EP4035970A1 - Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé - Google Patents

Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé Download PDF

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Publication number
EP4035970A1
EP4035970A1 EP21154235.2A EP21154235A EP4035970A1 EP 4035970 A1 EP4035970 A1 EP 4035970A1 EP 21154235 A EP21154235 A EP 21154235A EP 4035970 A1 EP4035970 A1 EP 4035970A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
user data
transmitted
telegram
unencrypted
encrypted
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP21154235.2A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Jens Braband
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Original Assignee
Siemens Mobility GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Mobility GmbH filed Critical Siemens Mobility GmbH
Priority to EP21154235.2A priority Critical patent/EP4035970A1/fr
Publication of EP4035970A1 publication Critical patent/EP4035970A1/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L3/00—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal
    • B61L3/02—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control
    • B61L3/08—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically
    • B61L3/12—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves
    • B61L3/125—Devices along the route for controlling devices on the vehicle or train, e.g. to release brake or to operate a warning signal at selected places along the route, e.g. intermittent control simultaneous mechanical and electrical control controlling electrically using magnetic or electrostatic induction; using radio waves using short-range radio transmission

Definitions

  • the invention also relates to a track-bound vehicle with a communication interface for a trackside device. Furthermore, the invention relates to a trackside device with a communication interface for a track-bound vehicle.
  • the invention relates to a computer program product and a provision device for this computer program product, the computer program product being equipped with program instructions for carrying out this method.
  • the telegrams are repeated cyclically.
  • the user data is scrambled (scrambling code), a substitution of the user data with code words of different Hamming distances is selected, and checking is made possible by a checksum. Since the checksum is only calculated after the substitution code of the user data, the additional shaping bits are used to fill up the bits of the checksum in such a way that the entire telegram consists only of symbols of the selected channel coding, with each transmitted symbol comprising 11 bits.
  • the object of the invention is to specify a method for coded communication between track-bound vehicles and trackside devices, which on the one hand can be standardized and on the other hand meets a high security standard during transmission.
  • the object of the invention is to specify a track-bound vehicle and a trackside device which are suitable for the use of the method mentioned.
  • the object of the invention consists in specifying a computer program product and a provision device for this computer program product, with which the aforementioned method can be carried out.
  • user data can therefore be easily encrypted (for example before standardized coding), for example with a block cipher (and filled up padding bits in order to arrive at the required format) or a stream cipher.
  • the sender and receiver i.e. the wayside facility and the wayside vehicle
  • the encoded transmission standard itself does not have to be touched for the purpose of transmitting the encrypted information. From a technical point of view, according to the invention only other data than in the known method, namely the encrypted data, are transmitted, which can certainly have the same content. This means that an encrypted telegram can have identical content to a comparable unencrypted telegram after decryption. The content of a telegram is contained in the user data (more on this below).
  • the intervention in the transmission standard is limited to a minimum.
  • no hardware-related changes are required either on the track-bound vehicle or on the track-side facility.
  • the encryption can be done by modifying the operating software, which is associated with significantly lower investments.
  • the mixed transmission according to the invention of encrypted and unencrypted telegrams is also advantageously possible for the improved transmission method to be introduced step by step.
  • a step-by-step introduction means that a relevant route section, which is equipped with trackside devices that can already use the method according to the invention, can also be driven on by track-bound vehicles that cannot decrypt encrypted telegrams. This is because unencrypted telegrams can be transmitted to such vehicles by the trackside facilities.
  • the modification according to the invention can be carried out, for example, for the communication of Eurobalises with rail vehicles.
  • the modification is not limited to this application.
  • this can also be supplemented by encryption of the information to be transmitted before it is encoded in order to increase the security standard.
  • this modification can be advantageous not only in rail-bound vehicles, but also, for example, in vehicles (automobiles) that are tied to a specific route, for example a road, due to autonomous operation.
  • the decoding step itself may not conform to the standard, since it has to be checked whether all telegrams received are identical.
  • the standard would have to be changed here if necessary.
  • at least the transmission itself can take place using the advantage according to the invention without changing the standard.
  • the standard could thus be expanded, which ensures downward compatibility of an unencrypted transmission.
  • decryption could take place independently of the standard after decoding.
  • both the track-bound vehicle can be the receiver and the track-side device can be the transmitter, and the track-bound vehicle can be the transmitter and the track-side device can be the receiver. It's both It is possible for transmission to occur in only one direction (and optionally at a different time in the other direction), as well as for transmission to occur in both directions at the same time.
  • Coding within the meaning of the invention is understood to be a modification of the user data of the user data area using the code area, which contains the necessary information for the coding.
