GB2362743A - Inhibiting fraudulent transactions - Google Patents

Inhibiting fraudulent transactions Download PDF

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Publication number
GB2362743A
GB2362743A GB0012339A GB0012339A GB2362743A GB 2362743 A GB2362743 A GB 2362743A GB 0012339 A GB0012339 A GB 0012339A GB 0012339 A GB0012339 A GB 0012339A GB 2362743 A GB2362743 A GB 2362743A
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United Kingdom
Prior art keywords
according
anatomical
parameter
transaction
document
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
GB0012339A
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GB0012339D0 (en
Inventor
John Ward
Michelle Ward
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John Ward
Michelle Ward
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Application filed by John Ward, Michelle Ward filed Critical John Ward
Priority to GB0012339A priority Critical patent/GB2362743A/en
Publication of GB0012339D0 publication Critical patent/GB0012339D0/en
Publication of GB2362743A publication Critical patent/GB2362743A/en
Application status is Withdrawn legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/202Depositing operations within ATMs
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F19/00Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
    • G07F19/20Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
    • G07F19/207Surveillance aspects at ATMs
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07FCOIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G07F7/1016Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption

Abstract

Fraudulent transactions are inhibited by using a personal parameter of the transactor as verification, or otherwise, of identity as the authorised person to sign a cheque or to use a bank or credit card. When the transaction involves the use of a cash-dispensing machine 30, the identity of the person wishing to withdraw money is established by insertion of a forefinger in a scanner 40 that sends a corresponding signal along a transmission line 41 to a comparator 38 which also receives a signal along a transmission line 37 from a card inserted in a slot 35. The comparator 38 compares the identity of the person wishing to withdraw money with the pre-recorded identity of the authorised card holder held in a data base 39. If the identities do not match, a signal is sent along transmission line 42 to prevent cash being dispensed through slot 34 or otherwise to terminate the transaction. The data base 39 also includes the identities of known fraudsters. The details of each attempted fraud are stored in the data base. The comparator 38 is additionally able to send a signal along a transmission line 43 to operate a light showing that the transacation has been aborted and/or a video camera 40 to record a picture of the person illegally using the cash dispenser.

Description

1 2362743 INHIBITING FRAUDULENT TRANSACTI1ONS

Field of the Invention

This invention is concerned with the inhibition of various fraudulent transactions and provides both a method and a system for achieving this. In the event that the trans action involves the use of a document requiring a personal signature, this invention also provides a document that may be used to combat the use of a fraudulent signature. In the event that the transaction requires the use of a cash-dispensing machine, this inven tion also provides a cash-dispensing machine that may be used to combat fraudulent use. In the event that the transaction requires a card terminal, this invention also pro vides a card terminal that may be used to combat bank card and credit card fraud.

Background to the Invention

A very wide range of transactions are currently authorised by the personal sig nature of the transactor, for instance a purchase of goods or services or facilities by cheque, or by signature of a chit to authorise the transfer of funds from the transactor's bank or credit card company. In an attempt to prevent criminals from conducting fraudulent transactions based on forged signatures, banks, credit card companies and other organisations issue plastic cards which identify both the name of the card holder and the number of the account to which the card relates, and bear a specimen signature of the card holder verified by the card issuer. This system relies on the integrity of the specimen signature; that is the difficulty with which the specimen signature might be al tered or the difficulty with which the signature might be forged. It also relies on the care taken by the other party to the transaction in checking the signature written by the transactor against the specimen signature. Such transactions are therefore vulnerable to fraud by alteration of the specimen signature, or by forgery of the specimen signature, or by inadequate checking of the actual signature against the specimen signature.

Both bank and credit cards are commonly used to withdraw cash from cash dispensing machines, the security of the transaction being reliant on the use of a four digit pin number which is intended to be known only to the applicant. Fraudulent with drawais of cash are commonly made when credit cards are lost or stolen, particularly when the owner of the card has made a note of his pin number. Organised criminals are also use decoding equipment to deduce the pin number.

All of the above systems are insecure and their inadequacies result in major losses. The present invention provides a method, a system and apparatus to inhibit fraudulent transactions thereby enabling the present financial losses to be significantly reduced.

