EP4019368A2 - Procédé, système et train pour un suivi d'intégrité du train - Google Patents

Procédé, système et train pour un suivi d'intégrité du train Download PDF

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Publication number
EP4019368A2
EP4019368A2 EP21215697.0A EP21215697A EP4019368A2 EP 4019368 A2 EP4019368 A2 EP 4019368A2 EP 21215697 A EP21215697 A EP 21215697A EP 4019368 A2 EP4019368 A2 EP 4019368A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
train
rail vehicle
main conductor
electrical
main
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
EP21215697.0A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP4019368A3 (fr
Inventor
Kai Zingler
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alstom Holdings SA
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Bombardier Transportation GmbH
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Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Bombardier Transportation GmbH filed Critical Bombardier Transportation GmbH
Publication of EP4019368A2 publication Critical patent/EP4019368A2/fr
Publication of EP4019368A3 publication Critical patent/EP4019368A3/fr
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0054—Train integrity supervision, e.g. end-of-train [EOT] devices
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0072—On-board train data handling
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0081—On-board diagnosis or maintenance
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
    • B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
    • B61L25/028—Determination of vehicle position and orientation within a train consist, e.g. serialisation

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method, a system and a train for train integrity monitoring.
  • a train can have several train parts, which in turn can consist of a number of individual cars. Different train lengths can be provided by coupling several train parts together. All of these variants of rail vehicles and trains can also be provided within the scope of the present disclosure.
  • train integrity For a safe operation of trains it is known to monitor the so-called train integrity. This relates to monitoring as to whether all the rail vehicles or wagons and/or train parts coupled to one another to form the train are still coupled to one another. If a coupling detaches and individual carriages tear off, they can remain on the route as an obstacle and jeopardize operational safety.
  • train integrity has mainly been checked by trackside devices that record a length and/or number of axles of a passing train.
  • Such trackside devices are costly and allow train integrity to be monitored only at the moment of passing.
  • control systems can cooperate with one another and, more precisely, communicate with one another over the entire length of the train.
  • These control systems can be part of a so-called TCMS (Train Control and Management System).
  • TCMS Train Control and Management System
  • the communication can take place in a known manner by connecting data lines of the control systems via the couplings of the individual rail vehicles.
  • SIL safety integrity level
  • the invention provides a solution with which a type of closed monitoring circuit (or also a monitoring loop) is preferably formed when the individual rail vehicles of a train are connected.
  • the solution preferably has at least one main conductor per car, which is connected to a voltage source in at least one of the cars.
  • the main conductor is preferably connected to the voltage source in a train part (located at the front or rear of the train in the direction of travel).
  • the main conductors are advantageously conductively connected to one another when they are coupled to adjacent carriages.
  • the train parts which preferably forms a train end or a train head, it can be checked whether an expected voltage level is present on the main conductor there and preferably not fed from any other source.
  • the main conductor which is connected to the voltage source, of the other rail vehicle, which preferably forms a front end of the train.
  • this check can be carried out across several rail vehicles of the train positioned between them. If the voltage level is present, the train integrity is present. Otherwise it can be detected as not present.
  • the monitoring of the train integrity is not carried out solely on the basis of at least one main line, but is also monitored as to whether at least one other line, which extends beyond the coupling connections in the train and which may be used for communication between the software-controlled facilities of each part of the train has been unintentionally interrupted. If this is the case, a train integrity violation is detected.
  • At least two main conductors can be provided per car, one of which is connected to a voltage source in a rail vehicle (preferably at the head of the train).
  • the main conductors in another of the rail vehicles may be interconnectable to form a monitoring loop. From there, one of the main conductors can return a current to the rail vehicle at preferably the remote head of the train.
  • a main conductor in particular the returning main conductor in one of the rail vehicles
  • an electrical variable with a specific value for example too little or no voltage or too little or no current flow
  • the voltage is applied as DC voltage to the main line and is therefore checked to monitor train integrity whether the voltage on the main line is at a sufficient voltage level to indicate an uninterrupted main line or uninterrupted chain of main lines.
  • a DC current can be injected into the main line and it can be monitored whether the current is flowing through the line with sufficient amperage.
  • an alternating voltage that is constant over time or an alternating current that is constant over time can be applied to the main line without the need for monitoring for specific signal forms. Fluctuations in the two respective alternating variables, which can typically occur in practice, preferably do not lead to this being interpreted as a break in a clutch connection after the voltage or the current has been recorded.
  • a level of safety can be improved, for example, by electrically monitoring the integrity of the train, with the signals and/or variables monitored for this purpose being able to be reliably recorded accordingly.
  • a desired safety integrity level of 4 can be reliably achieved for current loops (e.g. in the form of the monitoring circuit disclosed herein), in particular when clocked signals are used, i.e. the current loop changes its potential or polarity at regular intervals and this change occurs elsewhere (e.g. a monitoring unit) is detected with the same clocking.
  • the same safety level (SIL 4) applies to both the safe clock generator and the safe clocked detection.
  • This type of implementation may be technically complex, but it is still possible within the scope of the present invention, as explained by way of example at the end of the description of the figures.
  • safety can be significantly improved in particular if the disclosed solution (then advantageously without the above clocking) is used in addition to other approaches to train integrity monitoring and in particular in addition to train integrity monitoring using the above control systems or TCMS, which the invention provides according to exemplary embodiments.
  • the solution presented here can be used redundantly for further monitoring, in particular to achieve the desired safety integrity level of at least 4.
  • the electrical quantity of the main conductor can be measured directly on it or on a further conductor connected to it (i.e. can be measured indirectly).
  • the electrical variable is preferably measured on a main conductor of another (second) rail vehicle, in particular on a remote end of the train or a remote front of the train.
  • the main conductor can be connected to a second (in particular low voltage level) in the other (second) rail vehicle. If there is no current flow or if there is a voltage drop in particular on this main conductor, it can be concluded that the connection of this main conductor to the main conductor of the first rail vehicle is interrupted.
  • a return electrical connection to the first rail vehicle e.g. by means of subsequent return main conductors, can be omitted in this embodiment.
  • a single-strand electrical connection can be established between the rail vehicles at preferably distant ends of a train by connecting the respective (preferably single) main conductor to one another and to the voltage levels described.
  • a method for monitoring the train integrity of a train with (or, in other words, from) several rail vehicles coupled to one another is proposed, the rail vehicles each comprising an electrical arrangement with a feeding main conductor and a returning main conductor (which correspond to the at least one main conductor above correspond to the embodiment) and the respective feeding and returning main conductors of rail vehicles coupled to one another are connected to one another in an electrically conductive manner (i.e. a feeding main conductor of a first rail vehicle with a feeding main conductor of another rail vehicle coupled to it and a returning main conductor of the first rail vehicle with the returning main conductor of the other rail vehicle).
