EP3067489A1

EP3067489A1 - A safe room

Info

Publication number: EP3067489A1
Application number: EP16159274.6A
Authority: EP
Inventors: Rodney Dummer
Original assignee: ROC SECURE Ltd
Current assignee: ROC SECURE Ltd
Priority date: 2015-03-09
Filing date: 2016-03-08
Publication date: 2016-09-14
Anticipated expiration: 2036-03-08
Also published as: TR201904234T4; GB201503970D0; GB2536234A; ES2719676T3; EP3067489B1

Abstract

A safe room 10 comprises a cubicle 12 large enough to contain a person and including an opening 14 large enough for a person to pass through, and a door 16 for closing the opening 14 and including a locking mechanism 18 for the locking the door 16 from the inside. The safe room 10 also comprises a tray 22 comprising a fuel absorbent 23 and/or a fuel flame suppressor 24 and includes an aperture 21 external to the cubicle.

Description

This invention relates to a safe room and, in a preferred embodiment, to a fuel absorbent and flame suppressor system suitable for use with a safe room or the like.
Within the security industry, the use of safe rooms (sometimes called panic rooms) is well known. They are used by individuals who consider that they may be at threat of violence in a building such as their office or their own home. This may be because the individual is at risk of abduction, wealthy or because threats of violence have been made against the individual or because the security situation in the specific locality is unreliable. They are used by high net worth individuals around the world, by individuals who are at threat of domestic violence, and by business people in locations where significant local unrest is taking place, such as can occur in civil wars and other dangerous security situations. A safe room is normally a purpose built structure or the adaption of an existing room that can be used in an emergency to be locked from the inside to prevent external access. An individual who feels that they are at threat, such as during a burglary, can retreat to the safe room and lock themselves into the safe room and await the arrival of the relevant security or law enforcement operatives.
It is also well known that there are dangers to a panic room or safety refuge that may be resistant to impact and projectiles, via the use of fuel. For example, frustrated attackers who can find a safe room and fail to gain entry or penetrate the safe room will use fuel such as a bucket of petrol to throw over the front of the safe room and ignite the fuel, hoping to kill or drive out the occupant. When petrol is thrown at a refuge/vault/panic room door, the fuel can often flow under a door that is flush with the ground or has an insufficient threshold. Once ignited, the flame will propagate inside the safe room, with the potential to harm the occupant and/or use up the oxygen. Even if the fuel does not flow under the door of the safe room, the ignited fuel can burn a combustible refuge, overheat a refuge and if there is sufficient fuel, the occupant could be over-heated or if the door is not sealed, breathe in the fumes of the combustion of the fuel or whatever else is burning such as furnishings in the room. Most lightweight ballistic material such as fibreglass, plastics and modern textiles/fibres can often give of toxic fumes when they get hot or are exposed to ignition, and even if they do not burn, their fumes are potentially dangerous. High energy fuels like petrol can also damage and reduce the strength of some adhesives and plastics.
It is therefore an object of the invention to improve upon the known art.
According to the present invention, there is provided a safe room comprising a cubicle large enough to contain a person and including an opening large enough for a person to pass through, and a door for closing the opening and including a locking mechanism for the locking the door from the inside, characterised in that the safe room further comprises a tray comprising a fuel absorbent and/or a fuel flame suppressor and including an aperture external to the cubicle.
Owing to the invention, it is possible to provide a safe room that, in addition to protecting the user, will also provide protection against fuel being used as means of attacking the safe room. The purpose of the safe room is to provide enough time for the occupant to survive before the relevant security forces arrive. In general, anything that extends the time that is available to protect the occupant will increase the chances of the occupant surviving an attack.
The improved safe room has a fuel tray with fuel absorbing media that can soak up, for example, several cans of petrol. The tray has an aperture that is external to the cubicle and any fuel on the exterior of the cubicle will drain into the tray. Preferably, a base is provided that is made of parallel face channels on the outside and the base has absorbent media under the actual cubicle. Preferably, the tray extends beyond the front and if needed the sides and back. The tray could be sunk into the floor under any safe/vault/panic room door or window to reduce the success of a fuel attack. The tray could also have an overflow pipe to outside or not have any media at all, simply drain to a tank in ground or on a lower level.
Advantageously, a mesh material or perforated material can be used to cover the tray. The fuel flame suppressor can be pulled out from the front when the mesh is removed. Where the tray extends, there is preferably wire wool or corrugated strip metal or metal ribbon or metal mesh or sintered metal or metal wire or ceramic or polypropylene or polyethylene and combinations of these and/or other heat-conductive and/or porous material under a strong mesh and this material or combination of materials act as a flame suppressor.
Ideally, the door and door surround is designed to avoid fuel washing in under the door and the tray is designed to absorb it, so the fuel flows into the tray and then the flame suppressor reduces the size of a flame and hence reducing the resultant fire. If the fuel is not ignited before it has been absorbed, ignition is made a lot harder. Flame arrestor suppressors work by taking away the heat as well as making the gaps smaller.
The door to the cubicle is preferably reinforced and has multiple locking points on a pantograph-type mechanism. This is only accessible from the inside of the cubicle and a wheel/handle is used to turn the cam and the linkage result in bolts shooting out and locking the door securely. The cam goes slightly over centre to lock the mechanism. The internal door cover and mechanism is fixed with nuts and a spanner is left inside should the mechanism be damaged so it can be easily dismantled. The door mechanism (and shape) can be applied to any safe/vault/panic room door. There is no access to the locking mechanism to those outside.
The cubicle preferably has a hole for ventilation to the outside, CO₂ absorbent curtains (such as those that come in a plastic envelope and are activated by removing the outer cover), battery lights such as LEDS, a secure communications system using several armoured screened cables (for redundancy) to an external communications system able to resist RF and electromagnetic jamming. Also armoured screened cable can be provided for controlling smoke dispensers and receiving audio and CCTV images from cameras around the building and enable real time evidence gathering. The inside of the cubicle could be lined with a fire retardant board.
A ventilation system can be provided, for example using a snorkel which the occupant clamps in their teeth with a hose to the exterior of the cubicle, a simple air pump with bellows and flap valve to the outside or with an electric fan with manual power as a possibility if the battery or power supply fails. The cubicle can be stocked with basic equipment and supplies to enable occupant to survive for one hour until professional help arrives. Greater provision would enable a occupant to remain inside the panic room for longer. Preferably, the cubicle is provided with a seat. The seat can be steel and under the seat could be securely stored batteries, communications system and supplies etc. The exterior of the cubicle could be up armoured to specified threat levels without compromising the air tight integrity of the basic cubicle. The cubicle could be lined inside or outside with additional material or combinations of material to make penetration more time consuming and to require specialist equipment and therefore harder to penetrate.
Embodiments of the present invention will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:-