  • Such a coding can be defined, for example, in a standard for the transmission of the telegram and is therefore known per se. For this reason, such a coding cannot be used to restrict access to the telegram by unauthorized persons, since the coding can be traced.
  • encryption within the meaning of the invention is to be understood as a modification of the user data using keys, with the encryption ensuring protection against unauthorized access to the telegrams.
  • the key must be available to both the sender and the recipient in order to ensure that the telegram is encrypted and then decrypted. Encryption methods known per se can be used here.
  • “computer-aided” or “computer-implemented” can be understood to mean an implementation of the method in which at least one computer or processor executes at least one method step of the method.
  • Computers can be, for example, personal computers, servers, handheld computers, mobile phones and other communication devices that process computer-aided data, processors and other electronic devices for data processing, which can preferably also be combined to form a network.
  • a “processor” can be understood to mean, for example, a converter, a sensor for generating measurement signals, or an electronic circuit.
  • a processor can, in particular, be a Main processor (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a microprocessor, a microcontroller, or a digital signal processor, possibly in combination with a memory unit for storing program instructions, etc.
  • a processor can also be understood to mean a virtualized processor or a soft CPU.
  • a “memory unit” can be understood to mean, for example, a computer-readable memory in the form of a random-access memory (RAM) or data memory (hard disk or data carrier).
  • RAM random-access memory
  • data memory hard disk or data carrier
  • the "interfaces" can be realized in terms of hardware, for example wired or as a radio connection, and/or software, for example as an interaction between individual program modules or program parts of one or more computer programs.
  • Cloud is to be understood as an environment for “cloud computing” (German computer cloud or data cloud). What is meant is an IT infrastructure that is made available via interfaces of a network such as the Internet. It usually includes storage space, computing power or software as a service, without these having to be installed on the local computer using the cloud.
  • the services offered as part of cloud computing cover the entire spectrum of information technology and include infrastructure, platforms and software, among other things.
  • Program modules are to be understood as meaning individual functional units which enable a program sequence of method steps according to the invention. These functional units can be implemented in a single computer program or in several computer programs that communicate with one another. The interfaces implemented here can be implemented in terms of software within a single processor or in terms of hardware if multiple processors are used.
  • At least one of the telegrams transmitted with unencrypted user data is also transmitted as a telegram with encrypted user data of the same content.
  • the unencrypted user data is of course different from the encrypted user data. However, this does not change the fact that the unencrypted user data can have the same content as the encrypted user data.
  • Content within the meaning of the invention is therefore to be understood as the information content of the user data, which becomes accessible after decryption of the encrypted user data and then has the same content as the user data of the corresponding telegram transmitted unencrypted.
  • the content of the telegram By transmitting a telegram with the same content in both encrypted and unencrypted form, it is possible for the content of the telegram to be evaluated both by track-bound vehicles that can decode the encrypted telegram (hereinafter referred to as equipped vehicle) and by track-bound vehicles that do not (yet) have the key (hereinafter referred to as non-equipped vehicle). Although the latter cannot use the encrypted transmitted telegram to check whether the unencrypted transmitted telegram has been manipulated, the operation of the vehicle can be ensured using the unencrypted telegram.
  • equipped vehicle track-bound vehicles that can decode the encrypted telegram
  • non-equipped vehicle track-bound vehicles that do not (yet) have the key
  • a security measure can be derived from this detection.
  • the decoding of the coded telegrams thus advantageously makes train operation safer overall, including the operation of unequipped vehicles, even if telegrams with changed content relating to the unequipped trains can only be detected with a time delay.
  • the safety measures can relate to individual track-bound vehicles, trackside facilities or specific track sections or the entire operation, depending on the severity of the error or errors detected (in the form of deviations in the content of telegrams).
  • This refinement of the invention is aimed at improving the performance when decoding the user data.
  • the unencrypted user data is decoded first (before the encrypted one with the same content), since in this case the step of decryption can be saved and in this way the content can be accessed earlier.
  • This effect has a particularly strong effect when the telegrams are received by a vehicle or a trackside device that is not yet able to decrypt the encrypted user data. Otherwise, they would have to access the unencrypted user data in a further step, which would mean an additional loss of time.
  • an additional gain in performance can advantageously be generated in the evaluation of the transmitted user data at the receiver.
  • This gain in performance is achieved in that the decoding of the unencrypted user data in the transmitted message can already begin while the message with the encrypted user data of the same content is still being transmitted. This would not be possible in reverse order.
  • telegrams with encrypted and unencrypted user data are transmitted in alternating order.
  • a first telegram can be encrypted and unencrypted
  • a second telegram can be encrypted and unencrypted
  • a third telegram can be encrypted and unencrypted, etc. If all telegrams to be transmitted are encrypted and were transmitted unencrypted, you can start again with the first telegram, etc. If, for example, the track-bound vehicle passes the track-side Setup while the third telegram is being transmitted, the first and second telegrams can be received in the second transmission cycle.
