EP3098559B1 - Procede de lancement d'un missile depuis un lanceur - Google Patents

Procede de lancement d'un missile depuis un lanceur Download PDF

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Publication number
EP3098559B1
EP3098559B1 EP16001046.8A EP16001046A EP3098559B1 EP 3098559 B1 EP3098559 B1 EP 3098559B1 EP 16001046 A EP16001046 A EP 16001046A EP 3098559 B1 EP3098559 B1 EP 3098559B1
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Prior art keywords
unit
control unit
missile
information
data connection
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EP16001046.8A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP3098559A1 (fr
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Diehl Defence GmbH and Co KG
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Diehl Defence GmbH and Co KG
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Priority to PL16001046T priority Critical patent/PL3098559T3/pl
Publication of EP3098559A1 publication Critical patent/EP3098559A1/fr
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    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41A—FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS COMMON TO BOTH SMALLARMS AND ORDNANCE, e.g. CANNONS; MOUNTINGS FOR SMALLARMS OR ORDNANCE
    • F41A19/00—Firing or trigger mechanisms; Cocking mechanisms
    • F41A19/58—Electric firing mechanisms
    • F41A19/68—Electric firing mechanisms for multibarrel guns or multibarrel rocket launchers or multicanisters
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41A—FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS COMMON TO BOTH SMALLARMS AND ORDNANCE, e.g. CANNONS; MOUNTINGS FOR SMALLARMS OR ORDNANCE
    • F41A19/00—Firing or trigger mechanisms; Cocking mechanisms
    • F41A19/58—Electric firing mechanisms
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41G—WEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00—Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/007—Preparatory measures taken before the launching of the guided missiles
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42C—AMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
    • F42C15/00—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges
    • F42C15/40—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42C—AMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
    • F42C15/00—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges
    • F42C15/40—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically
    • F42C15/42—Arming-means in fuzes; Safety means for preventing premature detonation of fuzes or charges wherein the safety or arming action is effected electrically from a remote location, e.g. for controlled mines or mine fields
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42D—BLASTING
    • F42D1/00—Blasting methods or apparatus, e.g. loading or tamping
    • F42D1/04—Arrangements for ignition
    • F42D1/045—Arrangements for electric ignition
    • F42D1/05—Electric circuits for blasting

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for starting a missile from a launcher, wherein a data connection between a control unit of the launcher and a remote from the launcher command is established and a start of the missile is controlled by the command stand on the data connection.
  • Ground-based air defense systems that are controlled from a remote command post are known to defend against aerial attacks.
  • the air defense systems include a launcher having a number of missiles, such as missiles, launched from the launcher into the air.
  • the command post controls one or a plurality of such launchers distributed over a greater distance in the landscape.
  • a high safety standard In ground-based air defense systems, a high safety standard must be maintained in order to avoid an unwanted launch of a missile.
  • the boot devices are connected via a data connection with the command state, so that an unwanted manipulation of the data flow between the command post and boot device is avoided.
  • the launch of the missile can only be controlled from the command post.
  • a start can take place only after the release by an operator of the starting device, for example, after this has flipped a switch and a safety time has elapsed, in which the operator can move away from the launcher.
  • a rocket launching container and method for connecting a rocket launching container to a rocket launcher is known.
  • a safety device is provided. With this safety device are Ignition cables to ignition units so interruptible that no signal from a control device of the rocket launcher can penetrate via interfaces to the ignition units.
  • the invention is based on the consideration that the laying of a data line between the command post and the starting device is associated with great expense, in particular with a long distance between the two units.
  • Starting the missile could therefore be simplified if existing data links are used, for example existing data lines and / or wireless data links.
  • existing data links are used, for example existing data lines and / or wireless data links.
  • the fuse unit By the fuse unit according to the invention, the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device can be locked. Only in the presence of Entommesinformation the signal connection can be unlocked and thus the launching of the missile are possible.