Figure 1 is a perspective transparent view, from the front, of a safe room,
Figure 2 is a perspective transparent view, from the back, of the safe room,
Figure 3 is a vertical section through the safe room,
Figure 4 is a vertical section through a second embodiment of the safe room,
Figure 5 is a partial perspective view of a base of the safe room,
Figure 6a is a rear view of a door of the safe room, in an unlocked configuration,
Figure 6b is a rear view of the door of the safe room, in a locked configuration,
Figure 7 is a perspective rear view of the door of the safe room,
Figure 8 is a vertical section through a fuel absorbent and flame suppressor system, and
Figure 9 is a further embodiment of a safe room.

Figure 1 shows the safe room 10. The safe room 10 comprises a cubicle 12 large enough to contain a person and including an opening 14 large enough for a person to pass through, a door 16 for closing the opening 14 and including a locking mechanism 18 for the locking the door 16 from the inside, and a base 20 mounting the cubicle 12 and including a tray 22 comprising a fuel absorbent and/or a fuel flame suppressor. The tray 22 has an aperture 21 that is external to the cubicle 12. The tray 22 extends at least along the edge of the cubicle 12 adjacent to the opening 14 and preferably can extend along all of the edges of the cubicle 12. In this embodiment, the tray 22 extends underneath the cubicle 12.
The safe room 10 is designed to protect an individual in a situation where the individual feels that they are under attack (real or imagined). The safe room 10 could be installed in the home of a domestic violence victim, for example, or could be installed in the office of a wealthy person in a part of the world where the security situation is weak (such as in a civil war or other civil unrest) or in high risk industrial environments such as an oil producing region subject to ethnic tension or unrest. The purpose of the safe room 10 is to provide a refuge for the individual where they will be safe from harm. The individual enters the cubicle 12 and locks themselves into the cubicle 12 until help can arrive (usually 30 minutes protection is sufficient).
The safe room 10 is so designed that it provides additional protection against the use of fuel targeting the safe room 10, since this is a well-known method by which assailants will attack safe rooms. Once an individual enters a safe room and locks themselves into the safe room, then they become vulnerable to being burnt out by fuel being poured or thrown onto the safe room and ignited. The tray 22 will absorb any fuel used to attack the safe room 10 since it will generally run off the sides of the cubicle 12 and into the tray 22 in the base 20, through the aperture 21, where one or more fuel absorbents and/or fuel flame suppressors are present.
Figure 2 shows the safe room 10 from the back. The cubicle 12 is essentially a sealed metal box of one or more layers with the single opening 14 at the front. The cubicle 12 is of a rectangular prism shape. The cubicle 12 can be provided with flame resistant and/or flame retardant coating on the external face of the cubicle 12. The door 16 closes the opening 14 and can be locked from the inside only. The opening 14 is of a stadium shape, meaning that it is formed by two parallel lines of equal length with a semi-circle at top and bottom, this shape is commonly referred to as a "stadium". The opening 14 is located so that its lowest point is above the lowest edge of the cubicle 12. This ensures that liquid fuel cannot slosh under the door when used against the safe room 10.
The door 16 opens inwards and although this might be considered a weakness since it could be pushed open from the outside, if the door 16 were to open outwards, then it could be blocked from the outside, leaving the occupant unable to exit the cubicle 12. In another embodiment the door may open outwards. The cubicle could have more than one door. In one embodiment the cubicle could have a second door opening outwards on another face to act as an emergency exit should the door used to enter the cubicle become so damaged it will not open. The interior of the cubicle 12 may be lined with fire retardant material and the interior of the cubicle 12 may be provided with an oxygen source and a carbon dioxide removal material. In this embodiment of the safe room 10, the cubicle 10 is located within an open hole in the base 20, so that the base 20 can be fixed into position, with the cubicle then lowered into hole.
The cubicle 12 includes within it a seat 28, which can also be used to store equipment that an occupant of the cubicle 12 might need, such as communication equipment and so on. The safe room 10 can have external connections, it need not be a completely sealed unit. For example, if the back of the cubicle 12 is flush to a solid wall, then communication wires or and oxygen connection can be provided out of the back of the cubicle 12. In general though, the cubicle 12 will be as shown in Figures 1 and 2 as a sealed steel box that provides as much protection as possible to the occupant.
