JP2009100946A - Security device for game machine - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a security device for a game machine, which can announce fraudulence at a high probability. <P>SOLUTION: A main board 1 includes a main board-side counter 1a and a main board-side table 1b. When a game ball enters a start pocket, main board-side collation data corresponding to the counted value in the main board-side counter 1a are read from the main board-side table 1b, and a collation command representing the main board-side collation data is transmitted to a subordinate board 5. The subordinate board 5 includes a subordinate board-side counter 5a and a subordinate board-side table 5b. When the collation command is transmitted from the main board 1, subordinate board-side collation data corresponding to the counted value on the subordinate board-side counter 5a are read from the subordinate board-side table 5b, and the read subordinate board-side collation data are collated with the main board-side collation data represented in the collation command. If the subordinate board-side collation data do not match the main board-side collation data, a fraudulence announcing means 7 is operated. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2009,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to a fraud countermeasure device for a gaming machine such as a pachinko gaming machine, and more particularly to a fraud countermeasure device for a gaming machine that notifies that a fraudulent act has been performed on the gaming machine.

  As shown in FIG. 6, the pachinko gaming machine includes a power supply board 2, a main board 1, and an effect control board 5 that is a sub board, and the main board 1 is connected to a start winning opening (start opening) on the game board. When a game ball wins, that is, when the start switch 3 is turned on, one random number is obtained from a predetermined number, for example, 256 random numbers that change periodically in sequence. When the acquired random number is a jackpot random number value, a jackpot command is transmitted to the sub-board 5, and the sub-board 5 that has received this jackpot command starts symbol variation, reach effect, jackpot symbol display in the symbol display device. After the stop or the like is performed, the main board 1 performs a control to release the large winning opening on the game board a predetermined number of times, and a large amount of gaming balls can be paid out based on the winning of the gaming balls to the large winning opening.

  By the way, recently, there has been a case where a fraudulent act is performed on a pachinko gaming machine using a fraudulent board and a large number of game balls are illegally paid out.

  The outline of this fraud will be described in order with reference to FIG.

  (1) First, the illegal substrate 10 is connected between the main substrate 1 and the power supply substrate 2 and between the main substrate 1 and the sub substrate 5, and the power supply of the main substrate 1 is suddenly lowered by the illegal substrate 10. In the main board 1, the CPU is stopped due to the sudden drop of the power, and the backup process by the CPU is not normally performed.

  (2) Thereafter, the unauthorized substrate 10 normalizes the power supply line. When the power supply line is normalized, the CPU of the main board 10 performs a reset process, the RAM of the main board 1 is cleared because it is not backed up, and the initial random number starts from “0”. Here, the initial value random number is used for determining the initial random number, that is, the initial random number when the random number consisting of a predetermined number, for example 256, sequentially changes in a predetermined cycle and completes a round. It is a random number. For example, in the first round after resetting, the random number changes in order from “0” to “255”, and in the next round, if the initial random number is “1”, “1”... “255” , The random number changes in the order of “0”.

  (3) The main board 1 transmits a command to the effect that the RAM has been cleared to the sub board 5. However, the illegal substrate 10 eliminates this command, and the sub-board 5 cannot receive this command. For this reason, the sub-board 5 performs notification based on this command, that is, notification that fraud has occurred. It is not possible.

  (4) Since the illegal board 10 is known to have an initial value random number “0”, the pseudo game ball passing signal is synchronized with the main board 1 in accordance with the timing when the acquired random number becomes the big hit random value. That is, a false signal corresponding to the signal when the start port switch 3 is turned on is transmitted. When the main board 1 receives this signal, it acquires a random number. Since the acquired random number is a jackpot random value, the main board 1 transmits a jackpot command to the sub board. After the sub-board 5 receives the jackpot command, the various effects described above and the opening of the big prize opening are performed, and a large amount of game balls are unreasonably paid out to the fraudster.

  The present invention is based on the above-described fraud using the illegal substrate 10, and an object of the present invention is to provide a gaming machine fraud countermeasure device capable of reporting fraud at high probability. .

