EP2306407A1 - Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen - Google Patents

Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2306407A1
EP2306407A1 EP09170475A EP09170475A EP2306407A1 EP 2306407 A1 EP2306407 A1 EP 2306407A1 EP 09170475 A EP09170475 A EP 09170475A EP 09170475 A EP09170475 A EP 09170475A EP 2306407 A1 EP2306407 A1 EP 2306407A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
acoustic
accreditation
data
cac
encrypted
Prior art date
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Granted
Application number
EP09170475A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP2306407B1 (de
Inventor
Pascal Metivier
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Openways Sas
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Openways Sas
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Publication date
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Priority to EP09170475.9A priority Critical patent/EP2306407B1/de
Priority to ES09170475T priority patent/ES2428004T3/es
Priority to US13/394,855 priority patent/US8712365B2/en
Priority to PCT/FR2010/051502 priority patent/WO2011033199A1/fr
Publication of EP2306407A1 publication Critical patent/EP2306407A1/de
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP2306407B1 publication Critical patent/EP2306407B1/de
Not-in-force legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00801—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by acoustic waves

Definitions

  • the invention relates to lock devices electrically controlled by means of a dematerialized and encrypted key, this key being able to be conveyed by a portable object held by the user such as a magnetic card, a smart card, a badge or a card. contactless card, etc.
  • lock device is meant not only a lock stricto sensu, that is to say a mechanism placed for example on a door to condemn the opening, but also any device to achieve a comparable result, for example a lock gun considered in isolation, or a more specific locking device comprising various members not grouped in the same lock box, the ultimate goal being to obtain the conviction by mechanical means of physical access to a place or given space, and access to this place or space by unlocking the lock device, on the order of a user, after verification that this user has access rights (i) that are specific to him and (ii) who are specific to the lock device.
  • the lock device may also include, or be associated with, an alarm system that is to disable to allow access to a given space, or conversely activate to protect this space before or after the to have left.
  • the portable object when approached from the lock, acts as a key for ordering the opening by means of a given hereinafter "certification” (credential).
  • certification credential
  • Various coding and encryption techniques can be implemented in the lock and / or in the portable object to provide protection against fraudulent manipulations and secure communication between the portable object and the lock.
  • Numerous magnetic card systems are known, or cards or badges with microcircuit implementing with the lock a galvanic coupling (smart card contacts) or non-galvanic (inductive coupling card or RFID type card). This coupling ensures between lock and badge communication allowing in particular the lock to read in the memory of the badge accreditation data to control the opening if this data is recognized as compliant.
  • Another drawback is related to the variety of techniques used, each manufacturer having its own specifications both at the level of the physical layer (technological choice of coupling: inductive, RF, magnetic, galvanic, etc.) at the level of format of the data and protocols for exchanging this data between the reader and the portable object.
  • This variety of techniques linked to technological choices and implementations specific to different manufacturers, is a brake on interoperability, the standardization of materials and procedures and technological evolution, which prevents the rapid spread of these techniques, despite their indisputable advantages.
  • the system is a fixed system, because if one wishes to update the authorizations, to delete existing authorizations or to create new ones, it is necessary either to proceed to the exchange of the portable object, or to update the memory of the latter by means of a protocol and / or a specific reader, with the need for physical manipulations and displacements.
  • One of the aims of the invention is to propose an alternative technique of management and control of locks that can complement the existing techniques, or even replace them, without requiring substantial changes in both hardware and software, and which offers a maximum level of security, a great flexibility of implementation and is usable without recourse to a specific portable object.
  • the technique of the invention can be used by means of any conventional mobile phone serving the portable object carrying the key to control the lock, without the user needs to use a specific and dedicated portable object, such as a badge or card.
  • the system of the invention can thus be immediately generalized to the greatest number, being usable by anyone from a telephone standard model, unmodified, but enjoying all the security and flexibility of modern cryptographic techniques.
  • the technique of the invention will allow to adapt without major modification the existing locks, without having to replace the hardware elements or the software already integrated in the lock. It will be seen that the invention is perfectly compatible with the pre-existing techniques implemented by the various current manufacturers, insofar as it limits the intervention to a single layer of the communication protocol (the transmission of the accreditation to the lock), thus maintaining the same logical management of the different levels of security already provided by the manufacturer.
