EP1847092A1 - Procede pour intervenir dans des liaisons de communication codees dans un reseau oriente paquet - Google Patents

Procede pour intervenir dans des liaisons de communication codees dans un reseau oriente paquet

Info

Publication number
EP1847092A1
EP1847092A1 EP06707918A EP06707918A EP1847092A1 EP 1847092 A1 EP1847092 A1 EP 1847092A1 EP 06707918 A EP06707918 A EP 06707918A EP 06707918 A EP06707918 A EP 06707918A EP 1847092 A1 EP1847092 A1 EP 1847092A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
network element
session key
message
skl
encryption
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP06707918A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Jens-Uwe Busser
Gerald Liebe
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens AG
Original Assignee
Siemens AG
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens AG filed Critical Siemens AG
Publication of EP1847092A1 publication Critical patent/EP1847092A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/22—Arrangements for supervision, monitoring or testing
    • H04M3/2281—Call monitoring, e.g. for law enforcement purposes; Call tracing; Detection or prevention of malicious calls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1076—Screening of IP real time communications, e.g. spam over Internet telephony [SPIT]
    • H04L65/1079—Screening of IP real time communications, e.g. spam over Internet telephony [SPIT] of unsolicited session attempts, e.g. SPIT
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication
    • H04L65/1066—Session management
    • H04L65/1073—Registration or de-registration
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M7/00—Arrangements for interconnection between switching centres
    • H04M7/006—Networks other than PSTN/ISDN providing telephone service, e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), including next generation networks with a packet-switched transport layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M7/00—Arrangements for interconnection between switching centres
    • H04M7/006—Networks other than PSTN/ISDN providing telephone service, e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), including next generation networks with a packet-switched transport layer
    • H04M7/0063—Networks other than PSTN/ISDN providing telephone service, e.g. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), including next generation networks with a packet-switched transport layer where the network is a peer-to-peer network

