EP3306506A1 - Authentification d'un nouveau dispositif par un dispositif de confiance - Google Patents

Authentification d'un nouveau dispositif par un dispositif de confiance Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3306506A1
EP3306506A1 EP16192717.3A EP16192717A EP3306506A1 EP 3306506 A1 EP3306506 A1 EP 3306506A1 EP 16192717 A EP16192717 A EP 16192717A EP 3306506 A1 EP3306506 A1 EP 3306506A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
response
authentication data
data
new device
asic
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Granted
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EP16192717.3A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3306506B1 (fr
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Mikael Lindberg
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Axis AB
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Axis AB
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Priority to EP16192717.3A priority Critical patent/EP3306506B1/fr
Priority to CN201710918861.1A priority patent/CN107919959B/zh
Priority to US15/725,706 priority patent/US10700877B2/en
Publication of EP3306506A1 publication Critical patent/EP3306506A1/fr
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/45—Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/34—User authentication involving the use of external additional devices, e.g. dongles or smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2129—Authenticate client device independently of the user
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to authentication of devices in a network of devices, and more specifically to a challenge-response authentication in which one trusted device presents a question (“challenge”) and another party must provide a valid answer (“response”) to be authenticated.
  • Network connected devices are getting more and more common. In many applications, it is vital for security reasons that the origin, hardware and functionality of new devices in a network are known and controlled. This has brought with it new issues and challenges concerning authentication of new devices in the network.
  • Cryptographic solutions to the problem of secure authentication of devices in such networks. However, such solution relies on distribution of cryptographic keys, which may result in logistical security problems.
  • an objective of the invention is to solve or at least reduce one or several of the drawbacks discussed above.
  • the above objective is achieved by the attached independent patent claims.
  • the present invention is realized by a method performed by a trusted device for authentication of a new device, the method comprising:
  • trusted device should, in the context of present specification, be understood a device that has already been authenticated and known to be reliable, e.g., within a network of connected devices.
  • authentication data should, in the context of present specification, be understood a set of values that can be processed using the ASIC. Such data is preferably generated such that it is different each time it is retrieved, e.g., using a (pseudo) random function of some sort.
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • ASICs as used in this context may provide operations (processing of data) which are not easily reproducible unless the hardware design of the ASIC is known. In a network where some or all connected devices each should have an ASIC with the same hardware design, this may advantageously be used as equivalent to a cryptographic mechanism when authenticating a new device.
  • the trusted device When determining the authenticity of a new device, the trusted device will send a challenge to the new device, asking it to perform operations on the authentication data using its ASIC and a set of processing parameters. If a response is received from the new device, data comprised in that response may be compared to an expected result.
  • the trusted device knows the expected result since it has already generated such result by processing the authentication data using its own ASIC and the same set of processing parameters that was sent to the new device. Provided that a difference between the processed authentication data and the data comprised in the response does not exceed a threshold difference, the new device may be authenticated and thus trusted by the trusted device (and any other device already connected to, and trusted by, the trusted device).
  • the allowed threshold difference may be predetermined and for example be expressed as an allowed number of bits (e.g. Hamming distance, or the L2-norm) that can differ between the data of the response and the processed authentication data.
  • the allowed difference may vary from time to time. For example, if the connection (Wi-Fi, wired etc.) between the trusted device and the new device is unstable, the allowed difference may be larger to allow for missing bits in the received response from the new device.
  • the new device is authenticated only if:
  • an ASIC having a specific hardware design and functionally, i.e. designed for processing a specific type of data in a specific way, for processing the authentication data may be computationally expensive to reproduce for a device not having access this type of ASIC.
  • a fraud device i.e. a device which tries to act as a device that should be trusted
  • the trusted device may also measure the time it takes for the response to be received and compare the response time to a threshold time span based on how long it should take for a true trusted device to process the authentication data.
  • This threshold time span may be predetermined, or based on the time it took for the trusted device to generate the processed authentication data.
  • the threshold time span may also be based on data about the network (connection between the trusted device and the new device), e.g., bit rates etc. So even if the new device responds correctly to the challenge from the trusted device, it is also required that the response is received from the new device within a specific time span for the new device to be authenticated.
  • the method comprises further authentication processes between the trusted device and new device.
  • the above discussed embodiments may be only part of the authentication process.
  • the new device may according to some embodiments requires further authentication from the new device in order to trust it, for example using certificates or other known security measures. This embodiment is known as multi-factor authentication.
  • the ASIC is selected from the group comprising: an image processing pipeline, video analytics pipeline and an audio processing pipeline.
