GB2274540A - Display device - Google Patents
Display device Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2274540A GB2274540A GB9406420A GB9406420A GB2274540A GB 2274540 A GB2274540 A GB 2274540A GB 9406420 A GB9406420 A GB 9406420A GB 9406420 A GB9406420 A GB 9406420A GB 2274540 A GB2274540 A GB 2274540A
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- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- alarm
- operator
- display
- sensor
- information
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
- G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
- G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
- G05B23/0259—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterized by the response to fault detection
- G05B23/0267—Fault communication, e.g. human machine interface [HMI]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B25/00—Alarm systems in which the location of the alarm condition is signalled to a central station, e.g. fire or police telegraphic systems
- G08B25/14—Central alarm receiver or annunciator arrangements
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C17/00—Monitoring; Testing ; Maintaining
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/008—Man-machine interface, e.g. control room layout
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
- Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S10/00—Systems supporting electrical power generation, transmission or distribution
- Y04S10/50—Systems or methods supporting the power network operation or management, involving a certain degree of interaction with the load-side end user applications
- Y04S10/52—Outage or fault management, e.g. fault detection or location
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- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Plasma & Fusion (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- High Energy & Nuclear Physics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Emergency Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Testing And Monitoring For Control Systems (AREA)
Description
2274540 DISPLAY DEVICE This invention relates to a display device which
could for example be used in connection with the control of operation of a commercial nuclear power plant.
Conventionally, commercial nuclear power plants have a central control room containing equipment by which the operator collects, detects, reads, compares, copies, computes, compiles, analyzes, confirms, monitors, and/or verifies many bits of information from multiple indicators and alarms. Conventionally, the major operational systems in the control room have been installed and operate somewhat independently. These include the monitoring function, by which the components and the various processes in the plant are monitored; control, by which the components and the processes are intentionally altered or adjusted, and protection, by which a threat to the safety of the plant is identified and corrective measures immediately taken.
The result of such conventional control room arrangement and functionality can sometimes by information overload or stimulus overload on the operator. That is, the amount of information and the variety and complexity of the equipment available to the operator for taking action based on such extensive information, can exceed the operator's cognitive limits, resulting in errors.
The most famous example of the inability of operators to assimilate and act correctly based on the tremendous volume of information stimuli in the control room, particularly during unexpected or unusual plant transients, is the accident that occurred in 1978 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Since that event, the industry has focused considerable attention to increasing plant operability through improving control room operator performance. A key aspect of that improvement process is the use of human engineering design principles.
Advances in computer technology since 1978 have enabled nuclear engineers and control room designers to display more information, in a greater variety of ways, but this can be counterproductive, because part of the problem is the overload of information. Improving "user friendliness" while maintaining the quantity and type of information at the operator's disposal has posed a formidable engineering challenge.
Claims (14)
1. The algorithm averages the process representation' inputs from the A and 3 cold legs and outputs the average as the loop (1 or 2) T c process representation'..
2. The algorithm checks to see if A and 5 are 'valid' - Yes, output average as 'valid, go to step 5.
m Hog go to step 3.
3. The algorithm checks to see if A or 8 is woperator selectu.
- Yes, go to step 4.
m No. output the average as wfault select', go to step 5.
4. A display device as claimed in claim 1 substantially as herein described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
4 The algorithm checks to see if A or B is 'fault select.
Yes, output the average as fault select', go to step
5.
No, outputytht average as 'operator selettli. go to step 5.
5. Ddviation check A and 5 against the average. (Within sum of 112 wide range instrument uncertainty andexpected process variation).
If the deviation checks are satisfactory. clear the 'T, Cold Leg (1A/18 or ZA/28) Temp Deviation' alarm If present, go to step
6.
97- If either deviation check Is unsatisfactory, generate tne wT c Cold Leg (1A/13 or 2A/23) Temp Geviation alarm, so to step 6.
6. The algorithm cheeks to see if A and S are narrow range.
Yes. output the average as narrow range, go to step
7.
No, output the average as wide range, go to step 7.
7. The algorithm checks to see If either or both Inputs is out-of-range.
If either or both are out-of-range, output this TC loop 'process representation4 signal with the message gout-of-rangem, go to step
8.
