transmitted. Further, the arrangement of the dummy authentication data transmission timing may be switched depending on the number of divisions.

  Next, a functional configuration of the peripheral board 320 having functions as peripheral portions such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 will be described. As shown in FIG. 3, the peripheral board 320 includes a receiving unit 321 and an authentication unit 322.

  The receiving unit 321 receives authentication data and dummy authentication data transmitted by the main control board 310. For example, the reception unit 321 receives the authentication data and the dummy authentication data by receiving a control signal to which the authentication data or the dummy authentication data is added. Note that the receiving unit 321 does not have to identify whether the received data is authentication data or dummy authentication data.

  The authentication unit 322 authenticates the main control board 310 based on whether the calculation result obtained by performing the binary operation on the authentication data received by the reception unit 321 matches a predetermined expected value. Here, the predetermined expected value is, for example, a value obtained by performing the above-described binary operation on all data in the data storage unit 311. The binary operation performed by the authentication unit 322 and the binary operation performed by the authentication data generation unit 313 of the main control board 310 are the same type of binary operation. Since this binary operation satisfies the combining law, the expected value generated from all data in the data storage unit 311 matches the value obtained by performing the same operation on the authentication data generated from the divided data. It should be. Thereby, the authentication unit 322 can authenticate the validity of the main control board 310.

  Here, the data received by the receiving unit 321 includes authentication data and dummy authentication data, but the authentication unit 322 is the authentication subject to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control board 310 is established. Authentication data and dummy authentication data are identified based on the number of data (hereinafter referred to as “number of connections”). Specifically, for example, out of the data received immediately after the authentication data subjected to the binary operation when the authentication is established, the number of authentication data corresponding to the binary operation when the authentication is established. Identify the data as dummy authentication data. More specifically, when the number of authentication data subjected to binary operation when authentication is established is 2, two of the data received immediately after receiving the two authentication data are dummy authentication data. Identify as.

  As described above, the authentication data and the dummy authentication data cannot be distinguished. However, since the number of authentication data (number of connections) that is the target of the binary operation when authentication for the main control board 310 is established matches the number of divisions, the authentication unit 322 determines which data is dummy authentication data. It can be identified. Therefore, the peripheral board 320 can identify the authentication data and perform the authentication process on the regular main control board 310 even when the authentication data and the dummy authentication data are mixed.

(Basic operation of pachinko machines)
An example of the basic operation of the pachinko gaming machine having the above configuration will be described. The main control unit 201 outputs the winning status of the game ball for each winning port to the winning ball control unit 203 as a control command. The winning ball control unit 203 pays out the number of winning balls corresponding to the winning situation in accordance with the control command output from the main control unit 201.

  The main control unit 201 outputs a corresponding control command to the effect control unit 202 every time a game ball wins the start winning opening 105, and the effect control unit 202 displays the symbols on the symbol display unit 104 in a variable manner. Repeat to stop. When the occurrence of the big hit has been determined, the corresponding control command is output to the effect control unit 202, and the effect control unit 202 stops with a predetermined pattern aligned. At the same time, control for opening the special winning opening 109 is performed. The effect control unit 202 displays various effects on the symbol display unit 104 in addition to the symbol variation display during the jackpot occurrence period, during the reach until the jackpot occurrence, or at the time of reach notice. . In addition, effects such as performing specific driving for various types of accessories and changing the display state of the lamp 261 (see FIG. 2) are performed.

  When a big hit occurs, the big winning opening 109 is opened a plurality of times. One release is one round, for example, 15 rounds are repeatedly executed. The period of one round is set, for example, when 10 game balls are won or for a predetermined period (for example, 30 seconds). At this time, the winning ball control unit 203 pays out with, for example, 15 winning balls per winning game ball to the big winning opening 109. After the jackpot is over, the jackpot state is canceled and the normal gaming state is restored.

(Details of processing by each control unit)
Next, details of various processes performed by each control unit will be described. First, the control process of the effect control unit 202 by the main control unit 201 will be described. 4 and 5 are flowcharts showing the procedure of the control process of the effect control unit by the main control unit. 4 to 9, the authentication data, the dummy authentication data, and the accompanying data are not considered in order to clarify the control processing procedure of the effect control unit 202. That is, in the description of FIGS. 4 to 9, “transmit a command” means “transmit a control signal including data (control command data) indicating the command”. For example, authentication data or dummy The presence or absence of authentication data and accompanying data (see FIG. 10) is not considered.

  4 and 5, the main control unit 201 first waits until the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: No loop). When the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned on (step S401: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a power-on command to peripheral parts such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 (step S402). ). When the power-on command is transmitted, the effect control unit 202 controls the lamp control unit 251, the sound control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104 for effect control at the time of power-on (specifically, the lamp control unit 202). Control command to instruct the lighting of the LED, output of sound, display of the demonstration screen, etc.).