  A gaming machine fraud countermeasure apparatus according to the present invention is a gaming machine fraud countermeasure apparatus including a main board, a sub board, and fraud notification means, wherein the main board counts the number of occurrences of a predetermined event. And a main board side table in which main board side collation data corresponding to the count value of the main board side counter is written on a one-to-one basis, and when the predetermined event occurs, The main board side verification data corresponding to the count value of the main board side counter is read, a verification command indicating the main board side verification data is transmitted to the sub board, and the sub board is transmitted from the main board. A sub-board-side counter that counts the number of times the matching command is received, and sub-board-side matching data that corresponds to the count value of the sub-board-side counter on a one-to-one basis. A sub-board-side table in which sub-board-side verification data is written, and when the verification command is transmitted from the main board, the sub-board-side table corresponds to the count value of the sub-board-side counter. The sub-board-side verification data to be read, the sub-board-side verification data and the main-board-side verification data indicated by the verification command are verified, and the sub-board-side verification data and the main-board-side verification data The fraud notification means is actuated when does not match.

  According to the fraud countermeasure device of the present invention, when the power supply of the main board suddenly drops due to the illegal board, and then the power line is normalized normally, the count value of the main board counter is reset by the CPU resetting of the main board. Is reset to “0”, and then the illegal board generates a false event equivalent to the predetermined event, the verification data corresponding to the count value of “0”, that is, the main board side verification data Is read from the main board side table, and a verification command indicating the main board side verification data is transmitted to the sub board.

  On the other hand, on the sub-board, the sub-board counter counts the number of times that the verification command is received until immediately before the illegal action by the illegal board is performed. Not cleared by start. For this reason, the sub-board is the main board-side collation data indicated by the collation command transmitted from the main board after normalizing the power line, and the collation data corresponding to the count value of the sub-board side counter, that is, the sub-board side collation When the data is collated, the count value corresponding to the main board side collation data indicated by the collation command is “0”, whereas the count value corresponding to the sub board side collation data is except for immediately after reset. Since it is a value other than “0”, it is determined that the two do not coincide with each other, and the fraud notification means is activated based on the determination result, and the fraud is reported.

  Therefore, according to the present invention, it is possible to notify fraudulent activity with high probability. Further, according to the present invention, it is possible to make a different determination for each model by changing the verification data for each different gaming machine.

  Here, instead of verifying the main board side verification data and the sub board side verification data, it is also illegal to check the count value of the main board counter and the counter value of the sub board side counter. Can be notified with a high probability, however, since the count value is further converted into the data for verification and the data for verification is verified, it becomes even more difficult to cheat.

  The predetermined event includes a plurality of events, and the main board side counter and the sub board side counter are provided in one-to-one correspondence with each event of the plurality of events, and the sub board includes at least one sub board. If the sub-board-side verification data and the main-board-side verification data do not match due to the verification corresponding to an event, the fraud notification means is activated, and one of the events happens by chance. This is a case where the result of the above collation is “match” due to the fraudulent act being performed after the counter counter corresponding to the counter is reset to “0”, and the fraudulent act is not reported for this event. Even if there are, the counter counter on the secondary board corresponding to the other event is often not reset to “0”, so the collation result for this other event is “mismatch”, and the misconduct is reported. The probability that the divide is high. Therefore, it becomes possible to notify the illegal act with a higher probability.

  Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

  FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an electric control system of a pachinko gaming machine incorporating an anti-fraud device according to an embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 2 is a flowchart of processing performed by a main board, and FIG. 3 is performed by a sub board. FIG. 4 is a timing chart for explaining the operation of the fraud countermeasure device, and FIG. 5 is a configuration diagram of the main board side table and the sub board side table.

  In FIG. 1, the pachinko gaming machine includes a main board (also referred to as a main control board) 1 that plays a central role in controlling the gaming state, and the main board 1 is configured by a CPU, ROM, RAM, and the like. .

  The main board 1 receives power from the power board 2 and executes processing. In the main board 1, the CPU can perform the backup process normally when the power supply decrease rate is less than a predetermined level. However, the backup process by the CPU is not normally performed when the power supply drop rate is suddenly lower than a predetermined level, such as when the power is turned off.

  The main board 1 is connected to a start port switch 3, a big prize opening solenoid 4 and a sub board 5. The sub board 5 is composed of, for example, an effect control board, and the symbol display device 6 and the fraud notification means 7 are connected to the sub board 5.

  The start opening switch 3 is a switch that is turned on when a game ball wins a start winning opening (start opening) on the game board. There are one or a plurality of start ports, and the start port switches 3 are provided in one-to-one correspondence with the respective start ports.