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a method for connection to encrypted communication links according to the preamble of patent claim 1 and a network element according to the preamble of patent claim 13.
  • the term "legal interception” refers to a feature of public communication networks that allows authorized government agencies to connect to communication links and listen to the communication taking place via this communication link.
  • the term communication includes both real-time connections z. B. for voice and / or video communication as well as non-real-time connections such as remote copy transmission, electronic mail or. E-mail or messaging services, commonly referred to as "chat", etc.
  • Decentralized networks are known in the prior art in which a predominant proportion of connected network elements offer functions and services to other network elements and, on the other hand, offered by other network elements
  • a considered network element takes on a case by case role as a server or server over another network element. a role as a client.
  • a network element connected to the decentralized network is often referred to as a "peer" in contrast to a conventional client-server classification.
  • peer-to-peer networks are also referred to as peer-to-peer networks or, in short, as P2P networks.
  • P2P network the definition of a decentralized network does not generally exclude the existence of centralized instances. Also on mixed forms of networks, where certain tasks on a central instance or. Server are relocated, is called decentralized network or. P2P network, as far as in these networks, no server is maintained over which any communication relationship between two network elements is to lead.
  • PKI Public Key Infrastructure
  • every participant in a communication system has a digital certificate that binds a public key to its identity.
  • Each participant also has a private key corresponding to his public key, which the present participant keeps secret.
  • the digital certificate of a current participant is given by a third party, a so-called Certification authority resp. Certificate Auhority, CA, or Trusted Third Party, TTP, generated with the corresponding identification features of the subscriber.
  • the security infrastructure provides a trusted one
  • a so-called end-to-end Encryption used for confidential communication between two participants.
  • the data to be exchanged are first sent to a sending subscriber A with a session key or message.
  • Session key symmetrically encrypted.
  • This session key is then encrypted with the public key of a receiving subscriber B and sent to this subscriber B.
  • this session key is recreated for each message and re-communicated to the receiving party B in each case.
  • Non-real-time communication occurs, for example, with encrypted e-mail.
  • a message MSGl sent by a first party A is initially assumed.
  • a first session key SK1 is asymmetrically encrypted by the transmitting first subscriber A with a public key Q B of the receiving second subscriber B.
  • the reference symbol E denotes an encryption operation ("encryption").
  • Communication data PLD which contain, for example, the actual message text of an e-mail, are encrypted with the first session key SK1. Both components are then transmitted to a receiving subscriber B.
  • the message MSG1 can still be digitally signed by the sending subscriber A, so that the receiving subscriber B can check the authenticity of the message.
  • FIG. 1B shows a message MSG2 sent by the second party B.
  • a second session key SK2 is asymmetrically encrypted by the sending second subscriber B with a public key Q A of the receiving second subscriber A.
  • a new second session key SK2 was generated for the second message MSG2 and communicated to the receiving subscriber A again.
  • a method for a real-time-capable communication for example a telephone connection between two communication partners, using an end-to-end encryption
  • a common session key is usually negotiated dynamically when establishing a communication connection, for example via a so-called Diffie-Hellman method with authentication.
  • both communication partners select a secret random number and calculate a one-way function with suitable parameters that are the same for both communication partners.
  • the resulting intermediate result is then sent to each other's communication partner.
  • Both communication partners use this to calculate a session key that is identical for both communication partners.
  • This session key can not be calculated by a third party because you have to know at least one of the two secret random numbers.
  • exchanged messages of the respective communication partner are digitally signed, so that an authenticity of the respective communication partner is ensured.
  • the object of the invention is therefore to provide improved means for switching authorized devices to encrypted communication connection while maintaining the security infrastructure.
  • a solution of the object is achieved in a communication system with the features of claim 1 with regard to their method aspect by a method having the features of claim and in terms of their device aspect by a network element having the features of claim 13.
  • the object is further by a computer program product with the features of Patent claim 14 solved
  • the invention is based on the consideration of enabling activation by authorized entities without the private keys of the network elements connected to a packet-oriented network (for example communication terminals, computer systems, mobile computer units such as personal digital assistant, PDA, etc.) central office.
  • a packet-oriented network for example communication terminals, computer systems, mobile computer units such as personal digital assistant, PDA, etc.
  • the method according to the invention is made possible by a change in the software of the network elements involved.
  • the network elements are placed in a listening mode in the course of which they communicate the session keys of incoming and outgoing messages to an authorized control point.
  • the invention for example, builds on an environment in which participants in a communication network have a digital certificate, and thus a strong authentication and end-to-end encryption of communication data is possible.
  • the inventive method is based on a
  • the encryption is included - but not necessarily wise - an end-to-end encryption.
  • Such encryption takes place in the following method steps: a) Definition of a session key or even "session key" between the first network element and the second network element.
  • the use of this session key is for performance reasons in the form of a symmetric session key, d. H . a key that is applied by both the sending and the receiving side.
  • a change of the first network element into a listening mode takes place upon receipt of a request from a third network element, in particular a computer system of an executive authority, which carries out a connection.
  • This listening mode takes place without the need to hear the participants participating in the communication.
  • a result of an encryption of the session key with a public key assigned to the third network element is inserted into the message according to step d) and / or added to the message.
  • Encryption with a public key assigned to the third network element ensures that makes sure that only the executive authority can decrypt the session key by means of a corresponding private key assigned to the third network element.
  • Intermediate node devices make it easy to intercept the thus modified message because of the packet-oriented nature of the network.
  • a significant advantage of the method according to the invention is the fact that a legal interception by authorized agencies is made possible without providing for each network element a deposit of the j eching private key.
  • a further advantage lies in the difficulty for a subscriber to determine the listening process using the method according to the invention.
  • controlling peer is a peer which otherwise operates in a conventional manner and a hierarchy, advantageously no changes in the architecture of the network and no further interventions in the software of other network elements are necessary for implementing the method according to the invention.