Surnmary of the Invention According to one aspect of the invention a method of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprises recording an anatomical parameter of the transactor. In this manner the transaction is positively linked to the unique corporal identity of the transactor. This corporal identity can be used either to verify the identity of the legitimate transactor, or as proof of the identity of a fraudster; either approach introduces a very strong deterrent to fraud and a valuable tool for the positive identification of fraudsters.

Preferably the anatomical parameter is used to verify the identify of the transactor be fore completion of the transaction. Alternatively the method may include retrospective identification of a fraudulent transaction, transferring the recorded anatomical parame ter of the fraudster to a database, and using the database to frustrate any future trans action by the fraudster.

In the case where the transaction is effected by personal signature of the trans actor on a document, the method may include recording the anatomical parameter on the document. In this manner a typical cheque transaction will include positive evidence of the corporal identity of the signatory. The anatomical parameter is preferably re corded on a predetermined area of the document. In the case of a cheque, this prede termined area may be immediately adjacent the position of signature. This predeter mined area is preferably treated to enhance recordal of the anatomical parameter. For instance the area may be impregnated with a chemical which will react with the natural oils and/or acids and/or moisture present on human skin.

The method may include using dermal corrugations from a predetermined part of the transactor's anatomy as the anatomical parameter. Whilst such dermal corruga tions may be from any convenient part of the anatomy, they preferably comprise one or more finger or thumb prints or a palm print. Such dermal corrugations may be printed on the document either using an ink pad or a pad impregnated with a non-toxic oil or chemical that will enhance permanent printing of the dermal corrugations on the cheque or other transaction document. For instance, the pad may be a source of mois ture, such as water, for reaction with a chemical impregnated in the document; instead the pad may be a source of a light colourless oil that will be transferred by the dermal corrugations to the cheque or other transaction document.

Alternatively the method may include recording the anatomical parameter elec tronically, magnetically, thermally or optically on the document. The anatomical pa rameter is preferably recorded as digital information in or on the document. In this event the method preferably includes comparing the anatomical parameter with a data base of equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, and issuing a warning before completion of the transaction in the event that the scanned anatomical parame ter is the same as that of a known fraudster. In this manner fraud is prevented in the event that the fraudster is known; unknown fraudsters will be strongly discouraged by the knowledge that their completion of the fraudulent transaction will ensure both that they will be leaving evidence of their identity and that their anatomical parameter will be entered on the data base to frustrate any further fraudulent or legitimate transaction that utilises this method.

The method may include scanning the anatomical parameter on or in the docu ment, transmitting the scanned anatomical parameter to a remote location having a database of equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, comparing the scanned anatomical parameter with those stored in the database, and issuing a warning before completion of the transaction in the event that the scanned anatomical parame ter is the same as that of a known fraudster. In this manner the identities of known fraudsters can be kept on a central data base arranged to process a large number of sales points. The central data base will typically be operated by a financial organisation such as a bank, building society, credit card company or internet sales organisation.

In the case where the transaction is verified before completion by referral to a database at a location remote from the transactor, the method may include providing the database with the equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, transmit ting the anatomical parameter of the transactor to the location, comparing the anatomi cal parameter of the transactor with the equivalent anatomical parameters of fraudsters in the database, and prohibiting completion of the transaction in the event that the aria- tomical parameter of the transactor is the same as that of a known fraudster. In this manner all of the processing takes place at the remote location, thereby simplifying the equipment needed at the transaction station.

According to another aspect of the invention a document, for inhibiting a 5 fraudulent transaction by personal signature, defines an area dedicated for the recordal of an anatomical parameter of the signatory. Such document could be in the form of a cheque, the normal signature being backed up by the unique corporal identity of the signatory. The dedicated area is preferably for recording dermal corrugations from a predetermined part of the transactor's anatomy as the anatomical parameter. The dedicated area may be positioned immediately adjacent the position in which the signature is to be made. The dedicated area is preferably treated to enhance recordal of the anatomical parameter.

Alternatively the document may have a portion for electronically recording the anatomical parameter. This portion may be an electronic chip secured in or to the document. Alternatively the document may have a portion for magnetically recording the anatomical parameter. This portion may be a magnetisable strip secured to the document. Where either an electronic chip or a magnetisable strip is used, this may be pre-recorded with the anatomical parameter of the legitimate signatory for use in comparison with the equivalent anatomical parameter of the actual transactor.

