GB2135030A - Nuclear weapon system - Google Patents
Nuclear weapon system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- GB2135030A GB2135030A GB08402090A GB8402090A GB2135030A GB 2135030 A GB2135030 A GB 2135030A GB 08402090 A GB08402090 A GB 08402090A GB 8402090 A GB8402090 A GB 8402090A GB 2135030 A GB2135030 A GB 2135030A
- Authority
- GB
- United Kingdom
- Prior art keywords
- control system
- attack
- control
- control means
- sensors
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41G—WEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
- F41G7/00—Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
- F41G7/007—Preparatory measures taken before the launching of the guided missiles
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F41—WEAPONS
- F41G—WEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
- F41G3/00—Aiming or laying means
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42C—AMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
- F42C15/00—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges
- F42C15/40—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically
- F42C15/42—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically from a remote location, e.g. for controlled mines or mine fields
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
- Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
- Aiming, Guidance, Guns With A Light Source, Armor, Camouflage, And Targets (AREA)
- Measurement Of Velocity Or Position Using Acoustic Or Ultrasonic Waves (AREA)
Abstract
A control system for counter- attack missiles (14) having nuclear warheads comprises sensor means (10) producing respective sensor signals in response to the occurrence of events produced by an attack involving nuclear explosion, and a control means (11) which is arranged to control a missile launching means (16) in response to the sensor signals and targeted to constitute a counter attack. The events to which the respective sensors (10a to f) respond include gamma or other radiation, light of high intensity, thermal radiation, sound waves and pressure waves. The control means (11) initiates operation of the missile launching system only when a predetermined number of the sensor signals of the several sensors occur during a predetermined time. <IMAGE>
Description
SPECIFICATION
Control system for controlling the launching of guided missiles and method of controlling such a system
The invention is concerned with a control system for controlling the launching of guided missiles forming part of a deterrent defensive system having atomic or nuclear warheads and a method of controlling the launching of guided missiles. It will be understood that such missiles are ordinarily rocket propelled but the invention would be applicable to control systems for launching other forms of guided missile.
The existing problem when defending states is that, after a surprise attack in which atomic or nuclear weapons are used, the manned controlling organisation which would decide on defensive counter-action to be taken may no longer be operative. Even if such organisation were still operative it may be slow to react to the attack and thus the possibility of timely and effective defensive counter-action may be impaired or lost, for example that of destroying selected missile bases of the attacking enemy.
Furthermore, such an organisation being dependent upon manning by personnel will not provide sufficient deterent effect because an intending aggressor will assume that such organisation will be unable to take decisions and react effectively at a critical time.
Thus the problem to be dealt with by the invention is to provide a control system and method which starts effective defensive counter-action by the launching of missiles automatically in reponse to an attack using atomic or nuclear weapons.
According to one aspect of the invention there is provided a control system for controlling the launching of a guided missile having an atomic or nuclear warhead, characterised in that it comprises sensor means producing respective sensor signals in response to the occurrence of events produced by an attack involving atomic or nuclear explosion, and a control means which is arranged to, or is able to, control a missile launching means in response to the sensor signals and targeted to constitute a counter attack.
In a preferred form the control system is further chacterised in that the sensor means comprise a plurality of sensors for producing respective sensor signals in response to the occurrence of different events resulting from atomic or nuclear explosion.
According to a further aspect of the invention there is provided a method of controlling the launching of counter-attack missiles, characterised by sensing a plurality of events occuring in consequence of an atomic or nuclear explosion and generating sensor signal in response thereto, and processing the sensor signals to produce a trigger signal for initiating the launching of the counter-attack missile but which is produced only if a predetermined number of sensor signals, originated by the occurrence of different events deriving from an atomic or nuclear explosion, are generated within a predetermined period of time.
A control system in accordance with the invention has the advantage that every surprise attack, which would not otherwise be countered in a suitable way because of a temporary incapacitation of the controlling personnel, automatically produces a counterattack, so that an attack against a state subject to protection by this system producing programmed counter-attack is no longer of interest to a potential aggressor. For an example, if some of the personnel of the defending state should have already been killed by chemical and/or biological weapons, a counter-attack is still possibie, so that an attack on a state protected in this manner gives rise to a great risk for the aggressor.
It is, however, especially necessary to enable the control system to distinguish between such an attack and an accident, for example a catastrophe orginating from an atomic power plant, an earthquake, or similar event.