  • proprietary ASIC IP such as an image processing pipeline, video analytics pipeline or an audio processing pipeline for processing the authentication data, it is very difficult for a fraud device to replicate a correct response to a challenge.
  • the step of retrieving the authentication data comprises reading the authentication data from a computer memory of the trusted device.
  • the authentication data may be generated at the trusted device by a random function, or the memory may comprise a set of authentication data from which one is selected for each authentication process.
  • the trusted device is a camera
  • the step of retrieving the authentication data comprises capturing image data using an image sensor of the camera and using at least parts of the image data as the authentication data.
  • Image data may be considered as random data since two captured images never will be identical due to the presence of image noise.
  • the ASIC comprises a first version number
  • the response received from the new device comprises a second version number
  • the method further comprises: determining the threshold difference based on the first version number and the second version number.
  • Different versions of proprietary ASIC may have different numerical accuracy when processing data. Consequently, to allow for different ASIC versions among trusted devices, it may be advantageous to adapt the threshold difference based on a comparison of version numbers of the trusted device and the new device.
  • differing version numbers of the trusted device and the new device may result in a higher allowed difference between the processed authentication data of the trusted device and the data comprised in the received response.
  • the ASIC comprises a first version number
  • the response received from the new device comprises a second version number
  • the method further comprises: determining the threshold time span based on the first version number and the second version number.
  • a lower version number of an ASIC may result in a different processing speed of data.
  • an ASIC of an older version may process data more slowly compared to an ASIC of a newer version.
  • an ASIC of a newer version may process data in a different way compared to an ASIC of an older version, which may result in a slower processing speed.
  • the present invention provides a device configured to authenticate a new device, the device comprising:
  • the processor is configured to authenticating the new device only if: a response from the new device is received by the digital network module, wherein the response comprises data, the response is received within a threshold time span from transmitting, by the digital network module, the authentication data and the set of processing parameters to the new device, and a difference between the processed authentication data and the data comprised in the response does not exceed a threshold difference.
  • the device of the second aspect is a network camera.
  • the present invention provides a device comprising, a digital network module configured to receive a challenge from a second device, the challenge comprising authentication data and a set of processing parameter, an application specific integrated circuit, ASIC, a processor configured to generate processed authentication data by processing the authentication data using the ASIC and the set of processing parameters, wherein the digital network module being further configured to transmit a response to the challenge to the second device, the response comprising the processed authentication data.
  • a digital network module configured to receive a challenge from a second device, the challenge comprising authentication data and a set of processing parameter, an application specific integrated circuit, ASIC, a processor configured to generate processed authentication data by processing the authentication data using the ASIC and the set of processing parameters, wherein the digital network module being further configured to transmit a response to the challenge to the second device, the response comprising the processed authentication data.
  • the device of the third aspect is a network camera.
  • the present invention provides system comprising the trusted device of the second aspect and the device of the third aspect.
  • the present invention provides a computer program product comprising a computer-readable storage medium with instructions adapted to carry out the method of the first aspect when executed by a device having processing capability
  • the second, third, fourth and fifth aspect may generally have the same features and advantages as the first aspect.
  • Figure 1 shows a system 100 of devices 102, 104, connected to each other via a network 110.
  • the connection may be wired or wireless, and the devices may be connected through e.g. a local area network or Internet.
  • the devices 102, 104 are connected via a peer-to-peer network, i.e., where interconnected devices ("peers") share resources amongst each other without the use of a centralized administrative system.
  • the devices 102, 104 may for example be image or video recording devices (video camera, network camera etc.), audio recording devices (microphones) etc.
  • the system 100 comprises one or more trusted devices 102, i.e., devices 102 which already been authenticated in some way and thus is known and reliable, e.g.
  • a new device (untrusted device, unauthenticated device etc.) 104 has connected to the network 100.
  • the present disclosure relates to how such new device 104 should be authenticated such that it may be reliable within the network 100. Determining if a new device 104 is authentic may be important for a number of reasons, for example to determine if data received from the new device 104 104 is authentic and can be trusted, or to determine if the new device 104 is a genuine device of a specific brand or type, or if it is an imposter device which cannot be trusted.
  • the devices 102, 104 are exemplified as video recording devices or network cameras, but as understood by the skilled person, other devices such as audio recording devices or any other device having an application specific integrated circuit, ASIC, may be employed.
  • FIG. 2 shows by way of example a design of a device 102, 104.