  • the changing order does not necessarily mean that unencrypted telegrams (U) and encrypted telegrams (V) must be sent alternately, i.e.: U, V, U, V...
  • sequences are repeated in the alternating order (namely U, V and U, V, V and U, U, U, V - other sequences are conceivable).
  • the sequence to be repeated can also be changed during the transmission as required. Another possibility is to determine the alternating order without a repetition rule.
  • unencrypted telegrams (U) and encrypted telegrams (V) are sent in alternating order, ie mixed and consecutively, in the transmission stream of the balise, e.g. B. alternately.
  • U unencrypted telegrams
  • V encrypted telegrams
  • three-part sequences of short telegrams can be selected, which correspond to the transmission of a long telegram.
  • This embodiment of the invention has the advantage that a larger amount of data can be transmitted with a limited available transmission time, for example when the track-bound vehicle drives over a balise as a track-side device. Because the transmission of unencrypted data can be faster than the transmission of unencrypted data. This is primarily due to the fact that the data still has to be encrypted before it is sent, but also because encryption increases the amount of data and thus the transmission time required.
  • the payload data of a telegram sent in encrypted form after decryption is compared with the payload data of a telegram sent in unencrypted form with the same content before and/or after decoding.
  • the comparison serves to reveal errors or manipulations of the user data in the telegrams.
  • the transmission method can be made sufficiently secure, even if some of the telegrams are sent unencrypted. Deviations in content in unencrypted telegrams will be noticed promptly, so that countermeasures can be taken and the security of the operation is only slightly impaired.
  • an error signal is generated and/or output if the comparison shows that the user data of the encrypted telegram sent differs from the user data of the unencrypted telegram with the same content.
  • the error signal is used to initiate further steps. These steps can consist of an interpretation or evaluation of the deviations of the telegram in question from the expected content. These steps can also already contain security-relevant reactions, as has already been described in more detail above.
  • the error signal is thus the basis for information technology processing that must follow the registration of an error or manipulation.
  • the size of the user data areas is advantageously possible for the size of the user data areas to be able to be selected in accordance with the amount of information to be transmitted.
  • encryption this is of particular advantage, since the Encryption of smaller amounts of data entails less time and computing effort and therefore the transmission and decryption, and thus the use of the data, can take place in a shorter time interval.
  • only a short time interval is available while the vehicle is crossing the balise.
  • the Transmission takes place between a balise as a wayside device and the wayside vehicle.
  • a check is made as to whether the balise belongs to a balise group, with the data received then being classified as trustworthy.
  • unlinked balises are to be understood as balises which are not connected to other balises during transmission: these therefore offer a greater potential for unauthorized attacks. For example, hackers could delete a danger point or increase the speed limit for a train.
  • linked beacons are functionally related to other beacons in a beacon group.
  • this also means that an unauthorized attack can also be uncovered without the encrypted transmission of telegrams with the same content if the information sent by the balises does not fit into the context of the balise association, i. H. does not fit into the context that would be expected when crossing the balises concerned.
  • the functionality of the beacon group is known, it is possible to draw conclusions as part of a plausibility check as to what information can be expected from a specific beacon in the beacon group and when this information is transmitted (depending on the position of the beacon within the beacon group ).
  • the devices can achieve the advantages that have already been explained in connection with the method described in more detail above. What has been said about the method according to the invention also applies correspondingly to the devices according to the invention. Furthermore, a computer program product with program instructions for carrying out the method according to the invention and/or its exemplary embodiments is claimed, with the method according to the invention and/or its exemplary embodiments being able to be carried out in each case by means of the computer program product.
  • a provision device for storing and/or providing the computer program product.
  • the provision device is, for example, a storage unit that stores and/or provides the computer program product.
  • the provision device is, for example, a network service, a computer system, a server system, in particular a distributed, for example cloud-based computer system and/or virtual computer system, which the computer program product preferably in the form of a data stream stores and/or makes available.
  • the provision takes place in the form of a program data block as a file, in particular as a download file, or as a data stream, in particular as a download data stream, of the computer program product.
  • this provision can also be made, for example, as a partial download consisting of several parts.
  • Such a computer program product is read into a system, for example using the provision device, so that the method according to the invention is executed on a computer.
  • the described components of the embodiments each represent individual features of the invention to be considered independently of one another, which also develop the invention independently of one another and are therefore also to be regarded as part of the invention individually or in a combination other than the one shown. Furthermore, the components described can also be combined with the features of the invention described above.
  • a track GL is shown as the route, on which a route-bound vehicle FZ is traveling in a travel direction FR.
