EP2093532A1 - Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles - Google Patents

Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2093532A1
EP2093532A1 EP08200007A EP08200007A EP2093532A1 EP 2093532 A1 EP2093532 A1 EP 2093532A1 EP 08200007 A EP08200007 A EP 08200007A EP 08200007 A EP08200007 A EP 08200007A EP 2093532 A1 EP2093532 A1 EP 2093532A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
missile
module
data
ship
systems
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP08200007A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
designation of the inventor has not yet been filed The
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
MBDA UK Ltd
Original Assignee
MBDA UK Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by MBDA UK Ltd filed Critical MBDA UK Ltd
Priority to EP08200007A priority Critical patent/EP2093532A1/fr
Priority to EP09712189A priority patent/EP2245413A2/fr
Priority to AU2009215371A priority patent/AU2009215371A1/en
Priority to US12/443,789 priority patent/US8274023B2/en
Priority to CA2715869A priority patent/CA2715869A1/fr
Priority to PCT/GB2009/050160 priority patent/WO2009104015A2/fr
Publication of EP2093532A1 publication Critical patent/EP2093532A1/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F41—WEAPONS
    • F41G—WEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
    • F41G7/00—Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles
    • F41G7/34—Direction control systems for self-propelled missiles based on predetermined target position data
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
    • F42B15/00—Self-propelled projectiles or missiles, e.g. rockets; Guided missiles
    • F42B15/01—Arrangements thereon for guidance or control
    • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
    • F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
    • F42B—EXPLOSIVE CHARGES, e.g. FOR BLASTING, FIREWORKS, AMMUNITION
    • F42B8/00—Practice or training ammunition