  The big prize opening solenoid 4 drives the big prize opening on the game board to be opened a predetermined number of times when a big hit occurs, enabling a predetermined number of game balls to be awarded to the opened big prize opening, The game ball can be paid out.

  The main board 1 acquires a random number when the start port switch 3 is turned on, and transmits a jackpot command to the sub board 5 when the acquired random number is a jackpot random value. The random number is composed of a plurality of numerical values, for example, 256 numerical values that change in order from “0” to “255”, and changes in order from the initial value determined by the initial value random number every round. For example, when the initial value random number is “3”, the random number sequentially changes from “3” to “255”, and then sequentially changes from “0”, “1”, and “2”. Immediately after the CPU performs the reset process, the initial value random number is reset to “0”, so that the random number changes in order from “0” to “255” in the first round.

  The sub-board 5 that has received the jackpot command from the main board 1 performs a predetermined symbol variation and effect (reach effect, etc.) on the symbol display device 6 and then displays an image showing the occurrence of the jackpot (normally all three rows of symbols are displayed) A set of images) is displayed, and during the big hit, a big hit effect is performed in accordance with the opening / closing operation of the big prize opening.

  Further, when the acquired random number is a jackpot random value, the main board 1 displays the image indicating the occurrence of the jackpot as described above on the symbol display device 6, and then the above described for the winning prize solenoid 4. Such a big hit operation, that is, an operation for driving the big prize opening to open a predetermined number of times is performed.

  The main board 1 includes a counter, that is, a main board side counter 1a. The main board counter 1a counts the number of occurrences of a predetermined event. As the predetermined event, for example, it can be mentioned that an ON signal from the start port switch 3 which is a condition for acquiring a random number is received. Other examples of the predetermined event include that a random number has been acquired, that a symbol variation command has been transmitted, that a game ball has been won at a gate on the game board or a normal winning opening, that a jackpot has occurred ( And the fact that the winning prize opening was closed during the jackpot, and the customer waiting demonstration display was performed on the symbol display device.

  The main board 1 includes a table, that is, a main board side table 1b. In the main board side table 1b, as shown in FIG. 5, the count value of the main board side counter 1a (referred to as main count value) and the data for one-to-one correspondence are written.

  When the predetermined event occurs, the main board 1 reads out the verification data (main board side verification data) corresponding to the count value (main count value) of the main board side counter 1a from the main board side table. A verification command indicating the main substrate side verification data is transmitted to the sub-substrate 5, and the count value (main count value) of the main substrate counter 1a is incremented by "1" and updated.

  Similar to the main board 1, the sub board 5 is constituted by a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and the like. The sub board 5 includes a counter, that is, a sub board side counter 5a. The sub-board-side counter 5a counts the number of times that the verification command transmitted from the main board 1 is received.

  The sub board 5 includes a table, that is, a sub board side table 5b. As shown in FIG. 5, the sub-board-side table 5b includes sub-board-side verification data corresponding to the count value (sub-count value) of the sub-board-side counter 5a on a one-to-one basis. Sub-board-side verification data that matches is written.

  When the sub-board 5 receives the matching command from the main board 1, the sub-board-side matching data corresponding to the main board-side matching data indicated by the matching command and the count value (sub-count value) of the sub-board-side counter 5a is shown. The data is collated, and then the count value (sub count value) of the sub board counter 5a is incremented by "1" and updated. If the result of the collation is “mismatch”, the sub-board 5 determines that fraud has occurred and transmits a fraud detection signal to the fraud notification means 7.

  The fraud notification means 7 is configured to notify a hall employee that fraud has occurred by hearing or vision when a fraud detection signal is received from the sub-board 5, for example, a buzzer, a lamp, a game Consists of ball launch stop means. The fraud notification means 7 may be configured by means capable of recognizing that fraud has occurred in the hall computer.

  Next, an example of the operation of the fraud countermeasure apparatus configured as described above will be described.

(1) Main board 1 operation (processing)
In the main board 1, as shown in FIG. 2, it is determined whether or not a game ball has won a start opening based on an ON signal from the start opening switch 3 (step S1). Here, when the winning at the starting port corresponds to the predetermined event referred to in the present invention, and it is determined that there is a winning at the starting port, the predetermined event has occurred.