  • the arming information can remain very simple, so that their transmission can be made simpler and safer than the transmission of larger starting information amounts that are transmitted for a start of a missile from the command post to the starting device.
  • a manipulation of the transmission of the arming information can also be counteracted in this way, since the correctness of the arming information is easier verifiable. If there is a suspicion of manipulation of the arming information, the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device can be blocked and thus an unwanted start of the missile can be prevented.
  • the starting device and the command post expediently form a ground-based air defense system.
  • the starting device is expediently a mobile starting device, for example, mounted on a vehicle, which may have a canister positioned on a truck or a ship and containing a plurality of missiles.
  • the missile may be a missile with a rocket engine.
  • the invention is also applicable to starting devices for Ballistic missiles, such as for steering ammunition and / or artillery projectiles.
  • To start the missile start information can be sent from the command post to the control unit, in particular flight information, such as information on the flight route and / or destination information contains, the start information is sent via the data connection from the command post to the control unit of the starting device, this information - if necessary edited - passes on to the missile.
  • the start information may further include start trigger information for triggering a launch of the missile.
  • the launch of the missile may be controlled by the control unit of the launcher, which initiates the launch of the missile in response to the presence of the start trigger information.
  • the data connection expediently extends from the command post to the starting device, at least it extends over 90% of this route. It can be a wired connection, in particular from the command post to the starting device, for example a connection via one or more optical fiber lines. Also possible is a wireless data connection or a combination of wired and wireless connection.
  • the data connection comprises or is an Internet connection, so that the start information and in particular also the release information is sent via an Internet connection.
  • An Internet connection can be understood as a connection in a public or non-public network, for example in an intranet, which takes place according to an IP protocol, for example according to TCP / IP.
  • a data transmission over the data connection can in this case take place via an IP protocol, the data connection in particular being a frame-based transmission path.
  • the data transmission of the destination information and the arming information is expediently carried out over the same transmission path of the data connection. It runs at the boot device expediently via the same Media Access Controller (MAC) and especially router.
  • MAC Media Access Controller
  • the data connection runs via a same MAC or router and, for example, via the same Ethernet switch.
  • Inclusion of an Internet connection is considered to have been effected by maintaining the same transmission path of start information and arming information via the data connection when both the start information and the arming information are sent via the Internet.
  • the fuse unit maintains the unlock for a predetermined period of time.
  • the time period may begin upon receipt of the arming information or after a successful check of the arming information for plausibility.
  • the fuse unit blocks the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device after the expiration of the time period again.
  • the receiving of the uncorrupted release information can therefore only trigger an unlock for the predetermined period of time.
  • the period of time may be predetermined from the outset, for example by an information stored in the security unit. It is also possible that the predetermined period of time is dependent on the arming information and, to that extent, is specified externally, for example by an authorization unit.
  • the time period is expediently in a range between 1.1 times and 2.9 times a transmission interval of the arming information to the security unit, in particular between 1.1 times and 1.9 times the transmission interval.
  • the arming information is repeatedly sent by an authorization unit via the data connection to the security unit.
  • the repetition interval is smaller than the predetermined time period after which the fuse unit blocks the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device again.
  • the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device can be repeated in this way and / or continuously maintained, so that an interim control of the launch of the missile by the command post is possible.
  • the arming information is sent regularly to the fuse unit, for example, with a repetition rate of more than 1 Hz, in particular more than 10 Hz.
  • a corruption of the arming information can be counteracted when it is sent in IP / UDP format to the backup unit.
  • UDP protocol instead of the UDP protocol, another private protocol is also possible.
  • the transmission of the arming information and this itself can be kept simple, so that the verification of the arming information on plausibility is possible in a simple manner.
  • the security unit may comprise a commercially available PC as at least a primary data processing element. Conveniently, however, the fuse unit is Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) circuitry built up. By configuring an unwanted intervention can be counteracted. Also an authorization unit sending the arming information is expediently constructed from FPGA circuits. Such an authorization unit may include an encoder for transmitting the arming information. The security unit expediently comprises a corresponding decoder for decrypting the release information.