Figure 3 shows a vertical section through the safe room 10, taken in a plane parallel to the front face of the cubicle 12. The cubicle 12 is located within the base 20, which mounts the cubicle 12 (i.e. takes the weight of the cubicle 12). The tray 22 can be seen, which extends to one side of the cubicle 12 and underneath the cubicle 12. The tray 22 contains the fuel flame suppressor 24, which comprises an absorbent and wire wool. The aperture 21 of the tray 22 is covered, at least in part, by a mesh material 30, which can support the weight of a person and can be covered with decorative elements, for example.
The base 20 includes a plinth 26, the plinth 26 extending upwards from the base 20 and optionally mounting the cubicle 12 (in this embodiment, the plinth does not support the weight of the cubicle 12). The sides of the plinth 26 are sloping downwards. The purpose of the sloping sides is to facilitate the flow of any liquid fuel into the tray 22, through the aperture 21, should fuel be thrown or doused over the safe room 10. The fuel will run down into the tray 22, where it will come into contact with the flame suppressor 24, which will delay or prevent ignition of the fuel and/or lower the heat or fumes produced by any fire.
The tray 22 can include an overflow pipe or a connection to a separate tank in order to drain away the fuel that is present. Any delay that can be introduced in the growth of a fire will provide further time for the rescue of the occupant of the cubicle 12. The tray 22 serves the function of trapping fuel that is used against the cubicle 12 and the fuel flame suppressor 24 in the tray will dampen any fire that may be ignited. The fuel flame suppressor 24 could also include one or more chemical components similar to those used in fire extinguishers to further reduce the effect of any ignited fuel.
Figure 4 shows a vertical section through a second embodiment of the safe room 10. This section is taken longitudinally through the safe room and is effectively a side view of the safe room 10 in section. The cubicle 12 is mounted by the base 20, which can be sunk into the tray 22 if desired. The seat 28 is shown in the cubicle 12. The optional plinth 26 is shown, which helps the fuel thrown at the safe room 10 to flow into the tray 22 through the aperture 21. In this embodiment, the tray 22 is provided with a fuel flame suppressor 24 and a fuel absorbent 23. The mesh 30 covers the entrance 21 to the tray 22.
The fuel absorbent 23 is located in the base 20 under the cubicle 12. The absorbent 23 is in the form of "socks" manufactured from hydrophobic materials, and the socks will absorb oil and hydrocarbon based products whilst repelling water. The socks are pushed in the tray 22 under the cubicle 12 and are effectively hidden from view. The socks would burn or feed any fire so are kept protected from the flame by the wire wool flame arrestor 24 and the flame arresting matrix is protected by the heavy duty perforated mesh 30 as an exposed face which could be fixed down to avoid an intruder easily removing the mesh 30.
The perforated mesh 30 is covering the exposed entrance 21 to the tray 22. The protected area is filled with the fuel absorbent socks or other media. The wire wool 24 or sintered metal or corrugated metal covered by the heavy duty perforated mesh 30 is a metal matrix and this helps to prevent the propagation of a flame from the exposed side of the unit 10 to the protected side, the absorbent media 23.
Figure 5 shows a partial perspective view of the base 20, which shows the tray 22 at the front edge of the base 20, which also extends down one side of the base 20. The tray 22 contains the fuel flame suppressor 24, as discussed in detail above. A detail labelled "A" of the base 20 is also shown to indicate the structure at the corner of the base 20, where the tray 22 at the front edge of the base 20 joins with the part of the tray 22 that extends along the long side of the base 22. The tray 22 also extends under the part of the base that will mount the cubicle 12, in order to provide as much space as possible to capture any fuel.
The base 20 can be concreted into position in the location where the safe room 10 is to be sited. This will help to reduce the likelihood of attacks on the safe room 10 interfering with the function of the tray 22, in order that the structure of the safe room 10 cannot be disrupted. The size and shape of the base 20 relative to the size and shape of the cubicle 12 are all design choices that will depend on the positioning of the safe room 10 and the amount of protection that is desired by the occupant of the safe room 10. The base 20 can be constructed of toughened steel.
The open part of the tray 22 can extend on all sides of the cubicle 12, if desired, or can just extend along the front edge of the cubicle 12. The mesh material 30 is provided over the fuel flame suppressor 24 that is located in the tray 22 in order to prevent any assailants interfering with the operation of the tray 22 and the material that is located within the tray 22. The mesh material 30 can be locked in place using a suitably secure method. Any fuel thrown at the safe room 10, once it is installed in position, will drain off the cubicle 12 and into the tray 22 in the base 20.