  • the principle of the invention is based on the use, for the transmission of the accreditation data to the lock, encrypted acoustic accreditations type information.
  • acoustic accreditations are for example in the form of a coded series of tones (DTMF tones or other), emitted by the speaker of a transmitting device and picked up by the microphone of a receiving device.
  • DTMF tones coded series of tones
  • the present invention consists in translating, at the level of a secure site, the conventional accreditation used for access management (a data block comprising a manufacturer's identifier, a unique identifier of the lock and possibly additional information ) and translate them into an encrypted acoustic accreditation format.
  • This acoustic accreditation is in the form of an audio signal that can be conveyed by audio transmission channels, including telephone transmission channels, and reproduced as such by acoustic transducers.
  • the acoustic accreditation is sent in this manner to the mobile phone of the user, which is listed in a database of the secure site.
  • the user approaches his phone lock and triggers the transmission by the speaker of his phone in the series of tones corresponding to encrypted acoustic accreditation, so that these tones can be captured by a microphone incorporated or coupled to the lock.
  • the latter operates a translation inverse of the acoustic accreditation allowing to restore the original format of the conventional accreditation, which is then applied to the circuits of the lock to be treated in the same way as if this accreditation had been read by a standard reader coupled to the lock (magnetic or smart card reader, inductive coupling reader or RFID, etc.).
  • This document describes a technique for securing logical access to a computer network by a remote terminal, for example by a computer connected to this network via the Internet.
  • the user connects to the network with his computer, simultaneously lights his mobile phone, and calls through it a control site interfaced with the network to which access is requested.
  • the network sends a sound signal (Acoustic Accreditation) to the remote computer that has just connected, a signal that is reproduced by the speaker of the computer.
  • This sound signal is picked up by the telephone, transmitted to the remote control site via the mobile telephone network operator and "listened to" by the control site, who can then check accreditation and authorize access to the computer network by the terminal.
  • the acoustic accreditation is captured by the microphone of the phone which retransmits it to the control site. Knowing the recipient of the phone call, the control site can identify the user through the mobile phone used for this operation, and thus allow logical access to the network by the terminal located near the phone identified.
  • the encrypted acoustic accreditations are on the contrary “downward” accreditations, that is to say that they come from a remote management site and transmitted to the mobile phone of the user.
  • the invention relates, in a manner known per se, to a secure locking device opening control system, comprising at least one lock device provided with electronic circuits. for the conditional control of mechanical locking / unlocking devices from digital accreditation data.
  • This lock device comprises means for recognizing, analyzing and authenticating said digital accreditation data, and means for controlling the unlocking of the mechanical members on recognition of conforming digital accreditation data.
  • the system also comprises a mobile phone available to a user authorized to open the lock device, a remote manager site, and a mobile network operator.
  • the management site comprises a database of authorized users, with for each user an identifier associated with a mobile telephone number, means for receiving, as input, digital accreditation data suitable for allowing the opening of specific lock devices.
  • an encrypted acoustic accreditation generator comprising means for converting the digital accreditation data into encrypted acoustic accreditations in the form of single-use audio signals.
  • the mobile network operator is coupled to the management site and to the mobile telephone, with means for securely transmitting the encrypted acoustic accreditations from the management site to the mobile telephone of the user, the telephone comprising an electro-acoustic transducer able to reproduce these accreditations. acoustic numbers.
  • the system of the invention is also characterized in that the lock device comprises an acoustic module comprising an electro-acoustic transducer capable of capturing encrypted acoustic accreditations reproduced by the transducer of the telephone previously placed near the lock device.
  • the acoustic module further comprises means for extracting the digital accreditation data from the encrypted acoustic accreditations captured by the transducer, and means for applying to the recognition, analysis and authentication means the digital accreditation data. thus extracted.
  • the encrypted acoustic accreditation produced by the acoustic accreditation generator comprises a field resulting from the conversion of the digital accreditation data, and a variable field, with different content for each encrypted acoustic accreditation generated.
  • This variable field can in particular be a sequence number or a time stamp, in which case the acoustic module also comprises means for storing, at each use, the sequence number or timestamp of the encrypted acoustic accreditation which has enabled the unlocking of the mechanical members. , and to compare and verify the conformity of the sequence number or the timestamp of any subsequent encrypted acoustic accreditation.