Definitions

  • the present invention is directed to missile training systems.
  • the present invention is directed to the provision of a mechanism that allows missiles and similar devices to be fired at a target in a realistic, but safe, manner.
  • Live fire exercises in which army or other armed forces personnel use fully functioning weapons systems is well established. Live fire exercises can be used to provide realistic training scenarios, but also present obvious dangers. Live fire exercises present opportunities for checking that weapons systems function correctly and allow users, such as soldiers, to practice using real weapons in situations that are more realistic than firing ranges. Also, training with live ammunition prevents the situation where a soldier's first experience of live firing is in a real combat situation from occurring.
  • Live fire exercises are not limited army training exercises. Other branches of the armed forces use live fire exercises and the principles can be extended to other situations, including civilian applications.
  • a first known approach for firing live missiles at a ship involves the use of a dummy ship. Such a ship may be fitted with appropriate anti-missile technology, but crucially requires no personnel to be on board, thereby eliminating the risk to human life.
  • This approach has two clear disadvantages. First, if the anti-missile defences are unsuccessful, the dummy ship is likely to be damaged. This would be expensive, particularly if sophisticated defensive weapons systems are damaged.
  • a second disadvantage with this system is that if no personnel are on-board, then there is no exposure of such personnel to the effects of an in-coming missile.
  • Figure 1 shows a ship 10 and a missile launch site 12. The trajectory of the missile is indicated by the curve 14.
  • the anti-missile defences of the ship 10 attempt to destroy the missile using an anti-missile weapon, indicated schematically by the arrow 16. If the anti-missile defences of the ship 10 are ineffective, the missile continues over the ship and lands harmlessly, as indicated by the trajectory 18.
  • over-firing involves firing a missile or other projectile at a target, such as a ship, so that the missile or projectile passes over the ship and lands safely on the other side.
  • a target such as a ship
  • This approach enables personnel to be on board the ship and enables the on-board systems to be used in a realistic manner to attempt to destroy the incoming missile.
  • the increased realism provided by enabling personnel to stay on board is tempered by the absence of the reality of the missile approaching the ship.
  • a third approach is to direct a missile towards a ship but to program its route so that it moves away from the ship during the later stages of its approach.
  • Figure 2 shows such an arrangement, including a ship 20 and a missile launch site 22.
  • a missile is fired along trajectory 24 that initially directs the missile towards the ship 20.
  • the anti-missile technology of the ship has an opportunity to destroy the missile as indicated schematically by the arrow 26. If the anti-missile technology is not effective to destroy the missile, the trajectory 24 is programmed such that missile moves away from the ship in a safe manner, as shown in Figure 2 .
  • a problem common to many prior art arrangements is their inability to test for "soft kill” defences.
  • the principle of "soft kill” defences is shown in Figure 3 .
  • a ship 30 is provided and a missile launched from a launch site 32 along trajectory 34 that initially is targeted at the ship 30. Once the missile is detected by the ship 30, a decoy 36 is deployed.
  • the decoy could take many different forms as is well known in the art.
  • the purpose of the decoy is to convince the missile's guidance systems that the decoy 36 is in fact the ship 30.
  • the missile's trajectory 34 is adjusted so that the missile is directed towards the decoy 36.
  • Pre-programmed missiles such as that described with reference to Figure 2 are simply unable to react to soft-kill defences; thus, they cannot be used to test the effectiveness of such defences.
  • the present invention seeks to address at least some of the problems identified above.
  • the present invention provides a module for attachment to an object (such as a missile), the object being adapted to be directed towards at a target (such as a ship), the module comprising a control system providing an output signal indicative of whether or not said object is to be destroyed.
  • the object is destroyed if one of a number of conditions is not met.
  • the present invention also provides a method comprising the steps of: directing an object (such as a missile) towards a target (such as a ship), the object having a module attached thereto; determining the position of the module using a position detector (which may be located within the object); and using the module to destroy the object if one of a number of conditions is not met.
  • an object such as a missile
  • a target such as a ship
  • the object in question may be a missile, torpedo or a similar object or projectile.
  • the object may be fired at the target.
  • the missile may be a conventional missile with its warhead removed.
  • the present invention addresses problems outlined above concerning the testing missile defence systems and the provision of live fire exercises by providing missiles that can be fired at a ship in a conventional manner.
  • the inherent dangers with such a system are reduced by providing a mechanism for destroying the missile before it reaches the target.
  • the present invention provides a simple, elegant means for enabling a real missile or a similar object to be used to provide a realistic battlefield scenario, whilst providing means for destroying the missile before it is able to reach the target in question.
  • a module such as a pod
  • a missile or similar object enables the use of obsolete missiles and/or the manufacture of missiles to obsolete designs for the purpose of training exercises, thereby providing cheap, reliable and relatively realistic training scenarios. In this way, many missiles reaching the end of their in-service life could be used as training missiles.
  • the control system may be adapted to set said output signal to indicate that said object is to be destroyed if one of a number of conditions is not met.
  • Exemplary conditions include the position of the object, the speed of travel of the object and the duration of travel of the object.
  • one of said conditions is whether said object is positioned within an allowed zone.
  • the control system may indicate that the object should be destroyed if any position sensor system indicates that the object is outside an allowed zone.
  • a position detector may be provided for providing position data to said control system.
  • the position detector comprises two or more independent position detector systems.
  • Exemplary position detector systems include various satellite-based systems (such as GPS and Galileo) but there are many alternative positioning systems that could be used (such as inertial and proximity sensor systems).
