EP3167437A1 - Method for reading an identification document - Google Patents
Method for reading an identification documentInfo
- Publication number
- EP3167437A1 EP3167437A1 EP15737986.8A EP15737986A EP3167437A1 EP 3167437 A1 EP3167437 A1 EP 3167437A1 EP 15737986 A EP15737986 A EP 15737986A EP 3167437 A1 EP3167437 A1 EP 3167437A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- chip
- document
- information
- code
- data
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
- G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
- G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/20—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor of structured data, e.g. relational data
- G06F16/22—Indexing; Data structures therefor; Storage structures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6209—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/0873—Details of the card reader
- G07F7/0893—Details of the card reader the card reader reading the card in a contactless manner
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for reading an identification document and a readout terminal.
- Read-out terminals are used at sea and / or airports to handle ID card checks and in shops in the duty-free shopping area of a sea and / or airport to read an ID document such as a passport.
- Identification document "contactless readable” stored data only by providing an "access code” is possible.
- This access code may be, for example, the CAN (Card Access Number) or optical data stored in the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone).
- the holder of the identification document In order to allow access to this access code, the holder of the identification document must hang this on a reader in a predetermined manner. Both the placement of the ID document in the correct orientation, the layout (the ID document must be partially open and a particular page must be on top) as well as the optical capture of the data in the CAN or MRZ require Time and are error prone. At airports and / or shipping ports, the handling of large numbers of passengers takes place and it can therefore become larger
- Identification document must place exactly on the reader, so that a reading of the MRZ and / or the CAN is possible.
- WO 2004/090800 A2 is an apparatus and a method for securely detecting the willful use of a contactless
- Disk in which the disk in addition to a
- contactless interface has an optically readable area.
- data is stored, which for
- Reading the kon tactless data are required (for example, a code).
- the invention has for its object to provide a method for reading a passport document as well as a readout terminal, which solves the known problems of the prior art and also suitable for the safe and repeated provision of data contained in a chip of the identity document by means of a previously read-in identity document to an authorized person
- the object is achieved by the subject matter of the independent claims. Preferred embodiments of the subject invention emerge from the dependent claims.
- the invention is based on the idea of speeding up the read-out of an identity document in that a renewed readout in a defined area (for example within an airport) can take place without renewed optical read-out of the identity document.
- the method can be further accelerated by storing these data in a database and storing a reference to the data in the database in a preferably contactlessly readable chip of the identity document, the reference to the data being stored hidden on the identity document.
- a method for reading out an identification document comprises determining a code necessary for setting up a secure connection to a first chip of the identification document from the
- Identification document wherein in the first chip and / or in a second chip of the identification document, an authentication key and information are stored hidden.
- the code necessary for setting up a secure connection to the first chip of the identity document may, for example, be a barcode and / or data which is stored on the
- Identification document in the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) are stored or can be read by machine or it may be the C AN (Card Access Number). Only by using this data, it is possible to read out the first chip of the ID document without contact. This will prevent the ID document without
- Consent of the owner is read out, if this moves past a reading terminal without showing the identity document.
- Authentication keys are stored in the first and / or the second chip.
- the holder of the identity document receives another memory card or a barcode label on which the data of the identity document or the storage location are stored in the database, the
- the method according to the invention has the advantage that "authorized"
- Readout terminals i. Readout terminals owned by the
- Reading the MRZ or the CAN is done can be saved in this way a lot of time. Due to the fact that the authentication key and the information "hidden” are stored in the first and / or second chip, it is possible to see whether the information is on the chip after successful authentication with respect to the chip (with the aid of the authentication key).
- Authentication keys may also be referred to as authenticating keys for determining whether the information is on the first and / or the second chip.
- the authentication key from the first and / or the second chip of the identity document is not readable. In this way, it is advantageously ensured that only authorized reading terminals are allowed access to the data in the identity document. Thus, the security of the personal data of the
- the authentication key and / or the information from the first chip and / or the second chip of the identity document can not be read out without prior successful authentication with the authentication key. This ensures that only read-out terminals that are in the knowledge of the authentication key, get access to the ID document.
- the information may include at least the code for establishing the secure connection to the first chip of the identification document. In this way, the repeated readout of the
- the method further comprises reading out at least part of the data from the first chip of the first chip An identification document using the secure connection to the first chip and storing the data in a database, wherein the information comprises at least the storage location of the data in the database.
- the readout terminal can access the data of the first chip stored in the database. At the same time the remains
- the secure connection to the first chip is established using the determined code and / or the secure connection to the first chip is established using the information comprising the code. Conversely, if the connection is established using the information containing the code, this means that the CAN / MRZ has already been read out. In this way, a secure connection to the chip can be made particularly efficient.
- the first and / or the second chip of the document of identification is any storage element arranged on the identity document, which may preferably be read without contact.
- the first and / or the second chip is in the
- ID card integrated. It is possible to execute the ID document only with a first chip. To prevent the unauthorized reading of the reference to the data in the database, this is only in the possession of the
- the data stored in the database are preferably encrypted stored in the database. In this way it can be prevented with advantage that an unauthorized reading of the data from the database leads to the receipt of information stored on the chip of the document of information. Thus, the security of personal information is guaranteed.