  • the device 102, 104 comprises an ASIC 202, a processor (e.g. a central processing unit, CPU) 204 and a network module 206 such that it can be connected via Wi-Fi, Internet etc.
  • the ASIC 202 may include any application specific integrated circuit, for example an image processing pipeline (IPP), video analytics pipeline and an audio processing pipeline.
  • the ASIC 202 comprises also the processor 204 and the network module. Since an ASIC 202 is designed for a specific reason, e.g. to process a specific type of data in a specific way, it may be very difficult to copy such IC.
  • fingerprints may uniquely identify an ASIC of a specific type.
  • IP Image Processing
  • the IP blocks which according to embodiments are part of an ASIC may provide operations which are computationally expensive to reproduce if such ASIC is not used, and not easily reproducible unless the hardware designs are known.
  • the hardware design of an ASIC is often kept a secret by the company developing the ASIC, since a lot of research typically is put into such an integrated circuit.
  • the authentication process starts S402 when the new device 104 is somehow discovered by the trusted device 102.
  • the new device may for example multicast 302 its ID within a peer-to-peer network.
  • the new device 104 may also directly transmit a request 302 for authentication to the trusted device 102, the request may comprise the identity (ID) of the new device.
  • the trusted device 102 may according to some embodiments discover the new device 104 on the network and request 302 an identity from the new device 104.
  • the trusted device 102 performing the authentication that discovers the new device 104.
  • it is another trusted device 102 of the network (e.g. one of the dashed devices 102 of figure 1 ) that discovers the new device 102 and then asks another trusted device 102 to perform the authentication.
  • This may be advantageous in case several types or versions of trusted devices 102 are connected in the network, and the trusted device 102 that actually discover the new device 104 is not the best option for performing the authentication due to the fact that it is of a different type or version compared to the new device 104.
  • the trusted device 102 discovering the new device 104 may be occupied with other tasks and for that reason may ask another trusted device 102 within the network to perform the authentication.
  • the trusted device may retrieve S404 authentication data 304.
  • the retrieval of authentication data 304 may comprise reading authentication data from a memory of the trusted device, requesting authentication data from an authentication data repository separate from the trusted device, generating the authentication data at the trusted device 102 e.g. using a random function etc.
  • an image/audio sensor of the trusted device 102 may be used for generating the authentication data 304, e.g. capturing an image or video sequence (image data), or recording audio data.
  • the authentication data 304 is exemplified as a matrix of data, e.g., an image,
  • the authentication data 304 and a set of processing parameters 306 will be used for authentication of the new device using the ASIC 202a of the trusted device 102 and any corresponding ASIC 202b of the new device 104.
  • the processing parameters 306 depends on what type of ASIC that is used for authentication. By way of example, if the ASIC 202a is an IPP, the processing parameters 306 may for example relate to noise filtering, color compensation, edge detection etc. If the ASIC 202a is a video analytics pipeline, the processing parameters 306 may relate to motion detection, face detection etc. If the ASIC 202a is an audio processing pipeline, the processing parameters 306 may relate to gain levels of certain frequencies etc.
  • the authentication data 304 and a set off processing parameters 306 are transmitted S406 to the new device 104.
  • the trusted device 102 may, at the same time, or before or after the transmission S406, process the authentication data 312 using the ASIC 202a (configured with the processing parameters 306) to generate processed authentication data 312.
  • the trusted device 102 performing the authentication (as will be described below) that also generate the processed authentication data 312.
  • the processed authentication data 312 is generated by another device separate from the trusted device 102.
  • the trusted device 102 transmits the authentication data 304 and the set of processing parameters 306 to the separate device, which generates the processed authentication data 312 using an ASIC 202 and then transmits the processed authentication data 312 to the trusted device 102 that then completes the authentication process.
  • the processed authentication data 312 will then be used as a key for determining or assessing the authenticity of the new device. This is may be done as follows.
  • a response 315 is expected to be received at the trusted device 102 (e.g. via the network module 206 of the trusted device 102).
  • the trusted device may determine that the new device 104 cannot be trusted, since it was not set up to transmit a response 315 to the challenge 305.
  • the trusted device may retransmit the challenge 305 a number of times, to ensure that a transmission error was not the reason for not receiving a response 315 at the trusted device 102.
  • the new device 104 may be a reliable device.
  • the new device may in this case comprise a digital network module 206 configured to receive the challenge 305 from the trusted device 102.
  • the new device 104 may also comprise an ASIC 202b and a processor configured to generate processed authentication data 314 by processing the authentication data of the challenge 305 using the ASIC 202b and the set of processing parameters of the challenge 305.
