EP2018632A1 - Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès - Google Patents
Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accèsInfo
- Publication number
- EP2018632A1 EP2018632A1 EP07729015A EP07729015A EP2018632A1 EP 2018632 A1 EP2018632 A1 EP 2018632A1 EP 07729015 A EP07729015 A EP 07729015A EP 07729015 A EP07729015 A EP 07729015A EP 2018632 A1 EP2018632 A1 EP 2018632A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- record
- memory carrier
- code
- memory
- security
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 43
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 16
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 10
- 230000005055 memory storage Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 8
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 241001313846 Calypso Species 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/29—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass containing active electronic elements, e.g. smartcards
Definitions
- Memory carrier authorisation method, reader, network and access control system
- the present invention relates to the technical field of memory carriers for access control systems.
- Such memory carriers comprising a unique, read-only serial code and a plurality of records, comprising a memory carrier identification record and at least one contract identification record, for access control.
- contactless cards such as CALYPSO® or M I FARE® have already been proposed as a versatile means of providing both logical and physical access control to a variety of facilities, such as public transportation, telecommunications or monetary transaction facilities.
- a single such card can contain information about a plurality of contracts, thus providing access to several different facilities.
- such cards already usually comprise in-built security features, they do not, by themselves, provide comprehensive security, as the structure of the contract information and the method of reading it may leave loopholes and backdoors allowing potential abuse.
- United States Patent 5,721 ,781 disclosed a memory carrier for access control, comprising: a unique, read-only serial code; and a plurality of records, comprising a memory carrier identification record and at least one contract identification record; wherein each one of the memory carrier identification record and at least one contract identification record comprises an authentication code; the authentication code of said memory carrier identification record matches in a first check a memory carrier security code resulting from encrypting with a security key a combination of at least part of the unique, read-only serial code and at least part said memory carrier identification record.
- the authentication code of the memory carrier identification record should ensure that copying the records from a valid memory carrier to a blank will not produce another valid memory carrier, since it is linked to both the memory carrier identification record, and the unique, read-only serial code of each memory carrier through an opaque encryption.
- the authentication code of the at least one contract identification record ensures that copying the contract identification records of one valid memory carrier to another valid memory carrier will not produce valid contract identification records in the second memory carrier, since this other authentication code is linked to both the memory carrier serial code and identification record, and to the specific contract identification record.
- the authentication code of the at least one contract identification record also ensures that no authorisation to proceed with operations related to a given contract can be given by a reader not having access to the specific product key associated with that contract.
- the memory carrier of the invention comprises a record allocation table pointing to the memory addresses of at least some of the plurality of records.
- the record allocation table is dynamic, so that each record can be stored in the first available memory address, and said record allocation table comprises a record allocation table authentication code, so as to allow a data integrity check of said record allocation table.
- a dynamic record allocation table enables a much faster authorisation process, a critical aspect in applications such as car parking access cards.
- the record allocation table authentication code ensures that this does not affect the security of the card and that the pointers to the memory addresses of the records can not be tampered with.
- the potential application of this secure dynamic record table is not limited to the memory carrier of the invention, and could also be applied to other memory carriers.
- the plurality of records also comprises other records, such as a life cycle record.
- This has the advantage of allowing further security measures against, for instance, the used of expired or stolen memory carriers.
- the invention also provides a method for using said memory carrier for the authorisation of operations associated with one of the at least one contract identification record of said memory carrier, said method comprising the steps of:
- this method when using a memory carrier comprising a record allocation table pointing to the memory addresses of at least some of the plurality of records, this method also comprises the step of finding in the record allocation table the memory addresses of each memory carrier record to be read. Still more preferably, when using a memory carrier comprising a dynamic record allocation table with a record allocation table authentication code, this method also comprises the step of performing said data integrity check on said dynamic record allocation table.
- this method when using a memory carrier comprising a life cycle record, also comprises the step of reading said life cycle record.
- this method when using a memory carrier comprising at least one record other than the memory carrier identification record and the at least one contract identification record, wherein said other record comprises a record authentication code, this method also comprises the steps of:
- a product table contains a plurality of potential product keys, each one of them individually identified by a product identification code
- said one of the at least one contract identification record contains a particular product identification code
- the step of obtaining the product key involves reading a product identification code contained in said contract identification record and extracting from said product table the product key identified by said particular product identification code.