Further features and advantages of the invention will be pointed out in, or apparent from, the claims and the following description, in the latter of which the invention is described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings wherein:- Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of one embodiment of control system in accordance with the invention;
Figure 2 is also a schematic diagram in plan showing the application of the system of Fig.
1 to the control of a plurality of counter-attack missiles and utilising two sensor stations.
The embodiment of control system shown in Figs. 1 and 2 comprises sensor means 10 connected through computer means 11 to a missile trigger control means 1 2 at a large distance. This connection is effected in the preferred embodiment by physical conductors for appropriate signals such as electric wires, or glass-fibre conductors for light signals or similar means providing a signal transmitting system between computer means and trigger control means 1 2.
Preferably the sensor means 10 comprises a plurality of sensors 1 Oa to 1 Of responsive respectively to an early warning signal provided by a radar or satellite, light generated by an atomic or nuclear explosion, thermal radiation generated by said explosion, rising radioactivity, sonic waves, and seismic activity.
The signals originating from the sensors 1 Oa to 10f are led to a computer 13 which determines, by a timing circuit 14, whether the signals produced from all, or a selected plurality of, the sensors 1 0a to 1 Of are pro duced within a predetermined time period at respective intensities, and in appropriate cases, i.e. lOb to 1 Of, are characteristic of, an atomic or nuclear explosion. If the sensor signals do not occur within this time, or do not exhibit the required characteristics because for instance the radioactivity or the sound are controlled by laws other than those characteristic of the atomic or nuclear explosion, then the computer 1 3 would not generate an output signal.
Missiles 14 for counter-attack, preferably rocket propelled, are preferably provided at sites distributed at considerable distances from each other. Each missile 1 4 may be targetted upon a pre-selected target or may be aimed by a guide system 1 5 fed with a signal from the trigger control means 1 2 and derived from the output of computer 1 3. Such signal may be generated by the computer 1 3 from data obtained from the early warning sensor 10a or a satellite identifying the source of attacking missiles.The trigger control means 1 2 initiates operation of a missile launch system 1 6 which produces ignition of the rocket propulsion motors while the missile is supported in its carrier 1 7. At any given missile site 1 8 there may be a plurality of missiles 14 each carrying a single or multiple atomic or nuclear warhead controlled by units 12, 1 5, 1 6 common to these missiles. The source data obtained from the early warning sensor 1 0a and computer 1 3 may be used to check the status (readiness) of the counter attack missiles and adjust their aiming if necessary but these missiles would not be fired until triggered as described in the preceding paragraph.
As seen in Fig. 2, a plurality of missile sites 1 8a to 1 8c each contain (say) two missiles 1 8a and 1 8b being mobile installations with the missiles 14a, 14bsupported in mobile carriers while 1 8c and 1 8d are static with their missiles 1 4c, 1 4d housed in belowground silos. Computer complexes 11 a, 11 b, each equivalent to 11, are fed with signals from sensor means 10 and each are associated operatively with all the missile sites through preferably highly shielded conductor lines 1 9 (of different kinds as already men toned) as well as via non-conductor links 20, 21 such as radio, light or laser means carrying coded signals.
The computer complex 11 or each of same 11 a, 11 b may have an input means requiring positive signals from a policy control station or preferably a plurality, e.g. two, policy control stations before a signal can be sent out from the computer complex to trigger any of the trigger controls 1 2 embodied in the missile sites 18a-18d.
The sensors lotto 10f of Fig. 2 are spaced from each other by large distances such that they are not both, or not all, destroyed at the same time in case of an attack.
Further, each of the sensors 1 0a to 1 Of may be duplicated or multiplicated. The duplicate sensor or the multiplicity of like sensors would be spaced apart by distances sufficiently large to avoid or minimise the risk of any one kind of sensor being destroyed. It is contemplated that spacings of 30 miles (48km) would be suitable to reduce materially the risk of destruction of other sensors when one is subject to a direct hit. It will be understood that the distance is affected by variations in the terrain such as hills and mountains, valleys and plains.
The computer complexes 11 a, 11 b may also be provided with means to develop an output signal to units 1 2 to bring about the launching of the counter-attack missiles if all sensors spaced by large distances are destroyed by separate attacking missiles.