  • connection of electrical components here can generally be understood to mean an electrically conductive connection or, in other words, a connection to one another, so that an electrically conductive connection is produced.
  • a train can move up to, preferably, a distant end of the train and back to the first rail vehicle extending back electrical line arrangement are provided, which enables a particularly reliable train integrity monitoring.
  • connection points and/or connections can be provided in the couplings of the rail vehicles.
  • the couplings can also enable the known establishment of a pneumatic and/or data-transmitting connection between the rail vehicles. Appropriate connections can also be provided in the couplings for this purpose.
  • the couplings can be automatic couplings, e.g. requiring no manual intervention to establish a coupling, or at least no corresponding intervention on the coupling components themselves (e.g. manual operations at most in or on a driver's cab of the train). They are preferably couplings that are provided for varying a train length for frequent coupling and decoupling, for example to connect two railcars, two train parts and/or two cars, each with a driver's cab, to one another. This can be distinguished from what are known as car couplings, with which the cars of a rail vehicle are combined to form a unit which, as a rule and in particular in normal operation, cannot be easily separated. Such couplings can, for example, only be opened and/or closed manually and/or be designed as so-called hook couplings.
  • the main conductors can generally be cables.
  • feeding and “returning” designate functions that these main conductors can assume in the monitoring circuit.
  • feeding and “returning” designate functions that these main conductors can assume in the monitoring circuit.
  • feeding and "returning” designate functions that these main conductors can assume in the monitoring circuit.
  • from the point of view of the connection of these main conductors which can optionally only be produced selectively, in one of the rail vehicles and in particular in a rail vehicle forming the end of the train, there can be a corresponding feeding and returning function of these main conductors.
  • the first rail vehicle can have a vehicle battery for connecting to the different voltage levels.
  • the first or the feeding main conductor can be connected to a first pole of the battery and/or indirectly connected to it via other conductors.
  • the second or the returning main conductor can be connected to the corresponding other pole of the voltage source and/or indirectly connected thereto. The latter can be done in particular by having a ground line to which both the returning main conductor and the corresponding other pole of the voltage source are connected.
  • the electrical variable can relate in particular to a current carried by the monitoring circuit and in particular by a returning main conductor or to a voltage present thereon. It can be recorded directly or also only indirectly, for example by detecting an electrical unit connected to the monitoring circuit or returning main conductor, the state of which depends on the electrical size of the monitoring circuit or this main conductor.
  • this unit can be a switching element and in particular a relay, the operating state of which can change as a function of the values of the electrical variable.
  • one variant provides that the state of at least one electrical element and/or one electrical unit, in particular a relay, is determined, the state of which changes in a defined manner and as a function of values of the electrical variable of the monitoring circuit or the returning main conductor, and that based thereon a train integrity state of the train is determined.
  • a lack of train integrity is detected when a voltage or a current (or generally a value of the electrical variable) of the monitoring circuit is below a defined threshold value.
  • the threshold value can be zero, which means that if there is no voltage or no current, it can be concluded that there is a lack of train integrity. Then, for example, an electrical unit connected to the monitoring circuit can change its state and/or carry out a defined switching process, which can be detected to determine the train integrity state.
  • At least one further electrical element and in particular a switching element within the electrical arrangement of the rail vehicle concerned can be actuated as a function of this change in state.
  • a switching element for example, a warning device can be energized, which signals a train driver or another technical unit of the train that a lack of train integrity has been detected.
  • the warning device can be set up, for example, to emit acoustic or visual warning signals.
  • the further technical unit can, in particular, be a Act control computer or other control device of the train and in particular that rail vehicle with the main conductor whose electrical size is detected.
  • this control device can be set up to transmit a status of the train integrity and in particular the lack of train integrity to an external device and in particular to a control center.
  • the control device can be an ETCS vehicle device or a component thereof (European Train Control System). In particular, it can be a so-called EVC (European Vital Computer).
  • EVC European Vital Computer
  • This or the ETCS vehicle device in general can be set up to communicate with a so-called radio block center (RBC) or also an ETCS route control center and to transmit the status of the train integrity to them.
  • RBC radio block center
  • the first rail vehicle preferably forms a head of the train and the second rail vehicle forms a tail of the train.
  • Any number of other rail vehicles can be coupled between the two rail vehicles described, which continue the main ladder. They cannot provide any necessary function for the monitoring circuit (e.g. do not feed or close it). However, their coupling points can be included in the surveillance. This makes it possible for the main conductors to be able to extend through all the rail vehicles in the train and are preferably only electrically connected to one another at the end of the train. In this way, faults in the monitoring circuit can be detected at any other point, in particular over the entire length of the train and over all of its couplings.
  • the front of the train and the rear of the train are variable, depending on the direction of travel selected, ie one and the same rail vehicle can form both a front of the train and a rear of the train depending on the direction of travel. Provision is preferably made for that rail vehicle whose driver's desk is activated to form the head of the train.
  • the electrical variable is detected by the returning main conductor of the first rail vehicle. Since the feeding main conductor is preferably also connected to the voltage source in this first rail vehicle, the monitoring circuit according to Art a monitoring loop from the first rail vehicle through the other rail vehicles and preferably through all other rail vehicles of the rail vehicle and back to the first rail vehicle. If, for example, the electrical value of the returning main conductor is recorded there, all faults in the monitoring circuit occurring in the other rail vehicles and thus also any breaks in coupled couplings, through which the monitoring circuit is routed by connecting the main conductors there, of the train can be detected.
  • a development provides that there is at least one additional rail vehicle that is positioned between the first and the second rail vehicle, with no electrical connection being made in the additional rail vehicle between the feeding main conductor there and the returning main conductor there.
  • the same preferably applies to all rail vehicles that are positioned between the first and the second rail vehicle. This makes it possible for the electrical connection to be established only at the end of the train or in the second rail vehicle, which makes it possible to detect faults over a correspondingly large train length and large number of couplings.
  • the electrical connection in the second rail vehicle is established (and in particular also maintained) when the second rail vehicle is not coupled to another rail vehicle via a defined coupling device.
  • the defined clutch device can be an automatic clutch. However, it is preferably not a car clutch of the type mentioned above.
  • the electrical connection can comprise at least one controllable element and in particular a switching element whose state changes according to a clutch state of the defined clutch device. If there is a coupling, which can be determined, for example, via known diagnostic systems of the train and/or the coupling device, the element can, for example, open and interrupt the connection. If, on the other hand, there is no coupling, it can close the connection.
  • this makes it possible for the two main conductors to be selectively connectable to form the monitoring circuit, although they preferably extend into the coupling device or are connected to it, in order to be connected to another rail vehicle that may follow.
  • one variant provides for the electrical connection in the second rail vehicle to be automatically canceled when the second rail vehicle is coupled to another rail vehicle via a defined coupling device (in particular of the type described above and in particular in the form of an automatic coupling).