  When it is determined that there is a winning at the start port, main board side verification data corresponding to the count value (main count value) of the start port counter (main substrate side counter 1a) is read from the main substrate side table 1b ( In step S2), a verification command indicating the main substrate side verification data is transmitted to the sub-substrate 5 (step S3), and then the count value (main count value) of the start port counter (main substrate side counter 1a) Is updated by adding only “1” (step S4).

  Therefore, the main board 1 transmits a verification command indicating the main board side verification data corresponding to the count value (main count value) of the main board side counter 1a to the sub board 5 in response to the winning at the starting port. Then, a process of updating the count value (main count value) of the main board side counter 1a is performed.

(2) Operation (processing) of sub-board 5
As shown in FIG. 3, the sub-board 5 determines whether or not a command has been received from the main board 1 (step S11).

  When a command is received from the main board 1, it is determined whether or not the received command is a collation command (step S12).

  If the received command is not a verification command but another command, other processing corresponding to the received command is executed.

  On the other hand, if the received command is a collation command, the sub-substrate-side collation data corresponding to the count value (sub-count value) of the sub-substrate-side counter 5a is read from the sub-substrate side table 5b (step S13), and the collation command is The main board side verification data and the sub board side verification data shown in the figure are verified, and it is determined whether or not the main board side verification data and the sub board side verification data match (step S14).

  If the main board side verification data matches the sub board side verification data, the count value (sub count value) of the sub board side counter 5a is incremented by 1 and updated (step S15).

  On the other hand, if the main board side verification data and the sub board side verification data do not match, a fraud detection signal is transmitted to the fraud notification means 7 (step S16). Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed.

(3) When a fraudulent act using a fraudulent board is performed (Fig. 4)
When the power is turned on as the hall opens, the CPUs of the main board 1 and the sub board 5 perform reset processing. By this reset processing, the count values of the main board side counter 1a and the sub board side counter 5a become “0”.

  After that, when the player starts playing and the game ball wins the starting opening, the main board 1 uses the main board side verification data “13H” corresponding to the count value “0” of the main board side counter 1a. The reference command “D613H” is read from the side table 1b and indicates the main substrate side verification data “13H” to the sub-board 5, and the count value of the main board-side counter 1a is incremented by “1”. The count value of the side counter 1a is updated from “0” to “1”.

  When the sub board 5 receives the collation command “D613H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub board side collation data “13H” corresponding to the count value “0” of the sub board side counter 5a is stored in the sub board side table. 5b, the sub-board side verification data “13H” and the main board side verification data “13H” indicated by the verification command “D613H” are checked, and both verification data match with “13H”. Therefore, the collation result is “YES” and it is determined that fraud has not been performed. The fraud detection signal is not transmitted to the fraud notification means 7 and the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is incremented by “1”. Then, the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is updated from “0” to “1”.

  After that, when the game ball wins again at the starting port, the verification command “67H” indicating the main substrate side verification data “67H” corresponding to the count value “1” of the main substrate side counter 1a from the main substrate 1 to the sub substrate 5 is displayed. "D667H" is transmitted, the count value of the main board counter 1a is incremented by "1", and the count value of the main board counter 1a is updated from "1" to "2".

  When the sub-board 5 receives the matching command “D667H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub-board-side counter data “67H” indicated by the matching command “D667H” and the count value “ The sub-board side matching data “67H” corresponding to “1” is collated, and both the matching data are “67H”, so the collation result is “YES” and no fraudulent activity has been performed. Accordingly, the fraud detection signal is not transmitted to the fraud notification means 7, the count value of the sub-board counter 5a is incremented by "1", and the count value of the sub-board counter 5a is changed from "1" to "2". Update to

  After that, when the power supply line is normalized after the power supply is suddenly lowered using an unauthorized board, the CPU of the main board 1 performs a reset process, and the count value of the main board counter 1a is reset to “0”. However, since the CPU of the sub board 5 does not perform the reset process, the count value of the sub board side counter 5a is maintained at “2”. The initial value random number is reset to “0” by the CPU reset processing of the main board 1, and the random number changes periodically and sequentially from “0” to “255”, for example.