  • An advantage of using multiple position detector systems is the provision of added confidence in the position data; this confidence is further increased if the various position systems are independent and function in a different manner.
  • a single position signal may be generated in response to the data from the various position detector systems that are used. This simplifies the design and functionality of the remainder of the system.
  • the algorithm used to provide a single position signal in response to a number of position data inputs may take account of confidence data associated with the various position data inputs.
  • the module may include a mechanism for destroying said object.
  • the destruction mechanism may be dependent on the object that is being destroyed. Indeed, the destruction mechanism may be one of the few (possibly the only) bespoke elements of the module.
  • a transmitter for transmitting data, such as position data, to a central server may be provided.
  • Recording position data enables the movement of the object to be tracked and, in the case of a missile or similar object that is fired at a ship or the like, enables a complete three-dimensional reconstruction of an engagement to be generated.
  • the tracking of position by recording the output of the position sensor(s) of the module is relatively straightforward and typically much simpler and cheaper than providing full telemetry data. Tracking position data enables the effectiveness of soft kill defences to be monitored.
  • the module may include a receiver for receiving data from a central server in addition to, or instead of, a transmitter.
  • the receiver may, for example, receive position data and/or destruction instructions; for example, such data or instructions may be transmitted from the target.
  • the module may be provided with means for mechanical attachment to the said object.
  • the mechanical attachment may be extremely simple; for example, a jubilee clip might be provided.
  • the mechanical attachment may be dependent on the object with which the module is intended to be used.
  • the present invention further provides a method comprising the steps of: directing an object (such as a missile or some other projectile) at a target (such as a ship); determining the position of the object using a position detector (for example, using a module or pod attached to the object); and transmitting data concerning the position of the module to a remote server.
  • the method may be used for providing a battlefield simulation.
  • the method may further comprise the step of destroying the object if one of a number of conditions is not met. For example, allowed and disallowed zones for the object may be defined, with the step of destroying the object being activated if the object is within a disallowed zone.
  • the step of destroying the object may be implemented using a module attached to the object.
  • Figure 4 shows a missile 40 having a pod 42 attached thereto using an attachment means 44.
  • the pod is provided to destroy the missile in the event that one of a number of conditions is not met, as described in detail below.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a control system that can be used to destroy the missile 40.
  • the system indicated generally by the reference numeral 50, comprises a position sensor 52, a controller 54, a transceiver 56 and a destruct mechanism 58.
  • the destruct mechanism 58 is used to destroy the missile when instructed to do so by the controller 54.
  • the controller 54 receives position data from position sensor 52. On the basis of the position data, the controller determines whether the missile is in a safe position. If it is, the controller simply allows the missile to proceed as normal. As soon as the missile is deemed to be in an unsafe position, the controller instructs the destruct mechanism 58 to destroy the missile.
  • the destruction of the missile can be achieved in a variety of ways.
  • One exemplary method is to use a break-up explosive charge within the pod that when fired is sufficient to cause the missile to break-up, thereby ensuring that it stops flying as quickly as practicable. Further methods are known to persons skilled in the art.
  • the controller 54 is able to receive data from transceiver 56.
  • the transceiver may, for example, receive instructions from a transmitter to destroy the missile.
  • the transceiver 56 can also be used to transmit position and other data from the controller 54 to a remote server as discussed further below.
  • the transceiver 56 may be able to receive data instructing the control system 50 to destroy the missile, this is unlikely to be sufficiently reliable to be used as the primary mechanism for destroying the missile. Nevertheless, it could provide a useful backup system.
  • a signal might be received at the transceiver to destroy the missile in the event of a failure at the ship and the consequential aborting of the exercise.
  • FIG. 6 The arrangement of Figure 6 includes the position sensor 52 and controller 54 of the system 50.
  • the position sensor 52 includes a first position sensor 60, a second position sensor 62 and a third position sensor 64, each having an output coupled to an input of a circuit 66.
  • the circuit 66 coverts the position data from the sensors 60, 62 and 64 into a single position data signal that is provided to the controller 54.
  • the circuit 66 may function in one of a number of ways. For example, the circuit 66 may provide a simple average position. Alternatively, the circuit 66 may provide an average, but omitting any data signal that is significantly different to the others.
  • the missile in the event that any of the position sensors indicates that the missile is in an unsafe position, the missile is destroyed under the control of the controller 54.
  • the outputs of the first 60, second 62 and third 64 position sensors includes data concerning the reliability of that data.
  • the controller determines a single position signal on the basis of the three position inputs, with the degree of confidence in each data input being used to determine the weight to apply to that data input.
  • the circuit 66 may select the most reliable position data, or may average all data inputs that are above a predetermined reliability threshold. Other algorithms are possible which take into full account the characteristics of each position input to minimise errors.
  • the position sensors may use a Global Position Navigation System, such as the well known Global Positioning System (GPS).
  • GPS Global Positioning System
  • the first 60, second 62 and third 64 position sensors may use different Global Position Navigation Systems; for example, the first position sensor 60 may be a Global Positioning System, the second position sensor may be a GLONASS system and the third position system 64 may be a Galileo positioning system.
  • one or more of the position sensors may implement a different technology.
  • one of the position sensors may be inertial, dead-reckoning system that measures the distance travelled from a known starting position.