If both are In-range, this TC loop process representation' Is not output with the message, out-of-range. go to step 8.
8. The algorithm checks to see if A and B Inputs are PAMI.
Yes output the 'PAM1m message with the loop (1 or 2) T b h c process representation', the loop T c algorithm Is repeated, go to step 1.
Mo, do not output the 'PAMI message with the loop (1 or 2) Tc 'Process representation'. the loop TC algorithm Is repeated, go to step 1.
Method to Oetermine RCS Teold The RCS Tcold uprocess representation' will he calculated by averaging the 'process representation' Inputs from loop 1 and 2 T cold' No. output the process representation' from step 2 as,fault select# go to step 6. 5. The algorithm checks to see If signal 1 or 2 Is fault select.
m Yes, output the process representations from step 2 as,fault select,, go to $tap 5.
m No, output the process represenution' from step 2 as operator selectd, go to step 6. Range Check 6. This step Is Identical to step 10 of the generic validation algorithm. GO to step 1 and repeat the algaritto.
PressurIzer Pressure Validation Alcorithm lg 1 (F, - 38 There are 12 sensors used to measure pressurizer and RCS pressure. During most operational sequences, the operator Is looking for a single process representation of all pressurtzer/RCS pressure readings. This value will be provided In DIAS with a display labeled PRESS'. For consistency, this values which is determined by OLAS9 Is also used on the 1PSO board. To Insure reliability. OPS compares DIAS's Press ' Process representation, with its own Press 'process representation and alarms any deviations (OPSIDIAS Press Calculation Deviation).
The algorithm determines a valid Oprocess representatioO for pressurizer/RCS pressure. For situations when a Ovalldw pressure process representation cannot he calculated. the algorithm will %elect the sensor closest to the last valid signal as the fault selecto Process representation' pressure. This autamatic fault selection Insures continuous output of the pressurizer/RCS 'process representation' pressure for displays and alarms. After a failure the operator may select an individual sensor for the pressure "process representation' as the 'fault select" "process representation'.
The following section describes the algorithm and display processing on the DrAS and CRT displays.
1. The ';rocass representation' pressure shall always be displayed on the applicable 01AS display andlor the CRT page(s) where a single mprocess representation' is neteed as opposed to multiple sensor values.
2. The pressure algorithm and display processing is Identical to the generic validation algorithm with the following modifications:
a. Steps 1-5 (Determination of Calculated Signal' and Faults) of the generic validation algorithm are modified to account for the following.
1. Three sensor ranges (0-1600 psig), (1500-2500 psig) and (0-4000 psig).
h. The remainder of the generic algorithm (steps 6-10) are renumbered to account for additional steps in the (Octeminatipp of Calculated Signal' andFaults). They are almst identical with the minor modifications described with each step.
3. Using a menu (as described In the generic validation algorithm) the operator may view any of the 12 sensors values or single calculated signal'.
These selections include the following:
P-103, 104, 105, 106 0-1600 psig PressurIzer Pressure P-101A. 1018, 101C, 1500-2500 P519 Pressurizer Pressure 101D,Iboox, 100Y P-190A. 1908 0-4000 psig RCS Pressure, PANI CALC PRESS Calculated Signal Validation AlgorithmTo simplify the discussion of sensor tag numbers, the following letters will he used to designate pressure sensors..
P - 101A - A P - 1015 - a P - 101C - C P - 1010 - 0 P - 100x E P - 100Y F P - 103 - a P - 104 - H P 105 1 P 106 j P - 190A - K P - 190E1 - L The algorithm described below Is calculated and displayed Independently by both DPS and DIAS.
The pressurizer pressure 'calculated signal' will he calculated using sensors A. 8. C, 0, E. F, G, H, 1, J, K and L. An attempt will he made to use the narrow 1500 - 2500 psig range sensors (Ap 89 C, 0, ú and F) (pressure-is normally in this range). If pressure is outside the 1500 2500 psig range, the 0 - 1600 psig range sensors % H, 1 and J) will he used. If pressure cannot be calculated -101- using these sensors, the 0 4000 psig range sensors (K and L) will te used. In the event that the validation fails all. of these three ranges, the algorithm will select the sensor closest to the last "valid' signal as the ufault select' calculated signal.