  Then, when a pseudo game ball passing signal is transmitted from the unauthorized board to the main board 1 in accordance with the timing at which the random number acquired with the winning at the start port becomes the jackpot random value, the main board 1 The verification command “D613H” indicating the main board side verification data “13H” corresponding to the count value “0” of the main board side counter 1a is transmitted to the sub board 5, and the count value of the main board side counter 1a is set to “1”. ", And the count value of the main board side counter 1a is updated from" 0 "to" 1 ".

  When the sub-board 5 receives the collation command “D613H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub-board side collation data “13H” indicated by the collation command “D613H” and the count value “ The sub-board side verification data “45H” corresponding to “2” is verified, and both count values do not match between “13H” and “45H”. The fraud detection signal is transmitted to the fraud notification means 7. Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed. Further, the sub-board 5 increments the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a by “1”, and updates the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a from “2” to “3”.

  After that, when a pseudo game ball passing signal is transmitted from the unauthorized board to the main board 1 again in accordance with the timing when the random number acquired by the winning at the starting port becomes the jackpot random value, the main board 1 Transmits a verification command “D667H” indicating the main substrate side verification data “67H” corresponding to the count value “1” of the main substrate side counter 1a to the sub-substrate 5 and the count value of the main substrate side counter 1a. Only "1" is added, and the count value of the main board side counter 1a is updated from "1" to "2".

  When the sub-board 5 receives the matching command “D667H” transmitted from the main board 1, the sub-board-side counter data “67H” indicated by the matching command “D667H” and the count value “ The sub-board side matching data “1AH” corresponding to “3” is collated, and both matching data do not match “67H” and “1AH”. The fraud detection signal is transmitted to the fraud notification means 7. Upon receiving the fraud detection signal, the fraud notification means 7 notifies the employee in the hall by visual or auditory sense that fraud has been performed. The sub-board 5 increments the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a by “1” and updates the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a from “3” to “4”.

  As described above, when an illegal act is performed using an unauthorized substrate, the unauthorized reporting means 7 continuously reports the unauthorized activity. For this reason, even if a jackpot occurs due to an illegal act, the employee can surely know that the illegal act has been performed.

  As described above, the fraud countermeasure device according to the present embodiment is a gaming machine fraud countermeasure device including the main board 1, the sub board 5, and the fraud notification means 7, and the main board 1 is connected to the start port. A main board side counter 1a for counting the number of occurrences of a prize (predetermined event), and a main board side table 1b in which main board side verification data corresponding to the count value of the main board side counter 1a is written one-to-one. When the winning at the starting port occurs, main board side verification data corresponding to the count value of the main board side counter 1a is read from the main board side table 1b, and a verification command indicating the main board side verification data is received. The sub-board 5 has a one-to-one correspondence with the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a that counts the number of times of reception of the verification command transmitted from the main board 1 and the sub-board-side counter 5a. Sub-board side verification data And a sub board side table 5b in which sub board side collation data that matches the main board side collation data is written, and when a collation command is transmitted from the main board 1, The sub-board-side verification data corresponding to the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a is read from the table 5b, the sub-board-side verification data is compared with the main-board-side verification data indicated by the verification command, and the sub-board-side verification is performed. When the data for use and the main board side verification data do not match, the fraud notification means is configured to operate.

  According to the fraud countermeasure device of the present embodiment, when the power supply of the main board 1 suddenly drops due to the illegal board, and then the power line is normalized normally, the main board 1 counter is reset by the CPU resetting of the main board 1 The count value of 1a is reset to “0”, and then the main board side verification corresponding to the count value of “0” when the illegal board generates a false event equivalent to winning at the start port. A verification command indicating the data for use is transmitted to the sub-board 5.

  On the other hand, in the sub-board 5, the sub-board side counter 5a counts the number of times the verification command is received immediately before the fraudulent act by the illegal board is performed, and the count value of the sub-board side counter 5a depends on the illegal board. It is not reset by the start of cheating. For this reason, the sub-board 5 uses the main-board-side verification data indicated by the verification command transmitted from the main board 1 after normalization of the power supply line and the sub-board-side verification data corresponding to the count value of the sub-board-side counter 5a. , The counter value of the main board side counter 1a corresponding to the main board side verification data indicated by the verification command is “0”, whereas the sub board side counter corresponding to the sub board side verification data is Since the count value of 5a is a value other than “0” except immediately after reset, it is determined that the main board side verification data and the sub board side verification data do not match each other. The notification means 7 is activated, and an illegal act is notified.