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • the arming information is sent via a retry-free protocol via the data connection.
  • the transmission of a data packet containing release information to the security unit is thereby expediently carried out only once, so that the data packet can be lost in the event of disruptions in the connection. If a data packet is lost, this can be detected by, for example, the lack of expected information, so that possible corruption of the data connection can be detected.
  • the arming information can be contained in a data packet, which can be configured in particular as a so-called Wake On LAN data packet.
  • the data packet can be provided with a so-called magic. It can either be addressed directly to the protection unit (unitcast) or exclusively to a subgroup of several units of the network (multicast) or sent as a broadcast. In a broadcast, for example, it contains the hexadecimal value FF 6 times in succession, thereby addressing all the subscribers of the network.
  • the MAC address for multicast can be determined by the hexadecimal byte sequence 01 00 5e followed by three bytes whose lowest 23 bits consist of the IP address of the receiver group. This can be used to address selected network subscribers who have registered as subscribers to a particular completed group.
  • the MAC address at Unitcast is characterized by the 6 bytes (48 bit) worldwide unique MAC address of the receiver. This allows a single selected subscriber from the network to be addressed.
  • the magic is suitably a part of the arming information determined in its length, for example a 32-bit long area. It may contain the order of the areas of the release information, its protocol structure and / or a time condition of a regular transmission of the release information, for example the repetition rate. Next, the Magic contain a count of a counter. Appropriately, the data packet, at least the release information, encrypted, so that unauthorized access is difficult.
  • the arming information contains a data record, in particular a data packet, which contains a security state.
  • the backup state that is, information about whether the backup unit should block or unlock the signal connection between the control unit and the start device, can only be one bit long.
  • the arming information expediently contains a counter, which is expediently changed each time the arming information is sent. For example, the counter increments by one or another predetermined number each time the arming information is retransmitted.
  • the Entommesinformation advantageously contains a check information that allows a consistency check, or plausibility check the release information.
  • the check information may be, for example, a Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC).
  • the arming information is repeatedly sent by the authorization unit via the data connection to the security unit.
  • the arming information is expediently changed at each transmission at least in a counter relative to the previously transmitted unlocking information.
  • the successively sent Entommes differ so far from each other at least in a data packet area, such as the counter, which is changed at each repetition.
  • the security unit checks on the basis of the counter a complete receipt of the sequence of repetitions. In the absence of a repetition, such as the lack of arming information in a series of arming information sent in tandem, the security unit blocks the signal connection between the control unit and the missile's starting device. On the other hand, if there is a complete sequence of received repetitions of the transmission of the arming information, then the security unit appropriately keeps the signal connection unlocked.
  • the arming information can be sent from a command unit of the command post.
  • increased safety is useful if the control of the launch of the missile is done by a device of the command post and the release information from another device, in particular outside the command state is generated.
  • the arming information is generated independently of processes of the command unit, in particular if the device for generating the arming information is operated by another operator, as the device for controlling the start of the missile.
  • the device that generates the arming information is referred to below as an authorization unit. It is conveniently connected to the internet and sends the arming information over the same data link as the missile launch control device.
  • a release may be the unlocking of the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device of the missile by the security unit.
  • a second release may be an unlocking of the signal connection between the control unit and the starting device of the missile by a switch signal of an operator of the starting device.
  • the switch either a mechanical switch or an electronic switch
  • the switch can be brought by the operator in the armed position, the release is expediently after a predetermined period of time after bringing the switch into the arming circuit to give the operator time for removal from the launcher
  • the third release can be done by the control unit of the starting device, for example, triggered by the start command from the command state via the data connection.
  • the start command from the command post to the control unit or from the control unit to the starting device can be understood here as a backup.
