EP1576783A2 - Procede mandataire et systeme permettant de securiser l'administration sans fil d'entites gerees - Google Patents

Procede mandataire et systeme permettant de securiser l'administration sans fil d'entites gerees

Info

Publication number
EP1576783A2
EP1576783A2 EP03782045A EP03782045A EP1576783A2 EP 1576783 A2 EP1576783 A2 EP 1576783A2 EP 03782045 A EP03782045 A EP 03782045A EP 03782045 A EP03782045 A EP 03782045A EP 1576783 A2 EP1576783 A2 EP 1576783A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
message
user
proxy
wed
managed entity
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP03782045A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Kevin Kerstens
Allan Van Schaick
Jim Doree
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Sonic Mobility Inc
Original Assignee
Sonic Mobility Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from CA002414830A external-priority patent/CA2414830C/fr
Priority claimed from US10/326,226 external-priority patent/US7454785B2/en
Application filed by Sonic Mobility Inc filed Critical Sonic Mobility Inc
Publication of EP1576783A2 publication Critical patent/EP1576783A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0464—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/04—Protocols specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/08—Protocols specially adapted for terminal emulation, e.g. Telnet
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/76—Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/30—Definitions, standards or architectural aspects of layered protocol stacks
    • H04L69/32—Architecture of open systems interconnection [OSI] 7-layer type protocol stacks, e.g. the interfaces between the data link level and the physical level
    • H04L69/322—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions
    • H04L69/329—Intralayer communication protocols among peer entities or protocol data unit [PDU] definitions in the application layer [OSI layer 7]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates generally to wireless communication and particularly to remote access.
  • Network Administration services have become indispensable as businesses rely more heavily on Local Area Networks connected to the Internet to interact with their customers and their employees. Personnel capable of delivering those services are therefore in high demand and have accordingly become very expensive to maintain on staff. Mobile personnel able to provide high quality Network Administration services on a part-time basis, but on short notice to more than one business are therefore a desirable resource when they are able to provide an essential service for an acceptable price. Further, keeping mission critical technical infrastructure functioning correctly in times of a threat - one example is where a threat to a building forces the evacuation - all the critical systems and infrastructure are left inside the building while the IT staff are outside - unable to take the actions necessary to protect the network by performing administration functions including locking down core systems and users.
  • wireless technologies are a desirable means through which to deliver Network Administration services.
  • conventional methods of wireless communication are insufficient (in both capacity and security) for use administering networks such as LANs.
  • WIDS Wireless input Devices
  • Wireless Transport Layer Security is based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) (similar to Secure Sockets Layer, SSL), WTLS was developed to address the problems of mobile network devices, including: narrow bandwidth, high latency environment, limited processing power and memory capacity.
  • TLS was modified to address the needs of wireless users because radio networks do not provide end-to end security.
  • TLS is a protocol that is the successor to SSL.
  • TLS has two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol.
  • the Handshake Protocol allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before data is exchanged.
  • the Record Protocol provides session security using a particular method of encryption such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), but can be used without encryption.
  • DES Data Encryption Standard
  • TLS and SSL are not generally interoperable, but TLS can export for SSL.
  • WAP Wireless Application Protocol
  • WAP uses a specially developed protocol stack to implement the part of the wireless transmission from a WAP client device to a WAP Gateway.
  • the WAP architecture replaces the current web server technology for the portion of data communication between a wireless device and the web server.
  • a WAP Gateway implements the Internet protocol stack on behalf of the WAP client device. Since TCP/IP is not used for communication between the WAP client and the WAP Gateway, SSL or TLS could not be used to implement the security.
  • WTLS can sustain the low bandwidth, high latency transport layer and is derived from TLS by removing the overhead where possible without compromising security that makes the protocol suitable for the wireless environment. Like TLS, WTLS operates on top of the wireless transport layer also known as WDP, and below the session layer known as WSP.
  • WTLS runs on top of an unreliable datagram service, and not a reliable transport protocol like TCP/TP, creating reliability concerns respecting message exchanges across several WTLS operations.
  • WTLS also uses digital certificates to provide for server or client side authentication, but due to the memory limitation of WAP devices certain desirable attributes are omitted from the digital certificate specifications, including the Serial Number and Issuer ID fields.