Alternatively the document may have a portion for optically recording the anatomical parameter. This portion may be an optical recording layer secured to the document and may be suitable for printing a photograph of the anatomical parameter, or for recording the output from a digital camera, or for recording digital information.

According to a further aspect of the invention a system of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprises the aforesaid blank documents and a recording means operable to record an anatomical parameter of each transactor on the corresponding document. In this manner the unique personal identity of the transactor is permanently recorded on the document; in the event that the transaction is subsequently found to be fraudulent, the recorded anatomical parameter may be used as evidence during prosecution of the fraudster. Knowledge that such evidence will be recorded is a strong disincentive to a potential fraudster. This system preferably also comprises a comparator operable to compare the anatomical parameter of each transactor with a data base of the equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, and warning means operable to issue a warning before completion of a transaction in the event that the recorded parameter of the transactor is the same as that of a known fraudster. This recording means is pref erabiy arranged to record the parameter digitally. In this manner potentially fraudulent transactions can be thwarted before completion and may help in apprehending the fraudster. Knowledge that such a system is operative is a very strong deterrent to fraud.

According to another aspect of the invention a system of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprises a transaction station having a scanner operable to scan an ana tomical parameter of each transactor and to produce a unique signal representing the corporal identity of each transactor, a data base arranged to store unique information representing the equivalent corporal identity of known fraudsters, and a comparator operable to compare the signal representing the corporal identity of each transactor with the information stored in the data base and to frustrate completion of any transac tion where the corporal identity of the transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster. This comparator may be arranged to frustrate completion of a trans action by actuating a warning or a camera at the transaction station whenever the cor poral identity of a transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster.

In the case where the comparator and the data base are situated at a location remote from the transaction station, a signal transmission means is preferably provided to transmit signals from the scanner to the location of the comparator and the data base. Where the transactions involve transfer of funds from a financial organisation, the comparator is preferably arranged to prevent any transfer of funds whenever the cor poral identity of a transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster in the data base.

In the case where the comparator is situated at the transmission station and the data base is situated at a location remote from the transaction station, a transmission means is preferably provided to transmit information between the data base and the comparator. Such transmission means is preferably a telephone system.

According to another aspect of the invention a cash-dispensing machine of the kind that is arranged to dispense cash on insertion of a bank or credit card and verifica- tion of the identity of the card holder, is provided with a scanner operable to scan an anatomical parameter of every individual using the machine, a comparator arranged to compare the scanned anatomical parameter with a pre-recording of the equivalent ana tomical parameter of the card holder, and means to prevent the dispensing of cash to anyone other than the legitimate card holder. In this manner fraudulent use of a credit card is frustrated as the pin number has to be backed by the real corporal identity of the legitimate card holder.

The cash-dispensing machine preferably includes a memory to record the scanned anatomical parameter of any individual using a bank or credit card belonging to another. It may also include an alarm and/or a camera arranged to be operated when ever a individual uses a bank or credit card belonging to another.

According to another aspect of the invention a card terminal, of the kind that is operable to check details of a bank or credit card with a remote data base, includes a scanner operable to scan an anatomical parameter of each card holder whose card is being checked, a verifier operable to verify each scanned anatomical parameter with a pre-recording of the equivalent anatomical parameter of the card holder, and means to frustrate completion of any transaction with anyone other than the legitimate card holder.

The verifier may comprise a transmission means operable to transmit the scanned anatomical parameter to the remote data base, and a comparator at the re mote data base to compare the scanned anatomical parameter with a pre- recording of the equivalent anatomical parameter of the legitimate card holder.

Alternatively the verifier may comprise a transmission means operable to re ceive a pre-recording of an anatomical parameter of the legitimate card holder from the remote data base, and a comparator in the card terminal to compare the scanned ana tomical parameter with that of the legitimate card holder.

Brief Description of the Drawings

The invention is illustrated, by way of example only, with reference to the ac companying drawings, in which Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating a first method and system for inhibiting fraudu lent transactions and also a document for use therewith; Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating various modifications of the first method and system; Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating a second method and system for inhibiting fraudulent transactions and also a cash-dispenser for use therewith; Figure 4 is a diagram illustrating a third method and system for inhibiting fraudulent transactions and also a credit or bank card terminal for use therewith, and Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating a fourth method and system for inhibiting fraudulent transactions and also a credit or bank card terminal for use therewith.