  • a coupling device in particular of the type described above and in particular in the form of an automatic coupling.
  • an electrical element and in particular a switching element can again be controlled in the manner described above or open and/or close depending on the operating state.
  • a further development provides that a targeted uncoupling of at least two rail vehicles of the train is determined and in response to this the electrical connection in at least one of these rail vehicles whose coupling devices are to be uncoupled is established by the feeding main conductor there and the returning main conductor there. Failure to make such a connection can result in a voltage drop in the monitor circuit and particularly on the return main conductor. As a result, a lack of train integrity can be incorrectly detected, although the train length and thus integrity is changed consciously and in a controlled manner by decoupling. This erroneous detection is preferably prevented in that a specific desire to uncouple is detected and as a result the electrical main conductor connection is established in at least one of the rail vehicles whose coupling devices are to be uncoupled.
  • decoupling request can be recognized, for example, by a corresponding driver input and/or control input to the clutch devices.
  • uncoupling valves of conventional clutch devices can be controlled in a targeted manner in order to initiate a controlled uncoupling, which can be detected as a corresponding uncoupling request.
  • At least one switching element can be actuated in a conductor section connecting the main conductors (in particular of the type described above) depending on a detected desire to uncouple. If this wish is present, it can close and thus enable the connection. Otherwise the switching element can be open and separate the connection. With this switching element it is in particular the switching element explained above, which can be actuated as a function of a stored clutch state.
  • each rail vehicle preferably includes at least one relay (clutch storage relay).
  • This can preferably change its state depending on whether a coupled state is stored or should be stored or not.
  • This change of state can be achieved by applying different voltages and in particular by selectively switching off the voltage or by applying a voltage with a minimum value.
  • These voltage changes can be achieved by at least one switch arrangement that can be actuated in accordance with the operating and/or system states of the rail vehicle and/or the electrical arrangement.
  • a hardware-implemented digital memory device is used to store the respective state. The state is therefore not only saved by software.
  • the coupling status is preferably determined automatically with the activation of a car in the train, without the need for manual setup or configuration. Furthermore, the coupling status is preferably also maintained automatically when the train is strengthened (adding train parts) or weakened (uncoupled at the automatic coupling and removing train parts) without the need for special measures to reconfigure the monitoring.
  • the clutch memory relay can be de-energized when a separate driver's desk is active or when the car is stationary and there is also a request to decouple it, or no engaged state is currently stored.
  • a further switch arrangement can be provided, by means of which the same clutch storage relay, which is preferably the same, can also be switched to be live or dead depending on the operating state.
  • This switch arrangement can preferably be connected in parallel with the switch arrangement mentioned above. It can thus be sufficient if only one of the switch arrangements is conductive in order to energize the clutch memory relay. On the other hand, both switch arrangements are preferably to be put into a non-current-carrying state in order not to energize the clutch storage relay either.
  • This further switch arrangement can be conductive when a driver's desk in one of the coupled rail vehicles is active and either an electrical coupling or a mechanical coupling is registered. A non-conductive state can be reached if either there is no active driver's desk within the train or if both no electrical coupling and no mechanical coupling are detected.
  • this switch arrangement enables automatic reconfiguration of the electrical arrangement and/or the clutch memory relay. If another rail vehicle is coupled to a rail vehicle that is currently not coupled, this switch arrangement can be switched to a live state due to the coupling of an active rail vehicle and the then detected electrical and/or mechanical coupling and the coupling memory relay can then be energized and thus change its state. In particular, it can then indicate a coupled state. If it was previously closed, any connection between the main conductors can then be opened, in particular via a switching element that can be actuated according to the stored clutch state.
  • the clutch memory relay can generally continue to be active and, in particular, be energized. This can be done by the above-described first switch arrangement is conductive because the decoupling request is then not present and because the state is still stored as coupled.
  • the optional further switch arrangement can open due to the loss of the clutch, but this has no effect on the voltage present at the clutch storage relay in the preferred parallel circuit. Since the clutch storage relay is kept active in this way when a train breaks away, the connection between the main conductors in this rail vehicle is then preferably not closed either.
  • the switching element explained above and which can be actuated in accordance with the stored clutch state can remain open in this connection/this conductor section due to the storage that is still present.
  • the voltage supply can be specifically interrupted, in particular as part of a function test or as a function test, and at least one electrical variable of the monitoring circuit is then detected.
  • the functionality of the monitoring circuit is preferably determined on the basis of this variable.
  • this variable can be a voltage applied to the monitoring circuit and/or a current carried by it.
  • this electrical variable assumes impermissibly high values, although the power supply is interrupted, it can be concluded that there is an undesired external feed into the monitoring circuit. This can mean that voltage drops occurring as a result of train integrity are at least partially compensated for by the external power supply. As a result, a loss of train integrity may no longer be reliably detectable.
  • the interruption of the power supply described above can be carried out as part of a separate test method. This can be done manually (e.g. by actuating a switch in the driver's cab) or automatically and, for example, at regular intervals. If the monitoring circuit is functioning correctly, a loss of train integrity should be indicated as a result of the interrupted power supply.
  • the solutions disclosed herein based on a monitoring circuit are preferably provided in addition to and/or redundantly with other approaches to train integrity monitoring. Consequently, one development provides that the train integrity is monitored using at least one additional system and the train integrity is determined on the basis of monitoring results obtained both with the additional system and with the electrical arrangement.
  • the overall train integrity can be evaluated as non-existent. In this way, the probability of missed detections of train integrity loss is reduced.
  • the total safety integrity level can be 4, which is preferred in the present case.
  • the system can be set up to carry out a method according to any of the variants disclosed herein.
  • it can have all other units, components, switching elements and lines that were explained above in the context of the method and/or that are required to provide the steps and/or effects of the method described herein. All explanations for and developments of features of the method can also apply to the identical system features or be provided for them.
  • the rail vehicles coupled to one another can comprise electrical arrangements of a comparable and, in particular, identical type.
  • Identity may refer to the elements, units, switch assemblies, wire routing and connections, functions, and the like disclosed herein. It is not absolutely necessary that units of this type or the arrangements as a whole are arranged or positioned identically in the rail vehicles. In other words, the identity can in particular relate to and/or be limited to the type of components used and/or the hardware structure of the arrangement and/or the functionalities or operating states that can be achieved with it.
  • a monitoring circuit of the type described herein and with the properties described herein can also be provided in any configuration of a train with rail vehicles in any order.
  • Particularly advantageous in this context are the options explained above for establishing an automatic reconfigurability of a clutch memory relay when a clutch is established and/or the only selective establishment and in particular automatic establishment of the connection of the two main conductors, in particular only in one of the rail vehicles, by means of any of the switching elements described herein.