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 with reference to the data of the undrawn winning prizes recorded in the ROM 212 or the RAM 213 (step S403). The number of undrawn winning prizes is a number obtained by subtracting the number of times a lottery corresponding to the winning ball has been made (number of already drawn lots) from the number of winning balls detected at the start winning opening (number of winning prizes). When the number of undrawn winning prizes is 0 (step S403: Yes), the main control unit 201 measures the time elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S404).

  When a predetermined time elapses after the demonstration is started (step S405: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a customer waiting demonstration command to the effect control unit 202 (step S406), and proceeds to step S407. If the predetermined time has not elapsed since the demonstration was started (step S405: No), the process proceeds to step S407 as it is. When the customer waiting demonstration command is transmitted in step S406, the effect control unit 202 transmits a control signal for the customer waiting demonstration to the lamp control unit 251, the voice control unit 252, and the symbol display unit 104. In step S403, when the number of undrawn winning prizes is not zero (step S403: No), the process proceeds to step S410.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not a winning ball for the starting winning port is detected by the starting winning port detecting unit 221 (step S407). When a winning ball is detected at the start winning opening (step S407: Yes), the main control unit 201 clears the time that has been measured since the demonstration was started (step S408), and the number of undrawn winning prizes is reached. 1 is added (step S409). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 acquires a jackpot determination random number (step S410), subtracts 1 from the number of undrawn winning prizes (step S411), and proceeds to step S412 in FIG. If no winning ball for the start winning opening is detected in step S407 (step S407: No), the process returns to step S404 and the subsequent processing is continued.

  Next, the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the jackpot determination random number acquired in step S410 is a predetermined jackpot random number (step S412). When the jackpot determination random number is a jackpot random number (step S412: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot reach command (symbol variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S413). The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S414: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S415).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot start command to the effect control unit 202 (step S416), and then sequentially transmits commands corresponding to the rounds during the jackpot (jackpot command) (step S417). Then, when transmission of the jackpot command for all rounds is completed, the main control unit 201 transmits a jackpot end command (step S418), and proceeds to step S422.

  On the other hand, if the jackpot determination random number is not a jackpot random number in step S412, the main control unit 201 transmits a shift reach command (design variation command) to the effect control unit 202 (step S419). . The main control unit 201 waits until the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: No loop), and when the symbol variation time has elapsed (step S420: Yes), transmits a symbol stop command to the effect control unit 202 ( Step S421).

  The main control unit 201 returns to step S403 in FIG. 4 and repeats the subsequent processing until the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: No). Then, when the power of the pachinko gaming machine is turned off (step S422: Yes), the main control unit 201 transmits an end process command to the effect control unit 202 (step S423), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  FIG. 6 is a time chart showing the transmission timing of a jackpot related command (a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, a jackpot command, a jackpot end command). The jackpot reach command is transmitted more frequently and randomly than the actual jackpot occurs. The jackpot start command is transmitted only once when shifting to the jackpot state when a jackpot is actually generated. The jackpot command is continuously transmitted for each round after shifting to the jackpot state. The jackpot end command is transmitted only once when all rounds of the jackpot state are completed and the normal state is entered.

  Next, processing by the effect control unit 202 will be described. In the following, processing of the effect control unit 202 at the time of symbol variation (when a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a loss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5) is received) and a jackpot time will be described. .

  FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the symbol variation process by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 7, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot reach command (see step S413 in FIG. 5) or a miss reach command (see step S419 in FIG. 5), which is a symbol variation command. (Step S701: No loop). When the symbol variation command is received (step S701: Yes), the effect control unit 202 acquires a random effect selection random number (step S702), and selects a variation effect type based on the acquired random number (step S703). ). Then, the effect control unit 202 transmits an effect start command for each variable effect to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S704).

  The effect control unit 202 determines whether or not the effect time of the variable effect has elapsed (step S705) and whether or not a symbol stop command (see steps S415 and S421 in FIG. 5) has been received from the main control unit 201. (Step S706). When the production time has elapsed (step S705: Yes), or when the symbol stop command has been received (step S706: Yes), the production control unit 202 sends a production stop command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252. Is transmitted (step S707). If the production time has not elapsed (step S705: No) and the symbol stop command has not been received (step S706: No), the process returns to step S705, and the subsequent processing is repeated.

  Next, the processing for the big hit of the effect control unit 202 will be described. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the big hit processing by the effect control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 8, the effect control unit 202 first waits until a jackpot start command (see step S416 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S801: No loop). When the jackpot start command is received (step S801: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot start processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S802).