  • the digital accreditation data may be: data from the management site database, the latter also memorizing lock device information, with for each lock device an associated unique identifier, a list of authorized users with corresponding data of access rights, and possibly additional information; data transmitted online to the management site by a third party site; data transmitted offline, in batches, to the management site by a third party site; data delivered by a reader coupled to a physical medium storing the digital accreditation data; and combinations of the above data.
  • the acoustic module further comprises means for producing acoustic signals in return, on digital data acquisition accreditation, and an electro-acoustic transducer adapted to reproduce these acoustic signals back.
  • These may include a time stamp issued during, or immediately after, the receipt of acoustic accreditation, the marker being issued at a time corresponding to a predetermined temporal position, specific to the lock device, with respect to acoustic accreditation .
  • the acoustic module further comprises means for defining an additional parameter for transmitting the accreditation, means for, prior to any acoustic accreditation broadcast, producing an acoustic message coded by said additional parameter, and an electro-acoustic transducer capable of reproducing this acoustic message.
  • the telephone comprises, for its part, an electro-acoustic transducer capable of capturing the acoustic message, and means for transmitting to the management site a message coded by this acoustic message.
  • the encrypted acoustic accreditation produced by the acoustic accreditation generator includes the additional parameter, and the acoustic module also includes means for verifying the compliance of the additional parameter included in the acoustic accreditation received.
  • This additional parameter can be a password generated by the acoustic module and added as a variable field to the acoustic accreditation produced by the cryptographic generator. It can also be a time offset applied to the emission of the acoustic accreditation produced by the cryptographic generator.
  • One of the essential elements of the invention is a secure management site 10 centralizing in a database DB 12 information to identify and identify a number of locks and authorized users for each of these locks. For each user, the database lists a unique mobile phone number associated with this user, as well as access right data and conditions of use (access reserved for certain days or certain time slots, expiry date right of access, etc.).
  • the database also lists for each lock a Unique IDentifier (UID) that is uniquely assigned and uniquely identifies the lock in the various data exchange protocols.
  • UID Unique IDentifier
  • Other data may also be stored by the database, including the algorithms used by the lock, one or more cryptographic keys, a simplified free name ("entry”, “garage”, “cellar”, etc.) to facilitate the selection by a user of one of several locks, etc.
  • the management site 10 also comprises a cryptographic engine forming a generator 14 of accreditation data.
  • the "accreditation data" are encrypted acoustic accreditations or CAC (Crypto Acoustic Credential) in the form of single-use audio signals, for example (but not limited to) made of a succession of dual DTMF tones. These audio signals are designed so that they can be conveyed after digitization by telephone audio transmission channels and reproduced as such by acoustic transducers.
  • the site manager 10 is coupled to a network 16 of a mobile network operator MNO (Mobile Network Operator) via an audio telephone gateway PGW (Phone GateWay) 18 and a secure connection 20, e.g. IP link type https , so as to convey acoustic accreditations from the generator 14 to telephone 22 of the user through the audio transmission channels (voice channel) of the mobile network.
  • MNO Mobile Network Operator
  • PGW Packet GateWay
  • secure connection 20 e.g. IP link type https
  • the mobile telephone network 16 is used in a conventional manner by its various subscribers, each user being in possession of a mobile phone 22 of his own, individualized by the information of the SIM card contained in the telephone set or by another unique feature if the phone operates without a SIM card.
  • a user is recognized and identified by the network 16 by means of his subscriber number, and therefore in the same way by the management site 10.
  • Securing the link between the network 16 and the mobile phone 22 can be operated via a trusted service provider or TSM ( Trusted Service Manager ), able to ensure efficiently and safely the various procedures that the description will be exchange or transmission of information between the management site 10 and the mobile phone 22 via the mobile network operator 16.
  • TSM Trusted Service Manager
  • the object used is a mobile phone, so a trivialized object. But it is recognized and authenticated by the SIM card it contains (or by another single element) and which, above all, identifies the user via his phone number (subscriber number).
  • the management site 10 can thus identify a telephone to which it has been connected via the mobile network operator 16 as being that of the authorized user, listed in his database 12.
  • the implementation of the invention involves reproducing by the speaker 24 of the mobile telephone 22, as an audio signal, the encrypted acoustic accreditation generated by the cryptographic generator 14 and transmitted as a voice signal by the intermediary of the telephone gateway 18 and the operator of the mobile network 16.