This fault select,' wcalculated signal will be used as the 'process representationw until the operator selects an 'operator select" sensor to replace it or the algorithm is able to validate data.
Pressurizer Pressure Validation and Olsolay Alcorithm Oetermination of Calculated Slonal and Faults (steos 1-13) 1500 2500 osle Ranee Validation Attemot (steos 1-4) 1. The algorithm checks to see if there are 2 or more good' (1500 2S00 psig narrow range) sensors.
Yes, go to step 2 No, go to step 5 and attempt (0-1600 psig range validation) Note: A sensor is "goocw it was not declared a nbadll sensor on the previous pass or a suspect sensor on a previous pass.
le fl 1 b 2. The algorlthm averages all good (1500-2500) range sensors (A, 9, C, 0, E and F). Go to step 3.
3. Deviation check all 'good' (1500-2500) range sensors against the average (within sum of 112 narrow range uncertainty and expected process variation).
- If all deviation checks are satisfactory, go to step 4 to see if the average is in range.
If any deviation checks are unsatisfactory, the following occurs:
The sensor with the greatest deviation from the average Is flagged as a 'suspect sensor, then the algorithm checks to see if this the first or second pass on this scan.
If the first pass, the algorithm Is repeated, beginning at step 1.
Note: If the dev latIon check falls on the first pass, the algorithm has used one or more had sensors to calculate the average. Performing a second pass eliminates the one bad sensor or determines that multiple sensors are bad.
If it Is the second pass, the (1500-2500) range validation fails, go to step 5 to attempt 0 - 1600 psig range validation.
Note: Falling to pass the deviation cheek on the second pass Indicates that there are two or more simultaneous (1500-2500) range sensor failures. The algorithm cannot he sure to correctly elimfnate only the bad sensors, therefore the (1500-2500) range validation must fail. The 0 - 1600 psig range validation Is attempted. This Insures that the algorithm does not calculate an Incorrect signal for this case. Normally without two or more simultaneous failures. the algorithm will detect multiple nonsimultaneous deviatfons, sequentially eliminate thetz from the algorithm and still determine a valid' signal.
-103- Ranee Selection (steo 4) 4. The algorithm cheeks to see If the average is In-range.
The average goes In-range at 96% and 4% of narrow range.
The average goes out-of-range at 98% and 2% of narrow range.
Note: Hysteresis prevents frequent range shifts. Out-of-range occurs at 98% and 2% to Insure that no out-of-range sensors are used to calculate a ovalid, output (I.e., worst case sensors would read 100% and 0%).
If In-range, do the following:
a. Clear the Validation Fault alarm. If previously present.
h. Remove the 'Validation Fault Operator Select Permissive.
c. Output the average as the mvalld' mcalculated signal'.
d. GO to step 12.
If out-of-range. attempt the (0 - 1WO psig) range validation. go to $tap 5.
0 1600 cilg Ran2e Validation Attempt Leeps 5.8) The algorithm checks to s ce If there are 2 or more 0good' 0 - 1600 psig range sensors (G, H, 1 and j)..
-104- Yes, go to step 6 No, go to step 9 and attempt (0-4,000 rangp validation) 6. The algorithm averages all "good' 0 - 1600 psig range sensors (G. M, I and J). Go to step 7.
7. Oeviation check all good' 0 - 1600 psig range sensors against the average (within sum of 112 of the 0 - 1600 psig range uncertainty and expected process variation).
If all deviation cheeks are satisfactory, go to step 8 to see if the average Is In range.
If any deviation checks are unsatisfactory, the following occurs:
The sensor with the greatest deviation from the average is flagged as a 'suspect sensor, then the algorithm checks to see If this Is the first or second pass on this scan.
If the first pass, the 0 - 1600 psig range algorithm Is repeated, beginning at step 5.
Note: If the deviation check fall$ on the first pass. the algorithm has used one or more bad sensors to calculate the average.
Performing a second pass eliminates the one bad sensor or determines that multiple sensors are bad.