  • a WAP Gateway is responsible for the translation of messages from one protocol to another. Just like it encodes text based WML content into binary WML format before sending it on its way on the air, it has to decrypt TLS encoded messages, convert the content into binary format, encrypt it using WTLS and then send it on its way. The same happens when the message arrives from the WAP device.
  • the WAP Gateway sees all messages in clear text, including messages intended to be confidential throughout the transmission are exposed for a split second, and that is what is known as the WAP Gap, which can be addressed by setting up an internal WAP Gateway accessible only by Users of the application and configuring devices to use the new gateway for access to WAP content.
  • WAP Gap can be addressed by setting up an internal WAP Gateway accessible only by Users of the application and configuring devices to use the new gateway for access to WAP content.
  • WAP devices support multiple gateway configurations, switching between them as the users navigate from one application to another is difficult.
  • Most companies that deploy an end-to-end secure solution require their users to carry phones with pre-set gateway configurations and access to WAP applications hosted on their servers only. Despite the recent advent of WAP v. 2.0, this is currently this is the only known way to ensure end-to-end secure communications between a WAP device and an application server.
  • the web protocol used to communicate between the web-server and the microbrowser depends on the type of WID deployed. Some WTDs are capable of handling HTML such that they can be used for "direct access" to the web-server. Other WIDs are designed or set-up to handle the more compact WML, such that, although their speed of operation is higher, they must access the web-server through a WAP
  • FIG. 1 illustrates the prior art use of a wireless input device ("WID") running a generic micro-browser the output for which is in WTLS, communicating by radio means, typically a cellular network, through an IAS Server that authenticates the wireless user who is provided with access to the internet, through a WAP gateway that must convert from WTLS to TLS before transfer over the Internet, to a web-server that is relatively exposed to attack because Port 80 remains "open” in order for a web-server to be accessible round the clock for requests from unknown sources, and by virtue of which crackers have a point of access to anything logically connected to web-servers.
  • WID wireless input device
  • IAS Server that authenticates the wireless user who is provided with access to the internet
  • WAP gateway that must convert from WTLS to TLS before transfer over the Internet
  • Port 80 remains "open” in order for a web-server to be accessible round the clock for requests from unknown sources, and by virtue of which crackers have a point of access to anything logically connected to web-servers
  • Proxy technology us well-known in the computing industries as a means to reduce the number of points of access by or to a LAN from the Internet.
  • proxy technologies are used as a "gateway" permitting client devices that are "sealed off from the Internet a trusted agent that can access the Internet on their behalf, such gateway often running with a firewall positioned as a barrier to crackers.
  • a proxy gateway often running with a firewall positioned as a barrier to crackers.
  • a proxy gateway to proxy technology has been applied to as a "stand-in” or "proxy” for the client.
  • proxy In another example of a common use for proxy technology the "proxy" is applied for a server wherein caches of files that are popular are loaded onto a proxy server to fill requests for files originally from a machine that may be slower or more expensive to operate.
  • proxy teclinology is based on a machine that actually does something on behalf of another machine, unlike a router that merely makes connections between end points permitting the machined at those points to conduct their own affairs.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the prior art use of an intermediate server (as a router) to eliminate the use of a webserver and a WAP gap.
  • an intermediate server as a router
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the prior art use of an intermediate server (as a router) to eliminate the use of a webserver and a WAP gap.
  • SSH Secure Shell
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the prior art use of an intermediate server (as a router) to eliminate the use of a webserver and a WAP gap.
  • SSH is interpreted character by character causing a large volume data transfer and work on the client WTD interpreting messages sent using the SSH protocol, neither of which is desirable in the narrow-bandwidth, low capacity world of portable computing devices.
  • SSL can only run on an SSL enabled WID and requires that security operations (as well as device management, and service functionality) be performed by the Managed Entity (e.g.
  • an SSH based client is installed on each WTD for communication with a machine that is not a web-server, but which merely (like a router) forwards network administration traffic without further processing, screening or handling - directly to the Managed Entities.
  • a machine that is not a web-server, but which merely (like a router) forwards network administration traffic without further processing, screening or handling - directly to the Managed Entities.
  • each Managed Entity in order to handle SSH-based traffic each Managed Entity must run an SSH service.
  • SSH to deliver OS level calls to each Managed Entity is very restrictive, limiting the variety of operations that may be executed from SSH without an additional soft agent to convert from and enhance the older style command line interface of SSH.