- the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise logical access to an information system.
- the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise physical access to an enclosed space, comprising, for example, a secure building or at least one car parking space.
- the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise monetary transactions.
- the operations associated with the at least one contract identification record comprise access to services comprising, for example, transportation or telecommunication services.
- the invention also provides a reader for performing said method for using said memory carrier for the authorisation of operations associated with one of the at least one contract identification record of said memory carrier, wherein the reader preferably comprises local memory storage means for containing at least part of one of said security and/or product keys.
- the invention also provides a network comprising at least one such reader connected to at least one other such reader and/or a remote memory storage means for containing at least part of one of said security and/or product keys.
- the invention also provides an access control system comprising at least one such memory carrier and one such reader and/or network.
- Fig. 1 represents a memory carrier according to the invention
- Fig. 2 is a flow diagram representing a method of using said memory carrier according to the invention.
- Fig. 3 is a flow diagram representing the process of authenticating the memory carrier identification record
- Fig. 4 is a flow diagram representing the process of authenticating the life cycle record
- Fig. 5 is a flow diagram representing the process of authenticating a contract identification record
- Fig. 6 represents an access control system according to the invention.
- a memory carrier 1 that contains a serial code 2, a record allocation table 3, comprising a record allocation table authentication code 3a, a memory carrier identification record 4, comprising a memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a, a life cycle record 5, comprising a life cycle record authentication code 5a, and at least one contract identification record 6, comprising a corresponding contract identification record authentication code 6a and a product key 6b.
- the serial code 2 is unique to each memory carrier 1 and read-only, meaning that it can not be altered, erased or overwritten without destroying the memory carrier 1.
- the record allocation table 3 contains the memory address of each individual record in the memory carrier 1. So, for reading and/or writing in a given record, the record allocation table 3 needs to be consulted first in order to ascertain the memory address, that is, the actual position within the memory carrier, of that particular record.
- the record allocation table 3 is dynamic, that is, it can reassign a given record to a different memory address than its original one. This accelerates the read/write process, which is very advantageous in time-critical applications, such as car parking access cards.
- the record allocation table 3 also comprises a record allocation table authentication code 3a, which can be used to perform a data integrity check of the record allocation table 3 every time that it is to be consulted.
- the memory carrier identification record 4 serves to identify each individual memory carrier 1.
- the memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a ensures that a given memory carrier 1 cannot be falsified by copying it straight onto another, blank, memory carrier.
- the life cycle record 5 contains information regarding the life cycle of each individual memory carrier 1 , that is for instance, when it was produced, when it was activated, whether it has been previously locked or cancelled, whether it has been unlocked or reactivated, the expiration date, etc.
- the life cycle record 5 also contains an authentication code 5a to ensure, for instance, that a stolen memory carrier 1 is not illegitimately reactivated.
- Each contract identification record 6 contains information identifying a contract related to certain operations which the memory carrier 1 can authorize to perform. These operations may comprise logical access to an information system, physical access to an enclosed space, monetary transactions or access to services. In this way, a single memory carrier 1 can be used, for instance, to get entrance to a parking near an entertainment arena, to access the public transportation system so as to go from the parking to the arena, to get entrance to the arena, to pay for goods bought within the arena, etc. each one of these operations being actually related to a different contract with a different contractor.
- Each contract identification record 6 also comprises a contract identification record authentication code 6a and a product identification code 6b, to ensure not only that spurious contract identification records cannot be added to a memory carrier 1 , but also that a given contractor can only perform those operations related to its corresponding contract identification record, that is for instance, in the example given above, that the memory card reader of the arena access system cannot illegitimately charge the electronic wallet within the same memory carrier 1.
- the memory carrier 1 could be a card and could also comprise data processing means and/or a contactless interface.
- Contactless smart cards are particularly advantageous for realising the memory carrier 1 , because of their capabilities, ease of use and practicality.
- other types of memory carriers such as telephone SIM cards, should not be excluded.