If desirable the condition in which the computer complexes 11 a, 11 b have been set by operators at the policy control stations 22a, 22b can be made known to potential attackers by characteristic signals radiated from the stations 22a, 22b.
The features disclosed in the foregoing description, or the following claims, or the accompanying drawings, expressed in their specific forms or in terms of a means for performing the disclosed function, or a method or process for attaining the disclosed result, or a class or group of substances or compositions, as appropriate may, separately, or any combination of such features, be utilised for relaising the invention in diverse forms thereof.
Claims (14)
1. A control system for controlling the launching of a guided missile having an atomic or nuclear warhead, characterised in that it comprises sensor means producing respective sensor signals in response to the occurrence of events produced by an attack involving atomic or nuclear explosion, and a control means which is aranged to, or is able to, control a missile lauching means in response to the sensor signals and targeted to constitute a counter attack.
2. A control system according to claim 1, further characterised in that the sensor means comprises a plurality of sensors for producing respective sensor signals in response to the occurrence of different events resulting from atomic or nuclear explosion.
3. A control system according to claim 2, further characterised in that tfhe different events to which the respective sensors respond include gamma or other radioactive radiation, light of high intensity, thermal radiation, sound waves, pressure waves and/or similar phenomena.
4. A control system according to either of claims 1 or 2, further characterised in that the control means is so arranged that it initiates operation of the missile launching system only when a predetermined number of the sensor signals of the several sensors occur during a predeterminedtime period.
5. A control system according to any one of the preceding claims, further characterised in that the sensors are spaced at a large distance from each other.
6. A control system according to any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that the sensors are connected with the control means by electrical conductors.
7. A control system according to any one of the preceding claims, characterised in that the sensors are connected with the control means by glass-fibre conductors.
8. A control system according to any one of the preceding claims, further characterised in that the sensors are connected with the control means by radio or optical links operative through the atmosphere or space, as distinct from being transmitted along conductors.
9. A control system according to any one of the preceding claims, further characterised by the provision of status control means for setting the system in a state in which it will operate automatically upon occurrence of an attack involving atomic or nuclear explosion, or in a state in which it will not so operate.
10. A control system according to claim 9, further characterised in that the status control means includes an input means requiring positive input signals from a policy control station before it will establish the system in a state in which the system will operate automatically as aforesaid.
11. A control system according to Claim 10 further characterised in that the status control means includes an input means requiring positive input signals from a plurality of policy control stations before it will establish the system in said state.
1 2. A control system according to any one of claims 10 and 11, further characterised in that there is associated operatively with the status control means, signalling means for signalling the subsisting staus of the status control means.
1 3. A method of controlling the launching of counter-attack missiles, characterised by sensing a plurality of events occurring in consequence of an atomic or nuclear explosion and generating sensor signal in response thereto, and processing the sensor signals to produce a trigger signal for initiating the launching of the counter-attack missile but which is produced only if a predetermined number of sensor signals, originated by the occurrence of different events deriving from an atomic or nuclear explosion, are generated within a predetermined period of time.
14. A method of controlling the launching of counter-attack missiles substantially as hereinbefore describrd with reference to and as illustrated by the accompanying drawings.
1 5. A contral system for controlling the launching of counter-attack missiles substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to and as illustrated by the accompanying drawings.