  • the invention is directed to a train comprising a plurality of rail vehicles coupled together, which train includes a system according to any aspect disclosed herein.
  • train parts that each have a plurality of train parts (hereinafter also referred to as rail vehicles).
  • the train parts are coupled to each other via an automatic coupling. This does not rule out the possibility of wagons or other rail vehicles being coupled to one another within at least one part of the train via a non-automatic coupling.
  • a main conductor used independently for monitoring extends through all rail vehicles of the train, which can be coupled to another rail vehicle by means of at least one automatic coupling.
  • more than one main conductor extends through these rail vehicles of the train, in particular two main conductors, it also being possible for more than two main conductors to extend through these rail vehicles of the train.
  • main conductors are thus used for train integrity monitoring, while the two main conductors have a single electrical connection throughout the train, or the more than two main conductors have a multi-extension extending through the train between each two of the main conductors due to a single electrical connection throughout the train Form Executive Chain.
  • main conductor for monitoring the train integrity extends through the train parts (rail vehicles) that are coupled to another rail vehicle by means of at least one automatic coupler (or if a main conductor is used independently without using other main conductors for monitoring the train integrity), then the main conductor is on to be connected to the electrical supply at one end of the train and to record the electrical condition of the main conductor at the other end of the train.
  • An end of the train is understood here and below to mean that the end is in the last or first rail vehicle, i.e. no other vehicle is coupled to the (automatic) coupling at this end of the train and forms a further extension of the main conductor via this clutch out.
  • a wagon or a locomotive for example, can still be manually coupled to the rail vehicle at the end of the train, which, however, is not relevant in relation to the completeness of the train, since these do not lead on to a main conductor.
  • a main conductor may always have a particular train part, such as a locomotive, regardless of the number of train parts in the train, and this train part may always have the electrical supply of the main conductor or the main conductor detection device activated. Since this train part is always present, it is not necessary to check or change the activation status of this always-activated device after coupling or uncoupling another train part.
  • This device which is always activated (in this embodiment) is therefore also not dependent on the predefined assignment, so that the predefined assignment does not relate to this device which is always activated either.
  • no traction part always has the active electrical supply or the active main conductor detection device for any number of traction parts that are automatically coupled to one another.
  • these main conductors are to be electrically connected to one another at one end of the train or are permanently electrically connected to one another and one of the main conductors at the opposite end of the train is connected to the electrical to be connected to the supply or permanently connected to it.
  • the electrical state of the other main conductor can in principle be detected at any point on the other main conductor, since the integrity of the electrical connection of one main conductor can be determined in this way.
  • the electrical condition of the other main conductor is sensed at the same end of the train where the electrical supply takes place.
  • a rail vehicle can optionally always be present and can be located in this rail vehicle e.g. B. are always the activated electrical supply of the main conductor and the activated main conductor detection device.
  • the electrical connection between the two main conductors or between two of the several main conductors can always be located in this rail vehicle, but not the electrical supply of the main conductors and, for example, also not the main conductor detection device.
  • the rail vehicle condition can only depend on the coupling condition or also on the active or passive driver's cab in depend on the rail vehicle.
  • a train train parts i.e. rolling stock
  • the rolling stock state also depends on the active or passive state of the driver's cab in the relevant rolling stock and that this information also is taken into account by the specified assignment.
  • rail vehicles can only be coupled and uncoupled at one end of the train, the rail vehicle status can also depend on the active or passive status of the driver's cab in the respective rail vehicle.
  • the specified assignment takes into account the respective configuration with regard to the number of main conductors and, in the case of more than one main conductor, optionally takes into account a specification with regard to the location of the detection of the electrical state.
  • the specified assignment takes into account the state of the rail vehicle (depending on the configuration, determined by the coupling state and optionally also determined by the passive or active state of the driver's cab in the rail vehicle) and assigns activation or non-activation to the rail vehicle state, depending on the configuration. Activation of one, two or all three of the aforementioned devices (electrical supply of the main conductor, main conductor detection device and electrical connection between two main conductors).
  • the predetermined assignment for the rail vehicle state can be defined at both ends of a rail vehicle. In this case, the activation or non-activation of one, two or all three of the aforementioned devices can be assigned to the rail vehicle state at the respective end, depending on the design.
  • a coupled state between two rail vehicles is established or released via at least one automatic coupling, at least this change in the coupling state is to be determined in each of these two rail vehicles. If, as a result of the change in the coupling state, a different driver's cab in the train than before is activated, this can also be determined depending on the design, possibly also in a rail vehicle of the train that is not involved in the coupling process.
  • changing the train configuration by automatically coupling or automatically uncoupling a rail vehicle therefore means that in each rail vehicle of the newly configured train it is determined whether a driver's cab of the rail vehicle is active or passive.
  • This determination can also be carried out in that, as is preferred, information about the active or inactive state of the driver's cab is stored in the respective rail vehicle and this does not change. For example, prior to assembling a train by means of automatic coupling of a plurality of rail vehicles, each of the rail vehicles may have stored that the driver's cab is not active. Once the train has been assembled, it can be determined automatically or specified manually which cab is activated in the train. Then the stored information only has to be changed to "cab active" in that rail vehicle in which the activated or to be activated driver's cab is located.
  • the determination of whether a driver's cab is active or passive can be based on the reception of a signal generated by a person and/or the automatic determination based on an operation of the driver's cab.
  • a vehicle operator may activate a cab by inserting a key into a lock on the cab and turning it about a pivot to the "cab on" position.
  • Contactless keys can also be used to switch on the driver's cab.
  • the operation of the driver's cab can be determined automatically, for example when parts of the driver's cab are used by the vehicle driver, such as a controller for rigging a rail vehicle.
  • the rail vehicles can also be determined in at least one of the rail vehicles and in this case preferably in all of the rail vehicles of a train for both ends of the rail vehicle whether the end of the rail vehicle is coupled to another rail vehicle via at least one automatic coupling and/or whether the end of the rail vehicle has an active or non-active driver's cab.
  • a main conductor can be connected to the electrical supply (or to the main conductor detection device) at both ends of a rail vehicle, this determination makes sense and the connection to the electrical supply can then be made or not made according to the predetermined assignment (or the trunk detector activated).
  • the result of the predetermined assignment can optionally also depend on which driver's cab in the rail vehicle is active or whether both driver's cabs in the rail vehicle are passive. In general, only one driver's cab may be active in a train.
  • the information about the clutch status is preferably stored in the rail vehicle. This has the advantage that the stored information can be used at any time to configure the arrangement for testing the train integrity. Furthermore, the information need not be repeatedly re-determined, although occasional verification is preferred.
  • information about the passive or active state of the driver's cab can be stored in the respective rail vehicle, optionally separately for each end of the rail vehicle. This too has the advantage that the stored information can be used in a simple manner to configure the arrangement.