  • the order of the three arming is arbitrary. Conveniently, the three arming devices are triggered by three different persons, an operator of an authorization unit who sends the arming information to the security unit, an operator of the command post and an operator of the starting device.
  • the security unit sends a status report to the command post, expediently via the same data connection, for example the Internet connection, via which the arming information is sent.
  • the status report expediently contains the arming status, that is, whether the Signal connection is locked or unlocked.
  • the status report additionally contains the information as to whether the received arming information is plausible or whether it has been received without gaps for a predetermined period of time.
  • the status report can be sent to the command state using the TCP / IP protocol.
  • the command state contains a status display on which an operator is shown the status of the security unit.
  • command post sends a status request, for example in the form of an echo, to the security unit. This is answered in particular directly by the control unit and / or the security unit. For this purpose, a status report, as described above, be sent to the command post.
  • the security unit returns a modified release information to an authorization unit.
  • the modified arming information may contain a modified magic, for example an inverted magic, and in particular contains the status of the security unit, a counter and / or a plausibility information, such as a CRC.
  • the authorization unit may check the modified arming information and make the generation of further arming information, in particular the setting of the security state, depending on the test result.
  • the invention is also directed to a ground-based air defense system according to the features of claim 11 having a command post, an authorization unit and a launching device for launching a missile with a missile container, a control unit for controlling the launch of the missile and for establishing a data connection between the control unit and the Command state, for example, a MAC or router for establishing an Internet connection between the control unit and the command state.
  • the starting device includes a locking device in the signal connection between the control unit and a launch device of the missile and includes a connectable to the data connection fuse unit, which is technically connected to the locking device.
  • FIG. 1 shows a single figure a starting device 2 for a plurality of missiles 4 in a schematic representation, which is designed as a truck and thus mobile.
  • the launcher 2 comprises on its loading surface a starting device 6 with one or more canisters 8, in each of which one or more missiles 4 are held in the form of guided missiles, each with a rocket motor.
  • the missile 4 may be held on a launch rail.
  • the starting device 2 comprises a control unit 10 for controlling the launches of the individual missiles 4 from the starting device 6.
  • the control unit 10 is connected to the starting device 6 via a signal connection 12 in the form of a data line.
  • the signal connection 12 is through a blocking device 14 with two AND gates 16 interrupted, so that a signal transmission from the control unit 10 to start device 6 is interrupted when the signal connection 12 is interrupted.
  • the control unit 10 is also connected to the starting device 6 via a further signal connection 18.
  • a switch 20 is arranged, with which the signal connection 18 can be interrupted or connected.
  • the signal connection 18 is connected to one of the AND gates 16.
  • a fuse unit 22 is connected via a further signal connection 24.
  • the fuse unit 22 is also directly connected to the control unit 10.
  • a command post 26 with a command unit 28 and an input means 30.
  • the command post 26 may further be an authorization unit 32 with a further input means 34 is present.
  • the authorization unit 32 is located with its input means 34 away from the command post 26, for example in another building or another city. This is indicated by the dashed line at the command post 26, which indicates that the authorization unit may be part of the command post 26, but need not be.
  • a number of starting devices 2 are controlled, of which in FIG. 1 only two launcher 2 are shown. Other launcher 2 are represented by three points in the lower part of FIG. 1 indicated.
  • the command post 26 is connected via a data connection 36 with all starting devices 2.
  • the data connection 36 is in FIG. 1 For the sake of clarity, it is shown interrupted, but it is consistent.
  • the data connection 36 is implemented between a transmitter 38 and a receiver 40 as at least one wireless Internet connection, which is implemented as a non-public network (intranet) and is operated in an Internet protocol.
