JP2010044792A - Secure device, integrated circuit, and encryption method - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To update a program while maintaining high security on an LSI (large scale integrated circuit) executing a program encrypted with a unique key. <P>SOLUTION: A system including the secure LSI 1 establishes a communication line with a server 3 (UD1), and receives a shared key encrypted program transmitted from the server 3 and encrypted with a shared key (UD6, UD7). The system then decodes the received shared key encrypted program to generate a plaintext program, further re-encrypts the plaintext program with the unique key and stores it as a new unique key encrypted program in an external memory. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2010,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a technique for updating a program while maintaining security in a key-mounted system and an LSI used for the system.

  Conventionally, in order to protect a program for operating an LSI from unauthorized processing, a program encrypted with a predetermined manufacturer key is stored in a memory, decrypted and executed. However, in such a system, since there are a large number of LSIs that execute programs encrypted with a common manufacturer key, if the information of the manufacturer key is illegally leaked even from one product, the program can be executed in a large number of products. There is a problem that it becomes possible to tamper, and therefore security cannot be increased.

  In order to solve this problem, there is a technique in which a program for operating an LSI is encrypted with a unique key unique to each LSI, and the product can execute only a program encrypted with a unique key (Japanese Patent Application 2002-2002). 215096, Japanese Patent Application No. 2002-258484). By using this method, even if the key information is illegally leaked in one product, there is no influence on other products, so that security can be improved. As a premise of this method, there is a method of double-encrypting a key (see Japanese Patent Application No. 2001-286881).

  Note that none of the patent applications listed here has been published yet, and therefore there is no prior art document information to be described.

  In general, in updating (updating) a program installed in an LSI that is a product, a communication path is secured by SSL connection, and a plaintext program or a program encrypted with a manufacturer key is transmitted from the server to the LSI. Is done by that. However, with this technique, if the communication path is illegally accessed, a program that can be executed by a large number of products is illegally obtained, and thus security in program update cannot be increased.

  In order to solve this, when the above-described method is used, the LSI executes only the program encrypted with the unique key, so even if the plaintext program or the program encrypted with the manufacturer key is transmitted, Cannot be executed.

  Also, a program encrypted with a different key for each LSI is prepared on the server side, key information is managed for each LSI, and then the program encrypted with a different key for each LSI is transmitted from the server to the LSI. Although a method is conceivable, this method is not practical because it requires enormous effort and cost.

  In view of the above problems, it is an object of the present invention to provide a secure device, an integrated circuit, and an encryption method that enable high-security information encryption.

  In order to solve the above problems, the solution provided by the present invention is a secure device including an integrated circuit and an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit, and the integrated circuit is unique to the integrated circuit. A unique key holding means for generating and holding a unique key, encryption means for generating unique key encryption information by encrypting information received from outside the integrated circuit using the unique key, and the unique key Output means for outputting key encryption information to the external memory, and the unique key in the unique key holding means cannot be changed after generation.

  The solution provided by the present invention includes, as an integrated circuit, a unique key holding means for generating and holding a unique key unique to the integrated circuit, and a unique key encryption that is information encrypted using the unique key. Encryption means for generating encrypted information, and output means for outputting the unique key encryption information to an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit, wherein the unique key in the unique key holding means is generated, It cannot be changed.

  Further, the solution provided by the present invention is to generate a unique key unique to the integrated circuit as an encryption method in a secure device including the integrated circuit and an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit. Holding in a key holding means; generating unique key encryption information by encrypting information received from outside the integrated circuit using the unique key; and the unique key encryption information, And outputting to an external memory, and the unique key in the unique key holding means cannot be changed after generation.

  According to the present invention, even in a highly confidential secure LSI in which a program is re-encrypted with a unique key for each LSI and executed, the program can be updated only by transmitting the same program from the server.

  Further, even if the communication path from the server to the secure LSI is illegally accessed and the shared key encryption program is stolen, the secure LSI cannot be operated by the program, so the confidentiality is improved. In addition, even if the encryption is broken, the number of products that are damaged is limited, and the security is higher than before.

