FR2926911A1 - Certified electronic vote method for verifying counting of electronic vote in polling station, involves publishing anonymous certificates by public display of vote list after poll for polling station, where each line of list has certificate - Google Patents

Certified electronic vote method for verifying counting of electronic vote in polling station, involves publishing anonymous certificates by public display of vote list after poll for polling station, where each line of list has certificate Download PDF

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FR2926911A1
FR2926911A1 FR0800406A FR0800406A FR2926911A1 FR 2926911 A1 FR2926911 A1 FR 2926911A1 FR 0800406 A FR0800406 A FR 0800406A FR 0800406 A FR0800406 A FR 0800406A FR 2926911 A1 FR2926911 A1 FR 2926911A1
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vote
list
polling station
poll
code
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FR2926911B1 (en
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Alain Thierry Ratignier
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07CTIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C13/00Voting apparatus

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  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
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Abstract

The method involves carrying out anonymous identification of a vote by generating and presenting a random code to a voter before casting the vote. A digital signature of the vote is obtained by encryption with the help of a private signature key through chapping of a character chain constituted by the code and the vote. Certification of the vote is carried out by placing a vote certificate to the voter after casting the vote. Anonymous certificates are published by public display of a list of votes after poll for a polling station, where each line of the list includes the certificate.

Description

-1/6- La présente invention concerne un procédé de vote électronique certifié. Elle est utilisable dans le fonctionnement de machine à voter. Les machines à voter sont utilisées dans plusieurs pays. Elles permettent, en dématérialisant le bulletin de vote, d'alléger les ressources humaines et financières nécessaires au déroulement des scrutins et de réduire la durée du dépouillement. La sécurité des machines actuellement utilisées repose principalement sur un contrôle de leur fonctionnement par des organismes agréés. Les règles de sécurité portent principalement sur l'impossibilité de modifier le contenu de la machine et sur le fait que la machine fonctionne sans aucune connexion extérieure. Les machines utilisées jusque là ne font qu'assurer le comptage des votes. Par rapport au vote papier, elles ne permettent plus à des observateurs de vérifier visuellement la prise en compte des votes. The present invention relates to a certified electronic voting method. It can be used in voting machine operation. Voting machines are used in several countries. By dematerializing the ballot, they make it possible to reduce the human and financial resources needed to run the polls and to reduce the counting time. The safety of currently used machines is mainly based on the control of their operation by approved organizations. The safety rules mainly concern the impossibility of modifying the contents of the machine and the fact that the machine operates without any external connection. The machines used until then only count the votes. Compared to the paper vote, they no longer allow observers to visually verify the inclusion of votes.

Elles ne présentent aucune autre méthode garantissant au votant la prise en compte de son vote. Le procédé de vote électronique certifié permet au votant de vérifier la comptabilisation de son vote, en fin de scrutin tout en garantissant son anonymat. Ce procédé peut être utilisé dans les structures de bureau de vote traditionnelles ou dans des applications de vote à distance. Le procédé de vote électronique certifié ne gère que le décompte des voix, il est indépendant de la gestion des listes de votants, il doit être utilisé dans un contexte de bureau de vote assurant les fonctions complémentaires. Le bureau de vote, traditionnel ou virtuel, doit donc disposer d'une organisation pour vérifier l'identité du votant et l'unicité de son vote, en complément du dispositif de vote électronique certifié . La sécurité apportée par le vote électronique certifié repose sur l'utilisation d'algorithme informatique. They do not present any other method guaranteeing the voter the taking into account of his vote. The certified electronic voting process allows the voter to check the counting of his vote, at the end of the poll while guaranteeing his anonymity. This method can be used in traditional polling station structures or in remote voting applications. The certified electronic voting process only manages the counting of votes, it is independent of the management of the lists of voters, it must be used in a context of polling station ensuring the complementary functions. The polling station, traditional or virtual, must therefore have an organization to verify the identity of the voter and the uniqueness of his vote, in addition to the certified electronic voting system. The security provided by certified electronic voting is based on the use of computer algorithm.