- the first step 10 of the method consists in reading the serial code 2 of the memory carrier 1.
- the memory carrier identification record 4 is read.
- the memory carrier identification record authentication code 4a is contained, for example, as a two-digit trailer, in the memory carrier identification record.
- This memory carrier identification record authentication step 50 comprises several smaller steps, illustrated in Fig. 3:
- step 60 at least part of the serial code 2 and at least part of the memory carrier identification record 4 are combined by, for example, concatenating them.
- a key offset code is then calculated in step 70 using the result of this combination, by, for example, adding all digits.
- a security key is extracted from a security key table containing a plurality of potential security keys, each one identified by one key offset code.
- Table 1 Example of security key table
- step 90 Using this security key in a predefined encryption algorithm, it is then possible in step 90 to encrypt the above mentioned combination of at least part of the memory carrier identification record 4 and at least part of the serial code 2 to obtain a memory carrier security code.
- Each digit of the security key indicates at which string position the corresponding digit of the combined value needs to be stored.
- the second digit of the combined value thus needs to be stored at string position 4.
- step 100 the authentication code 4a of the memory carrier identification record 4 is verified by means of a check, in this case a redundancy check, in which this authentication code 4a is compared with the result of a predetermined calculation on the memory carrier security code. If that result does not match the authentication code 4a, the process of reading the memory carrier can be interrupted.
- a check in this case a redundancy check, in which this authentication code 4a is compared with the result of a predetermined calculation on the memory carrier security code. If that result does not match the authentication code 4a, the process of reading the memory carrier can be interrupted.
- step 110 will be to read the life cycle record 5.
- Authenticating the life cycle record in step 120 will comprise a number of smaller steps, illustrated in turn in Fig. 4:
- step 130 at least part of a code comprising information from the memory carrier serial code, such as the memory carrier security code, and at least part of the life cycle record 5 are combined in a similar combination process as that of step 50.
- step 140 the result of this combination is encrypted using an additional predefined encryption algorithm with the security key obtained in step 70.
- step 150 an additional check, in this case also a redundancy check, will compare the authentication code 5a contained in said life cycle record 5 with the result of an additional predefined calculation on the result of encryption step 140. If that result does not match the authentication code 5a, the process of reading the memory carrier can be interrupted.
- the next step 170 will be to read a contract identification record 6, followed by the step 180 of authenticating said contract identification record 6.
- the contract identification record authentication step 180 in turn comprises several smaller steps, illustrated in Fig. 5:
- step 190 at least part of a code comprising information from the memory carrier serial code, such as the memory carrier security code and at least part of the contract identification record 6 are combined in a similar combination process as that of step 50.
- step 200 which can be performed simultaneously to step 190, a product key is extracted using a product identification code 6b contained in the contract identification record 6 from a product table containing a plurality of potential product keys, each one identified by one product identification code 6b.
- the product key can be used in step 210 to encrypt the result of step 190 with yet another encryption algorithm to produce a business security code.
- this business security code will then be compared in yet another check 220, in the form of a redundancy check, using yet another predefined calculation, with the authentication code 6a of said contract identification record 6. If this check 220 failed, the process could also be interrupted, but if the contract identification record 6 is authenticated, then the operations related to said contract could be authorised.
- An access control system 11 comprises several memory carriers 1 as illustrated in Fig. 1 , in this case in the form of contactless smart cards.
- the access control system 11 also comprises several readers 12, each one of them capable of performing the method illustrated in Figs. 2-5 using the memory carriers 1.
- Some of these readers 12 can be autonomous and contain the security key and product tables in local memory storage means, whereas some other of these readers 12 can be integrated in a network 13 connecting them to each other and to a remote memory storage means 14, and the security key and product key tables can be contained in the remote memory storage means 14 or distributed throughout the network 13.
- the network 13 can be a local network in turn connected to a remote network (not illustrated) connected to several such local networks.
- Each reader 12 can have access to product tables containing different selections of product keys, therefore enabling them to authorise operations related to different selections of contracts. So, some readers 12 can be associated, for example, to a parking access, other readers 12 to a payment system, whereas other readers 12 may be associated to public transportation services.