  Next, the effect control unit 202 waits until receiving a round jackpot command (see step S417 in FIG. 5) from the main control unit 201 (step S803: No loop). When the jackpot command is received (step S803: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a round processing command corresponding to the received round jackpot command to the lamp control unit 251 and the sound control unit 252 (step S804). ).

  Subsequently, the effect control unit 202 waits until a jackpot end command (see step S418 in FIG. 5) is received from the main control unit 201 (step S805: No loop). When the jackpot end command is received (step S805: Yes), the effect control unit 202 transmits a jackpot end processing command to the lamp control unit 251 and the audio control unit 252 (step S806), and ends the processing according to this flowchart. To do.

  Subsequently, a lamp control process by the lamp control unit 251 will be described. Here, processing when a symbol variation command is received from the effect control unit 202 (during symbol variation) will be described. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the procedure of the lamp control process when the symbol is changed by the lamp control unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 9, the lamp control unit 251 first waits until an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: No loop).

  When an effect start command is received from the effect control unit 202 (step S901: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 reads data prepared for each command (step S902) and executes a selection routine for each command (step S903). ), Ramp data is set (step S904). Then, the lamp control unit 251 outputs lamp data to the lamp 261 (step S905). Based on the lamp data output from the lamp control unit 251, the lamp 261 is turned on or off.

  Until the lamp control unit 251 receives an effect stop command from the effect control unit 202 (step S906: No), the lamp control unit 251 returns to step S905 and continues outputting the lamp data. When the production stop command is received (step S906: Yes), the lamp control unit 251 stops the output of the lamp data (step S907) and ends the processing according to this flowchart.

  Note that although the processing of the lamp control unit 251 is shown in FIG. 9, the sound control by the sound control unit 252 is almost the same as the processing of FIG. In the sound control process by the sound control unit 252, “ramp data” in steps S <b> 904, S <b> 905, and S <b> 907 in the process of FIG.

  As described above, peripheral units such as the effect control unit 202 and the prize ball control unit 203 perform various processes based on the control commands output by the main control unit 201. On the other hand, when the output source of the control command is not the regular main control unit 201, for example, when an unauthorized control board is connected between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit (see FIG. 16), The peripheral portion performs an illegal operation by an illegal control command output from an unauthorized control board.

  In order to prevent this, in the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment, an authentication process is performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit. More specifically, authentication processing is performed with the peripheral unit as the authenticator and the main control unit 201 as the person to be authenticated, and the validity of the control signal transmitted from the main control unit 201 is authenticated. The authentication data used for this authentication process is generated based on data obtained by arbitrarily dividing the program data recorded in the main control unit 201. This authentication process detects fraud such as the main control unit 201 being replaced with an unauthorized control board, or an unauthorized control board being attached between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral part, and the pachinko gaming machine Fraud can be prevented.

  In the present embodiment, authentication data is added to control command data and transmitted. By adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to suppress an increase in communication load between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. Further, by adding the authentication data to the control command data, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data is extracted from the communication data and analyzed as compared with the case where the authentication data is transmitted alone. The format of a control signal including authentication data and control command data will be described below.

(Control signal data format)
Next, the data format of the control signal output from the main control unit 201 to the peripheral board will be described. FIG. 10 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a data format of a control signal output from the main control unit. As shown in FIG. 10, the normal control signal 1010 output from the main control unit 201 includes control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002. The control command data 1001 is data unique to each command such as a jackpot reach command, a jackpot start command, and a round command. The accompanying data 1002 is data accompanying the control command data 1001, and is data necessary for processing based on the control command data 1001, such as the number of winning game balls.

  In addition to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002, the main control unit 201 outputs a control signal with authentication data 1020 including authentication data 1003 to the peripheral board. For example, when the control command data 1001 is a predetermined command, the main control unit 201 outputs a control signal including the authentication data 1003 to the peripheral board.

  As described above, by including the authentication data 1003 in the control signal, it is possible to reduce the communication load between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit as compared with the case of transmitting the authentication data alone. Further, by including the authentication data 1003 in the control signal, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data 1003 is extracted from the communication data and analyzed as compared with the case where the authentication data 1003 is transmitted alone. .

  The authentication data 1003 is data for the peripheral unit to authenticate that the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 are output from the regular main control unit 201. Specifically, the authentication data 1003 is a value generated as follows.