Dans un contexte de bureau de vote , lors d'un scrutin, le procédé de vote électronique certifié consiste à faire générer par la machine à voter un code aléatoire dit code du vote au moment où la personne s'apprête à voter. Le code du vote identifie, de manière unique, ce vote dans le contexte du bureau de vote. Le code du vote est alors affiché à l'attention du votant et de lui seul. Un processus de choix de vote est alors lancé. Lorsque le choix est effectué par le votant, un certificat de vote est généré, sur lequel figure le code du vote et l'expression du vote . Ce certificat est imprimé et conservé par le votant. 2926911 -2/6- Après le scrutin, les résultats d'un bureau de vote font apparaître (publiée sur papier ou consultable en ligne) la liste des certificats de vote où sont énumérés chaque code du vote associés à l'expression du vote . Chaque votant pouvant retrouver son certificat de vote par son code du vote dans la liste, pourra vérifier que l'expression de son vote a été correctement prise en compte et comptabilisée. Pour que le certificat ne soit pas contestable, il fait apparaître une signature numérique du couple code du vote / expression du vote . Cette signature est basée sur un système de clé asymétrique. In a polling station context, during a poll, the certified electronic voting process consists in causing the voting machine to generate a random code called a vote code at the moment when the person is about to vote. The voting code uniquely identifies this vote in the context of the polling station. The voting code is then displayed to the voter and only him. A vote selection process is then launched. When the choice is made by the voter, a voting certificate is generated, which contains the voting code and the expression of the vote. This certificate is printed and kept by the voter. 2926911 -2 / 6- After polling, the results of a polling station shall show (published in paper form or available online) the list of voting certificates in which each vote code is listed together with the expression of the vote. Each voter who can find his voting certificate by his vote code in the list, can verify that the expression of his vote has been correctly taken into account and counted. So that the certificate is not questionable, it shows a digital signature of the code pair of the vote / expression of the vote. This signature is based on an asymmetrical key system.

Pour réaliser cette signature, un couple clé publique/ clé privé est attribué au bureau de vote pour la durée du scrutin. La signature de chaque certificat est générée par la méthode : condensé par hachage du couple code du vote / expression du vote puis chiffrement de ce condensé avec la clé privé du bureau de vote. Durant une période de recours, il sera possible de vérifier l'authenticité de certificat éventuellement contesté. Pour cela on pourra utiliser la clé publique correspondante au bureau de vote afin de déchiffrer la signature du certificat et comparer le résultat obtenu au condensé par hachage du couple code du vote / expression du vote du certificat contesté. 5 10 15 2926911 -3/6- To make this signature, a public key / private key pair is assigned to the polling station for the duration of the poll. The signature of each certificate is generated by the method: condensed by hashing of the couple code of the vote / expression of the vote then encryption of this digest with the private key of the polling station. During a recourse period, it will be possible to verify the authenticity of the certificate possibly contested. For this purpose, the public key corresponding to the polling station can be used to decipher the signature of the certificate and compare the result obtained with the digest by hashing of the code pair of the vote / expression of the vote of the challenged certificate. 5 10 15 2926911 -3 / 6-

Exemple de certificat : Les phases de codages de ce certificat sont : Texte à signer : (d41d8cd98f00b204)(CANDIDAT X) Condensé par hachage MD5 : 31BFCFF1ACOb36A39502D69D6C1C2927 Signature du condensé par la clé RSA du bureau de vote : 21E008BD2AD3FF1DCB5788388C311E9D101C819B Dans cet exemple, les clés RSA du bureau de vote sont : biclé privée : 6531287410190EB368852C369943D01B945EE14D A5C9765000F27B18D15F278AE1CB04C69AC3BA69 biclé public : 04C5BF556D50B75A1A5891FAE1328C19D3110445 A5C9765000F27B18D15F278AE1CB04C69AC3BA69 Tableau 1 : SCRUTIN : Election présidentielle du 6 mai 2012 PERIODE DU VOTE : dimanche 6 mai 2012 entre 8 heures et 20 heures VILLE : CIRCONSCRIPTION : BUREAU : Marseille Marseille 19eme 934 CODE DU VOTE : d41d8cd98f00b204 EXPRESSION DU VOTE : CANDIDAT X SIGNATURE: 21E008BD2AD3FF1DCB5788388C311E9D101C819B 5 - 4/6 - Certificate example: The encoding phases of this certificate are: Signed text: (d41d8cd98f00b204) (CANDIDATE X) MD5 hashed digest: 31BFCFF1ACOb36A39502D69D6C1C2927 RSA polling key digest: 21E008BD2AD3FF1DCB5788388C311E9D101C819B In this example, the RSA keys the poll are: key pair private: 6531287410190EB368852C369943D01B945EE14D A5C9765000F27B18D15F278AE1CB04C69AC3BA69 public key pair: 04C5BF556D50B75A1A5891FAE1328C19D3110445 A5C9765000F27B18D15F278AE1CB04C69AC3BA69 Table 1: pOLL: presidential election of May 6, 2012 PERIOD oF vOTE: Sunday, May 6, 2012 between 8:00 and 20 hours CITY: DISTRICT: OFFICE: Marseille 19eme 934 VOTING CODE: d41d8cd98f00b204 VOTING EXPRESSION: CANDIDATE X SIGNATURE: 21E008BD2AD3FF1DCB5788388C311E9D101C819B 5 - 4/6 -

