EP3219575B1 - Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module - Google Patents

Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3219575B1
EP3219575B1 EP16305296.2A EP16305296A EP3219575B1 EP 3219575 B1 EP3219575 B1 EP 3219575B1 EP 16305296 A EP16305296 A EP 16305296A EP 3219575 B1 EP3219575 B1 EP 3219575B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
key
communication module
communication
transportation
module
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
EP16305296.2A
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German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP3219575A1 (en
Inventor
Andre RADOMIAK
Xavier MAGDELYNS
Stéphanie FOSSION
Stephano BAGLIVO
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
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Alstom Transport Technologies SAS
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Publication date
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Priority to ES16305296T priority Critical patent/ES2843697T3/es
Priority to EP16305296.2A priority patent/EP3219575B1/en
Publication of EP3219575A1 publication Critical patent/EP3219575A1/en
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Publication of EP3219575B1 publication Critical patent/EP3219575B1/en
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
    • B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
    • B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
    • B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
    • B61L2027/202—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using European Train Control System [ETCS]
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
    • B61L2205/02—Global system for mobile communication - railways [GSM-R]

Definitions

  • the present invention concerns a method for securing the exchange of authentication keys used for symmetric data encryption communication between at least two communication modules.
  • the present invention also concerns a key management module performing this method.
  • At least one of said two communication modules is comprised in trackside equipment associated to a train control system and the other is an onboard communication module embedded in a railroad vehicle.
  • the invention is notably used for a train control system implemented according to the European Train Control System (ETCS) standard.
  • the invention particularly relates to level 2 or 3 of the ETCS standard.
  • the document DE 10 2011 006 772 A1 discloses a system and method for a key management of a train control system.
  • the ETCS standard allows the communication between trackside equipment and the railroad vehicle moving along the corresponding track.
  • Trackside equipment is notably presented by Radio Block Centre (RBC) and Eurobalises distributed along the tracks and making it possible for example to control the speed and movement of the railroad vehicle.
  • RBC Radio Block Centre
  • the communication between trackside equipment (e.g. RBC) and the railroad vehicle is based on a safe protocol called Euroradio protocol and constructed over the GSM-R standard and in particular, over its circuit switching or packet switching (e.g. GPRS) extension for data transmission.
  • RBC trackside equipment
  • GPRS packet switching
  • the Euroradio protocol for such type of communication makes use of symmetric authentication techniques (e.g. without data encryption).
  • the Euroradio protocol allows the authentication of transmitting data by symmetric authentication keys, called KMAC keys ("Key Management Authentication Code").
  • KMAC keys Key Management Authentication Code
  • the authentication keys are known by each railroad communication module and shall remain secret to ensure the required safety and security level.
  • new authentication keys may be regularly transmitted by a key management module to each railroad communication module.
  • the authentication keys are transmitted in a message encrypted using transportation keys, called also KTRANS ("Key for TRANsport").
  • the transportation keys are known only by the authority that issued it, the key management module, and the communication module. This last module is the recipient of the message containing the authentication keys.
  • the confidentiality of initialization i.e. first distribution of the transportation key into the communication modules
  • its update are based on a human procedure, hence opening potential weakness on the transportation key disclosure.
  • a secured human procedure requires a heavy and constraining procedure that jeopardizes the regular update of the transportation key, leading to a degradation of the security level with time.
  • One aim of the invention is to provide a method for securing the exchange of authentication keys having a security level which does not degrade with time.
  • the invention concerns a method for securing the distribution of authentication keys according to claim 1.
  • the method is according to any of claims 2 to 6.
  • the present invention concerns also a key management module for securing the distribution of authentication keys according to claim 7.
  • the vehicle 10 is for example a passenger train.
  • the term "railroad vehicle” refers to any guided vehicle, i.e. any vehicle capable of travelling on a railroad track.
  • the vehicle 10 comprises notably a plurality of onboard systems 13, allowing the control of the vehicle 10, and an onboard communication module 14, able to provide a wireless communication between the onboard systems 13 and exterior systems, such as a control system 18, as it will be explained below.
  • the movement of the vehicle 10 on the railroad track 12 is managed by a train control system 18.
  • the train control system 18 is implemented preferably according to the European Train Control System standard, which is usually denoted as ETCS standard, more preferably in its level 2 or 3.
  • ETCS standard European Train Control System standard
  • the train control system 18 comprises a control center 20, located away from the railroad track 12, and trackside equipment 22 distributed along the railroad track 12 or concentrated and connected to the control center 20 by a suitable network 24.
  • Trackside equipment 22 comprises notably a plurality of trackside entities, 26A to 26N.
  • Each trackside entity 26A to 26N is associated to a section of the railroad track 12 and able to collect and transmit to the control center 20 at least some data relative to the vehicle 10 when it is moving on the associated section.
  • Each trackside entity 26A to 26N is further able to communicate with the railroad vehicle 10 over a wireless bi-directional link, in order to exchange data related for example to the authorized speed of movement on the associated section, movement permissions on this section, etc., in one direction, and the position of the vehicle, etc., in the other direction.
  • each trackside entity 26A to 26N comprises a railroad communication module 28A to 28N performing the data exchange with the control center 20 and with the onboard communication module 14 of the vehicle 10.
  • the wireless communication between the communication modules 28A to 28N and 14 is constructed over the GSM-R standard and in particular, over its circuit switching or packet switching (e.g. GPRS) extension for data transmission.
  • GSM-R GSM-R standard
  • packet switching e.g. GPRS
  • Data transmission between modules 28A to 28N and 14 is a data transmission using a symmetric data authentication technique.
  • This data transmission responds to a required safety level, defined by railroad authorities.
  • the authentication data transmission between the modules 28A to 28N and 14 or between 28A to 28N over the network 24 is implemented according to the Euroradio protocol known in the art and used in the ETCS standard.
  • the railroad communication modules 28A to 28N are implemented in a similar way. Thus, only the railroad communication module 28A will be explained in details below.
  • the control center 20 manages the trackside equipment 22 in function of the data collected by the trackside entities 26A to 26N.
  • the control center 20 comprises a key management module 34 distributing the symmetric keys to the railroad communication modules 28A to 28N and the onboard communication module 14.
  • the key management module 34 and the communication modules 28A and 14 are illustrated more in details on figure 2 .