Detailed Description of the Drawings

With reference to Figure 1 a document 10, for use in a transaction, comprises a cheque which is of conventional design except for the provision of predetermined area 11 dedicated for the recordal of an anatomical parameter of the transactor. Although the anatomical parameter can be any parameter of the transactor that can establish a unique corporal identity, the embodiment of Figure 1 uses the dermal corrugations of the transactor's right forefinger 12.

The transactor is therefore required to verify his signature of the cheque by making a print of his/her right forefinger within the area 12. In the event that the trans action is subsequently found to be fraudulent, the fraudster is directly linked to the transaction by this fingerprint which constitutes evidence of the fraudster's involvement in the fraudulent transaction. After finding out that the transaction has been fraudulent, the fingerprint can be used to identify the fraudster in the event that the firaudster is already known to the police or any other agency holding the fingerprints of known fraudsters. On the other hand, if the fraudster is not already known, the fingerprint can be recorded for future use in prosecuting the fraudster after his/her identity is estab lished due to a subsequent offence. The knowledge that this system is in operation will serve as a very strong deterrent to any known or new fraudster due to the inevitability of eventual identification and prosecution.

As illustrated, a pad 13 may be provided adjacent the point of signature so that the fingerprint may be enhanced by the transactor first pressing the appropriate finger on the pad 13. Although the pad 13 may be a conventional ink pad loaded with an ink suitable for taking fingerprints, this has the drawback that the transactor's finger will be stained. Instead of using a pigmented ink, it is desirable to use a light oil or substance which will not mark the finger of the transactor and moreover will not Impart an unpleasant smell, will not be otherwise offensive, will not be poisonous, and is unlikely to cause any dermatological reaction. The effectiveness of such oil or substance may be enhanced by pre-treatment of the area 11 with a substance that will react physically or chemically with the oil or substance to make a permanent recording of the fingerprint. For instance the pad 13 may be used merely to moisten the dermal corrugations of the forefinger 12 with water, the area 11 being pre-treated with a substance that will react to make a permanent record.

Although the dermal corrugations of any part of the body could be used, it is important for the method and system to operate solely on a specific anatomical parameter so that everyone utilises the same parameter for verification. This is particularly critical with more sophisticated embodiments of the invention, which will shortly be described, in which the anatomical parameter is used either to identify a known fraudster or to verify the identity of the signatory. Instead of utilising dermal corrugations, the method and system may utilise other anatomical parameters, for instance by recording an eye scan, a photograph, or by leaving a DNA trace (for instance saliva).

Figure 2 illustrates an elaboration of the method and system described to this point. In Figure 2, verification of the identity of the signatory is achieved by the signa- tory placing his/her right forefinger 12 into a dermal corrugation scanner 14 which is arranged to transmit a signal 15 to a transcriber 15 arranged to record the anatomical parameter within the area 11 of a cheque 10 inserted within a location slot 16. The scanner 14 and transcriber 15 may be arranged to record the anatomical parameter in any convenient manner. For instance the scanner 14. and transcriber 15 may be ar- ranged merely to reproduce the right forefinger print in the area 11, or may be arranged to select and record salient features features normally utilised in fingerprint comparison. Alternatively the fingerprint may be digitised and recorded in the area in digital format. In the latter event the area 11 may comprise a portion for recording the digitised fingerprint and may comprise a layer of magnetic recording medium or may incorporate an electronic recording chip. Alternativelt the scanner 14 may be replaced by a camera to photograph the chosen dermal corrugations, face, retina, or iris of the signatory, the transcriber 15 being used to record such photograph in the area 11 either as a true image or as a processed digital signal. Such camera 14 and transcriber 15 may be combined into a single unit that will record the chosen anatomical parameter in or on the area 11. Such recordal can be achieved either photographically or by using a laser writer, the are 11 being appropriately pre-treated to accept the image.

The scanner 14 may additionally be provided with a signal transmission line 17 to transmit and receive signals from an unshown database which contains information regarding the equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters and/or of the authorised signatory. In this manner the scanner 14 can transmit the corporal identity of the actual signatory along the transmission line 17 to the database for verification as the correct signatory, or for identification as a potential or a known fraudster, the con clusion being transmitted back along the transmission line 17 to the transcriber 15. For this purpose the transcriber 15 is provided with numeric buttons 18 to enable commu nication along the transmission line 17 with the database, and appropriate function but tons 19. In the event that the anatomical parameter of the signatory is incorrect or fraudulent, the return signal from the data base will actuate a warning light 20 so that the transaction can be aborted. In this event the database will still have details of the corporal identity of the fraudster which may also, of course, be recorded in area as proof of the attempted fraud. The warning light 20 may be replaced by a covert signal and/or be linked to a video camera to produce further identification of the fraudster.