  • the route is in the form of track GL with trackside facilities SE1 ... SE6 equipped in the embodiment according to figure 1 are designed as Eurobalises.
  • the trackside facilities SE1 and SE3 ... SE6 form an association VB of trackside facilities.
  • These trackside facilities can, for example, have already been provided when the track was initially equipped, with these being functionally related and therefore referred to below as linked beacons.
  • the trackside device SE2 could have been retrofitted at a later point in time, for example, in order to get a further reference point on the route for locating the route-bound vehicle FZ.
  • this trackside facility SE2 does not belong to formation VB and should therefore be referred to as an unlinked balise.
  • the trackside facilities of the association VB are less vulnerable to hackers or error-prone compared to the non-linked balise, represented by the trackside facility SE2.
  • the trackside device SE2 therefore benefits the most from the method according to the invention of a mixed encrypted and unencrypted transmission of telegrams. This can be designed for the method according to the invention from the start, for example as part of a retrofit.
  • the route-bound vehicle FZ and the route-side device SE2 are shown schematically. Data is transmitted via a first interface S1, which is designed as a radio interface. Therefore, the trackside device SE2 has a first antenna A1 and the track-bound vehicle FZ has a second antenna A2.
  • the first antenna A1 is connected to a first computer C1 via a fourth interface S4.
  • the first computer C1 can retrieve a key KEY from a first memory device SP1 via a fifth interface S5.
  • the key KEY thus enables the inventive decryption or encryption of a telegram to be transmitted via the first interface S1 (in the function as a balise, the trackside device SE2 will preferably send the telegram via the first interface S1 to the track-bound vehicle FZ).
  • the second antenna A2 is connected to a second computer C2 via a second interface S2.
  • the second computer C2 can access a second memory device SP2 via a third interface S3, in which, among other things, a key KEY is stored.
  • a key KEY is stored.
  • the route-bound vehicle FZ and the route-side device SE2 each have a key KEY for decrypting or encrypting the telegram to be transmitted via the first interface S1.
  • FIG. 1 shows the advantage if several short telegrams KT are transmitted instead of one long telegram LT. This results in three short telegrams KT, as in figure 3 indicated, a long telegram LT - at least in terms of the amount of data to be transmitted.
  • the transmission of telegrams is in figure 3 represented as a band, this corresponding to a time course corresponding to a time axis t.
  • the vehicle FZ over the trackside facility (e.g. SE2 as in figure 2 shown) there is only a specific time window in which the two antennas A1, A2 are sufficiently close together for transmission to take place.
  • This time window is called the transmission window REC and is in figure 3 registered.
  • the track-bound vehicle FZ crosses the track-side device SE2 at a speed at which theoretically four short telegrams KT can be transmitted.
  • the transmission window REC opens while a short telegram KT is being transmitted, so that it is cut off and cannot be evaluated by the route-bound vehicle FZ.
  • three completely transmitted short telegrams KT which, in terms of their information content, can contain the information of a long telegram LT. If the transmitted data of three short telegrams KT are sent repeatedly by the trackside device SE2, the complete information content of the trackside device SE2 can be transmitted in the transmission window REC.
  • This example is only used as an example to illustrate a transmission standard and can also be implemented in any other way. However, this example is intended to be in the following figure 4 be used to create a sequence of encrypted and to discuss unencrypted telegrams in relation to the length of the transmission window REC.
  • the telegrams T1, T2 are with a view to figure 3 preferably short telegrams according to the ETCS standard. However, any other telegrams can also be transmitted, for example long telegrams LT if the route-bound vehicle FZ drives more slowly, for example, or also telegrams of a different transmission standard.
  • FIG 4 two variants V1 and V2 are shown for the targeted encrypted and unencrypted transmission of a first telegram T1 and a second telegram T2.
  • the first telegram is first sent unencrypted (T1U) and then the first telegram is sent encrypted (T1V).
  • the second telegram is then sent unencrypted (T2U) and then the second telegram encrypted (T2V).
  • the sequence described is then repeated, as shown in figure 4 is specified.
  • the transmission sequence of sequences according to variant V2 is better suited.
  • the first telegram is always first transmitted unencrypted (T1U) and then encrypted (T1V) and then the second telegram only unencrypted (T2U) and this sequence is then repeated.
  • FIG 5 the procedure for the transmission of telegrams is shown as a flowchart.
  • the method begins with a starting step START and takes place initially in the transmitter S. There, after an initialization step INI, a query is made as to whether a high security level SEC should be selected for the telegram to be transmitted. If this is the case, the key KEY is loaded from the memory device SP and the telegram is encrypted with it in an encryption step CRYP. The telegram is then coded in a coding step CODE and sent to the receiver R via the interface S1.
  • a decoding step DECO takes place in the receiver R and then a decoding DECR using the key KEY, which is loaded from the memory device SP. The telegram is then available there for further processing.
  • the memory devices SP in the transmitter S and in the receiver R are different memory devices. If the transmitter is the trackside equipment SE2 according to figure 2 , the memory device SP could be formed, for example, by the memory device SP1 and the memory device in the receiver by the memory device SP2.
  • a query RECEND is repeatedly carried out as to whether the transmission has ended. If this is the case, the transmission is aborted in a stop step STOP. If this is not the case, the security level SEC is queried again for the next telegram.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
EP21154235.2A 2021-01-29 2021-01-29 Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé Pending EP4035970A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