  • transmitter 38 and receiver 40 can be dispensed with in this case and both units in the illustrated circuits can be understood as Media Access Controller (MAC) and Ethernet Switch ,
  • MAC Media Access Controller
  • Ethernet Switch Ethernet Switch
  • the authorization unit 32 and the command unit 28 are housed in a single building and are connected via Ethernet in connected to a Local Area Network (LAN). Via an Ethernet switch 42 and a media access controller (MAC), not shown, the authorization unit 32 and the command unit 28 are connected to the Internet data connection 36 and thus to all start devices 2.
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • MAC media access controller
  • the starting device 2 also includes a media access controller 44, via which the security unit 22 and the control unit 10 are connected to the data connection 36 and thus have a connection to the command post 26.
  • An operator O1 of the starting device 2 establishes a data exchange with the command post 26 by operating the control unit 10 via the data connection 36.
  • Another operator 02 in the command post 26 prepares the start of the missile 4 by entering and / or selecting start information 45 in the command unit 28, each missile 4 own start information 45 is assigned.
  • the start information 45 is sent via the data connection 36 to the control unit 10, as in FIG. 1 is indicated by a dashed arrow.
  • the transmission takes place here as a unitcast and in the TCP / IP protocol, the start information 45 is thus sent to one and only to this control unit 10 of the plurality of boot devices 2 available.
  • the authorization unit 32 sends arming information 46 to the security unit 22.
  • the arming information 46 can be sent as a multicast, that is to only a part of the starter devices 2 present in the non-public network, or as a broadcast, that is to all the starting devices 2 present in the non-public network.
  • the releasing information 46 can be sent in the UDP / IP protocol. Alternatively, a private protocol can be used. The protocol used is defined in the header of the arming information 46.
  • the 16bit value of the Ethernet Version 2 Frame Type field according to IEEE 802.3 is such a value that is free by the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority), ie not with a log is occupied.
  • the value of the Type field may be officially registered, but without a related protocol.
  • the protocol may be pre-established between the communicating entities, in this case, the authorization entity 32 and the backup entities 22, or may be established in advance.
  • the authorization unit 32 sends the arming information 46, which is encrypted as well as the start information 45, regularly and at equal intervals, so that the arming information is sent, for example, 10 times per second via the data connection 36 to several or all of the security units 22 in the network.
  • the arming information is sent, for example, 10 times per second via the data connection 36 to several or all of the security units 22 in the network.
  • only one fuse unit 22 is considered, since all fuse units 22 of the boot devices 2 work the same in the network.
  • the arming information 46 is changed so that each arming information is individual for a predetermined period of time.
  • the arming information 46 is a data packet with at least four, in particular exactly four sections.
  • the first section is a so-called magic 48, in which the data structure or protocol structure of the entire data packet 46 is reproduced.
  • the temporal condition for the regular transmission of the arming information 46 in this case the selected repetition rate, can be found in the Magic 48.
  • the magic 48 contains the counting of a counter 50, which is included as the third segment of the data packet in the release information 46.
  • the arming information 46 also contains the arming state 52. This is specified by the authorization unit 32 and the operator 03 via the input means 34.
  • the arming information 46 includes a check code 54, in this example a so-called Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC).
  • CRC Cyclic Redundancy Code
  • the arming information 46 arrives regularly at the fuse unit 22, which compares the time of arrival with the specified in the Magic 48 time interval. In addition, it checks counter 50 based on the counter information specified in the Magic 48. This means in the illustrated embodiment that the counter with each Entommesinformation 46 counts up by one. In this way, the security unit 22 provides each arming packet 46 received determines whether any packet 46 sent in the meantime has been received or whether packets 46 have been lost.
  • the arming information 46 is sent repetitively from the authorization unit 32 to the arming unit 22.
  • a UDP protocol is used, which is a retry-free protocol.
  • another user data protocol without retry, or another private protocol where the magic without a header can directly mark the beginning of the corresponding frame.
  • the arming information 46 is sent as a broadcast from the authorization unit 32 via its UDP port 56 in the data connection 36. The arming information 46 thus reaches all start devices 2, the release units 22 receive the information on their UDP port 56.