Figure 6 shows two rear views of the door 16, which is used to close the opening 14 in the cubicle 12. In Figure 6a, the door 16 is shown in an unlocked configuration and in Figure 6b, the door 16 is shown in a locked configuration. The door 16 has a stadium shape that matches the stadium shape of the opening 14, there are no corners on either the opening 14 or the door 16. The shape and positioning of the door 16 and opening 14 is to prevent the ingress of fuel should a liquid fuel based attach be made against the safe room 10, as discussed above.
Mounted on the back of the door 16 (and hence visible in the rear views of Figure 6) is the locking mechanism 18 for the door 16. The locking mechanism 18 comprises a series of connected bars 32 that are movably mounted on a frame 34. The frame 34 is securely connected to the door 16. The bars 32 are connected to bolts 36 that are designed to move outwards when a central pin 38 is rotated, for example with a wheel (not shown) attached to the pin 38. When an individual enters the safe room 10 they will close the door 16 and use the locking mechanism 18 to lock the door after themselves.
By rotating the central pin 38, for example with a handle or wheel supplied, the bars 32 will move in such a manner that the bolts 36 are moved outwards from the door 16 and engage with corresponding latches that are formed in the part of the cubicle 12 that surrounds the opening 14. The locking mechanism 18 is a secure and fast system for locking the door 16 behind them once the individual has entered the cubicle 12. Only the person inside the cubicle 12 can operate the locking mechanism 18, which allows the user to lock themselves into the safe room 10 when they perceive that they are under attack and need to seek refuge.
Figure 7 shows a perspective view of the door 16, which shows the locking mechanism 16 in more detail. A central pin (not shown in this Figure), when rotated will cause the two inner vertical bars 32a to move away the central point. This will cause the two outer vertical bars 32b to be forced outwards, thereby pushing the bolts 36 outwards and into their locking position. As shown in Figure 7, the locking mechanism 18 of the door 16 is in its unlocked position. The locking action is easily reversible by the occupant of the cubicle 12 and the door 16 can only be locked and unlocked from the inside, using the locking mechanism 18.
Figure 8 show a fuel absorbent and flame suppressor system 40 as is used in the safe room 10 described above. The system 40 can be used to protect other objects that could be the target of fuel attacks, such as conventional doors and windows. The system 40 comprises the tray 22, which contains, from top to bottom, the mesh material 30, the flame suppressor 24, another layer of mesh material 30 (which is optional) and the fuel absorbent material 23. Here the system 40 has been concreted underneath a door frame 42. The system 40 can be used to protect any element that might be considered vulnerable to a fuel attack. The system 40 can be used on ships and oil rigs to protect safe room doors, for example.
Figure 9 shows a further embodiment of the safe room 10. The safe room 10 has in the cubicle 12 an additional opening 44 that is large enough for a person to pass through and an additional door 46 for closing the additional opening 44. The additional door 46 provides an additional route of escape for the occupant of the safe room 10. The safe room 10 also further comprises a draining tank 48 connected to the tray 22 by a connecting pipe 50, the draining tank 48 being located at a level lower than the tray 22. The connecting pipe 50 that connects the tray 22 to the draining tank 48 has a fuel flame suppressor 52 located therein. The draining tank 48 is also connected to a vent pipe 60 which vents the tank 48 and is provided with an inline flame suppressor 62.
A second tray 54 is located internally within the cubicle 12, where the second tray 54 comprising a fuel absorbent 23 and/or a fuel flame suppressor 24. The second tray 54 has an aperture 56 which is open to the interior of the cubicle 12. The interior of the cubicle 12 is also supplied with a fire extinguisher nozzle 58 that is connected to a water supply and can be used to douse any flames that are present within the cubicle 12. The nozzle 58 could also be located on the exterior of the cubicle 12. The second tray 54 is designed to catch any fuel that penetrates the door 16 and enters the interior of the cubicle 12.
The tray 22 which has an aperture 21 open to the exterior of the cubicle 12 is the primary defence to the use of fuel against the safe room 10. Fuel thrown against the front of the cubicle 12 will drain into the tray 22 through the aperture 21. In Figure 9, the tray 22 is shown with a flat bottom that is parallel to the floor level of the top of the tray 22, however the tray 22 may be provided with a sloping internal lower surface, which slopes away from the cubicle 12. This will cause any fuel that enters the tray 22 through the aperture 21 to flow away from the cubicle under the action of gravity.