  • the storage of the information about the coupling state has the advantage during operation of the train that an unintentional tearing off of the connection between two train parts is not mistakenly interpreted as an intentional uncoupling.
  • the implementation of the configuration of the devices of the train, which are used to monitor the integrity of the train depend on receiving a signal which indicates the desire for configuration or at least the possibility of configuration.
  • the signal can be generated manually, for example by a driver inside the train or by a control center outside the train, or it can be generated automatically.
  • the automatic generation of the signal may require the train to be stationary.
  • the automatically generated signal can also depend on other conditions, such as the specified course of a process when two rail vehicles are automatically uncoupled.
  • this information can be stored in a memory device of the rail vehicle. As described elsewhere in this specification in relation to specific embodiments, the use of hardware storage devices is preferred.
  • the memory device can store the state in such a way that an electrical connection between two connection contacts is either established or disconnected, depending on the state. This is the case, for example, with the latching relays mentioned elsewhere in this specification.
  • Other hardware memory devices can also be used such that an electrical connection is either made or broken depending on their memory state.
  • the configuration of the arrangement for checking the train integrity depending on the respective state can therefore be carried out in that the electrical connection between the two connection contacts or the electrical separation of the two connection contacts brings about or contributes to the configuration.
  • one memory device or two or more memory devices can be provided (e.g.
  • the second connection contact is permanently electrically connected to the third connection contact.
  • the electrical connection between the first connection contact and the fourth connection contact is therefore only present if the states of both storage devices are corresponding and therefore both the electrical connection between the first and the second connection contact (according to the state of the first storage device) is made as well as the electrical Connection between the third and fourth connection contact (according to the state of the second memory device) is made. If only the state of one of the two memory devices changes, the electrical connection between the first connection contact and the fourth connection contact is not established.
  • connection contacts can lead directly to the activation or non-activation of at least one of the three devices mentioned. This is particularly evident in the case of the electrical connection between two main conductors.
  • the electrical connection between the two connection contacts can be part of the electrical connection between the two main conductors. The same applies to the electrical supply of the main conductor.
  • the electrical connection between the connection contacts can be used as an electrical line that is used for the operation itself, such as a power supply for the main conductor detection device.
  • each train part is interchangeable or removable. If the rail vehicle with the central control device were to be removed if the configuration were controlled centrally, the function would no longer be provided.
  • a central controller with all the necessary electrical connections to all other rolling stock of the train must be present in all rolling stock. According to the invention, only the specified assignment is required to configure the arrangement for monitoring the train integrity in each rail vehicle.
  • figure 1 shows a schematic representation of parts of a rail vehicle in the form of a car 81. This is part of a below with reference to figure 2 explained train 1. In particular, an electrical arrangement 2 is shown, with which a train integrity can be monitored.
  • the carriage 81 shown in a schematic cut-away plan view, includes an automatic clutch 12 of conventional design.
  • This comprises two coupling elements 13, which can be automatically mechanically and electrically connected or coupled to correspondingly designed coupling elements 13 of another rail vehicle. This is done by making all the desired line connections to the other rail vehicle, in particular by making pneumatic connections, data-transmitting connections and electrical connections.
  • carriage 81 has a conventional carriage coupling 10 to an adjacent carriage 82 (see below figure 2 ).
  • this is a clutch that is permanently maintained during normal operation and preferably cannot be actuated automatically.
  • the carriage coupling 10 a type of integrated or, in other words, continuous train part 8 can be formed from the carriages 81, 82.
  • This train part 8 can be coupled with any number of other train parts to form a train with a desired length.
  • a voltage supply 24 is also shown. This can be, for example, a conventional voltage source and in particular a car battery.
  • One pole of the power supply 24 is connected to the vehicle ground 25, for example (see DC 0V).
  • a first live conductor section 27 extends from another pole of the voltage supply 24 (see DC 110 V). It should be pointed out that the level of the voltage can also be chosen differently. It is selected in such a way that the switching elements can be controlled reliably, it can be safely routed across all couplings and connections and, despite line resistance, can be reliably detected across the entire loop.
  • the conductor section 27 is connected at a feeding point 28 to a first main conductor 20 (feeding main conductor).
  • the conductor section 27 has a plurality of series-connected electrical switching elements 101-103.
  • the switching element 101 is opened (ie not conductive) when the monitoring circuit 4 is to be tested, either via a mechanical Switch 152 or via control by a TCMS via connections 207, 208, ie when a test-active relay 150 has been activated. This is explained below.
  • the switching element 102 is also opened when a clutched state is noted as stored via a switching element 110, i.e. a clutch storage relay 110 explained below is active, see below.
  • the switching element 103 opens when the driver's desk of the car 81 is stored as inactive. Since three switching elements 101-103 are connected in series, if no test is carried out and since the coupling point 12 of the car 81 is not saved as coupled and its own driver's desk is active (or the last active driver's desk was) the feeding main conductor 20 via the Conductor section 27 supplied with voltage. Since this state can preferably only be produced on a non-coupled train front with an active or last active driver's desk, it is ensured that the monitoring circuit 4 is advantageously fed at only one point.
  • Another return main conductor 22 is connected to a return connection point 30 .
  • a train integrity relay 100 which is also connected to the ground line 25 .
  • a differently designed switching element could also be used. If this main conductor 22 carries a voltage (in particular above a defined minimum value), the train integrity relay 100 switches to a first (preferably active) state. On the other hand, if the main conductor 22 is not live, the train integrity relay 100 switches to a second (preferably inactive) state.
  • the main conductors 20, 22 extend into the coupling parts 13 of the automatic clutch 12, respectively.
  • the main conductors 20, 22 of the coupled carriages are electrically connected to one another (see also the following figure 2 ).
  • the main conductors 20 , 22 and their connection points 28 , 30 in the example shown are connected to one another via a second conductor section 32 .
  • This also includes a plurality of switching elements 104-107 explained below.
  • the conductor section 27 and the ground connection 25 are connected via switch arrangements 40, 42 connected in parallel.
  • a clutch memory relay 110 is connected in series with these switch assemblies 40, 42. The latter can indicate a noted or stored state of the automatic coupling 12 and in particular whether it is currently (or was last) coupled to a coupling of another car or not.
  • the first switch arrangement 40 is generally in a live or current-conducting state when there is an electrical or mechanical coupling to another rail vehicle and any driver's desk of the train in which the car 81 is integrated is active.
  • the switch arrangement 40 has a switching element 112 which switches and in particular closes depending on whether any driver's desk of the train is active or not.
  • Two further parallel switching elements 113, 115 are connected in series, the switching element 113 switching depending on whether an electrical coupling or an electrical connection via the automatic coupling 12 of the carriage 81 to an adjacent carriage is established or not.
  • the switching element 115 switches depending on whether a mechanical clutch is detected via this automatic clutch 13 or not.