- a reader 12 could either read all the contract information records 6 present in a memory carrier 1 , or a selection thereof, such as only those contract information records 6 for which it has access to the corresponding product keys.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Communication Control (AREA)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP07729015A EP2018632B1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2007-05-11 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP06113897A EP1855254A1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2006-05-12 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
PCT/EP2007/054563 WO2007131952A1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2007-05-11 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
EP07729015A EP2018632B1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2007-05-11 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2018632A1 true EP2018632A1 (fr) | 2009-01-28 |
EP2018632B1 EP2018632B1 (fr) | 2009-09-16 |
Family
ID=37103125
Family Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP06113897A Withdrawn EP1855254A1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2006-05-12 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
EP07729015A Active EP2018632B1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2007-05-11 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
Family Applications Before (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP06113897A Withdrawn EP1855254A1 (fr) | 2006-05-12 | 2006-05-12 | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (2) | EP1855254A1 (fr) |
AT (1) | ATE443305T1 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE602007002495D1 (fr) |
ES (1) | ES2332022T3 (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2007131952A1 (fr) |
Family Cites Families (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US4816653A (en) * | 1986-05-16 | 1989-03-28 | American Telephone And Telegraph Company | Security file system for a portable data carrier |
FR2722596A1 (fr) * | 1994-07-13 | 1996-01-19 | France Telecom | Systeme de controle d'acces limites a des places horaires autorisees et renouvables au moyen d'un support de memorisation portable |
US5721781A (en) * | 1995-09-13 | 1998-02-24 | Microsoft Corporation | Authentication system and method for smart card transactions |
US6871278B1 (en) * | 2000-07-06 | 2005-03-22 | Lasercard Corporation | Secure transactions with passive storage media |
-
2006
- 2006-05-12 EP EP06113897A patent/EP1855254A1/fr not_active Withdrawn
-
2007
- 2007-05-11 AT AT07729015T patent/ATE443305T1/de active
- 2007-05-11 ES ES07729015T patent/ES2332022T3/es active Active
- 2007-05-11 EP EP07729015A patent/EP2018632B1/fr active Active
- 2007-05-11 DE DE602007002495T patent/DE602007002495D1/de active Active
- 2007-05-11 WO PCT/EP2007/054563 patent/WO2007131952A1/fr active Application Filing
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO2007131952A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE602007002495D1 (de) | 2009-10-29 |
EP1855254A1 (fr) | 2007-11-14 |
EP2018632B1 (fr) | 2009-09-16 |
ATE443305T1 (de) | 2009-10-15 |
EP1855254A8 (fr) | 2008-04-02 |
WO2007131952A1 (fr) | 2007-11-22 |
ES2332022T3 (es) | 2010-01-22 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US5900606A (en) | Method of writing information securely in a portable medium | |
US8258924B2 (en) | Merchandise-integral transaction receipt | |
KR100265473B1 (ko) | 위조신용카드,억세스배지,전자회계등의악용방지방법및수단 | |
US4357529A (en) | Multilevel security apparatus and method | |
US20030154355A1 (en) | Methods and apparatus for providing a memory challenge and response | |
JP2002512715A (ja) | 安全なマルチアプリケーションカードシステムおよびプロセス | |
CN113450092A (zh) | 一种基于区块链网络的物品安全高效交易方法、系统及存储介质 | |
US20060200674A1 (en) | Method for securing rfid charge value media via cryptographic signing and block locking | |
EP1058216A1 (fr) | Carte à mémoire | |
KR20000069703A (ko) | 칩카드 및 이것의 사용을 위한 방법 | |
US8276814B1 (en) | System and method for carrying out secure transactions | |
JP2001525088A (ja) | インテリジェント・データキャリヤのデータの安全な読み取りおよび処理のためのシステム | |
US7562050B2 (en) | Aging of electronic payment units | |
RU2412484C2 (ru) | Защищенный переносной терминал для электронных транзакций и защищенная система электронных транзакций | |
JPH1131190A (ja) | 電子マネーカード、電子マネー入出金機及び電子マネーカード編集装置 | |
EP2018632B1 (fr) | Support de mémoire, procédé d'autorisation, lecteur, réseau et système de contrôle d'accès | |
JPH0822517A (ja) | ハイブリッドカードの改ざん防止方式 | |
JP2003108530A (ja) | 認証システム | |
JP6270005B1 (ja) | 磁気記録カード及び情報照合システム | |
Kose et al. | A SECURE DESIGN ON MIFARE CLASSIC CARDS FOR ENSURING CONTACTLESS PAYMENT AND CONTROL SERVICES | |
JPH09106456A (ja) | カード利用における本人確認方法及びicカードを用いた本人確認システム並びに当該システムに用いるicカード | |
JP2000251050A (ja) | Icカード、icカード情報読取装置、icカード情報集中管理装置、icカードの不正記録情報検知方法及びシステム | |
Kose et al. | ADVANCES IN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS Vol. 7, Num. 1, 2022 A SECURE DESIGN ON MIFARE CLASSIC CARDS FOR ENSURING CONTACTLESS PAYMENT AND CONTROL SERVICES | |
Shelfer et al. | Smartcards. | |
JPH04118797A (ja) | 偽造ユーザカード使用防止付取引端末機 |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20081126 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL BA HR MK RS |
|
GRAP | Despatch of communication of intention to grant a patent |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR1 |