(Method for generating authentication data (inspection value))
FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram schematically showing a method of generating authentication data (inspection value) in the main control unit. The authentication data 1003 is generated using data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 or the like. More specifically, after dividing a predetermined area of the ROM 212 by an arbitrary number of divisions, a binary operation (semigroup operation) that satisfies the combining law is performed on the data stored in each of the divided areas, and the inspection value is obtained. Is calculated. Examples of the semi-group operation include addition and exclusive OR operation. Then, a value obtained by performing a predetermined operation (for example, encryption processing) on the inspection value is set as authentication data. Whether or not to inspect the inspection value is arbitrary, but it is desirable to encrypt it from the viewpoint of fraud prevention.

  The type of data used for calculating the inspection value is arbitrary, but for example, program data (instruction code or fixed data) recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201 can be used. By using the program data recorded in the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, it is possible to detect unauthorized rewriting of the program data, unauthorized replacement of the ROM 212 of the main control unit 201, and the like.

  For example, 12 data (0x01 to 0x09, 0x0A to 0x0C) are stored in the program data storage unit 1100 shown in FIG. When the division number is 3, the program data storage unit 1100 can be divided into, for example, a first block 1100a including four data, a second block 1100b including three data, and a third block 1100c including five data. The main control unit 201 calculates a test value by performing a semi-group operation on the data stored in each block. The number of data in the block described above is an example. The number of data in the divided blocks may be a fixed value or may be determined randomly.

  For example, if the method of using addition as the semi-group operation is method A, the four pieces of data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a are added to obtain the first inspection value 0x0A. Similarly, the three data 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b are added to obtain the second check value 0x12 as the five data 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C stored in the third block 1100c. Are added to obtain the third inspection value 0x32.

  Further, for example, if the method using the exclusive OR operation as the semi-group operation is method B, the exclusive OR operation is performed on the four data 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 stored in the first block 1100a. An inspection value of 0x04 is obtained. Similarly, exclusive OR operation is performed on the three pieces of data 0x05, 0x06, and 0x07 stored in the second block 1100b, and the second check value 0x04 is stored in the five pieces of data 0x08, 0x09, and 0x0A stored in the third block 1100c. , 0x0B, 0x0C are subjected to exclusive OR operation to obtain third check values 0x0C, respectively.

  Then, the obtained inspection value is encrypted to obtain authentication data. At the time of this encryption processing, the encryption processing may be performed including the inspection value and data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 that are transmitted at the same time. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 includes the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, operations on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 using a hash function, a parity check, and a cyclic redundancy check (Cyclic Redundancy Check). : CRC), a value obtained by performing an operation such as a checksum.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. For this reason, if the authentication data 1003 is generated using the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002, even if the authentication data 1003 is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data 1003 matches the control command. Unable to detect fraud.

  On the other hand, the peripheral part as the authenticator holds the value obtained by performing the semi-group operation on the entire data stored in the program data storage part 1100 as an expected value. For example, the expected value in the case of method A is 0x4E, which is the sum of 0x01 to 0x0C. In addition, the expected value in the case of method B is 0x0C, which is an exclusive OR of 0x01 to 0x0C.

  The peripheral part extracts the inspection value from the received control signal with authentication data 1020 and collates the value obtained by performing the semigroup operation on the inspection value with the expected value. Since the test values are generated using a half-group operation, if the same half-group operation is performed on all the test values generated from the divided program data, the expectation that the half-group operation was performed on the entire program data Should match the value. When the value obtained by performing the half-group operation on the inspection value matches the expected value, the peripheral unit authenticates the main control unit 201.

  Note that the semi-group calculation process in the peripheral portion corresponds to a process of combining the inspection values generated from the divided data, and is therefore referred to as “joining process”. In addition, the number of inspection values used for the combining process when authentication is established is referred to as “number of connections”. The number of connections in the peripheral part and the number of divisions in the main control unit 201 are the same.

  Returning to the description of FIG. 10, the dummy authentication data 1004 is dummy data of the authentication data 1003 and is data transmitted to prevent the transmission timing of the regular authentication data 1002 from being analyzed by an unauthorized analyst. . Since the normal control signal 1010 does not include the authentication data 1003, the data size is smaller than that of the control signal with authentication data 1020. For this reason, the control signal to which the authentication data 1003 is added is likely to be detected and the data is easily stolen. In order to prevent such a problem, dummy authentication data 1004 having the same size as the authentication data 1003 is added to a normal control signal 1010 that does not include the authentication data 1003 to obtain a control signal 1030 with dummy data.

  Therefore, the dummy authentication data 1004 and the authentication data 1003 are generated so that they cannot be distinguished from at least an unauthorized analyst. The dummy authentication data 1004 may be, for example, authentication data used for another authentication process different from the authentication process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  In addition, if the processing amount at the time of receiving the normal authentication data 1003 and the processing amount at the time of receiving the dummy authentication data 1004 are different in the peripheral portion, it is determined to the fraud analyst at which timing the authentication data 1003 is transmitted. There is a possibility of being known. For this reason, for example, the processing for temporarily authenticating the main control unit 201 using the dummy authentication data 1004 may be performed so that the processing amount in the peripheral portion does not vary.