Exemple de liste de résultats (ou figure le vote certifié ci dessus): Pour faciliter la recherche, la liste est triée dans l'ordre croissant des code du vote . Le tri est donc indépendant de l'ordre chronologique des votes. Tableau 2 : LISTE DES VOTES : SCRUTIN : Election présidentielle du 6 mai 2012 PERIODE DU VOTE : dimanche 6 mai 2012 entre 8 heures et 20 heures VILLE : Marseille CIRCONSCRIPTION : Marseille 19eme BUREAU : 934 Code du vote Expression du vote co 0 U N ro ro U Oa0cd8a45b02ab01 CANDIDAT X 1 10c876d6aa520a5e CANDIDAT Z 1 1a7c55adc3b590ac CANDIDAT Z 2 1f58b0cd87b4921a CANDIDAT X 2 2da91a657da6bf60 CANDIDAT X 3 330c4ad83b77a89b CANDIDAT Z 3 4a96bca029f7d812 CANDIDAT Z 4 5ad525a2f31657da CANDIDAT Y 1 5fcOflb6a831c2f3 CANDIDAT Z 5 78cb758b0cd0cd87 CANDIDAT Y 2 801c0ala6a531cb7 CANDIDAT X 4 9d0cd870cd8732ca CANDIDAT X 5 ad021b5841cb718a CANDIDAT Y 3 b56d663bda12a98f CANDIDAT Z 6 baa526d602ab87a7 CANDIDAT Z 7 bf7c55afcOflb6a5 CANDIDAT X 6 c01f58bOcdb7586c CANDIDAT Y 4 c9902abb7588fda3 CANDIDAT Z 8 d41d8cd98f00b204 CANDIDAT X 7 dc3612a6bf45ac21 CANDIDAT Z 9 ed6d67c55ad69e6b CANDIDAT Y 5 f196dlf58bOcd96b CANDIDAT Z 10 f87fcOflb6a9dc54 CANDIDAT X 8 RESULTAT DU BUREAU : CANDIDAT X 8 CANDIDAT Y CANDIDAT Z 10 Sample result list (or figure the certified vote above): To facilitate the search, the list is sorted in ascending order of voting code. Sorting is therefore independent of the chronological order of the votes. Table 2: LIST OF VOTES: VOTE: Presidential Election of May 6, 2012 VOTING PERIOD: Sunday, May 6, 2012 between 8 am and 8 pm CITY: Marseille CIRCUMSTANCES: Marseille 19th OFFICE: 934 Voting Code Expression of the vote co 0 UN ro ro U Oa0cd8a45b02ab01 APPLICANT X 1 10c876d6aa520a5e APPLICANT Z 1 1a7c55adc3b590ac APPLICANT Z 2 1f58b0cd87b4921a APPLICANT X 2 2da91a657da6bf60 APPLICANT X 3 330c4ad83b77a89b APPLICANT Z 3 4a96bca029f7d812 APPLICANT Z 4 5ad525a2f31657da APPLICANT Y 1 5fcOflb6a831c2f3 APPLICANT Z 5 78cb758b0cd0cd87 APPLICANT Y 2 801c0ala6a531cb7 APPLICANT X 4 9d0cd870cd8732ca APPLICANT X 5 ad021b5841cb718a CANDIDATE Y 3 b56d663bda12a98f APPLICANT Z 6 baa526d602ab87a7 APPLICANT Z 7 CANDIDATE bf7c55afcOflb6a5 X 6 c01f58bOcdb7586c APPLICANT Y 4 c9902abb7588fda3 APPLICANT Z 8 d41d8cd98f00b204 APPLICANT X 7 dc3612a6bf45ac21 APPLICANT Z 9 ed6d67c55ad69e6b APPLICANT Y 5 f196dlf58bOcd96b APPLICANT Z 10 f87fcOflb6a9dc54 APPLICANT X 8 RESULT OF STUDY: CANDIDATE X 8 CANDIDATE Y CANDI DAT Z 10