  • Other alternatives include the use of a proximity sensor indicating the actual distance of the missile from the target. Suitable radar proximity sensors are known.
  • An alternative proximity sensor uses the strength of a transmitted electrical signal as an indicator of distance.
  • many alternative positioning systems that could be used in the present invention will be known to persons skilled in the art.
  • controller 54 is adapted to instruct the destruct mechanism to destroy the missile when the missile is deemed to be in an unsafe area.
  • Figure 7 demonstrates one definition of an unsafe zone.
  • Figure 7 shows a ship 70.
  • the ship 70 has a missile defence system that has a known operational range. That range defines an area in which incoming missiles should be destroyed and is shown by the dotted line 72 in Figure 7 .
  • an incoming missile should be allowed to enter into the zone 72 but should not be allowed to move sufficiently close to the ship 70 to pose a risk.
  • a line 74 is shown in Figure 7 .
  • the line 74 indicates the boundary of acceptable and unacceptable areas for the missile to be in. Should the missile move below the line 74, the missile is destroyed under the control of the controller 54.
  • Figure 8 shows a more sophisticated scenario, indicated generally by the reference numeral 80.
  • the scenario 80 includes a ship 81, a missile launch site 82 and land areas 83 and 84.
  • the land areas may be real land or may be simulated land.
  • a safe zone is defined by a line 85; should a missile be above of the line 85, it is destroyed under the control of the controller 54.
  • a missile is given a predetermined route 86. Plotting a route enables the missile to avoid the areas of land 83 and 84.
  • a safe corridor is defined around the route 86 as shown by the dotted lines 87 and 88. If the position sensors determine that the missile is outside the defined corridor, then the missile is destroyed.
  • the size of the safe corridor may be variable. For example, tighter tolerances may be required as the missile gets closer to the ship. Also, tighter tolerances may be desirable if the missile is over land. Further, in some embodiments of the invention, the altitude of the missile may be required to be within a given range; again, the tolerance of allowable altitude range might be variable.
  • position sensor redundancy may be provided such that should any of a plurality of navigation systems indicate that the missile is outside of the safe corridor, the missile is destroyed.
  • the destruct mechanism and its associated control system can be provided in a module that is separate to the missile.
  • One such arrangement provides a pod that is attached to the missile in some way, such as by using a simple jubilee clip.
  • An advantage of providing a separate module in this manner is that the control system for the module can be completely separate to the control system for the missile itself. In such an arrangement, there would be no need to understand the control system of the missile itself (and therefore no need for access of control algorithms); this would enable a missile to be used even if the details of missile control system were not known, for example if they were classified. Also, the pod algorithm can be kept simple, and therefore relatively safe and reliable.
  • control module may be provided with means to transmit position data to a remote server.
  • a remote server Such an arrangement enables the movement of the missile to be tracked and enables the engagement to be reconstructed. This might be useful, for example, to determine whether or not (or the extent to which) a soft kill decoy was successful in altering the course of the missile.
  • transmitting position data is relatively straightforward and certainly much simpler than attempting to access detailed telemetry data that might be generated by the control system of the missile itself, which telemetry data may simply be unavailable for testing purposes.
  • the present invention has been described using missiles being fired at a ship as an example; however, the invention is not so limited.
  • the concepts described are readily applicable to sea-skimming, anti-ship missiles, but can also be applied to land-attack cruise missiles approaching and attempting to cross an air-defence zone protected by ground launched anti-air missiles. It would also be possible to apply the principles of the invention to anti-air missiles against manned aircraft where vertical (altitude) separation can be used to maintain safety, although due to the generally smaller size of such missiles and more demanding aerodynamic requirements, the control system of the present invention may need to be incorporated internally, rather than as an externally mounted module.
  • a missile is destroyed in the event that the position of the missile is outside a defined area or range.
  • parameters include: the lateral displacement of the object from a planned track, the time of flight of the object, the early or late arrival of the object at a predetermined position, the altitude of the object, and the total distance travelled.
  • redundancy is to provide more than one position sensor, so that the control system is not reliant of a single input.
  • Another form of redundancy is to provide two entirely separate position control systems, which may have the same or different inputs. The separate control systems can each be used to generate a position output. Additional reliability can be obtained by having different design teams implementing the different systems; in extreme examples, the different design teams may be provided by different companies. In some examples, the design teams may provide different algorithms that use the same data inputs: in other examples, the data inputs themselves might be different.
  • the present invention is directed to the provision of a mechanism that allows missiles and similar devices to be fired at a target in a realistic, but safe, manner.
  • the invention also has application for system development and proving trials for offensive, defensive and surveillance systems.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
  • Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
  • Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
  • Aiming, Guidance, Guns With A Light Source, Armor, Camouflage, And Targets (AREA)
EP08200007A 2008-02-21 2008-02-21 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles Ceased EP2093532A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08200007A EP2093532A1 (fr) 2008-02-21 2008-02-21 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles
EP09712189A EP2245413A2 (fr) 2008-02-21 2009-02-19 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles
AU2009215371A AU2009215371A1 (en) 2008-02-21 2009-02-19 Missile training system
US12/443,789 US8274023B2 (en) 2008-02-21 2009-02-19 Missile training system
CA2715869A CA2715869A1 (fr) 2008-02-21 2009-02-19 Systeme d'entrainement au tir de missiles
PCT/GB2009/050160 WO2009104015A2 (fr) 2008-02-21 2009-02-19 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08200007A EP2093532A1 (fr) 2008-02-21 2008-02-21 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles

