EP1646992A2 - Remote-controlled programming of a program-controlled device - Google Patents
Remote-controlled programming of a program-controlled deviceInfo
- Publication number
- EP1646992A2 EP1646992A2 EP04738890A EP04738890A EP1646992A2 EP 1646992 A2 EP1646992 A2 EP 1646992A2 EP 04738890 A EP04738890 A EP 04738890A EP 04738890 A EP04738890 A EP 04738890A EP 1646992 A2 EP1646992 A2 EP 1646992A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- interface
- legitimation
- program data
- program
- control point
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
- G06F8/60—Software deployment
Definitions
- the present invention relates to methods for remotely programming a program-controlled device and an arrangement with an interface for receiving program data and a legitimation, and a remotely programmable program-controlled device which comprises a processor and a program memory.
- EDP program for controlling and regulating various functions of the vehicle. Operation of vehicle engines in particular is controlled by means of such control units. Electronic control units require an EDP program to perform their function. Often this EDP program has to be changed later, because program errors are discovered, or given values for operating parameters of a device controlled by the control unit are to be updated or functions of the EDP program are to be expanded or restricted.
- the control unit has an interface so that corresponding modifications tion of the computer program can be entered into the control unit and stored there in a program memory. To do this, however, the vehicle must go to a workshop where the new program data are imported into the control unit using a workshop tester.
- the program Since the program is generally of a confidential nature and any unauthorized manipulation of the functioning of the control unit - for example for reasons of liability and / or operational safety of the vehicle - must be prevented, the program data is transmitted using encryption mechanisms specified by the vehicle manufacturer or keys.
- the secret keys are stored by the manufacturer in the workshop tester and are used by the workshop tester before reprogramming the control unit as its legitimation in front of the control unit.
- the control unit is protected against direct manipulation, so that it is also not possible to access the control unit's identification algorithms for unauthorized access and to derive the legitimation from this. In order to avoid a cumbersome and time-consuming visit to the workshop, it is desirable to be able to program the control unit remotely, without having to compromise on tamper protection.
- the arrangement includes an interface for receiving program data from a remote control point over a remote wireless connection.
- Program data to be transmitted to the control unit of the vehicle are temporarily stored in a buffer memory at the interface and then transferred to a program memory of the control unit. Buffering of the program data is necessary due to the often unstable wireless remote connection, which can often lead to malfunctions such as incorrect data transmission or interruptions in the connection. Only when the program data have been completely received can they be entered into the memory of the control unit, since the operation of the vehicle is interrupted during the process of entering the program data into the memory of the control unit.
- the present invention provides methods for remotely programming a program-controlled device and an arrangement therefor which enable reprogramming of the program-controlled device with the shortest possible interruption of its normal operation and in which the secrecy ensures legitimation is.
- an uncontrolled spread of the secret legitimation is prevented by the fact that the legitimation transmitted remotely from the control point to the interface is not buffered by the interface like the program data, but is immediately transmitted to the device, where it is checked for validity , A physical storage of the legitimation at the interface as in the case of the program data or at another location is not necessary for the method to function. This means that the legitimation between the interface and the device is never present in a way that would allow unauthorized access to the legitimation.
- the legitimation is buffered like the program data at the interface, but its validity is period of time limited.
- the period of validity should be so short that it expires in the event of unauthorized access to the authentication before the device can be programmed without authorization.
- the identification and / or the program data are particularly preferably transmitted wirelessly via the remote connection. In principle, this allows the device unlimited mobility. In order to minimize the effect of disturbances that frequently occur during wireless transmission, the method is repeated when such a disturbance occurs, so that error-free transmission of the program data is guaranteed.
- the program data and / or the legitimation are preferably transmitted from the interface to the device via a wired connection.
- a wired connection between the interface and the device is particularly useful when the interface and the device, for example, both in a mobile device such as. B. a vehicle or robot.
- the control body Before transmission of the program data from the control point to the interface, it is possible to read out second data from a memory of the device, for example the program memory, and to transfer it to the control point. In this way, the control body is informed of the current status of the data present in the device. Based on this current state of the second data can then the control body compile the new program data accordingly. For example, values of operating parameters or program parts that are to remain unchanged do not need to be transmitted unnecessarily with the program data from the control point to the interface. A quantity of data of program data to be transmitted can be reduced in this way, which accelerates the remote transmission of the program data and thereby reduces the susceptibility to remote transmission. Before the remote transmission to the control point, the second data is advantageously buffered at the interface.