  • the key management module 34 comprises a first transceiver 41 for a direct wireless communication with the onboard communication module 14 of the vehicle 10, a second transceiver 42 for the communication with the railroad communication module 28A of the trackside entity 26A via the network 24, and a key server 43, providing symmetric keys for wireless communication link between the railroad communication modules 28A to 28N and the onboard communication module 14 or wired communication between 28A to 28N.
  • the key management module 34 is connected to a certification authority module 44, also called remote controller, able to deliver and to verify certificates at the purpose of the communication modules 28A,14 and key management module 34.
  • the remote controller is, for example, able to deliver a certificate including a public key for the asymmetric cryptographic technique to each key manager 48, 51.
  • the railroad communication module 28A comprises a first transceiver 46 for wireless communication with the onboard communication module 14, a second transceiver 47 for communication with the key management module 34, via network 24, and a key manager 48 allowing the encrypted and/or authenticated data transmission for wireless communication between the railroad communication modules 28A to 28N and the onboard communication module 14 or wired communication between modules 28A to 28N over network 24.
  • the transceiver 47 communicates also with the certification authority module 44 for the reception or verification of certificates at the purpose of the key manager 48
  • the onboard communication module 14 of the vehicle 10 comprises a transceiver 50 for wireless communication both with the railroad communication module 28A of the trackside entity 26A and the key management module 34 of the control center 20 and the certification authority module 44, and a key manager 51 allowing the encrypted or authenticated data transmission for wireless communication between the railroad communication modules 28A to 28N and the onboard communication module 14 or the certification authority module 44 directly, when this module 44 has an embedded communication module, or via the key management module 34 otherwise.
  • each key manager 48, 51 of each communication module 28A, 14 comprises a same plurality of authentication keys used to encrypt or authenticate data transmitted between these modules.
  • data transmitted from the onboard communication module 14 to the railroad communication module 28A is encrypted or authenticated by the transceiver 50 using one or several authentication keys stored in both key managers 48, 51.
  • the first transceiver 46 of the railroad communication module 28A When the first transceiver 46 of the railroad communication module 28A receives this data, it authenticates the data using the same authentication keys.
  • the authentication keys are called KMAC keys ("Key Management Authentication Code").
  • the authentication keys are generated by the key server 43 of the key management module 34.
  • the authentication keys are then distributed by the key server 43 to each communication module 28A, 14 according to a method 100 for securing the exchange of authentication keys according to the invention.
  • Each key manager 48, 51 is further able to generate a public key and an associated private key for implement an asymmetric cryptographic technique as it will be explained by the method 100.
  • the method 100 will be described hereinafter in reference to figure 3 presenting a general flow chart of its steps.
  • the authentication keys are generated by the key server 43.
  • the remote controller 44 delivers a certificate including a public key for the asymmetric cryptographic technique to each key manager 48, 51.
  • step 109 is repeated for each railroad communication module 28A of the trackside entity 26A.
  • the key server 43 generates one or several transportation keys.
  • a transportation key is generated for each communication module 28A, 14.
  • the transportation keys are used to encrypt or decrypt messages containing the authentication keys exchanged between the control center 20 and the corresponding communication module, using a symmetric cryptographic technique as it will be explained below.
  • transportation keys may be different for different communication modules 28A and 14, but they are all known by the key server 43.
  • the key server 43 transmits the generated transportation keys to the corresponding communication modules 28A, 14 via the first or the second transceiver 41, 42 using an asymmetric data cryptographic technique.
  • this step 120 includes several sub-steps.
  • the first transceiver 41 of the key management module 34 initializes a securing connection with the onboard communication module 14 according for example to the TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol.
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • the TLS protocol is defined for example in the RFC 6176 document.
  • the first transceiver 41 and the transceiver 50 initialize a connection using a handshaking technique.
  • the first transceiver 41 exchanges certificates from the transceiver 50 of the onboard communication module 14.
  • the certificates include in particular a public key generated by the key manager 51 of the onboard communication module 14.
  • the remote controller 44 verifies the certificate and if its authentication is not successful, reinitializes the connection with the transceiver 50.
  • the first transceiver 41 encrypts the transportation keys generated for the onboard communication module 14 using a session key derived from the public key of the received certificate.
  • the first transceiver 41 transmits the encrypted message to the transceiver 50 of the onboard communication module 14.
  • the transceiver 50 decrypts this message using the session key established in sub-step 122.
  • the steps 121 to 123 are repeated in a similar way in order to transmit the corresponding transportation keys to the railroad communication module 28A of the trackside entity 26A.
  • the sub-steps 121 to 123 are performed by the second transceiver 42 of the key management module 34.
  • the first or the second transceiver, 41 or 42 generates a message containing the new authentication keys, the message contained authentication keys being encrypted according to a symmetric cryptographic technique similar to the symmetric cryptographic technique used for the communication between the railroad communication modules 28A and the onboard communication module 14. This encryption is performed using the transportation keys specific of the recipient communication module.
  • the first or the second transceivers 41, 42 transmits this message to the recipient communication modules 28A and 14, which decrypts it using the transportation keys.
  • the extracted new authentication key is stored into the key managers 48 or 51.
  • An authentication key is thus stored in both key managers 48 and 51 and can be further used for the encrypted data transmission between the communication modules 28A and 14 or between 28A and 28N.
  • the method 100 is repeated each time a transportation key update is necessary. This allows maintaining the required security level of the encrypted data transmission with time.
  • the method according to the invention provides a transportation keys initialization and update in a particularly simple way.
  • the initialization and update can be done remotely and does not need a local intervention on the remote equipment, trackside or trainborne.
  • the invention further ensures the required safety and security level of the train control system and is particularly useful to mitigate the risk of transportation keys disclosure.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
EP16305296.2A 2016-03-17 2016-03-17 Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module Active EP3219575B1 (en)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
ES16305296T ES2843697T3 (es) 2016-03-17 2016-03-17 Método para asegurar el intercambio de claves de autenticación y módulo de gestión de claves asociado
EP16305296.2A EP3219575B1 (en) 2016-03-17 2016-03-17 Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP16305296.2A EP3219575B1 (en) 2016-03-17 2016-03-17 Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP3219575A1 EP3219575A1 (en) 2017-09-20
EP3219575B1 true EP3219575B1 (en) 2020-11-04