  Furthermore, since the validity of the shared key and program received from the server is performed using the hash value in the plaintext state, it is more difficult to tamper with the hash value than with the hash value in the encrypted state in the communication path, and security is improved. Rise.

1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a secure LSI according to an embodiment of the present invention. It is a figure showing the whole flow of development and commercialization using the secure LSI of FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the flow of the whole process of a boot program. It is a data flow of secure memory initial value setting SZ1. It is a flowchart of program mounting processing SD1 in the product operation mode. It is data flow 1 of program mounting process SD1. It is the data flow 2 of program mounting process SD1. It is a flowchart of normal boot processing SD2 in the product operation mode. It is data flow 1 of normal boot processing SD2. It is data flow 1 of normal boot processing SD2. It is a flowchart which shows communication with the server in program update. 2 is a diagram showing a configuration of a program related to program update stored in an external memory 100. FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the update process of a program.

  Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. In the following description, an encrypted key or program obtained by encrypting X (key or program) using the key Y is expressed as Enc (X, Y).

  FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an internal configuration of a secure LSI as a semiconductor device according to the present embodiment. In FIG. 1, the secure LSI 1 is configured to be connectable to an external memory (flash memory) 100, an external tool 110, and the like via an external bus 120. In addition, the operation mode can be set by giving the mode ID.

  The main components related to this embodiment will be briefly described.

  First, the secure LSI 1 includes a secure memory (secure flash) 10 including a non-rewritable area 11. In this non-rewritable area 11, a non-rewritable area write flag 12 is provided. When the mode ID is once written in the secure memory 10, the flag value of the non-rewritable area write flag 12 changes from “permitted” to “done”, and subsequent writing to the non-rewritable area becomes impossible. In the present embodiment, the secure memory 10 and the external memory 100 are configured by flash memory, but of course, the present invention is not limited to this, and any non-volatile memory may be used. Absent.

  The encryption unit 2 encrypts and decrypts a program, and includes a secret key calculation processing unit 20 and a key generation / update sequencer 30. The secret key calculation processing unit 20 includes registers (program shared key storage register 21, program unique key storage register 22, encryption key storage register 23, etc.) for storing various keys and program encryption types, and encrypting programs. A plurality of sequences including processing or decoding processing can be executed. The key generation / update sequencer 30 determines whether to execute each sequence that can be executed by the secret key calculation processing unit 20, and prohibits the operation of the secret key calculation processing unit 20 for the sequence that is determined not to be executed. The key generation / update sequencer 30 has a mode ID storage register 31, and determines whether to execute each sequence according to the mode ID stored in the mode ID storage register 31. Further, an encryption type identifier storage register 32 for storing an encryption type identifier indicating what algorithm and key length the key or program is encrypted with, and a storage unit 33 for storing the program encryption type are provided.

  The mode sequencer 40 also includes a mode ID storage register 41, and the operation of the external host interface (I / F) 50 according to the mode ID stored in the mode ID storage register 41 and the value of the jumper 43, that is, The I / F through which the program or data stored in the external memory 100 is read is controlled. Thereby, it is possible to control whether or not the plaintext program stored in the external memory 100 can be executed. Furthermore, the mode sequencer 40 includes an encryption type identifier storage register 42 that stores an encryption type identifier indicating which method is used to encrypt the key.

  According to the control of the mode sequencer 40, the external host I / F 50 includes an encryption through unit 52, an execution through unit 53, a program decryption cryptographic engine 54, and a data processing unit 55 that are included in the program processing unit 51. 56 and the content encryption / decryption encryption engine 57 are used to input / output programs and data to / from the external memory 100 and the external tool 110. The program decryption cryptographic engine 54 includes a program unique key enable register 58 for storing a program unique key used for decrypting a program.

  Here, in the key generation mode and the product operation mode, which will be described later, the program cannot be taken in via the execution through unit 53. In other words, the secure LSI 1 is configured not to make a transition to a program other than a program encrypted with a unique key in a key generation mode and a product operation mode described later.

  The boot ROM 60 stores a boot program that controls the startup operation of the secure LSI 1. The HASH calculation unit 70 calculates a HASH value in order to verify the validity of the program read into the secure LSI 1.