In Figure 3 the system and method are applied to a cash dispenser 30 having the usual transaction screen 31, function buttons 32, numeric buttons 33, cash dispensing slot 34, card insertion slot 35 and receipt issuing slot 36. The card reader associated with slot 35 is arranged to transmit the usual signal along a transmission line 37, to a comparator 38 which has access to a database 39. The cash dispenser 30 is additionally provided with a scanner 40 which comprises an aperture into which the person re questing cash withdrawal is to place his/her right forefinger. This scanner 40 transmits a signal, representing the scanned dermal corrugations, along a transmission line 41 to the comparator 38 which compares the signal from the scanner 40 with pre- recorded sig nals held in the database as the correct corporal identity of the authorised signatory of the account identified by the insertion of the card in the slot 35. In the event that the person using the cash dispenser is not an authorised signatory of the account, the comparator 38 can then refer to the identities of known fraudsters held in the data base. In the event that the comparator 38 verifies that the cash dispenser 30 is being operated by an authorised signatory, a signal is transmitted along line 42 to activate the conventional cash dispensing mechanism behind the slot 34. However, in the event that the cash dispenser is being operated by a person other than an authorised signatory, or by a recognised fraudster, the cash dispensing mechanism is disabled and the transaction is terminated, In either of these events the comparator 38 is able to send a further signal along transmission line 43 to operate a camera 44 and/or a light 45 to indicate that the transaction has been terminated. The data base 39 will probably be located at a central facility of the cash dispenser operator but the comparator may either have the same remote location or be housed within the cash dispenser 30.

Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the application of similar methods and systems to a card terminal 50 provided with the usual card swiping slot 51, numerical buttons 52 and function buttons 53. In both figures the card terminal 50 is provided with a finger scanner 54 and a warning light 55, the buttons 52 and 53 being used in the conventional manner to communicate with a remote data base 56 which checks the card details from the swiping slot 51 through a transmission line 57, and approves the transaction if the current status of the card account will permit the transaction without be- coming overdrawn, subject to the sole security of the signature on the card matching that of the transactor. This security is enhanced by the system and method of the present invention as the corporal identity of the transactor is also verified, the insertion of the forefinger into the finger scanner 54 causing an additional signal being transmitted along the transmission lines 58 and 57 to a comparator 59 which, as previously described with reference to Figure 3, is in communication with the data base 56. In this manner the transaction is only approved in the event that the corporal identity of the transactor matches that of the authorised card holder. In the event that the transaction involves illegal use of the card, the comparator 59 is arranged to transmit a signal along transmission line 60 to activate the warning light 55 and to abort the transaction. As previously described with reference to Figure 3, the corporal identity of the fraudster is retained in the data base 56 for future prosecution, and the comparator 59 may additionally be used to activate a video camera.

In Figure 4 the comparator 59 is shown at a remote location which may be identical to that of the data base 56, all communication being through a transmission system 70 which can be a telephone or other transmission line. This has the advantage of minimising the capital cost of the card terminal 50 whilst incurring the additional cost of the transmission line 60 (or a corresponding communication channel).

In Figure 5 the comparator 59 is located within the card terminal 50. This arrangement avoids having to make any alteration to the existing line of communication 71 with the data base but at the additional cost of providing an individual comparator within each card terminal 50.