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EP16305296.2A Active EP3219575B1 (en) 2016-03-17 2016-03-17 Method for securing the exchange of authentication keys and associated key management module

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EP (1) EP3219575B1 (es)
ES (1) ES2843697T3 (es)

Families Citing this family (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11796996B2 (en) * 2017-02-19 2023-10-24 Transportation Ip Holdings, Llc Vehicle control system
EP3825205A1 (en) * 2019-11-20 2021-05-26 ALSTOM Transport Technologies Railway vehicle, distributed control system, and method for managing operations of railway vehicles in a railway network
EP4035970A1 (de) * 2021-01-29 2022-08-03 Siemens Mobility GmbH Verfahren zur codierten kommunikation zwischen einem streckengebundenen fahrzeug und einer streckenseitigen einrichtung, und vorrichtungen zur anwendung des verfahrens

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB0311621D0 (en) * 2003-05-20 2003-06-25 Nokia Corp A system for crytographical authentication
EP1533971A1 (en) * 2003-11-18 2005-05-25 STMicroelectronics S.r.l. Method and system for establishing secure communication
DE102011006772A1 (de) * 2011-04-05 2012-10-11 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft System und Verfahren für ein Schlüsselmanagement eines Zugsicherungssystems

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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ES2843697T3 (es) 2021-07-20
EP3219575A1 (en) 2017-09-20

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