  The external memory 100 stores programs and contents. The external tool 110 stores various initial values stored in the secure memory 10 when the secure LSI 1 is first activated. The type of the initial value varies depending on the set operation mode.

  FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the overall flow of development and commercialization using the secure LSI 1 of FIG. As shown in FIG. 2, the secure LSI 1 has four modes: an administrator mode (mode ID: 00), a key generation mode (mode ID: 01), a development mode (mode ID: 10), and a product operation mode (mode ID: 11). Operates in various operation modes.

  First, the secure LSI 1 set to the administrator mode operates as an administrator LSI. In the administrator LSI, a key generation program is developed (PA1), and the key generation program is encrypted using an arbitrary key generation key (PA2).

  The secure LSI 1 set to the key generation mode operates as a key generation LSI. In the key generation LSI, an encrypted key generation program generated in the administrator LSI is mounted (PB1), and various keys are generated by executing this key generation program (PB2).

  The secure LSI 1 set to the development mode operates as a development LSI. In the development LSI, an application program to be executed by an actual product is developed (PC1). Then, the application program is encrypted using the program shared key (PC2).

  The secure LSI 1 set in the product operation mode operates as an actual product LSI. In the product LSI, the application program generated by the development LSI and encrypted with the program shared key is installed and converted into the application program encrypted with the program unique key (PD1). . Thereafter, it operates as a normal product LSI (PD2). This conversion process can be executed in the development LSI for debugging the application program (PC3).

  Hereinafter, details of the normal operation and the secure update operation in the product operation mode of the secure LSI 1 configured as described above will be described with reference to a flowchart and a data flow.

  FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing the overall processing flow of the boot program. When the secure LSI 1 is turned on, the boot program stored in the boot ROM 60 is executed by the CPU 65. As shown in FIG. 3, first, each hardware is initialized (SZ0). Then, various initial values are read from the external tool 110 and set in the secure memory 10 (SZ1).

  FIG. 4 is a flowchart of the initial value setting process SZ1. First, the jumper 44 determines whether or not the secure memory 10 is mounted in the LSI (SZ11). Next, it is determined whether or not the non-rewritable area write flag 12 is “completed” (SZ12). If it is “completed” (Yes), an initial value has already been set in the secure memory 10, so SZ1 is terminated. When the non-rewritable area write flag 12 is “permitted” (No), the initial value is written into the secure memory 10 (SZ13 to SZ18). In addition to the mode ID, the encrypted program unique key, address management information, and data unique key are written in the non-rewritable area 11 of the secure memory 10. As a result of the initial determination, when it is determined that the secure memory 10 is outside the LSI (No in SZ14), the mode ID is overwritten with a value representing the product operation mode (SZ15). Thereby, an unauthorized product in which the secure memory 10 is outside the LSI package can operate only in the product operation mode.

  Next, the unwritable area write flag 12 is set to “completed” (SZ19). This makes it impossible to rewrite the non-rewritable area 11 thereafter. Further, the encryption type identifier and the implementation mode flag are written in the normal areas 13 and 14 (SZ1A). When the mode ID indicates a mode other than the administrator mode (No in SZ1B), in addition to these, the encrypted shared key / key generation key is also written in the normal areas 13 and 14 (SZ1C).

  Thereafter, pre-processing SZ2 is executed. Here, the mode ID set in the non-writable area 11 of the secure memory 10 is set in the mode ID storage register 31 of the key generation / update sequencer 30 and the mode ID storage register 41 of the mode sequencer 40. In addition, the encryption type identifier set in the first normal area 13 of the secure memory 10 is set in the encryption type identifier storage register 32 of the key generation / update sequencer 30 and the encryption type identifier storage register 42 of the mode sequencer 40. The Furthermore, the address management information stored in the non-rewritable area 11 of the secure memory 10 is set in the encryption address section storage register 81 of the MEMC 80. The operations so far correspond to the initial value setting phases PA0, PB0, PC0, PD0 in FIG.