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EP21154235.2A EP4035970A1 (fr) 2021-01-29 2021-01-29 Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP21154235.2A EP4035970A1 (fr) 2021-01-29 2021-01-29 Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé

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EP4035970A1 true EP4035970A1 (fr) 2022-08-03

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EP21154235.2A Pending EP4035970A1 (fr) 2021-01-29 2021-01-29 Procédé de communication codée entre un véhicule lié à la voie et un dispositif côté voie et dispositifs d'application dudit procédé

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Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3219575A1 (fr) * 2016-03-17 2017-09-20 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Procédé pour sécuriser un échange de clés d'authentification et un module de gestion de clés associées
DE102016204630A1 (de) * 2016-03-21 2017-09-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Übertragen von Nachrichten in einem Eisenbahnsystem sowie Eisenbahnsystem
WO2019166182A1 (fr) * 2018-03-01 2019-09-06 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et agencement de transmission sécurisée d'un message d'un dispositif émetteur à un dispositif récepteur

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
EP3219575A1 (fr) * 2016-03-17 2017-09-20 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Procédé pour sécuriser un échange de clés d'authentification et un module de gestion de clés associées
DE102016204630A1 (de) * 2016-03-21 2017-09-21 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zum Übertragen von Nachrichten in einem Eisenbahnsystem sowie Eisenbahnsystem
WO2019166182A1 (fr) * 2018-03-01 2019-09-06 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé et agencement de transmission sécurisée d'un message d'un dispositif émetteur à un dispositif récepteur

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
GUO HUAQUN ET AL: "Protecting Train Balise Telegram Data Integrity", 2018 21ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS (ITSC), IEEE, 4 November 2018 (2018-11-04), pages 806 - 811, XP033470223, ISBN: 978-1-7281-0321-1, [retrieved on 20181207], DOI: 10.1109/ITSC.2018.8569616 *

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