If It Is the second pass, the 0 - 1600 psig range validation fails. go to step 9 to attempt 0 - 4000 psig range validation.
-105- Note: Failing to pass the deviation check on the second pass Indicates that there are two or more simultaneous 0 - 1600 psig range sensor failures. The algorithm cannot he sure to correctly eliminate only the bad sensors, therefore the 0 - 1600 psIg range validation muSt fall. The 0 - 4000 psIg range validation Is attempted. This Insures that the algorithm does not calculate an Incorrect signal for this case. Normally without two or more simultineous failures, the algorithm will detect multiple non-slmultaneous deviations, sequentlally eliminate them from the algorithm and still determine a Evalld' sIgnal.
Rance Selectlon (step 8) 8. The algorithm cheeks to see If the average Is In-range.
The average goes fn-range at 96% and 4% of the 0 - 1600 psIg range.
The average goes out-of-range at 98% and 2% of the 0 - 1600 psig range.
"terests prevents frequent range shifts. Out-of-range occurs at 98% and 2% to Insure that no out-of-range sensors are used to calculate a IMW output (i.e., worst case semors would read 100% or 01).
-106- If In-range, do the following:
a. Clear the 'Validation Fault' alarm, If previously present.
h. Remove the Validation Fault Operator Select Permissivel.
c. Output the average as the Yall-dl 'calculated sIgnalm.
d. Go to step 12.
If out-of-range, attempt the 0 4000 psig range validation, go to step
9.
0 4000 Psig Rance Validation Attemot (steps 9, 10, 11 9. The algorithm checks to see If both of the 0 - 4000 psig range sensors (K and L) are "good'.
m Yes, go to step
10. - No, (0-4000 psig) range validation Is not possible, go to step 13.
10. The algorithm averages K and L, the 0 - 4000 pslq range sensors. Go to step
11.
11. Deviation check K and L against the average (within sum of 112 0 4000 psig range uncertainty and expected process variation).
If both deviation checks are satisfactory, do the following:
-107- a Clear the validation fault' alarm, if previously present.
b. Remove the 'Validation Fault Operator Select Permissive, if previously present.
c. Go to step
12.
If either deviation check Is unsatisfactory, go to step
13.
Valid-PANT Cheek (stee 12) 12. Met the mvali40 calculated signal deviatIon cheek against the PANT sensors. Use method a If the 'valid' calculated signalm Is In the 1500- 2500 psig or 0-1600 psig range, and method b if In the 0-4000 psig range.
Method (a) (within sum of 112 0-4000 psIg range Instrument uncertainty, plus process variation, plus instrument position constant).
Method (b) (within sum of 112 0-4000 psIg range Instrument uncertainty, plus process variation).
Yes, do the fjollowing:
0 a. Output the OPAW message, If not previously present.
b. Reinove the PAMI Fault Operator Select Permissive', If previously present.
c. Go to step
14.
Not do the following:
a. Remove the 1PAM15 massage, If previously present.
b. Generate a PAM1 Fault alarm, If not previously present.
c. Enable the 'PAM1 Fault Operator Select Permissive d. Go to step 14.
Note: The (0 - 4000 ps19) wl d@ range sensors (K and L) are not located on the pressurizer, as are the other pressure sensors. The K and L sensors are positioned at the discharge of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) where they measure RCS pressure. During normal operation the pressure at this location Is much higher (approximately 110 psi for a System 80 plant) than at the pressurizer, where sensors (A. B C, 0, E, F, G, M, I and J) are located. An additional deviation acceptance criteria (called Instrument position constant) will be used when deviation checks are made with or against the K and L XO _ 4000 psIg range) sensors.
Failed Validation (steo 13) 13. The algorithm cheeks to see if the calculated signal output of the previous scan was a fault select' sensor.
If the previous scan was not 'fault select', a validation fault has just occurred, do the following:
a. Generate a 'Validation Fault &lam.
Jog.
h Aviation cheek all sensors or L) against the last mvalld Signal. Select the sensor that deviates the least from the last 'valid' signal as the 'fault select' sensor.
c. Output the signal from the Ofault select' sensor as the pressurizer pressure wcalculated sfgnall.
d. Enable the Validation Fault Operator Select Permissive.
c. So to step 14.