  Thereafter, the operation in each mode is performed according to the value of the mode ID (SZ3). In this way, the confidentiality of the program is enhanced by restricting the operations performed by the secure LSI according to the value of the mode ID.

  Next, normal product operation (normal boot processing) will be described in detail.

  When the mode ID is “11”, the secure LSI 1 is in the product operation mode, and executes the program mounting process SD1 or the normal boot process SD2 according to the value of the mounting mode flag (SD0).

  FIG. 5 is a flowchart of the program mounting process SD1, and FIGS. 6 and 7 are data flows. In the program implementation process SD1, the program unique key (SD11, SD12) is decrypted using the unique key information stored in the secure memory 10, and the program shared key is decrypted using the shared key information (SD13, SD14). The program Enc (program, program shared key) stored in the external memory 100 is converted into Enc (program, program unique key) using the program shared key and program unique key (SD15-SD17). Thereafter, the validity of the program is verified (SD18), and if it is valid, the mounting mode flag is set to OFF (SD19). As a result, the program mounting process SD1 is not performed from the next startup. Finally, the program shared key stored in the secure memory 10 and the program Enc (program, program shared key) stored in the external memory 100 are deleted (SD1A, SD1B).

  FIG. 8 is a flowchart of the normal boot process SD2, and FIGS. 9 and 10 are data flows. In the normal boot process SD2, first, the encrypted program unique key as the unique key key information stored in the non-writable area 11 of the secure memory 10 as the internal memory, that is, the encrypted unique key Enc (program unique key) The key (plaintext), MK0 (plaintext third intermediate key)) and the encrypted second intermediate key Enc (MK0, CK0 (plaintext fourth intermediate key)) are set in the encryption key storage register of the secret key calculation processing unit 20 ( SD21). Then, the encrypted program unique key is decrypted using the program encryption type installed in the key generation / update sequencer 30 to obtain the program unique key (SD22). The obtained program unique key is set in the program unique key storage register 22 of the secret key calculation processing unit 20 and the program unique key storage register 58 of the program decryption cryptographic engine 54 of the external host I / F 50 (SD23).

  Thereafter, the data unique ID stored in the unwritable area 11 of the secure memory 10 is set in the unique ID storage register of the secret key calculation processing unit 20 (SD24). Further, a random number is generated by the CPU 65 and set in a random number storage register of the secret key calculation processing unit 20 (SD25). Then, the secret key calculation processing unit 20 generates a data unique key from the data unique ID and the random number (SD26). Content reproduction is performed using a data unique key. Since the data unique key is generated using a random number, the data unique key is different for each activation, and the safety of content reproduction is increased.

  Thereafter, the program Enc (program, program unique key) encrypted with the program unique key stored in the external memory 100 is passed through the program decryption cryptographic engine 54 of the program processing unit 51 of the external host I / F 50. Are decoded and fetched into the HASH calculation unit 70 to calculate the HASH value (SD27). As a key used for decryption, a program unique key stored in the program unique key storage register 58 of the external host I / F is used. Then, the calculated HASH value is compared with the HASH value stored in the normal area 13 of the secure memory 10 to check whether the program has been tampered with (SD28). When the HASH values match (No in SD29), the process transitions to the program Enc (program, program unique key) stored in the external memory 100, and the application is executed (SD2A). On the other hand, when the HASH values do not match (Yes in SD29), it is presumed that some kind of fraud has been performed, and processing by the unauthorized access time control is executed (SD2B).

  Here, processing for updating a program for a secure LSI operating as a product as described above will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 11 is a flow showing data exchange between the server 3 and the system including the secure LSI 1 during program update.

  As shown in FIG. 11, first, when the secure LSI 1 starts the program update process, the server 3 receives the ID of the secure LSI 1 from the system, performs ID authentication, and if authenticated, establishes an SSL connection with the secure LSI 1 (UD1). ). Thereby, the safety of the communication path between the server 3 and the system including the secure LSI 1 is temporarily ensured.