  • SSH is also known as "Secure Shell", a unix shell program for providing secure encrypted communication between untrusted hosts over an insecure network for the purpose of logging into, and executing commands on a remote computing device.
  • SSH is available as a service for Windows and Unix servers, if the SSH service is not running on the Managed Entity at the time access by the WTD is required, or the Managed Entity is not responding at all (e.g. the administrative service is required because of a runaway process, or an overloaded CPU), then there is no way to communicate with the subject Managed Entity using SSH.
  • SSH is a limited industry standard protocol requiring a separate application to extend the number of commands that may be executed and the administrative work that may be performed when using it.
  • SSH Command Line interface is very powerful, it is very keystroke oriented and requires a highly-skilled operator to apply it effectively, especially using the small keyboard and screen of a typical handheld WID.
  • SSH Simple Object Access Management
  • it is possible to write a program to run a WMI command within SSH and then use SSH to execute the program on a Managed Entity it is very difficult to do.
  • standard admin applications that do not expose all functionality through the command line (e.g. accessing Windows mailbox's, rebooting a Windows server) it is very awkward to use those applications via SSH.
  • macros or batch files can be written to reduce the typing required to execute a particular function, those macros must also be stored on the WID and the Managed Entity.
  • SSH is basically an encrypted version of TELNET, which are the only ways to remotely access UNLX servers for admin purposes - making them not only helpful, but also necessary.
  • SSH is also an extremely dangerous service to leave running on a server since its expert user, command line access design is very powerful and unforgiving - potentially allowing essential files to be deleted and wiped from drives that may also be reformatted with no "user friendly" warnings, backups, or means for recovery. Consequently, many network administrators will not permit SSH services to run on their networks and it is desirable to implement network administration without resort to SSH.
  • Telnet and SSH are very powerful tools that can be misused to cause great disruption to the network on which they run.
  • Telnet/SSH in order to access Telnet/SSH remotely there are three options: 1) open a port in the firewall for each managed entity, 2) use a server to act as a router, or 3) open one port for one Telnet/SSH server and have users Telnet/SSH from one server to another.
  • the security of the system relies on the strength of the well-known, well-understood SSH model based on a simple User ID and password.
  • the firewall can be configured to allow access to the Telnet/SSH port only via restricted IP addresses, or a VPN solution can be used to tunnel between a remote location and the Telnet server.
  • a VPN solution can be used to tunnel between a remote location and the Telnet server.
  • Authentication is the process of attempting to confirm whether an entity (e.g. a device or a User) is, in fact, what or who it has been declared to be. Authentication is commonly done using identifier (e.g. user name) password combinations, the knowledge of which is presumed to guarantee that the user is authentic. Each user's password is initially registered providing a measure of verification, however passwords can thereafter be stolen, intercepted, accidentally revealed, or forgotten. The more levels of authentication, the higher the level of confidence that the entity successfully providing all "keys" is authentic. Logically, authentication precedes authorization although they may often appear to be combined. Authorization is the process of confirming that an entity has permission to do or have something, for example, to give certain commands or to access to specific Managed Entities (e.g. servers) or files. A person of skill in the art would understand that authorization may take place at any or all of the network operating system (NOS), computer operating system (OS), or application levels.
  • NOS network operating system
  • OS computer operating system
  • application levels e.
  • authentication takes place without encryption the keys for which may be negotiated once the host confirms the identity of the entity being authenticated.
  • authentication is carried out for the User alone and not for the device, which in the context of mobile devices has the disadvantage of permitting stolen devices to remain a threat against which there is no direct protection. It is therefore desirable to engage authentication means respecting mobile input devices.
  • a hardware element commonly referred to as a "dongle" is one known means for uniquely identifying computing devices.
  • Integrity in terms of data and network security, is the assurance that information has only been accessed or modified by persons authorized to do so.
  • Common network administration measures to ensure data integrity include the use of checksums to detect changes to file content.
  • the OSI or "Open Systems Interconnection" model comprises seven (7) specific functional layers, being: Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data Link and Physical. Two of those layers (Session and Transport) are particularly important to wireless network administrators because it is at these layers that security problems arise when using only the generic forms of processing, created for End Users (i.e. not Administrators) completing business transactions, are misapplied in order to enjoy flexible access for an Administrator's tool. IP is considered to be at the Network Layer, while TCP is at the Transport Layer.