- the buffering allows the second data to be transmitted to be collected at the interface with the lowest priority, ie without affecting the tasks to be carried out simultaneously by the device for its normal operation, and then to be transmitted continuously in a short time. In this way, the time period in which the normal operation of the device must be interrupted because there is no valid program for controlling this operation is kept as short as possible.
- the program memory of the remotely programmable program-controlled device of the arrangement according to the invention can be any type of permanent memory that can be electrically overwritten, such as an EEPROM or a flash memory.
- the interface can be connected to a control point by means of a wireless remote connection.
- the long-distance wireless connection can be, for example, a cellular mobile radio connection.
- the remotely programmable device receives the program data and the legitimation from the control point at the interface, which can be a legitimation with a limited period of validity.
- the interface either passes the authentication to the flash memory immediately and unbuffered or, if the authentication is valid for a limited time, buffers it like the program data in a buffer memory before it transfers the authentication to the flash memory. In this way, it is avoided that an unauthorized person at any point in the arrangement can access a legitimation with which he can can manipulate the program data at a later time.
- the device is preferably a control unit that controls a device.
- the device can be, for example, an engine or another part of a motor vehicle.
- the arrangement is particularly preferably arranged in a vehicle.
- Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a remotely programmable device.
- FIG. 3 shows a flow chart of a second method according to the invention.
- FIG. 1 shows schematically a remotely programmable device 1, which is a vehicle.
- the vehicle 1 comprises an engine 2, a control unit 3, an interface 4, an antenna 5 and a wired connection 6 between the control unit 3 and the interface 4.
- the interface 4 has a buffer memory 7, while the control unit 3 has a flash Memory 8 and a processor 12 has.
- the vehicle 1 can be connected wirelessly to a control point 9 via the antenna 5.
- the control point 9 essentially has a computer 10 and an antenna 11.
- the computer 10 can be a stationary computer, such as a personal computer, or a mobile device, such as a laptop.
- EDP programs for control and predetermined values for operating parameters of the engine 2 are stored in the flash memory 8 of the control unit 3. These IT programs and operating parameters have to be modified from time to time. This is done via the control point 9.
- a wireless connection is established between the vehicle 1 and the control point 9 by means of the antennas 5, 11. New program data are transmitted from the control point 9 to the vehicle 1 via this wireless connection and are buffered in the buffer memory 7 of the interface 4.
- the control point 9 then transmits a legitimation to the interface 4 and from there to the control unit 3.
- the flash memory 8 takes over the program data temporarily stored in the buffer memory 7. During this short time, the vehicle 1 is out of order.
- Two methods are preferred for the remote programming of the flash memory 8: are explained in more detail below with the aid of a flow chart in each case.
- FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram of the first preferred method according to the invention.
- a wireless connection is established via antennas 5, 11 between control point 9 and vehicle 1.
- data is read from the flash memory 8 in step 14 and transmitted via the connection 6 to the buffer memory 7, where it is buffered.
- these data are transmitted remotely from the buffer memory 7 via the interface 4 and the wireless connection between the antennas 5, 11 from the vehicle 1 to the control point 9.
- the data include one or more checksums calculated from the program data, on the basis of which the success of this remote transmission is checked in step 16 by the computer 10 of the control point 9.
- steps 15 and 16 are repeated. If faults occurred during the remote transmission of the data, for example because the remote transmission was interrupted or occurred incorrectly, steps 15 and 16 are repeated. If the remote transmission was successful, the control point 9 creates in step 17 with the computer 10 new program data to be programmed into the flash memory 8 on the basis of the data obtained. In particular, the computer 10 checks which operating parameters have to be changed or whether the EDP program of the flash memory 8 has to be expanded or corrected. After creating the new program data, these and the checksums calculated therefrom are transmitted from the control point 9 to the interface 4 of the vehicle 1 via the wireless connection between the antennas 5, 11 in step 18. The program data and checksums are buffered there in the buffer memory 7 in step 19.
- step 20 the interface 4 checks the integrity of the transmitted program data on the basis of the checksums. If it detects an error in the program data, it returns to step 18 to retransmit.
- the control point 9 transmits a legitimation in step 21 via the wireless connection of the antennas 5, 11 to the interface 4. From the interface 4, the legitimation in step 22 is immediately and unbuffered via the transfer wired connection 6 to the control unit 3.
- the processor 12 of the control unit 3 checks the validity in step 23 for its validity. The legitimation is not stored anywhere longer than is necessary so that the processor 12 can decide on its validity. This prevents uncontrolled access to the legitimation.