  • Accreditation reproduced by the speaker 24 of the mobile phone is intended to be picked up by a microphone 26 of a lock 28 so as to control the opening of this lock. It's about allowing the user, holder of the mobile phone number 22 known from the database 12, to prove to the lock 28 that he has the identity that he proclaims, and that he has the rights of access allowing the opening of this lock.
  • the reproduced sound signal thus constitutes a proof of the user's identity and of his opening rights, hence the terminology "acoustic accreditation”.
  • This acoustic accreditation is also encrypted (by cryptographic means in themselves known), and it is disposable to avoid any fraud by recording and duplication, otherwise it would be very easy to record the acoustic signal and then reproduce it at will.
  • the Figure 2 illustrates in the form of block diagram the main organs of the mobile telephone 22 and the lock 28.
  • the telephone 22 comprises a microcontroller 30 coupled to various peripheral devices such as a transmission / reception circuit 32, a display 34, a keyboard 36, a data memory 38, a corresponding UICC card ( Universal In-tegrated circuit card). the "SIM card” for GSM telephony functions) 40, and the acoustic transducer 24.
  • peripheral devices such as a transmission / reception circuit 32, a display 34, a keyboard 36, a data memory 38, a corresponding UICC card ( Universal In-tegrated circuit card). the "SIM card” for GSM telephony functions) 40, and the acoustic transducer 24.
  • Various precautions may be provided to increase the security of the process, in particular by an additional validation requested by the user, for example the input of a personal code of the "PIN code” type, or a validation of biometric type, by a biometric reader incorporated in the telephone or by means of a voice recognition system using the telephone microphone (the specific biometric fingerprint that can be stored in the memory 38 of the telephone, or in the UICC card 40, or in the database 12).
  • an additional validation requested by the user, for example the input of a personal code of the "PIN code” type, or a validation of biometric type, by a biometric reader incorporated in the telephone or by means of a voice recognition system using the telephone microphone (the specific biometric fingerprint that can be stored in the memory 38 of the telephone, or in the UICC card 40, or in the database 12).
  • This accreditation in DDC digital data read by the module 52 in a key or badge that the user has coupled with this module, is analyzed by the microcontroller 44 which conditionally issues an authorization to open the lock 46 if the required criteria are met. completed, including the conformity of the UID.
  • the invention proposes to replace the module 52, or to complete this module 52, by a module 54 able to process accreditations sent to the lock in the form of acoustic accreditations CAC transmitted by a mobile phone 22, instead of DDC digital accreditations read from a card or badge coupled to module 52.
  • the acoustic module 54 is provided with an acoustic transducer in the form of a microphone 56 making it possible to pick up the surrounding sound signals, in particular the acoustic accreditation which will be reproduced by the loudspeaker 24 of the telephone 22, and to transform the signals acoustics captured in digital signals applied to a stage 58 forming a translator, for converting the acoustic accreditations CAC into signals of the same format as the accreditations in digital data DDC would have provided the module 52 by reading a badge or a card.
  • the acoustic module 54 also comprises, advantageously, a transducer 60 making it possible to reproduce a sound signal emitted by the stage 58 and audible from outside the lock, this transducer 60 possibly comprising a loudspeaker or, in a version simplified, a simple component type buzzer (buzzer). It is also possible to use the transducer 46 of the acoustic module 54 by operating it in inverted mode (to emit sound signals instead of sensing them).
  • the primary object of the invention is to replace, or supplement, the "proprietary" technology, specific to the manufacturer and implemented in the reader module 52, with a universal technology based on CAC encrypted acoustic accreditations, which can be implemented without substantial modification of the lock components, both hardware and software.
  • the basic principle is to retain original digital data (DDC) accreditations with their own manufacturer's content and format, and to convert these DDC accreditations into CAC Accreditations, to transmit CACs to the phone, then to have them reproduced by the manufacturer. the user, by means of the loudspeaker of his mobile phone, the acoustic accreditation CAC thus transmitted.
  • Accreditation captured by the acoustic module 54 is then subject to an inverse conversion, performed by the translation stage 58 incorporated in the acoustic module 54, in order to reconstitute the original DDC digital data accreditation from the Acoustic Accreditation CAC that has been captured.