  When the communication path is secured, the system transmits an application ID that is identification information of the update target program to the server 3 (UD2). The server 3 manages a first table 4 indicating a correspondence relationship between an application ID of an updatable program and an ID of an LSI that can operate the program. Based on the first table 4, the program Is determined whether or not to be transmitted. When the correspondence between the ID of the secure LSI 1 and the application ID of the program requested to be updated is confirmed, the server 3 starts transmitting the update target program.

  First, the server 3 transmits the additional information of the update target program to the secure LSI 1 (UD3). The additional information here includes a signature for authenticating whether or not the program can be updated on the secure LSI 1 side, the size of the update target program, the hash value (value in plain text) of the update target program, and the like. . The secure LSI 1 performs authentication using the signature transmitted as additional information, and determines whether there is a free space that can be updated in the external memory 100 based on the transmitted program size. If it is determined that the update is possible, the server 3 is requested to transmit the shared key information (UD4).

  When the server 3 receives the request, the shared key information is encrypted shared key Enc (program shared key (plaintext), MK1 (plaintext first intermediate key)) and encrypted first intermediate key Enc (MK1, CK1 (plaintext). The second intermediate key)) is transmitted to the secure LSI 1 (UD5). The secure LSI 1 decrypts the program shared key using the shared key information, performs a hash operation in the decrypted state, and verifies the validity. When the program shared key is successfully decrypted, the system requests the server 3 to transmit the shared key encryption program (UD6). Upon receiving the request, the server 3 transmits a program Enc (program, program shared key) to the system (UD7). The secure LSI 1 converts Enc (program, program shared key) into Enc (program, program unique key). Further, the converted Enc (program, program unique key) is decrypted into a plain text program, subjected to a hash operation, and the validity is verified by comparison with the hash value previously received as additional information. This process will be described later in detail.

  When the shared key encryption program is successfully converted into the unique key encryption program, the system including the secure LSI 1 requests the server 3 to transmit the application unique information (UD8). The application specific information includes information necessary for program execution. Without the application specific information, the secure LSI 1 cannot execute the updated program. The server 3 also manages the second table 5 indicating the correspondence between the transmission history of the application specific information and the ID of the LSI, and prevents a plurality of application specific information from being transmitted to the same secure LSI. Therefore, the same secure LSI cannot update the same program a plurality of times.

  When the server 3 determines that the application specific information may be transmitted, the server 3 transmits the application specific information to the system including the secure LSI 1 (UD9). When the secure LSI 1 performs a hash operation to verify the validity, the program update is performed. Is terminated and communication is disconnected (UD10).

  Note that data exchange between the server 3 and the system including the secure LSI in the present invention is not limited to the above-described flow. For example, the server 3 does not necessarily have to manage the second table and prevent a plurality of application specific information from being transmitted to the same secure LSI. However, by not transmitting the same program to the same secure LSI multiple times, the confidentiality of the program is further enhanced.

  Further, the additional information, shared key information, and shared key encryption program do not necessarily have to be transmitted separately from the server 3 to the secure LSI. Also good.

  The conversion from the shared key encryption program Enc (program, program shared key) to the unique key encryption program Enc (program, program unique key) in the secure LSI 1 will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. FIG. 12 is a diagram showing a configuration of a program related to program update stored in the external memory 100.

  As shown in FIG. 12, in the external memory 100, an encrypted control program 200 (Enc (control program, program unique key)) and an encrypted application program 210 (Enc (application program) each encrypted with a unique key are stored. , The program unique key)) is stored.

  The encryption control program 200 includes an application activation unit 201 and a program update control unit 205, and the program update control unit 205 includes a shared key decryption unit 206, a program unique key encryption processing unit 207, and a program update success / failure determination unit 208. .

  In response to an instruction from the boot program stored in the boot ROM 60, the application activation unit 201 activates the encrypted application program 210. The shared key decryption unit 206 decrypts the program shared key using the key generation / update sequencer 30 based on the shared key information transmitted from the server 3. The program unique key encryption processing unit 207 uses the key generation / update sequencer 30 to convert the shared key encryption program Enc (program, program shared key) to the unique key encryption program Enc (program, program unique key). Do. The program update success / failure determination unit 208 decrypts the unique key encryption program Enc (program, program unique key) into a plain text program, and determines the success or failure of the program update by hash verification. When the program update is successful, the old program is deleted and information such as the program storage location and size is stored in the secure memory 10.