PressurIzer Pressure 'Orecess Reoresentatlon' Selection (stees 14.
IR 15) 14. Step 14 Is Identical to step 6 of the generic validation a 1 gori thm.
15. Step 15 Is Identical to step 7 of the generic validation algorithm.
PANT Check of Onerator Select Sensor (step 16) 16. Step 16 Is identical to stop 8 of the generic validation, except that the de 1. yfation criteria are the same.as those specified In step 12 of this pressurizer pressure validation and display algorithm.
* Sad Sensor Evaluation (steo 17) 17. This step Is Identical to step 9 of the generic validation algorithm, except that the deviation criteria checks are the same as those specified In step 12 of this pressurizer pressure validation and display algorithm.
Ranee Cheek (steo 18) 13. The algorithm checks to see If the process representation' Is at or above the maximum numerical range (1600 psig for the 0 1600 psig sensoris, 2500 psig for the 1500 - 2500 psIg sensors and 4000 psig for the 0 - 4000 pslg sensors) or at or below the minim= numerical range (0 psig for the 0 - 1600 psig and 15 4000 psIg sensors and 1500 psig for the 1500 - 2500 psIg sensors).
Yes, Output the message Out-of-Range' along with the process representation' signal. On the CRT place an asterisk (c) preceding the 'process representationn. Go to step 1 and repeat the algorithm.
No, go to step 1 and repeat the algorithm.
Note: 'Out-of-range' Informs the operator that the actual pressure may be higher or lower than the sensor Is capable of measuring.
0 CLAIMS 1. A display device for indicating the value of a parameter in a process plant having an indicator and alarm system, comprising: 5 a display screen; digital processing means for producing a plurality of display fields on the display screen, receiving input signals originating from sensors responsive to changes in the parameter, computing derived values from the input signals, and producing output value images in some of the display fields commensurate with the respective input signals and derived values; some of said fields defining touch-sensitive selection means for selecting particular of said fields and particular of said values for display on said screen; wherein a first set of said fields define a first display page and a second set of fields define a second display page, a) the first and second display pages each having a process field for displaying one output value image, a quality field for displaying the quality of said one output value, a menu field defining a touch-sensitive menu selection target whereby the use can alternate the display between said first and second pages, (b) the first display page having, a plurality of touch-sensitive sensor fields for displaying the identity of each sensor that generates an input signal for said parameter, such that touching one of said sensor fields causes the display of the corresponding value image in said process value field, a touch sensitive calculation field for causing the display of a derived value of said parameter in said process value field, a touch sensitive override field whereby the operator can specify which of the output values of said disolav it-,device is to be used as a representative value of the parameter in the indicator and alarm system, (c) the second display page having an analog field in which at least one analog representation of the value in the process value field is displayed.
2. A display device dependent on claim 1, wherein the sensor fields include displays which identify at least one sensor for each of at least two different range of values of the parameter.