  The number of transmissions of the dummy authentication data 1004 is determined by the number of divisions used for generating the authentication data 1003 described above. For example, when the number of divisions at the time of generating the authentication data 1003 is 2, after transmitting the two generated authentication data 1003, the two dummy authentication data 1004 are transmitted. More specifically, after two authentication data-added control signals 1020 to which two authentication data 1003 are added, two dummy data-added control signals 1030 to which dummy authentication data 1004 are added are transmitted.

  The peripheral part can know the number of transmissions of the dummy authentication data 1004 from the number of authentication data (number of connections) when the authentication process using the authentication data 1003 is established. For example, in the above-described example, the number of authentication data (the number of connections) when the authentication process is established is 2. For this reason, the dummy control data 1004 is included in the two control signals received next, and it can be determined that it should be discarded without being used for the authentication process. On the other hand, since the fraudulent analyst cannot know the number of divisions, the authentication data 1003 and the dummy authentication data 1004 cannot be distinguished. Thereby, the possibility that the authentication data 1003 is stolen by an unauthorized analyst can be reduced, and the strength of the authentication process can be improved. Note that the above-described relationship between the number of divisions and the transmission timing of dummy data is merely an example, and an arbitrary agreement may be made between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  Further, the authentication data 1003 may include data related to control command data 1001 and accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003. The data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 can be obtained by performing an operation using the error detection method described above on the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002 itself, or the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002. Value.

  In general, an unauthorized control board attempts to cause an unauthorized operation to be performed by transmitting a control command different from that of the regular main control unit 201. If the authentication data 1003 is generated using the control command data 1001 or the accompanying data 1002 transmitted together with the authentication data 1003, even if the authentication data 1003 is reused by an unauthorized control board, the authentication data 1003 and the control command Since the data 1001 cannot be matched, fraud can be detected. When the authentication data 1003 includes the data related to the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002, the main control unit 201 generates the authentication data 1003 by encrypting the control command data 1001 and the data related to the accompanying data 1002 together with the inspection value. To do.

  Further, the arrangement of the control command data 1001, the accompanying data 1002, the authentication data 1003, and the dummy authentication data 1004 is not limited to the order shown in FIG. 10, for example, the authentication data 1003 or the dummy authentication data 1004 is set to the head of the control signal, Authentication data 1003 or dummy authentication data 1004 may be inserted between the control command data 1001 and the accompanying data 1002.

(Control signal transmission / reception processing)
Subsequently, a control signal transmission / reception process performed between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit will be described. In the following description, authentication data or dummy authentication data is always transmitted when transmitting a control signal. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and authentication data is transmitted only at a predetermined timing, for example, when a predetermined control command is transmitted. Alternatively, dummy authentication data may be added.

  FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal transmission processing by the main control unit 201.

  In the following description, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data for the number of divisions and transmits the dummy authentication data to the peripheral unit. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and a predetermined number based on the number of divisions (for example, the number of divisions). The dummy authentication data may be generated and transmitted to the peripheral portion by a value obtained by performing a predetermined calculation on the data. In addition, the number of dummy authentication data generations (for example, the type of calculation described above) may be changed based on the number of divisions.

  In the following description, dummy authentication data is transmitted immediately after the authentication data is transmitted. However, the present invention is not limited to this, and is transmitted at a predetermined timing (for example, every control signal corresponding to the number of divisions). do it. Further, the arrangement of the dummy authentication data transmission timing may be changed based on the number of divisions. These arrangements may be made in advance between the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit.

  In the flowchart of FIG. 12, the main control unit 201 waits until the transmission timing of the control command comes (step S1201: No loop). When the control command transmission timing comes (step S1201: Yes), the main control unit 201 determines whether or not the remaining dummy number is 0 (step S1202). Here, the remaining dummy number is the remaining number of dummy authentication data to be transmitted to the peripheral part. For example, the main control unit 201 refers to the value stored in the remaining dummy number information storage area in the ROM 212 to make the determination in step S1202. If the remaining dummy number is not 0 (step S1202: No), the main control unit 201 proceeds to step S1210 in order to transmit dummy authentication data.

  On the other hand, when the number of remaining dummy is 0 (step S1202: Yes), since there is no dummy authentication data to be transmitted, the main control unit 201 determines the number of program data divisions for transmitting the authentication data (step S1203). ), The program data is divided by the determined number of divisions, and a test value is calculated by performing a semi-group operation on each of them (step S1204). Then, the verification value is encrypted to generate authentication data (step S1205). The method for determining the number of divisions is arbitrary. The number of divisions may be determined before the transmission timing of authentication data, and the inspection value and the authentication data may be calculated or generated before the transmission timing of the control signal.