Claims (1)

Revendicationsclaims 1. Le procédé du vote électronique certifié est constitué des étapes suivantes : a) Identification anonyme du vote obtenue par la génération et la présentation au votant et a lui seul, juste avant l'expression de son vote, d'un code aléatoire, unique dans le contexte du bureau et du scrutin, dit code du vote . b) Signature numérique de l'expression du vote obtenue par le chiffrement à l'aide d'une clé privée de signature du bureau de vote du condensé par hachage d'une chaîne de caractère constituée par le code du vote et l'expression du vote . c) Certification du vote obtenue par la mise à disposition au votant après son acte de vote d'un certificat de vote imprimé faisant apparaître : la désignation du bureau de vote, la désignation du scrutin, le code du vote , l'expression du vote et la signature numérique du couple Code du vote / l'expression du vote . d) La publication des certificats anonymes obtenue par la diffusion par affichage public après scrutin, pour chaque bureau de vote , sous forme papier ou télématique, de la liste de tous les votes. Chaque liste fait apparaître la désignation du bureau de vote et la désignation du scrutin, chaque ligne de la liste correspond a un certificat pour lequel apparaît : le code du vote et l'expression du vote . 1. The process of certified electronic voting consists of the following steps: a) Anonymous identification of the vote obtained by the generation and the presentation to the voter and only him, just before the expression of his vote, a random code, unique in the context of the office and the poll, called the voting code. b) Digital signature of the expression of the vote obtained by the encryption using a private signature key of the polling station of the digest by hashing a string of characters constituted by the code of the vote and the expression of the vote. c) Certification of the vote obtained by making available to the voter after his / her voting paper a printed voting certificate showing: the designation of the polling station, the designation of the poll, the voting code, the expression of the vote and the digital signature of the couple Voting Code / the expression of the vote. d) The publication of the anonymous certificates obtained by public display after the poll, for each polling station, in paper or telematic form, of the list of all the votes. Each list shows the designation of the polling station and the designation of the poll, each line of the list corresponds to a certificate for which appears: the code of the vote and the expression of the vote.
FR0800406A 2008-01-28 2008-01-28 CERTIFIED ELECTRONIC VOTING Expired - Fee Related FR2926911B1 (en)

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Cited By (2)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2017167526A1 (en) * 2016-03-29 2017-10-05 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for voting using concatenated signatures
EP3561782A1 (en) * 2018-04-24 2019-10-30 Regio IT Gesellschaft für Informationstechnologie mbH Voting method

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US20020128901A1 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-12 Athan Gibbs Vote certification, validation and verification method and apparatus
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US20030208395A1 (en) * 2000-06-15 2003-11-06 Mcclure Neil L. Distributed network voting system
US20020128901A1 (en) * 2001-03-09 2002-09-12 Athan Gibbs Vote certification, validation and verification method and apparatus

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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Title
JING-JANG H: "A conventional approach to secret balloting in computer networks", COMPUTERS & SECURITY, ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS. AMSTERDAM, NL, vol. 15, no. 3, 1 January 1996 (1996-01-01), pages 249 - 263, XP004008869, ISSN: 0167-4048 *

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2017167526A1 (en) * 2016-03-29 2017-10-05 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for voting using concatenated signatures
US10366557B2 (en) 2016-03-29 2019-07-30 Siemens Mobility GmbH Method for voting using concatenated signatures
EP3561782A1 (en) * 2018-04-24 2019-10-30 Regio IT Gesellschaft für Informationstechnologie mbH Voting method

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