  In addition to the normal operation unit 211 that is a normal application program, the encrypted application program 210 includes a program acquisition unit 212 for acquiring a new application program from a server or a recording medium. The program is updated using a program stored in the external memory 100 as described above.

  FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing a program update process including a conversion process from a shared key encryption program to a unique key encryption program.

  When the application program is being executed (SX1) and the program is requested to be updated due to an external factor such as a user operation, the system detects this and the normal operation unit 211 starts the encryption The program acquisition unit 212 as an acquisition program of the program 210 is activated (SX2).

  The program acquisition unit 212 communicates with the server 3 to perform authentication and acquire shared key information / program (SX3). When the shared key information is acquired from the server 3, the shared key decryption unit 206 decrypts the program shared key (SX4, SX5). That is, the encrypted program shared key Enc (program shared key, MK2) and Enc (MK2, CK) as shared key key information are set in the encryption key storage register 23 of the secret key calculation processing unit 20, and this encryption is performed. The program shared key is decrypted using the program encryption type installed in the key generation / update sequencer 30 to obtain the program shared key. The obtained program shared key is stored in the program shared key storage register 21 of the secret key calculation processing unit 20.

  Next, the program unique key encryption processing unit 207 converts the shared key encryption program into the unique key encryption program. That is, the program Enc (program, program shared key) transmitted from the server 3 and stored in the external memory 100 is transferred to the private key via the encryption through unit 52 of the program processing unit 51 of the external host I / F 50. The data is taken into the arithmetic processing unit 20 (SX6). Then, the fetched program is decrypted with the program shared key stored in the program shared key storage register 21 and then encrypted with the program unique key stored in the program unique key storage register 22 to obtain a program Enc (program, program unique key). ) As described above, the program unique key has already been decrypted when the system is activated, and is stored in the program unique key storage register 22 of the secret key calculation processing unit 20.

  Finally, the program update success / failure determination unit 208 determines the success or failure of the program update. That is, Enc (program, program unique key) is written in the external memory 100 (SX8), and then decrypted and fetched using the program decryption cryptographic engine 53 of the program processing unit 51 of the external host I / F 50 (SX9 ), The hash value in the plaintext state is calculated (SX10). The calculated hash value is compared with the hash value acquired together with the encryption program by the program acquisition unit 212, and the success or failure of the update is determined by this comparison (SX11). When the update is successful, the old program is deleted (SX12). When the update fails, the transmitted program is deleted (SX13). Then, information such as the program storage destination and size is written to the secure memory 10 (SX14), and the update process is completed.

  When the program shared key encryption program is transmitted from the server by using the program update method described above, the key to be encrypted is converted from the program shared key to the program unique key in the secure LSI, and is installed in the system. For this reason, even if the communication path from the server to the secure LSI is illegally accessed and the program shared key encryption program is stolen, the secure LSI cannot be operated by this program. Also, as a result of the update, each product that the user has is installed with a program encrypted with a different unique key, thereby improving confidentiality. In addition, even if the encryption is broken, the number of products that are damaged is limited, and the security is higher than before.

  In this embodiment, the shared key information is acquired from the server. This is because the decrypted program shared key and the secure memory 10 are stored at the end of the program implementation (SD1) in the product operation mode “11”. This is because the shared key information is deleted, and when these are not deleted, the shared key information does not need to be acquired from the server, but may be read from the secure memory 10 and decrypted.

  Further, in this embodiment, the start of the program update is instructed by an external factor, the normal pupil sub 211 starts the program acquisition unit 212, and after the program is acquired, each process is instructed by the boot program. The present invention is not limited to this. For example, by configuring the boot program to activate the program acquisition unit 212, security can be further enhanced.