|
RAP1 | Party data changed (applicant data changed or rights of an application transferred) |
Owner name: SERVIPARK INTERNATIONAL |
|
GRAS | Grant fee paid |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: EPIDOSNIGR3 |
|
GRAA | (expected) grant |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009210 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: HK Ref legal event code: DE Ref document number: 1125729 Country of ref document: HK |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: B1 Designated state(s): AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: HR |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: GB Ref legal event code: FG4D |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: EP |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: IE Ref legal event code: FG4D |
|
REF | Corresponds to: |
Ref document number: 602007002495 Country of ref document: DE Date of ref document: 20091029 Kind code of ref document: P |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: ES Ref legal event code: FG2A Ref document number: 2332022 Country of ref document: ES Kind code of ref document: T3 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: LT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: SE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: FI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
LTIE | Lt: invalidation of european patent or patent extension |
Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: PL Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: LV Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: SI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CY Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: EE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: IS Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20100116 Ref country code: CZ Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 Ref country code: PT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20100118 Ref country code: RO Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: SK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PLBE | No opposition filed within time limit |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009261 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: NO OPPOSITION FILED WITHIN TIME LIMIT |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: DK Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
26N | No opposition filed |
Effective date: 20100617 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20091217 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: MC Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20100531 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20100511 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IE Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20100511 Ref country code: MT Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: CH Ref legal event code: PL |
|
GBPC | Gb: european patent ceased through non-payment of renewal fee |
Effective date: 20110511 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: CH Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20110531 Ref country code: LI Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20110531 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: GB Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20110511 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: HU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20100317 Ref country code: LU Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF NON-PAYMENT OF DUE FEES Effective date: 20100511 Ref country code: BG Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
PG25 | Lapsed in a contracting state [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: TR Free format text: LAPSE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SUBMIT A TRANSLATION OF THE DESCRIPTION OR TO PAY THE FEE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME-LIMIT Effective date: 20090916 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: PLFP Year of fee payment: 9 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: HK Ref legal event code: WD Ref document number: 1125729 Country of ref document: HK |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: PLFP Year of fee payment: 10 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: PLFP Year of fee payment: 11 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: PLFP Year of fee payment: 12 |
|
REG | Reference to a national code |
Ref country code: FR Ref legal event code: PLFP Year of fee payment: 17 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: IT Payment date: 20230525 Year of fee payment: 17 Ref country code: FR Payment date: 20230412 Year of fee payment: 17 Ref country code: ES Payment date: 20230612 Year of fee payment: 17 Ref country code: DE Payment date: 20230530 Year of fee payment: 17 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: AT Payment date: 20230519 Year of fee payment: 17 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: BE Payment date: 20230412 Year of fee payment: 17 |
|
PGFP | Annual fee paid to national office [announced via postgrant information from national office to epo] |
Ref country code: NL Payment date: 20240415 Year of fee payment: 18 |