  • FTP/SMTP/TELNET/SNMP/NFS/RPC run The higher level Application, Presentation and Session Layers (where FTP/SMTP/TELNET/SNMP/NFS/RPC run) combined are commonly referred to as the Process Layer, consequently FTP, SMTP, and TELNET are said to "run over" TCP and IP .
  • Transport Control Protocol has been designed to be reliable, meaning that all (i.e. none missing) data packets will arrive in sequence and error-free.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol
  • FTP file
  • SMTP mail
  • TELNET terminal emulation
  • TCP/TP is necessary to use the Internet to move commands between a mobile client and a managed entity - whether presentation is in HTML, WML, or through a GUI, and whether security is achieved using generic SSL, TLS, or WTLS, or through a security model - consequently, it is desirable to ensure that whatever is output by the WID is in a form that requires minimal processing to "run over" TCP/IP.
  • HTML and more recently XML are OSI Presentation Layer languages including a full suite of formatting commands recognized by generic browser clients for general use on modern desktops and other powerful machines having broadband access to the Internet.
  • XML and WML are presentation language options neither of which is necessary unless a generic browser or micro-browser is involved in the system.
  • TLS is replacing SSL, in the OSI Transport Layer, as the industry standard for encryption when using TCP/IP to move packets securely across the Internet.
  • WAP has evolved as a subset of rules permitting wireless devices to more efficiently access such graphics heavy content
  • WML Wireless Markup Language
  • WTLS Wireless Transport Layer Security
  • WTLS is not required for carrier dependent transmission to occur, which various implementations of WDP achieve without encryption being applied at the socket level.
  • a simple wireless device sending public information not needing to be encrypted could be used to send presentation instructions written in HTML to a web-server for display.
  • the characters comprising the HTML would be processed for transmission in accordance with the radio carrier's particular radio network (and WDP) on the other hand end of which radio network they would be "de-processed" in preparation for uploading to "run-over" TCP/TP across the Internet, without security.
  • Decryption from WTLS takes place on a WAP Gateway (typically supplied by an Internet carrier) that us inherently “public” in nature. It is during the time between the decryption from the WTLS and re-encryption to TLS that a "gap" in security occurs that has become known as the "WAP gap". During the interstitial period the characters in WML would sit in an unencrypted form on the WAP Gateway exposed to "sniffers” or other tools used by crackers to "listen” to known weak points in the Internet for subject matter of interest. Even though TLS and WTLS are "strong encryption” options, neither of them is necessary if an alternate means if security has been implemented to avoid the WAP gap. It is therefore desirable, particularly for networked administration, to transmit applications, to transmit information and commands using a system that does not rely on WTLS alone for security.
  • API application programming interface
  • OS operating system
  • CTM WMI
  • Conventional remote administration technology delivers commands (e.g. reboot), through a web-server, suing these interfaces directly to the managed entity that executes without further inquiry- such that a risk of the unauthorized deliver of such commands exists.
  • one conventional approach is to store more (LAN) information on the WED, which disadvantageously creates a serious security risk to the LAN in the event that the highly portable WID is stolen. It is therefore desirable to provide a solution that requires neither extensive transfers nor the storage of LAN data.
  • Conventionally authentication takes place without encryption the keys for which may be negotiated once the host confirms the identity of the entity being authenticated. Authentication is also carried out for the User alone and not for the device, which in the context of mobile devices has the disadvantage of permitting stolen devices to remain a threat against which there is no direct protection. It is therefore desirable to engage authentication means respecting the mobile input devices as well.
  • the system aspect of the present invention avoids the use of a web-server and generic security to access a LAN, instead using a Message Processor that operates as a true Proxy device to pre-process all command traffic achieving several advantages.
  • Said system is further enhanced by combining the foregoing novel method of using a Proxy with a novel security model and a novel messaging protocol for the secure Wireless Administration of Managed Entities, including the novel secure delivery of TELNET services across the Internet and behind a firewall.
  • the method aspect of the present invention uses a soft client installed on each WTD for communication with a proxy server (avoiding the high risk use of a web-server) that is used to screen and otherwise pre- process all encoded traffic from each WTD.