  Next, the main control unit 201 sequentially transmits authentication data-attached control signals for the number of divisions including the generated authentication data (step S1206). At this time, the transmission order of the authentication data is arbitrary. The main control unit 201 returns to step S1206 and continues to transmit the control signal with authentication data until all the authentication data generated in step S1205 is transmitted (step S1207: No).

  When all the authentication data is transmitted (step S1207: Yes), the main control unit 201 performs a dummy authentication data transmission process. Specifically, the number of divisions determined in step S1203 is stored as the number of transmissions of dummy authentication data in the remaining dummy number information storage area of the ROM 212 (step S1208). Subsequently, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data (step S1209). The dummy authentication data may be generated every time a control signal (control signal with dummy data) is transmitted, or may be generated for the remaining number of dummy at the timing when the number of remaining dummy is determined. Also, an appropriate number of dummy authentication data may be generated in advance and used as necessary.

  Then, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with dummy data added with dummy authentication data (step S1210), and decrements the value of the remaining dummy number information storage area of the ROM 212 by 1 (step S1211). The main control unit 201 returns to step S1201 until the power is turned off (step S1212: No), and continues the subsequent processing. When the power is turned off (step S1212: Yes), the processing according to this flowchart is terminated.

  Next, the reception process of the control signal by the peripheral part will be described. FIG. 13 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure of control signal reception processing by the peripheral unit. In the flowchart of FIG. 13, the peripheral unit waits until a control signal is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1301: No loop). When a control signal is received from the main control unit 201 (step S1301: Yes), it is determined whether or not the remaining dummy number is 0 (step S1302). For example, the peripheral portion refers to the value stored in the remaining dummy number information storage area in the ROMs 242 and 282 to make the determination in step S1302.

  When the number of remaining dummy is 0 (step S1302: Yes), since the received control signal includes normal (not dummy) authentication data, the peripheral portion performs a decoding process on the authentication data. The inspection value is acquired (step S1303). Then, the acquired inspection value is stored in the inspection value memory (step S1304), and a semi-group operation (joining process) is performed on all inspection values in the inspection value memory (step S1305). If there is one inspection value in the inspection value memory, the process proceeds to step S1306 without performing the combining process.

  Then, the peripheral unit compares the operation result (combination result) with the expected value of the stored test value, and determines whether or not the combination result and the expected value match (step S1306). If the combined result matches the expected value (step S1306: YES), the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1307), and proceeds to step S1311.

  On the other hand, if the test value calculation result does not match the expected value in step S1306 (step S1306: No), the peripheral unit returns to step S1301 until a predetermined number or more of authentication data is received (step S1308: No). The subsequent processing is repeated. When a predetermined number or more of authentication data is received (step S1308: Yes), the peripheral unit fails to authenticate the main control unit 201 (step S1309). Although the predetermined number is an arbitrary number, for example, it can be the number of data that can be stored in the program data storage unit 1100 (maximum number of divisions). When the authentication is not established, the peripheral unit discards the control command data and the accompanying data, and outputs a notification signal from, for example, the speaker 262 (see FIG. 2) (step S1310), and ends the process according to this flowchart. .

  When the authentication for the main control unit 201 is established in step S1307, the peripheral unit erases the data in the verification value memory (step S1311), and the authentication data that is the target of the combination process when the authentication is established is performed. The number, that is, the number of connections, is used as the remaining dummy number, and the number of connections is stored in the remaining dummy number information storage area of the ROM 212 (step S1312).

  In step S1302, when the remaining dummy number is not 0 (step S1302: No), the received control signal includes dummy authentication data, so the peripheral portion does not perform authentication processing, and the remaining dummy number. Is decremented by -1 (step S1313), and the process proceeds to step S1314.

  The peripheral portion returns to step S1301 and continues the subsequent processing until the power is turned off (step S1314: No). Then, when the power is turned off (step S1314: Yes), the processing according to this flowchart ends.

(Specific examples of authentication data and dummy authentication data transmission processing)
Next, a specific example of authentication data and dummy authentication data transmission processing among the processing shown in FIGS. 12 and 13 will be described. FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram illustrating an example of a data flow between control units. In FIG. 14, the initial remaining dummy number is zero. For this reason, the main control unit 201 first determines the number of divisions used for the current authentication process by an arbitrary method. For example, assuming that the number of divisions at this time = 2 (step S1401), the main control unit 201 divides the data stored in the program data storage unit 1100 into two blocks, and uses the data contained in each block to 2 Two inspection values (first inspection value and second inspection value) are calculated, and further encryption processing is performed to generate two authentication data (first authentication data and second authentication data) (step S1402). Then, the control signal with the first authentication data including the first authentication data is transmitted to the peripheral part (step S1403).