  • An embodiment of the invention which is advantageous in particular for non-real-time-capable communication provides for defining the session key a definition of the session key by the first network element and a transmission of the session key to the second network element.
  • An embodiment of the invention that is particularly advantageous for real-time-capable communication provides for an agreement of the session key between the communication partners using the Diffie-Hellman method in order to determine the session key.
  • Fig. IA a structure diagram for the schematic representation of an encrypted message sent by a subscriber according to the prior art
  • Fig. IB a structure diagram for the schematic representation of a received encrypted message from a subscriber according to the prior art
  • Fig. 2 shows a structure diagram for the schematic representation of an encrypted message sent by an activated subscriber
  • Fig. 3A is a structural diagram for schematically illustrating an encrypted message received from an activated subscriber
  • Fig. 3B shows a structure diagram for the schematic representation of an encrypted message sent by an activated subscriber according to a first embodiment
  • Fig. 3C shows a structure diagram for the schematic representation of an encrypted message sent by an activated subscriber according to a second embodiment
  • FIG. 4 shows a structure diagram for the schematic representation of a message exchange in a first phase
  • FIG. Fig. FIG. 5 shows a structure diagram for a schematic representation of a message exchange in a second phase
  • Fig. 6 a structural diagram for a schematic representation of an opened message exchange in a third phase.
  • FIGS. 1A and 1B have already been explained in the introduction to the description.
  • a service provider resp. Network operator who is responsible for the implementation of legal interception, with the manufacturer of the network element software or. Terminal or software clients working together in an appropriate manner.
  • all messages in the considered here by the service provider managed packet - oriented network to a or. be forwarded from an activated network element via an intermediate network element, such as a network node unit, to an executive authority.
  • Such intermediate network elements are omnipresent in a packet-oriented network anyway, so that this assumption is not an indispensable prerequisite for the inventive method.
  • the listening mode according to the invention proceeds as follows.
  • courts receive certificates from a certificate issuer which authorize the issue of eavesdropper permits. If, on the part of a competent executive authority, there is a need to intercept the communication of a participant, this must first obtain permission from the competent court. This permission is provided in the form of a message signed by the competent court. In this message it is preferably determined who, how long and by whom may be intercepted.
  • the certificate of the competent court, which authorizes the executive authority for a connection must either be sent or integrated in the production.
  • the message specifies the identity of the listener, the listening period and the public key of the listening authority. Authority P can then send this message to the network element to be intercepted, thus switching it to the listening mode for the specified duration.
  • the internal logic of the network element automatically changes back to a normal O- operating mode.
  • the intercepted subscriber receives a message by the internal logic of the network element after expiry of a deadline that he has been intercepted.
  • measures are taken which prevent a manipulation of the system time of the network element by the respective user.
  • Another embodiment relates to additional messages generated by the intercepted network element in the context of the interception process to notify used keys to the executive authority.
  • these messages could be sent directly to the address of a network element available to the executive authority. But this would have the network address or. IP address to the intercepted network element are made known. However, this notice could be discovered and the transmission of messages to the executive authority blocked by settings on a firewall associated with the relevant network element. It is therefore proposed to send such messages in general to a central network element managed by the service provider, for example a gatekeeper, rendezvous server, charging server, etc. With such central network elements network elements also communicate otherwise, so that a message sent does not arouse suspicion in a participant of a wiretapped network element. Subsequently, a forwarding to the executive authority takes place starting from this central network element.
  • FIG. 2 is used predominantly for a non-real-time communication mode.
  • a network element to be intercepted (not shown) encrypts communication data PLD when a message MSG3 is sent with a session key SK1.
  • the result of this encryption is shown in the drawing as in the drawing as E s ⁇ i (PLD)
  • the session key SKl is now but in contrast to the method of FIG IA and FIG IB not only with the public key Q B of - not shown - receiving Network element B, but additionally encrypted with the public key Q p of the executive authority.
  • the encrypted contents are in the drawing as
  • this additional part can be separated from the message, so that the recipient receives a message identical to the first message in FIG. 1A message, thus a message, which is not different from a message MSGl in which the transmitter is not subject to a circuit.
  • the intercepting authority receives from the router a copy of the message which it can decrypt with a private key (not shown) assigned to it.
  • a private key (not shown) assigned to it.
  • Transmitter B transmits - analogously to the second message MSG2 in FIG. 1B - messages in which the contained session key SK2 is further encrypted only with the public key Q A assigned to the receiver A.
  • a copy of this message MSG5 is also forwarded to the network element associated with the executive authority.
  • the executive authority can not yet decrypt the forwarded message MSG5. This decryption can then take place as soon as the intercepted network element A, after receiving a message, encrypts the seat subkey SK2 used therein with the public key Q P of the executive authority, and according to the inventive method - cf.
  • FIG. 3B - corresponding message generated MSG5 sends to the executive authority.
  • the executive authority can now decrypt the previous message MSG4 received from the intercepted network element.
  • the sixth message shown in FIG. 3C is an optional, shortened form of the fifth message MSG5 from FIG. 3B, which is also the object of the
  • Decryption of the previous, received from the intercepted network element message MSG4 is used.
  • FIGS. 4 to 6 show a schematically illustrated sequence of a legal interception according to the method according to the invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows a communication system CSY, which has as a transmission medium a packet-oriented network, in particular with a peer-to-peer architecture.
  • a participant of a first network element A communicates via a first intermediate network node Rl and a second intermediate network node R2 with a participant of a second network element B.
  • a third party of a third network element X is not involved in this communication.
  • each network node A, B, X is assigned a respective certificate UCA, UCB, UCX.
  • the third party of the third network element X attempts to intercept communications between the network elements.
  • the string "&% $ ⁇ / (%" shown in the drawing on a communication path leading to the third network element X symbolizes that the third
  • Network element X in ignorance of a matching key can not gain knowledge about the content of the exchanged message.
  • the executive authority E receives from a competent court J a judicial hearing authorization PERM (A) in the form of a signed message.
  • This permission PERM (A) is sent by the executive authority E to the network element A to be switched on, which then changes into a listening mode.
  • the network element A shares in this mode, the executive authority E according to the foregoing, the symmetric key or. Session key with all incoming and outgoing messages. Only the executive authority E can then listen to the network element A.