- the readout terminal only has a read access to the information after being authenticated with the authentication key. This ensures that only authorized
- Reading terminals get access to the information. In this way, the security of the data stored on the ID card is maintained. Only after successful authentication, it is possible to detect whether the information is even stored in the identity document. Thus, tracking is prevented so that unauthorized persons can see if the information is stored in the chip.
- a readout terminal with a determination device for determining a code necessary for setting up a secure connection to a first chip of an ID document, wherein the determination device determines the code from the ID document, and a read-out device for reading at least a part of Data from the first chip of the Identification document, wherein the readout terminal is adapted to store in the first chip and / or in a second chip of the identification document hidden an authentication key and information.
- Identification document the repeated readout of the ID document are significantly accelerated, since the time-consuming, repeated determination of the necessary to build a secure connection to the first chip of the document of identification code deleted. Since the first and / or second chip of the identity document are preferably contactlessly readable, it is possible for legitimate readout terminals without the costly determination of the code after successful authentication with respect to the chip to reach the hidden information stored. Readout error, as caused by incorrect positioning of the ID document in the
- Detection device may arise, are avoided with advantage.
- the readout terminal is configured to store the data from the first chip of the identification document in a database and to store in the information a storage location of the data in the database
- the readout terminal and / or another, authorized readout terminal is designed for the data in the Database using the information stored in the information
- the read-out terminal can be designed to code for establishing the secure connection to the first chip of the
- At least a first readout terminal can be used in conjunction with a second readout terminal in a readout system, wherein the second readout terminal, which is in the knowledge of the authentication key, is adapted to read the information from the passport document.
- the second readout terminal which is in the knowledge of the authentication key, is adapted to read the information from the passport document.
- Fig. 1 shows the sequence of a method according to the invention with reference to a flow chart
- FIG. 2 shows the sequence when reading in an identification document again
- Fig. 3 shows a readout system according to the invention.
- Fig. 1 shows the sequence of a method according to the invention.
- step Sil a code necessary for setting up a secure connection to a first chip of the identity document is first of all made from the
- An identity document in the sense of the invention can be a passport, an identity card and / or another type of identification card, such as an employee ID card, which is used to allow an employee access to a company.
- Passports and ID cards may be in accordance with the ICAO standard (DOC 9303).
- ID documents in accordance with the ICAO Standard are designed to be read by a contactless interface in a contactless manner. To an unauthorized and
- MRZ machine-readable zone
- the chip may be an MRTD chip.
- a next step S12 information which may comprise the code for establishing the secure connection to the first chip and an authentication key are stored in the first chip of the identity document.
- the information is stored with the help of the authentication key hidden on the first chip so that it can be read only after successful authentication (using the authentication key) of a readout terminal relative to the first chip.
- Authentication key and the information stored in a similar manner in a second chip of the identification document can be integrated in the identity document.
- This second chip By providing the second chip, a clear separation between the first chip containing personal data and the second chip is enabled.
- the authentication key is preferred only a limited
- Number of reading terminals provided can the limited number refer to a closed system of readout terminals in an airport and / or seaport. In this way, within such a port, the reading of the already read once Ausweisdocument be significantly accelerated, while maintaining the security of the personal data, since only legitimate readout terminals, the first key is provided.
- the first chip of the identification document may be any type of device suitable for storing data.
- nonvolatile memory devices that can be written once or repeatedly are used for the chip.
- Identity document has already been read out once) or the CAN and / or the MRZ data a secure connection to the first chip of the identity document are prepared and the data stored there can be read.
- This read-out data may be stored in a database in an optional next step.
- the database is preferably designed so that it can be accessed only within the airport by authorized facilities.
- the communication with the database preferably takes place via a secure, cable-bound and / or wireless network connection. Alternative forms of access to the database are also possible.
- the read-out data can be stored in the information. They are stored there safely and not traceable because their Existence only after successful authentication with the
- Authentication key access to the stored information is sufficient to access the data stored in the database and / or in the first and second chip data of the first chip of the identification document (see Fig. 2). In this way, a repeated reading of the identity document, as for example at multi-level
- Identification control stations may be required to be further accelerated.
- ID card another memory card, with the data of the
- Identification document is issued, it can be ensured that when re-reading the ID document the owner still in possession of the ID document and not only in possession of the additional
- the location of the data is in the information on the first chip and / or on the second chip of the identification document according to a known indirect referencing method, only a pointer to the data stored in the database deposited.
- the pointer or the storage location of the data may be in accordance with the serial number of the first chip and / or according to the serial number of the second chip of the
- Identification document are designated. In this way a clear allocation between chip and database is guaranteed.
- the storage of the data in the database can be encrypted and in the first chip and / or in the second chip additionally required for reading from the database further keys are deposited.
- the key may have only a limited validity period. Furthermore, it is possible that not only an authentication key of an airport and / or ferry port but also the authentication keys of a plurality of such ports are stored on the first chip and / or on the second chip of the identity document.