  • a preliminary step is therefore to convert the DDC digital accreditation into a CAC encrypted acoustic accreditation.
  • DDC accreditations in the form of digital data blocks are converted by the cryptographic engine 14 of the secure site 10 into acoustic accreditations CAC.
  • the conversion can be carried out from a data block in which the fields VID, UID and DATA are presented explicitly, to a field CORE / CAC of the acoustic accreditation CAC (of the line a towards the line c of the Figure 3 ).
  • the cryptographic engine may well receive at this stage the information in a non-explicit form (CORE), which is directly converted to give the CORE / CAC field of acoustic accreditation CAC (from line b to line c of the Figure 3 ).
  • CORE non-explicit form
  • the cryptographic engine 14 also adds to the field CORE / CAC containing the actual accreditation data a variable field, different at each generation of an acoustic accreditation, so as to make this acoustic accreditation unique. It may be data generated by a pseudo-random generator or, preferably, a sequence number SEQ.
  • the field SEQ may be a counter incremented each generation of an accreditation by the cryptographic generator 14, or a time stamp that will be functionally equivalent to the incrementation of a counter.
  • the cryptographic generator 14 may also provide for the addition to the acoustic accreditation CAC of a password PWD making it possible to further increase the security of the process.
  • the user comes into contact with the management site by any appropriate means. This can be achieved by calling a phone number, or sending a message (SMS, MMS, e-mail, instant messaging, etc.) to the server, which will call back the user's phone for issue the authorization in the form of encrypted acoustic accreditation.
  • the transmission of this accreditation is executed immediately and directly.
  • it can also be executed by a method of "call back” type: in this case, the user makes telephone contact with the management site, which does not respond immediately, but after hanging up rings the mobile phone for that the user establishes again the contact with the site, and it is at this moment that the acoustic accreditation is delivered to him. Regardless of how the user comes into contact with the remote site, the latter delivers the acoustic accreditation directly to the user, without intermediate storage.
  • This mode is particularly simple to implement, insofar as it is sufficient to use the existing infrastructure, without prior adaptation of the phone, including without any need to load an applet or applet, including midlet or cardlet type .
  • the invention can thus be implemented with any type of mobile phone, even very simple, and without any prior intervention on it.
  • Another advantage lies in the ability to check in real time the validity of the accreditation, for example with the possibility of immediately taking into account a "blacklist" of users.
  • this online mode it is possible to have at the managerial site a large amount of information on the use made of acoustic accreditation, including the date and time of use. , and possibly the geographical location of the user (by identification of the cell of the network from which the user calls).
  • this mode implies having access to the mobile network, which is not always possible (underground car parks, uncovered areas, etc.).
  • it does not in principle allow to have, at the user's choice, several accreditations corresponding to several possible locks, to the extent that it is necessary to have a "one for one" correspondence between accreditation and lock.
  • “offline” is used especially if access to the network is not assured at the time of use.
  • the user connects in advance to the management site and receives from it a predetermined number of acoustic accreditations.
  • These accreditations are stored securely in the phone or in a peripheral memory of the phone (for example an SD or MicroSD card).
  • the user wants to reproduce an acoustic accreditation to open a lock, he launches an application integrated in his phone that searches for the first accreditation among those that have been stored, reproduces it to open the door, and removes it from memory. And so on to use the following accreditations.
  • the application allowing this implementation is an applet stored in the phone, previously sent to it via the mobile network operator, or by downloading to an external medium (SD or MicroSD card), or via a connection Internet.
  • the management site will have previously sent a message such as "SMS", "push SMS” or "WAP push” to the phone, in order to identify the brand and the model of it and present to the user a link allowing the download of the applet.
  • the acoustic module 54 of the lock receives this accredited acoustic accreditation CAC (corresponding at line c of the Figure 3 ).
  • the translation stage 58 then extracts the data block CORE (line d from the Figure 3 ), that is to say, in pictorial terms, that he "opens the envelope (acoustic)" containing these data. It is then possible to obtain, directly or after decoding, the digital data accreditation DDC (line e of the Figure 3 ) with its various useful fields VID, UID and DATA, which is identical to the corresponding accreditation DDC before it has been converted by the cryptographic engine (line a of the Figure 3 ).