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé pour intervenir ou intercepter de manière légale des liaisons de communication codées, de préférence dans un réseau de communication d'homologues. Si tous les participants dans un réseau de communication possèdent un certificat numérique, alors il est possible d'obtenir une forte authentification et un codage de bout en bout des données de communication. Cependant, afin de permettre une interception légale en des points autorisés, une modification d'éléments de réseau est proposée. Ces éléments peuvent être mis dans un mode d'écoute spécial, dans lequel ils communiquent les codes de tous les messages entrants et sortants d'un point de contrôle autorisé.
EP06707918A 2005-02-01 2006-01-31 Procede pour intervenir dans des liaisons de communication codees dans un reseau oriente paquet Withdrawn EP1847092A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE200510004612 DE102005004612A1 (de) 2005-02-01 2005-02-01 Verfahren zur Aufschaltung auf verschlüsselte Kommunikationsverbindungen in einem paketorientierten Netzwerk
PCT/EP2006/050546 WO2006082181A1 (fr) 2005-02-01 2006-01-31 Procede pour intervenir dans des liaisons de communication codees dans un reseau oriente paquet

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1847092A1 true EP1847092A1 (fr) 2007-10-24

Family

ID=36084423

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP06707918A Withdrawn EP1847092A1 (fr) 2005-02-01 2006-01-31 Procede pour intervenir dans des liaisons de communication codees dans un reseau oriente paquet

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US20080307225A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1847092A1 (fr)
CN (1) CN101151871A (fr)
CA (1) CA2596525A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE102005004612A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2006082181A1 (fr)
ZA (1) ZA200706193B (fr)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8862872B2 (en) * 2008-09-12 2014-10-14 Qualcomm Incorporated Ticket-based spectrum authorization and access control
CN102177689A (zh) * 2008-10-10 2011-09-07 爱立信电话股份有限公司 合法当局许可证管理
US8990569B2 (en) * 2008-12-03 2015-03-24 Verizon Patent And Licensing Inc. Secure communication session setup
DE102016200382A1 (de) * 2016-01-14 2017-07-20 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Verfahren zur Überprüfung einer Sicherheitseinstufung eines ersten Geräts mit Hilfe eines digitalen Zertifikats, ein erstes und zweites Gerät sowie eine Zertifikat-Ausstellungsvorrichtung
CN107426521A (zh) * 2016-05-24 2017-12-01 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种视频通话方法及终端
US10862872B1 (en) 2020-04-30 2020-12-08 Snowflake Inc. Message-based database replication

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US5557765A (en) * 1994-08-11 1996-09-17 Trusted Information Systems, Inc. System and method for data recovery
US5901227A (en) * 1996-06-20 1999-05-04 Novell, Inc. Method and apparatus for implementing partial and complete optional key escrow
US7006508B2 (en) * 2000-04-07 2006-02-28 Motorola, Inc. Communication network with a collection gateway and method for providing surveillance services
EP1452000A2 (fr) * 2001-12-07 2004-09-01 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) Interception licite de trafic de donnees chiffre de bout en bout

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US20080307225A1 (en) 2008-12-11
ZA200706193B (en) 2008-06-25
CA2596525A1 (fr) 2006-08-10
DE102005004612A1 (de) 2006-08-10
WO2006082181A1 (fr) 2006-08-10
CN101151871A (zh) 2008-03-26

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