  • a proxy server avoiding the high risk use of a web-server
  • the encoded messages are decrypted and the encoding "expanded" (i.e. the mapping is reversed) by the proxy into any suitable combination of standard WMI, ADSI, or WIN32 commands that are delivered directly to the OS of the appropriate Managed Entity, thereby eliminating a significant portion of the processing burden from each of the WID and the subject Managed Entity.
  • the WTD since the WTD is not merely redirected so as to connect to a Managed Entity, it is not necessary to transfer the LAN identifiers (e.g. User ID and User Password) in the subject SSH message along with a command sequence. Further, without the complexity of and restrictions imposed by SSH, a full suite of OS level calls are available conveniently, thereby increasing the variety of operations that may be remotely executed on each Managed Entity by even less skilled Users.
  • LAN identifiers e.g. User ID and User Password
  • a Wireless Input Device (“WTD”) client must exchange information with a server ("Proxy”) in order for commands from the User of the WTD to reach the devices (“Managed Entities”) being administered.
  • the more information captured in each data packet exchanged the fewer the packets the WTD must prepare, send, receive, and process.
  • the method aspect of the present invention uses a form of "shorthand notation” (basically overlaying a code on select commands that are organized in various sizes of groups of commands) according to which each message is encoded by applying a symbolic representation of one or more commands recognizable by the subject Managed Entity (e.g. for common computing devices this would include standard operating system commands).
  • the resulting abstraction permits the Proxy to complete a significant amount of processing based on information that the WID is advantageously not required to store.
  • the system of the present invention applies the well-known WIN32, ADSI and WMI programming interfaces (when administering LANS based on "Windows"), none of those network dependent collections of data are required to be resident on or handled by the WID.
  • the "shorthand" of the present invention contains less than a full set of the information required to execute a particular operation (session transaction) that requires a number of individual (WMI, ADSI, WIN32) commands and parameters, which number depends on the particular operation. Only a code identifying each requested operation together with the parameters that must be supplied for that operation - are transmitted (after being protected according to the security model described below), and all processing that need not be done on the WID is done behind the firewall by the much more powerful Proxy server.
  • the Proxy "expands" the shorthand by processing or interpreting the code into a sequenced list of individual commands together with the parameters necessarily supplied by the WTD. Upon expansion, the Proxy can determine what further parameters (e.g.
  • the Proxy may automatically execute a further series of network admin operations to locally confirm the status of the Managed Entity - all without requiring further intervention necessitating data exchange with the WTD, instead reporting to the WTD only the essential information remotely confirming status or requesting further input.
  • the codes and parameters are meaningless to anyone except the intended recipient and when received by the intended recipient provide both efficiency and additional security, because the Proxy identifies and expands the code into the associated block of interface commands and (parsed) parameters that it alone can submit directly to its Managed Entities.
  • a method of encoding commands for the purpose of preparing an administrative message for transmission between a wireless input device and a Managed Entity comprising the steps: map at least one command to an identifier comprising a first symbol, map at least one parameter to each said first symbol, map at least one value to each said parameter, create a first symbol-second symbol combination by appending a second symbol to said first symbol for the purpose of defining whether the transmission of said first symbol-second symbol combination is a request for or a confirmation of compliance, define a sequence according to which said first symbol-second symbol combination will be positioned within said message relative to said value of each said parameter, and assemble said message using said first symbol to represent at least one command recognized by said Managed Entity, and arranging said first symbols-second symbol combination together with said value of each said parameter in accordance with said sequence.
  • the security method aspect of the present invention is based on a combination of key management and prudent storage.
  • Secret, Site, Communications and Session Keys are applied together with Hashing and Tokens through an embedded client software application on the WTD (any suitable computing, paging, phone, or other mobile device) that stores minimal information in an encrypted form and authenticates each of the User and the WED separately, advantageously making it possible to "lock out" stolen or missing WTDs.
  • the novel use of a separate pass phrase for the WTD further strengthens authentication by making it harder for crackers to discover all of the elements that they require to attack a system. Even if a cracker were to obtain useful elements of access information, the subtle use of the software version number and other details shared between the WTD and its proxy permit the system to select and switch key algorithms and hash functions periodically forcing crackers to "start over”.
  • the solution of the present invention is to provide each WED- Proxy combination with a communications key algorithm to generate a Communications Key as needed, rather than to provide the key itself, which like certificates would need to be stored.