1 6. A control system having any novel feature or novel combination of features disclosed herein and/or shown in the accompanying drawings.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE3304282 | 1983-02-08 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
GB8402090D0 GB8402090D0 (en) | 1984-02-29 |
GB2135030A true GB2135030A (en) | 1984-08-22 |
GB2135030B GB2135030B (en) | 1986-10-15 |
Family
ID=6190319
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
GB08402090A Expired GB2135030B (en) | 1983-02-08 | 1984-01-26 | Nuclear weapon system |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
JP (1) | JPS60117100A (en) |
FR (1) | FR2540617B1 (en) |
GB (1) | GB2135030B (en) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1999032780A2 (en) * | 1997-12-02 | 1999-07-01 | Raytheon Company | Missile with safe rocket ignition system |
WO1999006276A3 (en) * | 1997-07-30 | 1999-08-12 | Raytheon Co | Rocket launching system employing thermal-acoustic detection for rocket ignition |
Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB1361962A (en) * | 1973-01-30 | 1974-07-30 | Pedrick A P | Earth orbital bombs as nuclear deterents |
Family Cites Families (8)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR1092324A (en) * | 1953-09-02 | 1955-04-20 | Improvements to means for the detection of atomic explosions | |
US3306557A (en) * | 1961-03-31 | 1967-02-28 | Harold W Miller | Apparatus for passive defense from explosions |
US3718918A (en) * | 1969-12-01 | 1973-02-27 | Atomic Energy Authority Uk | Nuclear explosion detection systems |
SE364802B (en) * | 1970-12-30 | 1974-03-04 | F Fruengel | |
SE416232B (en) * | 1976-11-05 | 1980-12-08 | Bofors Ab | DEVICE FOR A VIOLATION DETERMINATION FROM THE VIEW LINE |
JPS541877A (en) * | 1977-06-08 | 1979-01-09 | Nippon Aviotronics Kk | Method of making print wiring board |
JPS57202500A (en) * | 1981-06-05 | 1982-12-11 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Display device for picture |
GB2103341B (en) * | 1981-08-03 | 1984-08-30 | Ferranti Ltd | Aiming rocket launchers |
-
1984
- 1984-01-26 GB GB08402090A patent/GB2135030B/en not_active Expired
- 1984-02-08 JP JP2152284A patent/JPS60117100A/en active Pending
- 1984-02-08 FR FR8401934A patent/FR2540617B1/en not_active Expired
Patent Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
GB1361962A (en) * | 1973-01-30 | 1974-07-30 | Pedrick A P | Earth orbital bombs as nuclear deterents |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1999006276A3 (en) * | 1997-07-30 | 1999-08-12 | Raytheon Co | Rocket launching system employing thermal-acoustic detection for rocket ignition |
WO1999032780A2 (en) * | 1997-12-02 | 1999-07-01 | Raytheon Company | Missile with safe rocket ignition system |
WO1999032780A3 (en) * | 1997-12-02 | 1999-10-07 | Raytheon Co | Missile with safe rocket ignition system |
KR100360627B1 (en) * | 1997-12-02 | 2002-11-13 | 레이티언 캄파니 | Missile with safe rocket ignition system |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
FR2540617B1 (en) | 1988-01-22 |
JPS60117100A (en) | 1985-06-24 |
FR2540617A1 (en) | 1984-08-10 |
GB2135030B (en) | 1986-10-15 |
GB8402090D0 (en) | 1984-02-29 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
Garwin et al. | Anti-ballistic-missile systems | |
EP1350074B1 (en) | Combat simulation wherein target objects are associated to protecting object by means of a local co-operation between the target objects and the relevant protecting objects | |
US5229540A (en) | Tank alerting system | |
EP3538835A1 (en) | Method and defence system for combating threats | |
Fletcher | The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study | |
Fletcher | The technologies for ballistic missile defense | |
GB2135030A (en) | Nuclear weapon system | |
Broad | Nuclear Pulse (I): Awakening to the Chaos Factor: A single nuclear blast high above the United States could shut down the power grid and knock out communications from coast to coast | |
Terzić | Critical review of the protection of aircraft defense forces during the conflict in Nagorno Karabah in 2020 | |
SU1748736A1 (en) | Anti-hail missile complex | |
Patel et al. | Strategic defense and directed-energy weapons | |
Jasani | US national missile defence and international security: blessing or blight? | |
Herzfeld | BMD and national security: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 22 November 1965 | |
Shellans et al. | Designing survivable space systems | |
VAJK et al. | Military implications of a satellite power system | |
Garwin | Weapons on Earth and in Space: Global Security in the New International Situation | |
Rapanotti et al. | Developing Vehicle Survivability on a Virtual Battlefield | |
DE3402167A1 (en) | Control for the starting of guided weapons and method for controlling these | |
Gorschboth et al. | AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER· | |
DE3150173A1 (en) | Device for protecting persons and objects against erroneous attack | |
Rapanotti et al. | ModSAF-based development of operational requirements for light armored vehicles | |
Almond Jr | The Shared Expectations of Legal Order in Outer Space | |
Weltman | Trinity: The Weapons Scientists and the Nuclear Age | |
Shapley | Technology creep and the arms race: a world of absolute accuracy | |
Grupenhagen et al. | BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE: THE PROBLEM OF SURVIVABILITY |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PCNP | Patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee |
Effective date: 19930126 |