Claims (1)

1. A method of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprising recording an ariatomical parameter of the transactor.
2.. A method, according to Claim 1, including using the anatomical parameter to verify the identify the transactor before completion of the transaction.
3. A method, according to Claim 1, including retrospective identification of a fraudulent transaction, transferring the recorded anatomical parameter of the fraudster to a database, and using the database to frustrate any future transaction by the fraud ster.
4. A method, according to any preceding claim and in the case where the trans action is effected by personal signature of the transactor on a document, in which the anatomical parameter is recorded on the document.
5. A method, according to Claim 4, including recording the anatomical parame ter on a predetermined area of the document.
6. A method, according to Claim 4 or 5, including treating the predetermined area to enhance recordal of the anatomical parameter.
7. A method, according to any of Claims 4 to 6, including using dermal corruga tions from a predetermined part of the transactor's anatomy as the anatomical parame ter.
8. A method, according to Claim7, in which the dermal corrugations are printed on the document.
9. A method, according to any of Claims 4 to 6, including recording the ana tomical parameter electronically, magnetically or optically on the document.
10. A method, according to Claim 9, including comparing the anatomical pa rameter with a database of equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, and issuing a warning before completion of the transaction in the event that the scanned anatomical parameter is the same as that of a known fraudster.
11. A method, according to any of Claims 4 to 9, including scanning the ana tomical parameter in or on the document, transmitting the scanned anatomical parame ter to a remote location having a database of equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, comparing the scanned anatomical parameter with those stored in the database, and issuing a warning before completion of the transaction in the event that the scanned anatomical parameter is the same as that of a known fraudster.
12. A method, according to any of Claims 1 to 3 and in the case where the transaction is verified before completion by referral to a database at a location remote from the transactor, including providing the database with the equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, transmitting the anatomical parameter of the transactor to the location, comparing the anatomical parameter of the transactor with the equivalent anatomical parameters of fraudsters in the database, and prohibiting completion of the transaction in the event that the anatomical parameter of the transactor is the same as that of a known fraudster.
13. A method of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
14 A document for inhibiting a fraudulent transaction by personal signature, defining an area dedicated for the recordal of an anatomical parameter of the signatory.
15. A document, according to Claim 14, in which the dedicated area is for recording dermal corrugations from a predetermined part of the transactor's anatomy as the anatomical parameter.
16. A document, according to Claim 14 or 15, in which the dedicated area is positioned immediately adjacent the position in which the signature is to be made.
17. A document, according to any of Claims 14 to 16, in which the dedicated area is treated to enhance recordal of the anatomical parameter.
18. A document, according to Claim 14, having a portion for electronically re cording the anatomical parameter.
19. A document, according to Claim 18, in which the portion is an electronic chip secured to the document.
20. A document, according to Claim 14, having a portion for magnetically re cording the anatomical parameter.
21. A document, according to Claim 20, in which the portion is a magnetisable strip secured to the document.
22. A document, according to Claim 14, having a portion for optically recording the anatomical parameter.
23. A document, according to Claim 22, in which the portion is an optical re- cording layer secured to the document.
24. A document, for inhibiting a fraudulent a transaction by personal signature, substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
25. A system of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprising blank documents according to any of Claims 14 to 24, and recording means operable to record an anatomical parameter of each transactor on the corresponding document.
26. A system, according to Claim25, also comprising a comparator operable to compare the anatomical parameter of each transactor with a data base of the equivalent anatomical parameters of known fraudsters, and warning means operable to issue a warning before completion of a transaction in the event that the recorded parameter of the transactor is the same as that of a known fraudster.
27. A system, according to Claim 25 or 26, in which the recording means is arranged to record the parameter digitally.
28. A system of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction comprising a transaction sta tion having a scanner operable to scan an anatomical parameter of each transactor and to produce a unique signal representing the corporal identity of each transactor, a data base arranged to store unique information representing the equivalent corporal identity of known fraudsters, and a comparator operable to compare the signal representing the corporal identity of each transactor with the information stored in the data base and to frustrate completion of any transaction where the corporal identity of the transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster.
29. A system, according to Claim 28, in which the comparator is arranged to frustrate completion of a transaction by actuating a warning at the transaction station whenever the corporal identity of a transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster.
30. A system, according to Claim 28 or 29, in which the comparator and the data base are situated at a location remote from the transaction station, and a signal transmission means is provided to transmit signals from the scanner to the location of the comparator and the data base.
-is- 31. A system, according to Claim 30 and in the case where the transactions in- volve transfer of funds from a financial organisation, in which the comparator is ar- ranged to prevent any transfer of funds whenever the corporal identity of a transactor matches the corporal identity of a known fraudster in the data base.
32. A system, according to Claim 28 or 29, in which the comparator is situated at the transmission station and the data base is situated at a location remote from the transaction station, and a transmission means is provided to transmit information between the data base and the comparator 33. A system of inhibiting a fraudulent transaction substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
34. A cash-dispensing machine arranged to dispense cash on insertion of a bank or credit card and verification of the identity of the card holder, including a scanner operable to scan an anatomical parameter of every individual using the machine, a comparator arranged to compare the scanned anatomical parameter with a pre-recording of the equivalent anatomical parameter of the card holder, and means to prevent the dispensing of cash to anyone other than the legitimate card holder.
35. A cash-dispensing machine, according to Claim 34, including a memory to record the scanned anatomical parameter of any individual using a bank or credit card belonging to another.
36. A cash-dispensing machine, according to Claim 34 or 35, including an alarm arranged to be operated whenever a individual uses a bank or credit card belonging to another.
37. A cash-dispensing machine substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
39. A card terminal operable to check details of a bank or credit card with a remote data base, including a scanner operable to scan an anatomical parameter of each card holder whose card is being checked, a verifier operable to verify each scanned ana tomical parameter with a pre-recording of the equivalent anatomical parameter of the card holder, and means to frustrate completion of any transaction with anyone other than the legitimate card holder.
40. A card terminal, according to Claim 39, in which the verifier comprises transmission means operable to transmit the scanned anatomical parameter to the remote data base, and a comparator at the remote data base to compare the scanned anatomical parameter with a pre-recording of the equivalent anatomical parameter of 5 the legitimate card holder.
41. A card terminal, according to Claim 39, in which the verifier comprises transmission means operable to receive a pre-recording of an anatomical parameter of the legitimate card holder from the remote data base, and a comparator in the card terminal to compare the scanned anatomical parameter with that of the legitimate card 10 holder.
42. A card terminal substantially as described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings.
GB0012339A 2000-05-23 2000-05-23 Inhibiting fraudulent transactions Withdrawn GB2362743A (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0012339A GB2362743A (en) 2000-05-23 2000-05-23 Inhibiting fraudulent transactions