- step 23 If the legitimation in step 23 proves not to be valid, this leads to an abort 24 of the method. Is the validity of the legitimacy tion determined, the flash memory 8 takes over in step 25 the program data buffered in the buffer memory 7.
- step 26 the normal operation of the control unit 3 is resumed on the basis of the updated program now stored in the flash memory 8 and thus of the vehicle 1.
- step 27 there is a corresponding feedback to the control point 9.
- the wireless connection between vehicle 1 and control point 9 is then terminated in step 28 and the method is ended.
- FIG. 2 Another method according to the invention for remote programming of the flash memory 8 can be seen in the flow chart in FIG.
- This method like the previously described method, is initiated with the same steps 13 to 21, so that reference can be made here to the description of method steps 13 to 21 in FIG. 3 to the corresponding description of method steps 13 to 21 in FIG. 2.
- the second method according to FIG. 3 in the subsequent step 29 deviates from the first method in that the legitimation is buffered in the buffer memory 7 in step 29.
- the interface 4 does not need to be able to distinguish between program data and legitimation; it can therefore be constructed more simply than in the case of FIG. 2.
- the method of FIG. 2 the method of FIG.
- the legitimation 3 is a legitimation with a time-limited ter period of validity. This means that the legitimation is only recognized by the processor 12 of the control unit 3 as valid within a certain predetermined time interval. For this reason, the physical buffering of the legitimation in the buffer memory 7 does not mean any significant impairment of the security against manipulation, because if an unauthorized person succeeds in finding out the legitimation, he will nevertheless fail to attempt manipulation because the processor 12 will not fail the legitimation that has expired in the meantime recognized more than valid.
- step 30 the legitimation is transmitted from the interface 4 to the storage unit 3 and in step 31 the processor 12 checks its validity. As mentioned, this validity check also includes a check with regard to the temporal validity of the identification. If the decision regarding the validity of the legitimation is negative and the legitimation is classified as invalid, the procedure is terminated in step 24. If the legitimation is recognized as valid, steps 25 to 28 continue, which correspond to steps 25 to 28 of the flowchart in FIG. 2 and for the description of which reference is again made to the description in FIG. 2 at this point.
- step 21 of transmitting the legitimation before steps 18 to 20 of transmitting the program data, so that when all the received data are subsequently transmitted to the device in the order in which they were received, the Legitimation arrives first and can be checked by processor 12.
- Additional protection can be achieved if between checks 25 of the takeover of the program data by the device and 26 of the resumption of normal operation a check of checksums transmitted together with the program data to the device takes place by the processor 12 and if an error is detected step 25 is repeated.
- Interface 4 can also be assigned its own identification, which must be transmitted to the device every time the device is reprogrammed, just like the control body's authentication, and is checked before the device permits reprogramming.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10331874A DE10331874A1 (en) | 2003-07-14 | 2003-07-14 | Remote programming of a program-controlled device |
PCT/DE2004/001474 WO2005008612A2 (en) | 2003-07-14 | 2004-07-08 | Remote-controlled programming of a program-controlled device |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1646992A2 true EP1646992A2 (en) | 2006-04-19 |
Family
ID=34071665
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP04738890A Ceased EP1646992A2 (en) | 2003-07-14 | 2004-07-08 | Remote-controlled programming of a program-controlled device |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8060873B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP1646992A2 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2007524149A (en) |
CN (1) | CN1842765B (en) |
DE (1) | DE10331874A1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2005008612A2 (en) |
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2003
- 2003-07-14 DE DE10331874A patent/DE10331874A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2004
- 2004-07-08 WO PCT/DE2004/001474 patent/WO2005008612A2/en active Application Filing
- 2004-07-08 JP JP2006519757A patent/JP2007524149A/en active Pending
- 2004-07-08 CN CN2004800201768A patent/CN1842765B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-07-08 US US10/564,208 patent/US8060873B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2004-07-08 EP EP04738890A patent/EP1646992A2/en not_active Ceased
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1842765A (en) | 2006-10-04 |
WO2005008612A2 (en) | 2005-01-27 |
DE10331874A1 (en) | 2005-03-03 |
JP2007524149A (en) | 2007-08-23 |
US20060220900A1 (en) | 2006-10-05 |
CN1842765B (en) | 2011-06-15 |
WO2005008612A3 (en) | 2006-03-23 |
US8060873B2 (en) | 2011-11-15 |
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