  The peripheral unit receives the control signal (the control signal with first authentication data) transmitted from the main control unit 201 (step S1404). The peripheral unit determines whether the received data is a control signal with authentication data or a control signal with dummy data based on whether or not the number of remaining dummy data is zero. At this time, since the number of remaining dummy data is 0, the peripheral portion determines that the received data is a control signal with authentication data (step S1405), and decrypts the first authentication data in the control signal with first authentication data. The first inspection value is acquired and collated with the expected value. In this case, since the expected value and the inspection value do not match, authentication is not established (step S1406).

  Next, the main control unit 201 transmits a control signal with second authentication data including second authentication data (step S1407), and the peripheral unit receives a control signal (control signal with second authentication data) (step S1408). . The peripheral unit decodes the second authentication data in the control signal with the second authentication data to obtain a second inspection value, performs a combining process on the first inspection value and the second inspection value (step S1409), and combines them. Check the result against the expected value. In this case, since the combined result matches the expected value, the peripheral unit establishes authentication for the main control unit 201 (step S1410).

  After transmitting the control signal with the second authentication data, the main control unit 201 determines the number of transmissions of dummy authentication data based on the number of divisions (step S1411). In this case, since the number of divisions is 2, two dummy authentication data are transmitted after the transmission of the control signal with authentication data this time. That is, the number of remaining dummy = 2.

  Further, the peripheral part recognizes the number of dummy authentication data to be received from now on the basis of the number of inspection values when the authentication of the main control unit 201 is established, that is, the number of connections (step S1412). In this case, since the number of connections is 2, it is determined that two dummy authentication data are received after the reception of the control signal with authentication data this time. That is, the number of remaining dummy = 2.

  After determining the remaining dummy number, the main control unit 201 generates dummy authentication data for the remaining dummy number (step S1413), and transmits a control signal with dummy data to the peripheral part. In this case, the main control unit 201 generates two dummy authentication data and transmits two control signals with dummy data (a control signal with first dummy data and a control signal with second dummy data). As described above, the generation timing of dummy authentication data is arbitrary. That is, dummy authentication data may be generated every time a control signal (control signal with dummy data) is transmitted, or may be generated for the number of remaining dummy at the timing when the number of remaining dummy is determined. Also, an appropriate number of dummy authentication data may be generated in advance and used as necessary.

  When the main control unit 201 transmits the control signal with the first dummy data (step S1414), the remaining dummy number is set to −1 to set the remaining dummy number = 1 (step S1415). When the peripheral part receives the control signal (control signal with first dummy data) (step S1416), since the number of remaining dummy data is two at this time, the peripheral part determines that the received data is a control signal with dummy data. (Step S1417), the added data (dummy data) is discarded (step S1418). Then, the remaining number of dummy is decremented by 1, and the number of remaining dummy is set to 1 (step S1419).

  Subsequently, when the main control unit 201 transmits the second dummy data-added control signal (step S1420), the remaining dummy number is set to -1 and the remaining dummy number = 0 (step S1421). When the peripheral portion receives the control signal (control signal with second dummy data) (step S1422), the number of remaining dummy data is 1 at this time, so the peripheral portion determines that the received data is a control signal with dummy data. (Step S1423), the added dummy data is discarded (step S1424). Then, the number of remaining dummy is decremented by 1 so that the number of remaining dummy = 0 (step S1425).

  Up to here is a series of authentication data and dummy authentication data transmission / reception processing. Thereafter, since the remaining dummy number is 0, the main control unit 201 determines the number of divisions by an arbitrary method as in step S1401, and performs the same processing as the subsequent steps. By repeating the above procedure, the main control unit 201 and the peripheral unit transmit and receive authentication data and dummy authentication data, and continue the authentication process.

  As described above, in the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment, the main control unit generates dummy authentication data based on the number of divisions of the data in the data storage means and transmits it to the peripheral unit. Further, in the peripheral part, the authentication data and the dummy authentication data are identified based on the number of authentication data (the number of combinations) subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. Authentication for. Since the number of divisions and the number of connections are values known only by the main control unit and the peripheral unit, the fraud analyst cannot identify authentication data and dummy authentication data. For this reason, according to the pachinko gaming machine according to the present embodiment, it is possible to reduce the possibility that the authentication data is illegally stolen and improve the strength of the authentication process between the main control unit and the peripheral unit. be able to.