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0012339A GB2362743A (en) 2000-05-23 2000-05-23 Inhibiting fraudulent transactions

Publications (2)

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GB0012339D0 GB0012339D0 (en) 2000-07-12
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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2382207A (en) * 2001-11-19 2003-05-21 Muhammad Alhamdani Fingerprint recognition

Citations (8)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1548667A (en) * 1975-06-23 1979-07-18 Calspan Corp Fingerprint based access control and identification apparaus
GB2174831A (en) * 1985-04-22 1986-11-12 Quantum Fund Ltd The Skin-pattern recognition
GB2229305A (en) * 1989-03-13 1990-09-19 British Telecomm Identity verification
GB2256170A (en) * 1991-05-02 1992-12-02 William Robert Brandes Integrated circuit card with fingerprint verification.
WO1994010659A1 (en) * 1992-10-27 1994-05-11 Jasper Consulting, Inc. Credit card fraud elimination system
GB2313944A (en) * 1996-06-07 1997-12-10 Don Gerard Rohan Jayamanne Card with an individual's fingerprint
US5764789A (en) * 1994-11-28 1998-06-09 Smarttouch, Llc Tokenless biometric ATM access system
GB2332973A (en) * 1997-12-30 1999-07-07 Accu Time Systems Inc Biometric interface device

Patent Citations (8)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1548667A (en) * 1975-06-23 1979-07-18 Calspan Corp Fingerprint based access control and identification apparaus
GB2174831A (en) * 1985-04-22 1986-11-12 Quantum Fund Ltd The Skin-pattern recognition
GB2229305A (en) * 1989-03-13 1990-09-19 British Telecomm Identity verification
GB2256170A (en) * 1991-05-02 1992-12-02 William Robert Brandes Integrated circuit card with fingerprint verification.
WO1994010659A1 (en) * 1992-10-27 1994-05-11 Jasper Consulting, Inc. Credit card fraud elimination system
US5764789A (en) * 1994-11-28 1998-06-09 Smarttouch, Llc Tokenless biometric ATM access system
GB2313944A (en) * 1996-06-07 1997-12-10 Don Gerard Rohan Jayamanne Card with an individual's fingerprint
GB2332973A (en) * 1997-12-30 1999-07-07 Accu Time Systems Inc Biometric interface device

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2382207A (en) * 2001-11-19 2003-05-21 Muhammad Alhamdani Fingerprint recognition

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