- Authentication keys preferably have a limited validity. Alternatively, the authentication keys are valid for an unlimited time.
- FIG. 2 shows the sequence when a holder of an identity document repeatedly arrives at an authorized read terminal 10, 20 of a port in order to have his identity document read there.
- Readout terminal 10, 20 first checks in a first step S21 whether the information is stored hidden on the first and / or second chip. For this purpose, the readout terminal 10, 20 initiates an authentication with respect to the identity document using the authentication key. If the authentication fails, this means that no "information" is stored on the ID card and the
- step S22 Badge holder is prompted in step S22 to place his identity document on the read-out terminal in such a way that the MRZ and / or CAN can be read out in order to determine the code from the identity document necessary to establish a secure connection to the first chip of the identity document.
- the determination is made in accordance with the flowchart described in FIG. In this determination, an authentication using the CAN / MRZ data is also carried out, however, this authentication is another authentication key
- step S23 it is not necessary to determine the code from MRZ and / or CAN necessary for establishing a secure connection to the first chip of the identity document.
- FIG. 3 shows a readout system 100 according to the invention with a first readout terminal 10 and a second readout terminal 20.
- the first readout terminal 10 has a readout terminal 10
- Read-out device 12 and a detection device 14.
- Read terminal 20 has only one read-out device 22. With the readout terminal 20 it is possible, after the data has already been detected once with the detection means 14 of the readout terminal 10, only by means of the read-out means 22, i. without the requirement of
- the read-out terminal 20 can additionally be provided with its own determination device (not shown) with which, if the data has not yet been stored in the database (see FIG. 1), the data can be stored in the database.
- the identification document is placed on this readout terminal and then the data is deleted from the chip and possibly from the database. This additionally protects the privacy of the traveler.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102014010339.0A DE102014010339A1 (en) | 2014-07-11 | 2014-07-11 | Method for reading out an identity document |
PCT/EP2015/001436 WO2016005060A1 (en) | 2014-07-11 | 2015-07-10 | Method for reading an identification document |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP3167437A1 true EP3167437A1 (en) | 2017-05-17 |
Family
ID=53546569
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP15737986.8A Withdrawn EP3167437A1 (en) | 2014-07-11 | 2015-07-10 | Method for reading an identification document |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US10944741B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP3167437A1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN106575372B (en) |
DE (1) | DE102014010339A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2016005060A1 (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102017119803A1 (en) | 2017-08-29 | 2019-02-28 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | A method and system for collecting user identity data for an identity account at a point-of-sale |
WO2021140570A1 (en) * | 2020-01-07 | 2021-07-15 | 日本電気株式会社 | Gate device, server device, immigration inspection system, method for controlling gate device, and method for controlling server device |
Family Cites Families (37)
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JPS63253493A (en) * | 1987-04-09 | 1988-10-20 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | Information recording system |
EP0923040A3 (en) | 1997-12-12 | 2002-01-02 | Texas Instruments Inc. | Digital information system and portable device therefor |
JP3718382B2 (en) * | 1999-08-27 | 2005-11-24 | 株式会社日立製作所 | Method and system for managing information written to storage medium |
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US7333001B2 (en) * | 2002-11-23 | 2008-02-19 | Kathleen Lane | Secure personal RFID documents and method of use |
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DE102006027253A1 (en) * | 2006-06-09 | 2007-12-20 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | Document reader, method of reading a data object and computer program product |
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US20100245034A1 (en) * | 2007-06-28 | 2010-09-30 | Iris Corporation Berhad | Method of reading mrz using sam for electronic chip based travel document or identification document |
DE102007050024A1 (en) * | 2007-10-17 | 2009-04-23 | Bundesdruckerei Gmbh | Person control system and method for performing a person control |
GB2459662B (en) * | 2008-04-29 | 2012-05-23 | Cryptomathic Ltd | Secure data cache |
DE102008023914A1 (en) * | 2008-05-16 | 2009-12-10 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | Method for authenticating an RFID tag |
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JP5272637B2 (en) * | 2008-10-14 | 2013-08-28 | ソニー株式会社 | Information processing apparatus, encryption switching method, and program |
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2014
- 2014-07-11 DE DE102014010339.0A patent/DE102014010339A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2015
- 2015-07-10 CN CN201580035999.6A patent/CN106575372B/en active Active
- 2015-07-10 WO PCT/EP2015/001436 patent/WO2016005060A1/en active Application Filing
- 2015-07-10 US US15/325,382 patent/US10944741B2/en active Active
- 2015-07-10 EP EP15737986.8A patent/EP3167437A1/en not_active Withdrawn
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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None * |
See also references of WO2016005060A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20170195309A1 (en) | 2017-07-06 |
CN106575372A (en) | 2017-04-19 |
DE102014010339A1 (en) | 2016-01-14 |
WO2016005060A1 (en) | 2016-01-14 |
CN106575372B (en) | 2020-04-14 |
US10944741B2 (en) | 2021-03-09 |
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