  • the processed authentication data 314 may then be transmitted in the response 315 to the trusted device 102.
  • the trusted device may determine S412, in an authentication stage 316 at the trusted device 102, if the difference between the processed authentication data 312 and data 314 in the response 315 is less than (does not exceed) a threshold difference. In case the threshold difference is exceeded, the trusted device may determine S416 that the new device will not be authenticated.
  • the threshold difference may be predetermined, or it may be based on the authentication data (e.g. size, type of data etc.).
  • the ASIC of devices in the network may have different version numbers (be of different generations etc.). If this is the case, the threshold difference may need to be set based on the version numbers the two ASICs 202a, 202b. Consequently, according to some embodiments, the ASIC 202a of the trusted device 102 comprises a first version number, and the response 315 received from the new device 104 comprises a second version number (i.e. the version number of the ASIC 202b of the new device).
  • the trusted device e.g.
  • the authentication stage 316 of a processor 204 of the trusted device 102) may be configured to determine the threshold difference based on the first version number and the second version number. For example, an ASIC of a lower version number may have a reduced numerical accuracy compared to an ASIC of a higher version number which thus may require that the threshold difference is increased compared to if ASICs of the same version number is used.
  • the time it takes for the new device to produce a response 315 to the challenge 305 is used for authentication.
  • mimicking an ASIC using e.g. software requires substantial computational resources. This means that even if a fraud device somehow knows how to forge the fingerprint of an ASIC of a "true" trusted device, the time span of producing the processed authentication data using software may be substantially longer compared to using an ASIC 202. This knowledge may advantageously be used in the authentication process.
  • the trusted device 102 checks S414 if the response 315 is received within a threshold time span from transmitting the challenge 305 (the authentication data 304 and the set of processing parameters 306) to the new device 104.
  • the trusted device 102 may determine S416 that the new device 104 will not be authenticated. Similar to the threshold difference, the threshold time span may be predetermined, or it may be based on the authentication data (e.g. size, type of data etc.). In some embodiments, the threshold time span further depends on properties of the network such as bitrates etc. Moreover, similar to the threshold difference, the threshold time span may need to be set based on differing version numbers the two ASICs 202a, 202b. In this embodiment, the trusted device (e.g. the authentication stage 316 of a processor 204 of the trusted device 102) may be configured to determine the threshold timespan based on the first version number and the second version number. For example, an ASIC of a lower version number may have a reduced processing capability compared to an ASIC of a higher version number which thus may require that the threshold time span is increased compared to if ASICs of the same version number is used.
  • the threshold time span may be predetermined, or it may be based on the authentication data (e.
  • the trusted device determines S418 that the new device is authenticated.
  • the authentication process of figure 3 and 4 is only part of a larger, multi-factor authentication. Consequently, in case the new device fulfils the challenge-response authentication of figure 3 and 4 , further authentication processes may be initiated, such as a certificate based authentication process. However, if the new device does not correctly respond to the challenge 305, no further authentication processes may be needed and the trusted device may directly determine S416 that the new device 104 will not be authenticated and thus not trusted.
  • the systems and methods disclosed hereinabove may be implemented as software, firmware, hardware or a combination thereof.
  • the division of tasks between functional units or stages referred to in the above description does not necessarily correspond to the division into physical units; to the contrary, one physical component may have multiple functionalities, and one task may be carried out by several physical components in cooperation.
  • Certain components or all components may be implemented as software executed by a digital signal processor or microprocessor, or be implemented as hardware or as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • Such software may be distributed on computer readable media, which may comprise computer storage media (or non-transitory media) and communication media (or transitory media).
  • computer storage media includes both volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data.
  • Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store the desired information and that can be accessed by a computer.
  • communication media typically embodies computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism and includes any information delivery media.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
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  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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EP16192717.3A 2016-10-07 2016-10-07 Authentification d'un nouveau dispositif par un dispositif de confiance Active EP3306506B1 (fr)

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EP16192717.3A EP3306506B1 (fr) 2016-10-07 2016-10-07 Authentification d'un nouveau dispositif par un dispositif de confiance
CN201710918861.1A CN107919959B (zh) 2016-10-07 2017-09-30 用于受信设备对新设备的认证的方法、系统、装置及计算机可读存储介质
US15/725,706 US10700877B2 (en) 2016-10-07 2017-10-05 Authentication of a new device by a trusted device

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US20180102906A1 (en) 2018-04-12
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US10700877B2 (en) 2020-06-30
CN107919959A (zh) 2018-04-17

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