  • the DDC accreditation which is in all respects identical to that read by the module 52 from a conventional key or badge according to the manufacturer's own instructions, is applied to the microcontroller 44 for analysis, verification and conditional unlocking of the lock control system 46.
  • the various checks performed by the microcontroller 44 are identical to those which would have been made from information read in a conventional manner by the module 52, according to the specifications of each manufacturer.
  • the role of the translator stage 58 is simply to "open the envelope" of the acoustic accreditation CAC to extract the digital information DDC which had been previously placed in this envelope by the cryptographic engine 14, but without intervening on the content of this DDC digital accreditation.
  • the signal heard near the telephone, and therefore likely to be recorded, is that shown in line c , with superposition of the CAC signal emitted by the telephone and BEEP1 signal issued by the acoustic module of the lock.
  • the combined signal received by the acoustic module of this other lock will therefore be that illustrated line e of the Figure 4 , that is to say a signal comprising two acoustic parasites BEEP1 and BEEP2.
  • the presence of these two parasites will be immediately recognized by the acoustic module, which will refuse the opening.
  • sequence number SEQ1 would be equal to, or less than, that already stored in the memory of the acoustic module of the lock, which will thus be able to detect fraud due to this non-compliant sequence number SEQ1.
  • a bidirectional communication can be established with the secure site 10 if it is possible on the phone to obtain a link with the network at the time of use, which can be traced back to it from the phone.
  • the acoustic module 54 of the lock can produce in acoustic form a password, which is picked up by the microphone of the telephone, then transmitted to the network and to the remote site 10 for to be incorporated in the acoustic accreditation CAC that will be generated by the cryptographic engine 14 (PWD field of the line c of the Figure 3 ).
  • Acoustic accreditation CAC then reproduced by the telephone will include this password, which can then be decoded by the acoustic module 54, which will verify that it matches well with the one just generated by the same module just before.
  • another security consists in causing the acoustic module 54 to generate a delay value or time offset ⁇ t 1 , which is different each time (for example a random delay), and to transmit it to the secure site 10 so that it adds this time offset ⁇ t 1 to the acoustic accreditation CAC during the broadcast of it (line g of the Figure 4 ).
  • the acoustic module 54 verifies, upon receipt of the acoustic accreditation CAC, that it starts well with a time shift ⁇ t 1 , introduced by the remote server, which is equal to the offset value that it had itself. generated just before and sent to the server.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP09170475.9A 2009-09-16 2009-09-16 Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen Not-in-force EP2306407B1 (de)

Priority Applications (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP09170475.9A EP2306407B1 (de) 2009-09-16 2009-09-16 Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen
ES09170475T ES2428004T3 (es) 2009-09-16 2009-09-16 Sistema asegurado de gestión de cerraduras de control digital, adaptado a un funcionamiento mediante acreditaciones acústicas cifradas
US13/394,855 US8712365B2 (en) 2009-09-16 2010-08-16 System for the secure management of digitally controlled locks, operating by means of crypto acoustic credentials
PCT/FR2010/051502 WO2011033199A1 (fr) 2009-09-16 2010-08-16 Systeme de gestion securisee de serrures a commande numerique, adapte a un fonctionnement par accreditations acoustiques chiffrees

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP09170475.9A EP2306407B1 (de) 2009-09-16 2009-09-16 Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP2306407A1 true EP2306407A1 (de) 2011-04-06
EP2306407B1 EP2306407B1 (de) 2013-06-19

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EP09170475.9A Not-in-force EP2306407B1 (de) 2009-09-16 2009-09-16 Gesichertes System zum Programmieren von Schließvorrichtungen über elektronische Steuerung durch chiffrierte akustische Akkreditierungen

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US (1) US8712365B2 (de)
EP (1) EP2306407B1 (de)
ES (1) ES2428004T3 (de)
WO (1) WO2011033199A1 (de)

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EP2720199A1 (de) 2012-10-11 2014-04-16 Openways Sas Gesichertes Steuerungsverfahren zum Öffnen von Verschlussvorrichtungen mit Hilfe von Meldungen, die eine symmetrische Verschlüsselung auslösen

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EP2306407B1 (de) 2013-06-19
US20120172018A1 (en) 2012-07-05
ES2428004T3 (es) 2013-11-05
WO2011033199A1 (fr) 2011-03-24
US8712365B2 (en) 2014-04-29

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