  • This algorithm would combine the relatively simple and mnemonic WED ED and WTD pass-phrase to generate a unique and relatively complex 32 byte (256 bit) key that if intercepted would be much more difficult for a cracker to access and use. Since the communications key algorithm is loaded onto the WED and its Proxy, and is never legitimately transmitted, the algorithm is at low risk of being available to crackers by interception or otherwise. Further, since the WTD pass-phrase is never transmitted, even upon intercepting the key a cracker has insufficient information from which to reverse engineer the elements required to spoof the WTD in order to gain access to the Proxy that sends commands to the Managed Entities.
  • identifiers e.g. ID and password or pass-phrase
  • no LAN related access information is required by the mobile WTD.
  • identifiers e.g. ID and password or pass-phrase
  • the method and system aspects of the present invention are compatible with and contemplate the option of allowing LAN access information being used rather than identifiers unique to the service, advantageously the isolation permitted by the use of unique identifiers makes it less likely that a cracker may intercept LAN information useful for attacking the subject LAN even outside the wireless environment.
  • WTDs are commonly lost or stolen, no identifiers or LAN information are stored or even cached on the WED, and the WED ED and WED pass-phrase are stored on the WTD only in a database that is maintained in an encrypted (typically using the Secret Key) form.
  • a session may commence secured by the session key supplied by the Proxy together with a first token that must be returned by the client to complete the next transaction (e.g. Logon User).
  • a first token that must be returned by the client to complete the next transaction (e.g. Logon User).
  • an ACK response must also sent from the WTD to the Proxy each time a packet is received, advantageously, according to the security method of the present invention a valid token must accompany each transaction including commands that the User wishes to execute - and the Proxy will not deliver the commands (extracted from the message) to any Managed Entity until a valid token is supplied by the WTD.
  • a transaction will be denied if the token returned by the WED does not match the token provided to the WED. If more than one valid token (maintained in an array in the order that they are generated) has been sent by the Proxy, then all of the prior tokens will expire or be cancelled by the Proxy upon its receipt of a more recent token.
  • the Proxy also removes all prior tokens from the array when confirmation of receipt of a transaction is received, which is indicated by receipt from the WED of the ACK respecting the final packet of the subj ect transaction.
  • the novel use of the ACK "handshake" addresses the problem of dropped packets without flooding the network with unsolicited resends. After a configurable time (e.g. 10 minutes) the Proxy will terminate the session unless it receives an ACK froni the WID. Similarly, the WED may request a resend of a packet that it was expecting (e.g. due to an EOB suggesting that the message has been broken into blocks) but had not yet received.
  • an intermediate message processor e.g. a proxy server
  • receive, decrypt and decode all encrypted and encoded messages from the WED details respecting the existence of the Managed Entities become less readily available - making them more difficult to "see” as prospective subjects for an attack.
  • security is further enhanced by embedding the client software application into the WED and providing it with data that is never transmitted, while also imposing EP port and address restrictions and encrypting all necessary transmissions, further providing SSH and NTLM authentication, and a full audit trail and logging of all activity on every Proxy and every WTD making it easier to identify security problems.
  • a system for securing communication between a WTD and a Proxy having access to an encrypted service database for storing information respecting said WTD and information respecting at least one User of said WED, comprising: an identifier for said WTD, stored encrypted on said WTD and stored unencrypted in said service database, a password for said WTD, stored encrypted on said WTD and in said service database, a secret key pre-shared between said WED and said Proxy, a site key for encrypting said service database and decrypting said password for said WED stored encrypted in said service database, a communications key algorithm using both said identifier for said WED and said password for said WED, for the purpose of generating a communications key, a first message for the purpose of said WTD requesting a connection to said Proxy, said first message comprising two parts, one part including said identifier for said WED encrypted with said secret key, and a second part including an encoded command and parameters for said command, said second part encrypted
  • a system further comprising: an identifier for said at least one User of said WED, stored unencrypted in said service database, a password for said at least one User of said WED, stored as a hash value in said service database, a hash value resulting from hashing said identifier for said User with said password for said User, said hash value for substituting in place of said password for said User, and a third message for the purpose of securely authenticating and authoring said User.