  • the command unit 28 controls the start of the missile 4 via a standard TCP / IP protocol via a TCP port 58 of the command unit 28. Data from the command unit 28 are received via a corresponding TCP port 58 of the control unit 10.
  • the authorization unit 32 sends the armed state 52 "disabled” or "disabled”.
  • the release unit 22 receives this EntommesSullivan 52 and holds by a corresponding signal on the signal connection 24, the AND gate 16 and thus the signal connection 12 between the control unit 10 and the starting device 6 interrupted. Even if the control unit 10 would control a start of a missile 4, then the start of the missile 4 would be omitted by the interrupted signal connection 12. Even with a malfunction of the data link 36, the signal connection 12 - regardless of the armed state 52 - interrupted. Because the fuse unit 22 detects the fault by, for example, missing data packets of the arming information 46 and automatically switches the AND gate 16 to interrupt.
  • the operator 03 releases the release by a corresponding input in the input device 34.
  • the authorization unit 32 changes the arming state 52 of the next-transmitted data packet or of the next-following released arming information 46 to "unprotected” or "enabled".
  • the data packet is received by the security unit 22 and - with interference-free previous receipt of the data packets or arming information 46 - the fuse unit 22 releases the AND gate 16, so that the signal connection 12, the AND gate 16 can pass uninterrupted.
  • a start of the missile 4 can now be controlled by the command unit 28 and the operator 02.
  • the operator O1 receives a corresponding signal, so that it switches the switch 20 and thus suspends the interruption of the signal connection 18 through the switch 20. That second AND gate 16 is unlocked and the signal connection 12 is continuously enabled by the control unit 10 to the starting device 6 for data transmission.
  • the command unit 28 now controls the start via the data link 36, the control unit 10 receives the start signal and controls the starting device 6 accordingly, which fires the relevant missile 4 from the canister 8.
  • the operator O1 can already secure the starting device 6 prior to the authorization by the operator 03 and in particular also before the control by the operator 02.
  • the starting device 6 is now prepared for control by the command unit 28 when released by the authorization unit 32.
  • the security unit 22 detects the absence of arming information 46 on the basis of the counter 50. This happens very quickly because the fuse unit 22 knows the transmission frequency of the arming information 46. If more than a predetermined number of data packets 46, in particular only one, are missing, the security unit 22 blocks the signal connection 12. If, for example, after the last correct reception of the release information 46, the next following release information 46 does not exist after 1.8 times the transmission interval Thus, the fuse unit 22 blocks the signal connection 12. The absence of even a single data packet 46 is thus detected and the launch of the missile 4 is prevented by the interruption of the signal connection 12.
  • the security unit 22 sends its own state to the Command unit 28. This can be done via the control unit 10 and thus via a regular TCP protocol.
  • the transmission of the state of the security unit 22 to the command unit 28 also takes place regularly.
  • the state contains the indication of the most recently received arming state 52.
  • the transmitted state of the security unit 22 contains information as to whether the data traffic between the authorization unit 32 and the security unit 22 proceeded without interference. Disturbances caused by, for example, irregularities in the meter or irregularities in the plausibility (CRC) lead to a fault condition.
  • the corresponding state is displayed on a display unit 58 of the input of the input means 30, for example in the form of a traffic light, as in FIG FIG. 1 is indicated.
  • One color means trouble-free data transmission and unsecured arming state 52.
  • Another color means, for example, a trouble-free data traffic and a secure arming state 52.
  • a third color indicates a disturbance in the data transmission and can occur together with the other two colors.
  • a fault is now detected by the operator 02, and the operator 02 can decide whether he wants to put back the fuse unit 22 in a trouble-free state or start the missile 4 should be prevented.
  • a corresponding command can be given to the fuse unit 22 via the command unit 28 and the control unit 10.
  • a status request from the command post 26 or the command unit 28 is actively sent to the backup unit 22 or the control unit 10.