3. A display device dependent on claim 1 or claim 2, wherein the quality field can display one of at least three categories, including a first category indicating that the process parameter values has been derived from a plurality of sensor inputs and is deemed validated, a second category indicating that the process parameter value has been derived from a plurality of sensor inputs but cannot be validated, and a third category indicating that the process parameter value is one of the sensor values.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US07/430,792 US5267277A (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1989-11-02 | Indicator system for advanced nuclear plant control complex |
GB9023718A GB2238650B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1990-10-31 | Plant monitor system |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
GB9406420D0 GB9406420D0 (en) | 1994-05-25 |
GB2274540A true GB2274540A (en) | 1994-07-27 |
GB2274540B GB2274540B (en) | 1995-01-04 |
Family
ID=26297874
Family Applications (6)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
GB9400820A Expired - Fee Related GB2272327B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1990-10-31 | Display device |
GB9400818A Expired - Fee Related GB2272325B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1990-10-31 | Plant monitor system |
GB9400819A Expired - Fee Related GB2272326B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-01-17 | Plant monitor system |
GB9406418A Expired - Fee Related GB2274538B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-03-31 | Indicator device |
GB9406420A Expired - Fee Related GB2274540B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-03-31 | Display device |
GB9406419A Expired - Fee Related GB2274539B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-03-31 | Industrial process parameter measurement |
Family Applications Before (4)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
GB9400820A Expired - Fee Related GB2272327B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1990-10-31 | Display device |
GB9400818A Expired - Fee Related GB2272325B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1990-10-31 | Plant monitor system |
GB9400819A Expired - Fee Related GB2272326B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-01-17 | Plant monitor system |
GB9406418A Expired - Fee Related GB2274538B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-03-31 | Indicator device |
Family Applications After (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
GB9406419A Expired - Fee Related GB2274539B (en) | 1989-11-02 | 1994-03-31 | Industrial process parameter measurement |
Country Status (1)
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GB (6) | GB2272327B (en) |
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FR2519464A1 (en) * | 1981-12-31 | 1983-07-08 | Framatome Sa | METHOD FOR MONITORING AN ELECTRICITY GENERATION PLANT EQUIPPED WITH A NUCLEAR REACTOR |
US4816208A (en) * | 1986-02-14 | 1989-03-28 | Westinghouse Electric Corp. | Alarm management system |
ES2043654T3 (en) * | 1986-05-05 | 1994-01-01 | Westinghouse Electric Corp | MONITORING SYSTEM AND VISUAL PRESENTATION OF STATE TREES. |
US4812819A (en) * | 1987-04-13 | 1989-03-14 | The United States Of America As Represented By The United States Department Of Energy | Functional relationship-based alarm processing system |
US4853175A (en) * | 1988-03-10 | 1989-08-01 | The Babcock & Wilcox Company | Power plant interactive display |
US5167010A (en) * | 1989-08-03 | 1992-11-24 | Westinghouse Electric Corp. | Expert advice display processing system |
-
1990
- 1990-10-31 GB GB9400820A patent/GB2272327B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1990-10-31 GB GB9400818A patent/GB2272325B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
1994
- 1994-01-17 GB GB9400819A patent/GB2272326B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1994-03-31 GB GB9406418A patent/GB2274538B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1994-03-31 GB GB9406420A patent/GB2274540B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 1994-03-31 GB GB9406419A patent/GB2274539B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB2483972A (en) * | 2010-09-27 | 2012-03-28 | Fisher Rosemount Systems Inc | Identify hazardous process conditions associated with devices in a process control system |
US8606378B2 (en) | 2010-09-27 | 2013-12-10 | Fisher-Rosemount Systems, Inc. | Methods, apparatus, and articles of manufacture to identify hazardous process conditions associated with devices in a process control system |
GB2483972B (en) * | 2010-09-27 | 2018-12-26 | Fisher Rosemount Systems Inc | Methods,apparatus and articles of manufacture to identify hazardous process conditions associated with devices in a process control system |
CN103676830A (en) * | 2012-09-12 | 2014-03-26 | 阿尔斯通技术有限公司 | Devices and methods for diagnosis of industrial electronic based products |
US9513628B2 (en) | 2012-09-12 | 2016-12-06 | General Electric Technology Gmbh | Devices and methods for diagnosis of electronic based products |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
GB2272325A (en) | 1994-05-11 |
GB2274540B (en) | 1995-01-04 |
GB2272326B (en) | 1994-10-05 |
GB2274539A (en) | 1994-07-27 |
GB2272327A (en) | 1994-05-11 |
GB2272326A (en) | 1994-05-11 |
GB2274538B (en) | 1995-01-04 |
GB2272325B (en) | 1994-09-28 |
GB9406418D0 (en) | 1994-05-25 |
GB9400819D0 (en) | 1994-03-16 |
GB9400820D0 (en) | 1994-03-16 |
GB9406420D0 (en) | 1994-05-25 |
GB9406419D0 (en) | 1994-05-25 |
GB9400818D0 (en) | 1994-03-16 |
GB2274538A (en) | 1994-07-27 |
GB2272327B (en) | 1994-09-28 |
GB2274539B (en) | 1995-01-04 |
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Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
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732E | Amendments to the register in respect of changes of name or changes affecting rights (sect. 32/1977) | ||
PCNP | Patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee |
Effective date: 20081031 |