  Therefore, according to the fraud countermeasure device of the present embodiment, it is possible to notify fraudulent activity with high probability.

  Here, instead of collating the main board side collation data and the sub board side collation data, the count value of the main board side counter 1a and the count value of the sub board side counter 5a may be collated. Although fraudulent acts can be reported with a high probability, fraudulent acts become even more difficult by further converting the count value into collation data and collating the collation data.

  The predetermined event is not limited to winning a single starting port as described above. The predetermined event includes a plurality of events, for example, an upper starting port and a lower starting port on the game board. In this case, it is assumed that there are two events of winning at the upper starting opening and winning at the lower starting opening, and the main board side counter 1a and the sub board side counter 5a are awarded at the upper starting opening and at the lower starting opening. The sub-board 5 is provided in a one-to-one correspondence with each other, and the sub-board 5 is matched on the main board side indicated by the matching command by the matching corresponding to at least one of the winning to the upper starting opening or the winning to the lower starting opening. The fraud notification means 7 may be configured to operate when the use data and the sub-board-side verification data do not match. With this configuration, the result of the collation becomes “match” because an illegal act is performed after the sub-board counter 5a corresponding to one of the winnings is reset to “0” by chance. Even if no misconduct is reported, the sub-board-side counter 5a corresponding to other winnings is often not reset to “0”. The result is “mismatch”, and there is a high probability that fraudulent notification will be made. Therefore, it becomes possible to notify the illegal act with a higher probability.

  As the predetermined event, as described above, in addition to receiving the ON signal from the start port switch 3 which is a condition for acquiring a random number, acquiring a random number, transmitting a symbol variation command , A game ball won at a gate on the game board or a normal winning opening, a jackpot has been generated (a jackpot command has been sent), a winning opening has been closed during the jackpot, waiting for customers at the symbol display device 6 The demonstration display may be performed.

  Further, if the verification data is changed for each different gaming machine, it is possible to make a different determination for each model, making it more difficult to perform fraud.

1 is a block diagram of an electric control system of a pachinko gaming machine in which a fraud countermeasure device according to an embodiment of the present invention is incorporated. It is a flowchart of the process which a main board | substrate performs. It is a flowchart of the process which a subboard | substrate performs. It is a timing chart for demonstrating operation | movement of a fraud countermeasure apparatus. It is a block diagram of the main board | substrate side table and the subboard | substrate side table. It is a block diagram of an electric control system when an illegal act is not performed with respect to the pachinko gaming machine. It is a block diagram of an electric control system when an illegal act is performed with respect to a pachinko gaming machine.

Explanation of symbols

1 Main board 1a Main board side counter 1b Main board side table 2 Power supply board 5 Sub board 5a Sub board side counter 5b Sub board side table 7 Fraud reporting means

Claims (2)

An anti-fraud device for a gaming machine comprising a main board, a sub-board and fraud notification means,
The main board includes a main board side counter for counting the number of occurrences of a predetermined event, and a main board side table in which main board side collation data corresponding to the count value of the main board side counter is written one-to-one. When the predetermined event occurs, the main substrate side verification data corresponding to the count value of the main substrate side counter is read from the main substrate side table, and a verification command indicating the main substrate side verification data is Send to sub-board,
The sub-board is a sub-board-side counter that counts the number of times that the verification command transmitted from the main board is received, and sub-board-side verification data that corresponds one-to-one with the count value of the sub-board-side counter. And a sub board side table in which sub board side collation data that matches the main board side collation data is written, and when a collation command is transmitted from the main board, The sub-board-side verification data corresponding to the count value of the sub-board-side counter is read, the sub-board-side verification data is compared with the main-board-side verification data indicated by the verification command, and the sub-board-side verification is performed. The fraud countermeasure device for a gaming machine, wherein the fraud notification means is operated when the main data and the main board side verification data do not match.   The predetermined event includes a plurality of events, and the main board side counter and the sub board side counter are provided in one-to-one correspondence with each event of the plurality of events, and the sub board includes at least one sub board. 2. The game according to claim 1, wherein the fraud notification means is activated when the sub-board-side verification data and the main-board-side verification data do not match due to the verification corresponding to an event. Anti-fraud device.

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