  • This can take the form of a so-called echo, so that an interruption of the data connection 36, which is longer than a known time period, is already recognized by the echo. Otherwise, the transmission of the state of the fuse unit 22 may be as described above.
  • the security unit 22 sends information to the authorization unit 32.
  • This information is sent in the same way as the release information 46, namely in UDP protocol or a corresponding Protocol and the data connection 36.
  • This information includes a modified Entommesinformation in a data packet that is constructed analogous to the data packet of the arming information 46.
  • the modified arming information also includes a magic which is, however, inverted from the last received magic 48.
  • the arming state 52 is sent and a counter 50.
  • the own state is also sent, so that the modified arming information in a data packet has corresponding to five and not just four sections.
  • the authorization unit 32 analogous to the security unit 22, checks the received modified arming information for plausibility as well as for the count. If an undisturbed data transmission is detected, analogous to the execution of the security unit 22, a corresponding signal can be displayed on a display unit 60 of the input device 34. The operator 03 is now informed both about the state of the security unit 22 and about the state of the data connection 36. If there is a malfunction of the security unit 22, he can fix it via his input means 34, analogously to the described Entêtn by the operator 02. This is preferably done by sending a corresponding signal from the authorization unit 32 to the command unit 28, as described above , which causes reversion of the fuse unit 22 to the regular state via the control unit 10. The fuse unit 22 responds as described above.

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  • Aiming, Guidance, Guns With A Light Source, Armor, Camouflage, And Targets (AREA)

Claims (11)

  1. Procédé de lancement d'un missile (4) hors d'un lanceur (2), où une connexion de données (36) est constituée entre une unité de pilotage (10) du lanceur (2) et un poste de commandement (26) agencé à distance du dispositif lanceur (2) et un lancement du missile (4) est piloté depuis le poste de commandement (26) par le biais de la connexion de données (36), dans lequel une unité de sécurité (22) reçoit une information d'armement (46) par le biais de la connexion de données (36) et déverrouille une connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et un dispositif de lancement (6) du missile (4) et dans lequel l'unité de sécurité (22) maintient le déverrouillage pour une durée prédéfinie et verrouille de nouveau la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) après expiration de la durée,
    caractérisé en ce que l'information d'armement (46) est envoyée de manière répétée d'une unité d'autorisation (32) à l'unité de sécurité (22) par le biais de la connexion de données (36), dans lequel l'intervalle de répétition est inférieur à la durée prédéfinie après laquelle l'unité de sécurité (22) verrouille de nouveau la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6).
  2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que l'information d'armement (46) est envoyée à l'unité de sécurité (22) au format IP/UDP.
  3. Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'information d'armement (46) est envoyée en protocole privé Ethernet Frame par le biais de la connexion de données (36).
  4. Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'information d'armement (46) comprend un bloc de données contenant un état de sécurité (52), un compteur (50) et une information de vérification (54).
  5. Procédé selon l'une des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que l'information d'armement (46) est envoyée de manière répétée à l'unité de sécurité (22) par le biais de la connexion de données (36) et contient un compteur (50), lequel est modifié à chaque répétition, et l'unité de sécurité (22) vérifie à l'aide du compteur une réception ininterrompue de la séquence des répétitions et verrouille la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) du missile (4) s'il manque une répétition.
  6. Procédé selon l'une des revendications ci-dessus, caractérisé en ce que le pilotage du lancement du missile (4) s'effectue depuis une unité de commande (28) du poste de commandement (26) et l'information de sécurité (46) est obtenue depuis l'unité d'autorisation (32) à l'extérieur du poste de commandement (26) indépendamment des processus de l'unité de commande (28) .
  7. Procédé selon l'une des revendications ci-dessus, caractérisé en ce qu'un lancement du missile (4) s'effectue exclusivement après un armement au moins triple, un déverrouillage de la connexion par signal (18) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) du missile (4) par un signal de commutation d'un opérateur (O1) du lanceur (6), un déverrouillage de la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) du missile (4) par l'unité de sécurité (22) et un déverrouillage par l'unité de pilotage (10) du lanceur (2) .