Publications (1)

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EP2093532A1 true EP2093532A1 (fr) 2009-08-26

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EP08200007A Ceased EP2093532A1 (fr) 2008-02-21 2008-02-21 Système d'entraînement au tir de missiles

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Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2211371A (en) * 1987-10-17 1989-06-28 Ferranti Plc Position warning system
WO2000003193A1 (fr) * 1998-07-09 2000-01-20 Raytheon Company Missile a limite geographique
JP2004347195A (ja) * 2003-05-21 2004-12-09 Mitsubishi Electric Corp 敵味方識別衛星及び発射母機及び味方通報装置及び攻撃用飛翔体及び敵味方識別システム
US6896220B2 (en) * 2003-05-23 2005-05-24 Raytheon Company Munition with integrity gated go/no-go decision
US6952001B2 (en) * 2003-05-23 2005-10-04 Raytheon Company Integrity bound situational awareness and weapon targeting
US7021187B1 (en) * 2004-03-24 2006-04-04 The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Army Low velocity air burst munition and launcher system implemented on an existing weapon

Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB2211371A (en) * 1987-10-17 1989-06-28 Ferranti Plc Position warning system
WO2000003193A1 (fr) * 1998-07-09 2000-01-20 Raytheon Company Missile a limite geographique
JP2004347195A (ja) * 2003-05-21 2004-12-09 Mitsubishi Electric Corp 敵味方識別衛星及び発射母機及び味方通報装置及び攻撃用飛翔体及び敵味方識別システム
US6896220B2 (en) * 2003-05-23 2005-05-24 Raytheon Company Munition with integrity gated go/no-go decision
US6952001B2 (en) * 2003-05-23 2005-10-04 Raytheon Company Integrity bound situational awareness and weapon targeting
US7021187B1 (en) * 2004-03-24 2006-04-04 The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Army Low velocity air burst munition and launcher system implemented on an existing weapon

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