  • all switching elements 112-115 of the first switching arrangement 40 are make contacts or normally open switching elements (NO).
  • Couplings that have taken place can be registered by means of the first switch arrangement 40 and the clutch memory relay 110 can then be set to a state which represents the presence of a coupling.
  • the second switch arrangement 42 includes switching elements 116-119. It is generally in a live or conductive state when the driver's desk (of this car 81 and/or on the side of the rail vehicle with the automatic coupling 12 under consideration) is inactive (switching element 116); and no uncoupling process is registered or requested (eg by generating corresponding control signals for coupling valves of the automatic clutch 12, see switching element 117) or no standstill is registered (switching element 118); and if a coupled state (switching element 119) is currently stored. Consequently, the Switching elements 118, 117 are connected parallel to one another and in series with the switching elements 116, 119.
  • switching elements 104-107 (normally closed, NC) which are configured as break contacts and are connected in series. These can also be switched depending on the operating status. In particular, this can be used to close a connection between the main conductors 20, 22 when the carriage 81 is at one end of the train (and thus the active driver's desk is on the opposite side of the train or the towing vehicle). How based on 2 explained, this can be used to close a monitoring circuit.
  • Switching elements 104-107 switch to a non-conductive state when the car's own driver's desk 81 is stored as active (switching element 104), when an electrically coupled state (switching element 105) and also when a mechanically coupled state (switching element 106) of the Automatic clutch 12 is present and if the clutch memory relay 110 has registered a coupled state (switching element 107).
  • the present example preferably provides that the status "local or own driver's desk active" is stored as a continuation of the last active status. I.e. even if this driver's desk is deactivated again and no new/other driver's desk of a train has been activated, the location or car of the last active driver's desk is saved.
  • the connection of the main conductors 20 and 22 via the conductor section 32 at one end of the train remains active for the duration of the (own) driver's desk activation, as does the feed via the switching element 103 of the conductor section 27 at the front of the train, see above.
  • the driver's desk of a car 81 there is active, so that the second conductor section 32 is open and not conducting. This is desired so that the main conductors 20, 22 can be routed through the entire train to the end of the train without a direct electrical connection to one another and integrate all of the train's couplings into the monitoring circuit.
  • a third conductor section 44 parallel to the first and second conductor sections 27, 32 comprises a switching element 130 (for example an opener), by means of which the third conductor section 44 can be switched to be live when the train integrity is absent or inactive. This switching process takes place depending on the state of the train integrity relay 100. If this is inactive because the returning main conductor 22 suffers a voltage loss, the switching element 130 closes. This activates an optional signal lamp 136 or another type of warning device. It is not shown separately that signals can then also be transmitted to a control device of the car 81 and/or to a control system of the train, e.g. via the train integrity relay 100 or the digital connection or input 200.
  • a switching element 130 for example an opener
  • multiple digital ports 200-208 are provided. This gives a control system, in particular in the form of a TCMS, access to status information from switching elements of the electrical arrangement 2 and individual line sections for the purpose of fault diagnosis and monitoring.
  • Terminals 200-206 are digital inputs readable by the control system (for diagnostics) and terminals 207, 208 are digital outputs writable by the control system (to activate the loop test).
  • a first digital connection 200 can be used to monitor whether the returning main conductor 22 is live or not.
  • the digital connections 201-206 are each preceded by switching elements which switch in the same states as the switching elements already discussed. Analogous reference symbols are therefore used for these switching elements as in the cases already discussed. Consequently, the terminals 201-202 serve to monitor whether a clutched or a non-clutched state is stored, i.e. they reflect the state of the clutch memory relay 110 again via contacts or switching elements 107 and 119, the switching element 107 opening and the switching element 119 closing in the “coupled stored” state.
  • connections 203-204 are used to monitor whether train integrity is detected or not (corresponding to train integrity relay 100), the switching element 132 closing when the train integrity is detected or active and the switching element 130 opening.
  • Connections 205-206 are used to monitor whether a test mode, explained below, is activated.
  • the switching element 101 opens accordingly when this is the case, whereas the switching element 134 closes.
  • the oppositely switching switching elements in front of the connections 201-206 which enable a kind of antivalent control of these connections 201-206, it can be ensured that the state to be mapped in each case is clearly identified.
  • a single fault can be reliably detected by the reading unit (in particular the TCMS), in particular since both an external power supply and a cable break can be detected.
  • the relays 100, 110 used to switch these switching elements advantageously have forcibly guided contacts or switching elements, so that when one switching element is switched it is ensured that the contacts or the other switching element in front of the associated connection 201-206 have also switched.
  • the arrangement 2 has a test function. In this way, the feeding main conductor 20 can be separated from the voltage supply 24 in a targeted manner. If the monitoring circuit is functioning correctly, a lack of train integrity should then be detected. If this is not the case, this indicates an unwanted external feed, e.g. due to a cable break, which makes such a detection impossible.
  • the test function is implemented by means of the switch 101 already mentioned, which opens the first conductor section 27 and in particular its connection to the feed point 28 when the test is to be carried out.
  • the latter can be detected by means of a test relay 150, the state of which can be changed by actuating a manual switch 152 or by activating the connections 207, 208 by TCMS.
  • the shown optional plurality and in particular series connection of the connections 207, 208 improves reliability.
  • the test function can only be activated if both connections 207, 208 can be activated. Failure of either terminal 207, 208 such that it remains switched on, although no longer driven, does not allow the test function to be inadvertently activated.
  • figure 2 shows a rail vehicle combination in the form of a train 1 with two train parts 8, 9.
  • Each train part 8, 9 has two individual cars 81, 82, 91, 92.
  • the carriages 81, 82, 91, 92 of a train part 8, 9 are coupled to one another by means of a carriage coupling 10.
  • the train parts 8,9 are coupled to each other via the automatic couplings 12 of the adjacent carriages 82,91 of the train parts 8,9 facing each other. This also includes the closing of all lines running between the train parts 8, 9, in particular electrical lines, data lines and pneumatic lines.
  • the inside 2 leftmost carriage 81 corresponds to that of FIG 1 and forms the Switzerlandspitze.
  • the driver's desk of this car 81 is considered to be switched on in the following discussion.
  • the rule preferably applies that only those cars 81-92 can have an active driver's desk whose automatic coupling 12 is not connected to another car 81-92.
  • the driver's desks of all other cars 82-92 are inactive.
  • the inside 2 right-most positioned car 92 forms an end of train in the following discussion.
  • the carriages 81-92 each have a similar electrical arrangement 2, as for the carriage 81 on the basis of figure 1 was explained.
  • the arrangements 2 together form a (monitoring) system 3 for train integrity monitoring.
  • they form a monitoring circuit 4 of the type described below.
  • the alignments of the electrical assembly 2 in the individual carriages 81-92 depend on the position of the automatic coupling 12.