  8. Procédé selon l'une des revendications ci-dessus, caractérisé en ce que l'unité de sécurité (22) envoie un rapport de statut au poste de commandement (26) par le biais de l'unité de pilotage (10) du dispositif de lancement (6).
  9. Procédé selon l'une des revendications ci-dessus, caractérisé en ce que le poste de commandement (26) envoie une demande de statut à l'unité de sécurité (22), à laquelle l'unité de pilotage (10) et/ou l'unité de sécurité (22) répond directement.
  10. Procédé selon l'une des revendications ci-dessus, caractérisé en ce que l'unité de sécurité (22) renvoie une information d'armement modifiée à une unité d'autorisation (32) par le biais du même protocole que l'information d'armement (46).
  11. Système de défense sol-air doté d'un poste de commandement (26), d'une unité d'autorisation (32) et d'un lanceur (2) pour le lancement d'un missile (4) doté d'un conteneur de missile (8), d'une unité de pilotage (10) pour piloter le lancement, pour établir une connexion de données (36) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le poste de commandement (26) et pour établir une connexion de données (36) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et l'unité d'autorisation (32), dans lequel le lanceur (2) comprend un dispositif de verrouillage (14) dans la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et un dispositif de lancement (6) du missile (4) et une unité de sécurité (22) pouvant être connectée avec la connexion de données (36), qui est connectée par signal avec le dispositif de verrouillage (14), dans lequel l'unité de sécurité (22) est disposée de façon à déverrouiller une connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) après réception d'une information d'armement (46) par le biais de la connexion de données (36), à maintenir le déverrouillage pour une durée prédéfinie et à verrouiller de nouveau la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6) après expiration de la durée,
    caractérisé en ce que l'unité d'autorisation (32) est disposée de façon à envoyer de manière répétée l'information d'armement (46) à l'unité de sécurité (22) par le biais de la connexion de données (36), dans lequel l'intervalle de répétition est inférieur à la durée prédéfinie après laquelle l'unité de sécurité (22) verrouille de nouveau la connexion par signal (12) entre l'unité de pilotage (10) et le dispositif de lancement (6).
EP16001046.8A 2015-05-23 2016-05-10 Procede de lancement d'un missile depuis un lanceur Active EP3098559B1 (fr)

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DE102015006754.0A DE102015006754A1 (de) 2015-05-23 2015-05-23 Verfahren zum Starten eines Flugkörpers aus einem Startgerät

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DE102017006572A1 (de) * 2017-04-12 2018-10-18 Diehl Defence Gmbh & Co. Kg Verfahren zum Schutz eines vernetzten militärischen Systems
TR201921499A2 (tr) * 2019-12-25 2021-07-26 Yapi Merkezi Idis Muehendislik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi Askeri alanlar için gerçekleştirilen bir sistem

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US3539833A (en) * 1967-10-26 1970-11-10 Us Army Logic circuit for use with adaption kits and like missile devices
US3942409A (en) * 1974-02-08 1976-03-09 Hughes Aircraft Company Single rail missile launcher with shift register timing
US4324168A (en) * 1980-09-26 1982-04-13 The Bendix Corporation Weapon firing system including weapon interrogation means
DE102009050006A1 (de) * 2009-10-21 2011-04-28 Diehl Bgt Defence Gmbh & Co. Kg Raketenstartbehälter und Verfahren zum Verbinden eines Raketenstartbehälters mit einem Raketenwerfer
DE102015002563B3 (de) * 2015-02-27 2016-02-11 Mbda Deutschland Gmbh Flugkörper-Startvorrichtung

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DE102015006754A1 (de) 2016-11-24
PL3098559T3 (pl) 2019-10-31

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