Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
  • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/08—Access security
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W8/00—Network data management
  • H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data

Definitions

• Access control method between a control module and an autonomous localization module is a control module and an autonomous localization module
• the present invention relates to a module coupling a geographical location device and a wireless data transmission device.
• Such modules exist on the market and use for example the well-known GPS (Global Positioning System) technology which is based on the reception of signals from geostationary satellites. Once the position of the known module, this module has a wireless communication path type GSM, GPRS, CDMA or UMTS.
• GPS Global Positioning System
• the communication standard plays a minor role and can be of any type.
• Such modules are currently available on the market as proposed by Wavecom S.A (France). These modules are completely autonomous and can be used for many applications such as traceability of objects, animals or warning systems on boats or vehicles.
• the interrogative mode is the interrogative mode.
• the user wishing to know the position of the module sends a query message. This message triggers the activation of the locating device and when a position has been determined, this position is transmitted on the communication channel.
• a module has been used in EP 1.012.809 to determine the traffic load on the roads.
• the method and system relate to the collection of road traffic data via a mobile network.
• the instantaneous position of a vehicle is determined by means such as GPS which are equipped with certain vehicles that are in the road network.
• the determined positions are transmitted by means of transmissions installed in the vehicles, in the form of short messages to a traffic data collection center. These short messages are exploited to determine road segments and average vehicle speeds on these segments.
• the communication means are connected to a central unit that manages all the modules for example in order to trigger an emergency call as illustrated in the document EP 0748727A1.
• This call makes it possible to locate the vehicle in difficulty and to intervene quickly.
• the mobile equipment sends a token including an identification of the desired application, a date and a serial number.
• a secure token is also described and includes a signature and encrypted means.
• the token is presented to authenticate the mobile equipment when downloading data for example.
• the request is initiated by the mobile equipment in order to have additional services related to a particular location.
• this document does not solve the problem of the authentication of the central vis-à-vis the mobile but is only to transmit by the mobile device a token that allows a third party to require the position of the mobile.
• the messages exchanged on the telecommunication network are accessible to all and can easily be interpreted.
• a third party can interrogate the module and thus obtain the position at any time.
• the present invention aims to overcome this defect and proposes an access control method between a control module and an autonomous module comprising a localization device and a communication device, these two modules comprising a security key and an identifier, this method comprising the following steps: determining a control value by the control module,
• This method has the advantage of requiring no synchronization between the two modules to operate. If a message is lost and does not arrive at the standalone module, the next message will be accepted without any further provided that the identifier is correct on the one hand and that the control value has not already been used.
• This control value can take many forms.
• a first form is a simple counter. With each message generated by the control module, the counter is incremented. In the stand-alone module, the last value of the received counter is stored. When receiving a new message, the standalone module will check that the value of the counter is greater than that which has been memorized during a previous message.
• control value is generated randomly.
• the autonomous module will keep a certain number of these received values, for example 5, and will compare the new value received with one of the stored values. If it does not appear in the 5 stored values, the message is accepted. This new control value replaces the oldest of the stored values according to the well-known principle of the circular buffer.
• the most common command in a message is the query of the standalone module's position. Thus, this module will return its geographical position only if the verification by the identifier and the control value were positive. Note that each message transmitted is unique and can not be reused. A third party intercepting a message can not reuse it as this would be immediately detected by the standalone module. The identifier is not a critical data because even the knowledge of this data by a third party does not generate a valid message without the security key.
• This identifier can therefore advantageously be the module's call number or its serial number.
• FIG. 1 illustrates the flow of messages for obtaining a position of the autonomous module
• FIG. 2 illustrates the format of the messages sent from the control module to the autonomous module.
• the control module MC is located in a local device of a user.