  • the carriages 81, 91 accordingly have an alignment of the electrical assembly 2 in accordance with figure 1 and the carriages 82, 92 have a mirrored orientation thereto. But this is not mandatory.
  • the alignments of individual components and the courses of lines of the arrangements 2 within the carriages 81, 92 can differ. However, they preferably enable identical functionalities, as is the case above with reference to FIG figure 1 was explained.
  • each car 81-92 to have a train end with a closed connection 32 between the main conductors 20, 22 there, a front end with connection of the conductors 20, 22 there to a power supply 24 or a carriage 82-91 between the head of the train and the end of the train, through which the main conductors 20, 22 pass without deliberately changing their respective voltage level and/or connection to one another.
  • the electrical arrangements 2 of the carriages 81-92 are each shown in a schematically simplified manner, so that in particular not all switching elements, relays and optional digital connections are entered there.
  • the circuit in cars 81-82 or 91-92 can also be implemented in one car (without coupler 10), eg a locomotive with two driver's cabs at each end of the vehicle.
  • a monitoring circuit 4 is formed in that adjacent feeding main conductors 20 and returning main conductors 22 of each electrical arrangement 2 of the carriages 81-92 are electrically conductively connected to one another via the couplings 10, 13. Furthermore, the electrically conductive connection of the main conductors 20, 22 in the last carriage 92, as described below, takes place via the second conductor section 32 there.
  • the feeding main conductor 20 is connected to a pole of the local voltage source 24, which has a high voltage level, and the returning main conductor 20 is connected to the ground line 25 (low voltage level).
  • the second conductor section 32 is open in the carriage 81 and also in the following carriages 82, 91 and is not conductive.
  • the switching element 104 is off figure 1 opens.
  • the switches 105, 106 are open due to the electrical and mechanical coupling being established.
  • both of these switch arrangements 40, 42 are live, in particular because the driver's desk is not actively switched (affects switching element 116), no decoupling is requested (affects switching element 117), another driver's desk is active within train 1 (from carriage 81, affects switching elements 112) and there is a mechanical/electrical clutch (affects switching elements 113, 115). Consequently, there is always a voltage on the clutch memory relay 110 and the clutch is stored as present.
  • a train control system 300 is also shown schematically. This consists of a plurality of TCMS controllers 301 of known design in each of the cars 81-92.
  • the TCMS control devices 301 communicate with one another via data connections indicated by dashed lines, which can also be established via the clutches 12, 10.
  • the data connections can be implemented, for example, as Ethernet or MVB/WTB connections (MVB: Multifunction Vehicle Bus; WTB: Wire Train Bus).
  • a train integrity check can be carried out by the train control system 300 in such a way that it is checked whether all TCMS control devices 301 can communicate with one another. If this is not the case, the data connection is interrupted, which is most likely caused by a loosening of one of the clutches 12, 10.
  • a train control computer 302 is also indicated, for example in the form of a known European Vital Computer. This is entered as an example only for the first car 81, which forms the head of the train.
  • the train control computer 302 receives the results of the respective integrity monitoring both from the train control system 300 and from the monitoring circuit 4 formed by the electrical arrangements 2 or the corresponding monitoring system 3 .
  • a connection between the warning device 136 of at least the first car 81 and the train control computer 302 is shown as an example.
  • the train control computer 302 can take a predetermined countermeasure. In particular, it can communicate the train integrity loss to trackside and/or external facilities.
  • the train control system 300 can only achieve a safety integrity level of SIL 2 due to the limited capabilities of standard TCMS control devices 301 used.
  • the monitoring system 3 can also achieve a safety integrity level of at least SIL 2. Since both monitoring results are taken into account in the manner described above, the overall safety integrity level for the train integrity monitoring is 4.
  • a clock can switch the feeding main conductor 20 from 0 to 1 and back or from logical -1 to +1, eg +110V to -110V, at a fixed rate.
  • logic with, for example, four counters can be provided, which are counted down with their own fixed cycle, for example from a start value to 0 or, in the case of an upward count, from 0 to a limit value counting. As long as the pulse of the clock is detected, train integrity is reported.
  • Two counters each are restarted when the received level changes from 0 to 1 or alternatively from logical -1 to +1 and the other two counters when the opposite level change takes place, ie from 1 to 0 or alternatively from logical +1 to - 1.
  • the shorter counter which runs out slightly faster than the clock change, suppresses the detection of the clock change as long as it has not yet expired.
  • the second counter is longer than the clock change time and, if expired, will indicate loss of train integrity.
  • the tolerance ranges of the counters can be chosen to be correspondingly generous in order to tolerate fluctuations in the clock generator.
  • the clock of the counters can also be derived from the level or phase of the information read from the evaluation device and compared with a reference clock, for example comparing two counters or time units from the reference clock and the clock read.
  • the test is triggered manually by mechanical switch 152, the result is to be displayed to the testing person, for example by displaying the information from the TCMS.
  • the TCMS can determine the result at the other end of the train because it has communication between the cars.
  • a train control line shall be routed to transmit the train integrity status across the entire train back to the other end of the train, to propagate the train integrity status from the active driver's desk throughout the train, or to start the test at non-coupled ends of the train without an active driver's desk, see above that the activating person can read the result of the test directly on the active driver's desk.
  • FIG 3 shows one to 2 basically analogous view, but the electrical arrangements 2 of the carriages 81-92 are designed according to a different embodiment. With the exception of the deviations explained below, however, the electrical arrangements 2 are preferably analogous to the variants from FIG Fig.1 constructed so that on the 1 also referred to below. However, a simplified or generally different configuration is also possible 1 be provided, in particular not all switching elements and / or switch assemblies 40, 42 from figure 1 having.
  • the switching elements 105, 106 are open due to the existing coupling of the automatic clutches 12 (see Fig. 1 ), so that there is no additional feeding of the main conductor 22 there.
  • car 81 at the head of the train in which the switching element 103 is open due to the driver's desk being active there.
  • a voltage is therefore present at the respective train integrity relays 100 of the carriages 81-92 and, more precisely, the voltage level of the main conductor 22 there and fed from the end of the train in relation to the ground line 25.
  • the train integrity can again be additionally monitored by means of the train control system 300 .
  • the train monitoring is advantageously carried out by means of the train integrity relay 100 of the car 81 at the head of the train in order to be able to detect train integrity losses over the entire length of the train.
  • the power supply at the end of the car (car 92) should be interrupted (eg using one of the elements 207-208, 152).
  • the voltage drop should then be registered at the train integrity relay 100 to rule out an external supply.
  • test result determined at the tip can be transmitted and/or displayed to a person who actuates the switch 152 at the end of the train.
  • FIG. 4 shows in an even more simplified form than in the in 1 shown embodiment an arrangement with a device 405, which can be activated in the configuration to prepare for the monitoring of the train integrity.