  Note that the control method and authentication method for the main control unit and the peripheral unit described in this embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance on a computer such as a personal computer or a workstation. This program is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as a hard disk, a flexible disk, a CD-ROM, an MO, and a DVD, and is executed by being read from the recording medium by the computer. The program may be a transmission medium that can be distributed via a network such as the Internet.

  As described above, the present invention is useful for an electronic device in which fraud to the control unit is concerned and a control board mounted on the electronic device, and in particular, a pachinko gaming machine, a slot gaming machine, and other various gaming machines. Suitable for

310 main control board 311 data storage unit 312 determination unit 313 authentication data generation unit 314 dummy data generation unit 315 transmission unit 320 peripheral board 321 reception unit 322 authentication unit

Claims (13)

An electronic device comprising: a main control unit; and a peripheral unit that performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
The main control unit
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining the number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”);
Authentication value generation means for dividing the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions, and performing binomial operations that satisfy a combining rule for each of the divided data to generate authentication values for the number of divisions When,
Dummy value generating means for generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions;
Transmitting means for transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral part,
The peripheral portion is
Receiving means for receiving the authentication value and the dummy value;
Authentication means for authenticating the main control unit based on whether a calculation result obtained by performing the two-term operation on the authentication value received by the receiving means matches a predetermined expected value;
The expected value is a value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means,
The authentication means identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established, and performs the authentication. Electronic equipment characterized by performing. The dummy value generating means generates the same number of dummy values as the number of divisions,
The transmitting means transmits the dummy value for the number of divisions immediately after transmitting the authentication value for the number of divisions,
The authentication means includes a value corresponding to the number of the authentication values subject to the binary calculation among the values received immediately after the authentication value subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication is established. The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the electronic device is identified as the dummy value.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the transmission unit adds the authentication value or the dummy value to the control command and transmits the control command to the peripheral portion.   The electronic device according to claim 3, wherein the authentication value generation unit generates the authentication value using the control command to which the authentication value is added. The authentication value generation means encrypts the authentication value by a predetermined encryption method,
The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the authentication unit performs the authentication by decrypting the authentication value with a decryption method corresponding to the predetermined encryption method. The authentication value generating means changes the authentication value encryption method based on the number of divisions,
The authentication means changes a method for decoding the authentication value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary operation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. Item 6. The electronic device according to Item 5.   The electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the data storage unit stores program data used in the main control unit.   The electronic apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the binary operation is addition or exclusive OR operation.   A gaming machine comprising the electronic device according to claim 1, wherein the main control unit is a main control board, and the peripheral portion is a peripheral board. A main control board that is mounted on an electronic device and transmits a control command to perform a predetermined process on a peripheral board,
Data storage means for storing predetermined data;
Determining means for determining the number of divisions of the data stored in the data storage means (hereinafter referred to as “division number”);
Authentication value generation means for dividing the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions, and performing binomial operations that satisfy a combining rule for each of the divided data to generate authentication values for the number of divisions When,
Dummy value generating means for generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions;
Transmitting means for transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral board, and a main control board. A peripheral board that is mounted on an electronic device and performs a predetermined process based on a control command transmitted by the main control board,
Receiving means for receiving an authentication value transmitted by the main control board and a dummy value of the authentication value;
Authentication means for authenticating the main control board based on whether or not a calculation result obtained by performing the binary calculation on the authentication value received by the receiving means matches a predetermined expected value;
The authentication means identifies the authentication value and the dummy value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control board is established, and performs the authentication. Peripheral board characterized by performing. An authentication method in an electronic device comprising a main control unit and a peripheral unit that performs predetermined processing based on a control command transmitted by the main control unit,
In the main control unit,
A determining step of determining a number (hereinafter referred to as a “number of divisions”) for dividing the data stored in the data storage means for storing predetermined data;
An authentication value generation step of dividing the data in the data storage means into the number of divisions, performing a binary operation satisfying a combining rule on each of the divided data, and generating authentication values for the number of divisions When,
A dummy value generating step of generating a dummy value of the authentication value based on the number of divisions;
Transmitting the authentication value and the dummy value to the peripheral portion, and
In the periphery,
A receiving step of receiving the authentication value and the dummy value;
An authentication step of authenticating the main control unit based on whether a calculation result obtained by performing the two-term operation on the authentication value received in the reception step matches a predetermined expected value,
The expected value is a value obtained by performing the binary operation on all the data in the data storage means,
In the authentication step, the authentication value is identified by identifying the dummy value and the authentication value based on the number of the authentication values subjected to the binary calculation when the authentication for the main control unit is established. An authentication method characterized by performing.   An authentication program causing a computer to execute the authentication method according to claim 12.

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