• This local device can be a computer as illustrated, a mobile phone, a palm, PDA or electronic organizer or other suitable device. It comprises a memory for storing the secret key k, the identifier ID of the autonomous module MA and according to the preferred embodiment of the invention, the counter CPT.
• a message is generated by the control module MC and is transmitted to a management center CG according to the arrow 1.
• This center transmits this request to the communication device of the autonomous module MA and according to the implementation, adds the necessary commands to activate the autonomous module MA according to arrow 2.
• this module determines its position by means of the location device and returns a message to the management center according to the arrow 3. Acceptance of the message is done firstly by the verification of the conformity. the identifier ID, that is contained in the message and that specific to the autonomous module MA.
• This verification can be a simple comparison or use more sophisticated mechanisms such as sending the identifier in compacted form (Hash function, unidirectional and without collision) so that the interception of a message can not find the ID.
• Hash function unidirectional and without collision
• the message transmitted by the autonomous module MA is interpreted by the management center which can add information such as a position on the card and returns this information to the user (arrow 4).
• this method allows a user to control the use of its autonomous module while benefiting from the advanced functions of the management center as the display of the position on a map.
• the user does not necessarily know the call number of the autonomous module and the syntax of the commands. It is the role of the CG Management Center to format the messages. The latter has all the useful data of each autonomous module in its database BD.
• the control module MC is integrated in the management center CG and provides a high degree of security of use of the autonomous module.
• the messages coming from the user (arrow 1) will contain an identification and a password in order to authenticate the user with respect to the management center.
• FIG. 2 illustrates an example of messages transmitted between the control module MC and the autonomous module MA.
• Each of these modules has the secret key k, a counter CPT and the identifier ID.
• the control module MC is placed in the management center which also prepares the commands for the autonomous module MA.
• the autonomous module has its own CPTb counter for comparing the value of the CPT counter in the message. If the value of CPT is greater than CPTb, the message is accepted (if the identifier is correct). In this case, the value of CPT is copied to the counter CPTb. It can be seen that if a message is lost or not routed, the difference between the value of CPT and CPTb will be greater than 1. This is not a problem as long as CPT> CPTb. The system re-synchronizes itself.
• the control module MC composes a message comprising the counter CPT which is CPTa and the identifier ID. These two elements are encrypted by the secret key k. To this encrypted set, we add the CMD commands such as the request for the position of the autonomous module, the definition of the operating mode or the request of the state of the module (eg the level of the battery). Once the message has been prepared, the control module MC increments its counter CPTa for a next message.
• the autonomous module MA In execution with a random number, the autonomous module MA must keep a certain number of these received control values to ensure that each message is new. If for example the random number is 2 bytes, we will preferably keep the last 10 values or 20 bytes in total.
• the arrival and acceptance of a message causes the oldest value stored in this memory to be erased and replaced by the new one.
• the CMD command is included in the encrypted set. This makes it possible to secure the transmitted commands and to prevent any third party from replacing a command on a message legally generated by the control module.
• a third example illustrated by M3 shows the CMD commands placed outside the encrypted set. Nevertheless, a CS signature (Checksum, CRC, Hash, SHA or other function) is calculated on the CMD commands and this signature is inserted in the encrypted part. Thus it is possible for the autonomous module MA to make sure that the commands have not been modified.
• CS signature Checksum, CRC, Hash, SHA or other function
• the secret key k may be symmetrical (identical on both sides) or asymmetrical.
• the public key will preferably be placed in the control module MC and the private key in the autonomous module MA.
• This application covers all types of autonomous location module, either by a GPS (Global Positioning System) or by a location based on wireless telephony antennas. Indeed, it is possible to place appropriate software in the autonomous module to allow localization through telephony antennas. Such a system is proposed by Cambridge Positioning Systems Limited in the USA.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
• Computing Systems (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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Family Cites Families (4)

• 2004
  • 2004-08-25 CH CH01392/04A patent/CH699381B1/fr not_active IP Right Cessation
• 2005
  • 2005-08-24 WO PCT/EP2005/054161 patent/WO2006021570A1/fr active Application Filing
  • 2005-08-24 EP EP05774039A patent/EP1782653A1/de not_active Withdrawn

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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