  • the device 405 is electrically connected to one of two opposing contact points 407, 408 of an electrical connection, namely to the second contact point 408.
  • the first contact point 407 is connected to a power supply 424.
  • the electrical connection has two electrical switching elements 402, 403, which can in particular be memory relays and which, for example, have the function corresponding to the 1 have shown electrical switching elements 102, 103. Therefore, for example, the electrical switching element 402 is closed when an associated coupling connection to an adjacent rail vehicle is not established in the rail vehicle, namely when the automatic coupling is not connected to another coupling, ie no other vehicle is coupled.
  • the electrical switching element 403 is closed when an assigned driver's cab is active in the rail vehicle. In another configuration, the electrical switching element 403 may not be present if the configuration does not depend on the active or passive state of the driver's cab.
  • the electrical connection is made in this case and the device 405 is supplied with electrical power from the power source 424.
  • device 405 is the main conductor detection device mentioned above, which measures, for example, the voltage present on the main conductor in order to monitor train integrity.
  • the electrical connection between the two contact points 407, 408 could be part of the device 405.
  • the device 405 can be, for example, the electrical connection between two main conductors or the electrical supply of a main conductor.
  • figure 5 shows schematically two rail vehicles 410, 411, which are coupled to each other via an automatic coupling 412. The mechanical part of the coupling is not shown, but the electrical part of the electrical connections made by the existing coupling connection is shown.
  • two electrical connections are shown, one each between one of the main conductors 420, 422, which extend continuously through the two rail vehicles 410, 411 due to the electrical connection.
  • an electrical connection between line sections of an electrical supply line 423 is shown.
  • a line section of the supply line 423 is located in each of the two rail vehicles 410, 411. Also located in the left in figure 5 rail vehicle 410 shown has a voltage source 424.
  • a switching device 440 is shown at each end of each of the two rail vehicles 410, 411.
  • the respective switching device 440 establishes the electrical connection between the first main conductor 420 and the electrical supply line 423 .
  • the first main conductor 420 is connected to the voltage source 423 at the location of the switched-through switching device 440 via the electrical supply line.
  • the switching device 440 shown furthest to the left is switched through. All other switching devices 440 are not switched through.
  • the only electrical connection 450 between the first main conductor 420 and the second main conductor 422 is made.
  • the electrical connection 450 is also realized by a (preferably storing) switching element 451, which is figure 5 is shown schematically as a rectangular block.
  • switching elements 440 which switch through the supply voltage 424 from line 423 to the main conductor 420 when the switching device is active, there is a switching element 451 on each rail vehicle near each automatic coupling, which is located between the first main conductor 420 and the second main conductor 422 closed switching element produces an electrical connection.
  • these other switching elements 451 are in the in figure 5 state shown open.
  • a second switching device 441 is shown at each end of each of the two rail vehicles 410, 411.
  • Each of these switching devices 441 connects the second main conductor 422 to a signal line 425 in the switched-through state.
  • a line section of the signal line 425 is located in each of the rail vehicles 410, 411. These two line sections are connected to one another by the coupling connection that has been produced.
  • the signal line 425 is connected to a voltage and/or current measuring device, not shown.
  • a measuring device can also be located in each of the rail vehicles 410, 411. In this case, the connection of the line sections of the signal line 425 to the coupling connection can also be omitted.
  • the main conductor detection device is connected to the signal line 425 at the respective point at which the second switching device 441 is switched through. As shown by hatching, the one on the left is in figure 5 illustrated end of the rail vehicle 410 arranged second switching device 441 is switched through as the only one of these second switching devices.
  • the electrical voltage of the supply line 423 is therefore present at the same end of the train on the first main conductor 420 on which the main conductor detection device with the second Main conductor 422 is connected.
  • the switching device 441 could be omitted and the measuring device in each rail vehicle or at each end of a rail vehicle 410, 411 could be permanently connected to the main conductor 422 (in which case 441 can be interpreted as measuring device).
  • each of the rail vehicles is a detection device that detects the coupling status there and preferably also detects whether a driver's cab is active or passive at this end of the rail vehicle 410, 411.
  • the driver's cab is on the left in figure 5 illustrated end of the rail vehicle 410 active.
  • all other driver's cabs at the other ends of the rail vehicles 410, 411 are passive.
  • the first switching device 440 is switched through at that end of the respective rail vehicle 410, 411 at which the only active driver's cab of the train is located. Furthermore, the main conductor detection device is also connected to the other main conductor 422 at this end of the rail vehicle 410, 411, in that the corresponding second switching device 441 is switched through. Also, according to the predetermined assignment, at the opposite end of the train, in this case the right in figure 5 shown end of the rail vehicle 111, the electrical connection between the two main conductors 420, 422 via the switching element 451 automatically made.
  • the predetermined assignment accordingly defines, for example, that there must be no active driver's cab at this end and there must be no coupling connection via an automatic coupling to another rail vehicle at this end.
  • the specified assignment for the further ends of rail vehicles of the train defines that if there is an automatically generated coupling connection at the end, no electrical connection between the two main conductors 420, 422 may be established and neither the first and second switching devices 440, 441 are switched through may.
  • FIG. 6 Another embodiment is now based on 6 described. This embodiment differs from that in figure 5 shown in that only one main line 420 is present. This main line 420 is thus a main line used independently for monitoring the train integrity. she will in not electrically connected to a further main line extending through the train in any operating condition.
  • both the first and second switching devices 440, 441 are connected to the same main line 420.
  • the configuration of the train integrity monitoring arrangement according to the predetermined mapping is therefore different from that in the case of figure 5 .
  • the predetermined assignment defined in the embodiment of 6 that at the end of the train with the active driver's cab (for example, again the end of the rail vehicle 410 shown on the left in the figure), the second switching device 441 is switched through, which connects the main line 420 to the signal line 425.
  • the first switching device 440 there is to be activated In this way, the electrical voltage is applied to the main line there.
  • the entire main line 420 which extends throughout the train, contributes to the monitoring of train integrity.
  • connection to the supply line 423 and also the connection to the signal line 425 can be made at any point in the rail vehicle, since monitoring the unintentional break-off of two rail vehicles of the train that are coupled to one another is only dependent on the electrical connection of the main line or the electrical connections of the main lines arrive at the coupling connections.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Biomedical Technology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
EP21215697.0A 2020-12-22 2021-12-17 Procédé, système et train pour un suivi d'intégrité du train Pending EP4019368A3 (fr)

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DE19711772C1 (de) 1997-03-21 1998-08-06 Daimler Benz Ag Prüfvorrichtung und Verfahren zum Betreiben der Prüfvorrichtung
ITTO20011124A1 (it) * 2001-11-30 2003-05-30 Sab Wabco Spa Sistema di sicurezza per la verifica continua dell'integrita' di un convoglio ferroviario.
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