  Further, the program unique key does not necessarily have to be unique for each product, and may be the same for each product type or for each plurality. The purpose of the present invention is to reduce the damage when a cipher is broken in one product, and the effect can be sufficiently exerted only by reducing the number of LSIs having programs encrypted with the same key as much as possible. it can. Furthermore, even if all the program unique keys are common, even if the communication path is broken and the shared key encryption program is stolen, it cannot be operated on the secure LSI as it is, so the key is rewritten from the shared key to the unique key. Even just, it can be effective.

1 Secure LSI
3 Server 4 First table 5 Second table 10 Secure memory (internal memory)
58 Program unique key storage register 60 Boot ROM
100 External memory

Claims (11)

A secure device including an integrated circuit and an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit,
The integrated circuit comprises:
Unique key holding means for generating and holding a unique key unique to the integrated circuit;
Encryption means for generating unique key encryption information by encrypting information received from outside the integrated circuit using the unique key;
Output means for outputting the unique key encryption information to the external memory,
The secure device, wherein the unique key in the unique key holding unit cannot be changed after generation. The secure device of claim 1, wherein
The unique key holding means is
A setting holding unit that receives a setting of information indicating whether rewriting is permitted for a recording area in which the unique key in the unique key holding unit is held;
A rewrite control unit that switches whether to rewrite a recording area in which the unique key is held according to information set in the setting holding unit,
The integrated circuit further includes:
A secure device, comprising: a write disable setting unit that sets information for prohibiting rewriting of the recording area to the setting holding unit when the unique key is written to the unique key holding unit. . The secure device of claim 1, wherein
The secure device, wherein the unique key encryption information is data encrypted with a unique key. The secure device of claim 1, wherein
The secure device, wherein the unique key encryption information is a program encrypted with a unique key. The secure device of claim 1, wherein
Receiving means for receiving shared key encryption information, which is information encrypted with a shared key held by the server, from an external server;
Shared key holding means for holding the same shared key as the shared key held by the server;
Conversion means for converting the information received by the receiving means,
The encryption means further performs a decryption process using a shared key held by the shared key holding means,
The converting means includes
Receiving the shared key encryption information from the receiving means;
Using the encryption means, the received shared key encryption information is decrypted using the shared key to generate plaintext information, and the plaintext information is encrypted using the unique key to obtain a second unique key encryption Generation information
The secure device, wherein the second unique key encryption information is output to the external memory. The secure device of claim 5, wherein
The receiving means further receives from the server additional information including an authentication hash value to be calculated when the plaintext information has not been tampered with,
The integrated circuit further includes:
A hash operation means for calculating a hash value of the plaintext information generated by decryption,
The secure device further includes confirmation means for confirming whether or not the plaintext information is falsified by comparing the hash value of the plaintext information calculated by the hash calculation means with the authentication hash value. Secure device characterized by that. The secure device of claim 5, wherein
The old unique key encryption information written in the external memory before the second unique key encryption information after confirming that the second unique key encryption information has been written in the external memory A secure device comprising a deleting means for deleting The secure device of claim 5, wherein
The receiving means further receives a hash value corresponding to the second unique key encryption information from the server,
The secure device further includes:
Completion confirmation means for determining that writing of the second unique key encryption information is completed when the hash value received by the receiving means is equal to the hash value calculated from the second unique key encryption information A secure device comprising: The secure device of claim 5, wherein
The integrated circuit further includes:
Comprising a recording means for recording a boot program for performing a startup process of the secure device;
The secure device is characterized in that the conversion means is controlled by the boot program. An integrated circuit,
Unique key holding means for generating and holding a unique key unique to the integrated circuit;
Encryption means for generating unique key encryption information that is information encrypted using the unique key;
Output means for outputting the unique key encryption information to an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit;
The integrated circuit according to claim 1, wherein the unique key in the unique key holding unit cannot be changed after generation. An encryption method in a secure device including an integrated circuit and an external memory provided outside the integrated circuit,
Generating a unique key unique to the integrated circuit and holding it in a unique key holding means;
Generating unique key encryption information by encrypting information received from outside the integrated circuit using the unique key;
Outputting the unique key encryption information to the external memory,
The encryption method, wherein the unique key in the unique key holding means cannot be changed after generation.

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