Claims

A safe room (10) comprising:
• a cubicle (12) large enough to contain a person and including an opening (14) large enough for a person to pass through, and

• a door (16) for closing the opening (14) and including a locking mechanism (18) for the locking the door (16) from the inside, characterised in that the safe room (10) further comprises:

• a tray (22) comprising a fuel absorbent (23) and/or a fuel flame suppressor (24) and including an aperture (21) external to the cubicle (12).
A safe room according to claim 1, wherein the tray (22) extends at least along the edge of the cubicle (12) adjacent to the opening (14).
A safe room according to claim 1, wherein the tray (22) extends along all of the edges of the cubicle (12).
A safe room according to claim 1, 2 or 3, wherein the tray (22) extends underneath the cubicle (12).
A safe room according to any preceding claim, wherein the aperture (21) of the tray (22) is covered, at least in part, by a mesh material (30).
A safe room according to any preceding claim, wherein the tray (22) includes an overflow pipe.
A safe room according to any preceding claim, wherein the cubicle (12) is of a rectangular prism shape.
A safe room according to any preceding claim, and further comprising a base (20) mounting the cubicle (12) and wherein the base (20) includes a plinth (26), the plinth (26) extending upwards from the base (20) and optionally mounting the cubicle (12).
A safe room according to claim 8, wherein the sides of the plinth (26) are sloping downwards.
A safe room according to any preceding claim, wherein the fuel flame suppressor (24) comprises a wire wool.
A safe room according to any preceding claim, wherein the cubicle (12) further comprises an additional opening (44) large enough for a person to pass through and an additional door (46) for closing the additional opening (44).
A safe room according to any preceding claim, and further comprising a draining tank (48) connected to the tray (22) by a connecting pipe (50), the draining tank (48) being located at a level lower than the tray (22).
A safe room according to claim 12, wherein the connecting pipe (50) that connects the tray (22) to the draining tank (48) has a fuel flame suppressor (52) located therein.
A safe room according to any preceding claim, and further comprising a second tray (54) located internally within the cubicle (12), the second tray (54) comprising a fuel absorbent (23) and/or a fuel flame suppressor (24).