  • the method and system aspects of the present invention use and include a true proxy server ("Proxy") element intermediate the WED and the Managed Entity, advantageously thereby minimizing the processing burden on the WED and the Managed Entity.
  • Proxy true proxy server
  • the method of the present invention experiences a high probability of being both available and useful, since the Proxy can deliver low level commands to the operating system of the subject Managed Entity forcing it to reboot or shutdown if other commands would not be effective in restoring operation.
  • the Proxy may pre-process every message before it reaches any Managed Entity on the LAN, thereby off-loading the burden of message processing from the WED and the Managed Entities to a potentially more powerful machine dedicated to authentication, interpretation, authorization, and queuing all traffic created or requested by WEDs.
  • the system aspect of the present invention further implements a GUI to an embedded client application that may be used to deliver WMI, ADSI, Win32, Telnet, SSH and other commands through a common and familiar interface accessible to a wider range of User including less skilled operators in the event that a preferred Network Administrator is not available in a timely manner.
  • the system of the present invention is capable of (without the industry standard cryptic SSH Command Line interface considered unfriendly to legitimate but less-skilled operators) performing operations that an SSH based system could perform - but does so through an easier to use (i.e. less prone to error) interface that also accesses operations an SSH system cannot. Even where commands are (to reduce the keystrokes on the WED) grouped or batched, the macros or other means for such grouping are interpreted on the Proxy rather than stored on the Managed Entity.
  • the system aspect of the present invention requires no services (unless TELNET or SSH is desired) to be run on the Managed Entities and unlike a router processes, screens and other wise handles all network administration traffic before it is delivered to the Managed Entities.
  • the system aspect of the present invention further makes it possible for Telnet Services to be delivered securely from a wireless device and across the Internet to or from a Managed Entity behind a firewall by using the proxy technology described herein.
  • the WTD is never connected directly to the subject Managed Entity, advantageously, among the functionality that the WTD can request that the proxy provide on its behalf, is a Telnet/SSH connection. If the Telnet/SSH service is already running on the ME, since the LAN related User ID and User password are already stored on the proxy (i.e.
  • any Telnet/SSH commands mapped to the novel messaging protocol described in detail above will be encoded at the WED for decoding at the proxy and then sent to the ME after being authorized in exactly the same manner as all other commands are handled according to the method and system of the present invention.
  • Telnet/SSH commands may be mapped to the messaging protocol of the present invention, or the proxy may be used during authorization to restrict access to particular Telnet/SSH commands to particular Users respecting particular Managed Entities.
  • the apparatus aspect of the present invention in the Soft Agents for use on each of the wireless input device and proxy server ends of the communication process are provided to the User through a menu driven GUI novel to wireless Network Administration, as well as self-installing and easily configured.
  • a single installation of the service of the present invention permits management of all connected managed entities, even across multiple domains.
  • no software agents need to be installed on any of the managed entities.
  • the method and system of the present invention permit a full but configurable range of functionality, including: view, move, cut, copy and paste files; view and edit text files (e.g.
  • Bootini batch files, html, etc); e-mail ("send to") files from a managed entity; monitor the services and processes on any managed entity; stop, start, restart or pause services and kill bad processes; logoff, shutdown, or force-reboot any managed entity; generate and run custom scripts and batch files; control power to any external device including servers, switches, hubs, modems; and execute any command line instruction securely allowing control of any network device that supports SSH or Telnet, including: Unix, Linux, routers, hubs, print servers.
  • a method for a User to wirelessly administer at least one Managed Entity, comprising the steps: transmit an encoded message, including commands for said Managed Entity, from a wireless device, receive and decode said message on a message processor trusted by said Managed Entity, authenticate said device and authorize said commands on said message processor, and send authorized commands from said message processor to at least one Managed Entity.
  • said Managed Entity comprises a server connected to a LAN and said wireless device comprises a portable digital computing device having access to the Internet through a radio network.
  • said transmission of said message is via wireless or internet means or a suitable combination thereof.
  • said commands are adapted for execution by the operating system of said Managed Entity.
  • said message is encoded by applying a symbolic representation of groups of commands or an encryption of said representation (or both) for the purpose of making said message smaller in size or more difficult to access.
  • said decoding comprises: decrypting, interpreting, and expanding said message to a list of said commands suitable for transmission from said server to said Managed Entity.
  • said authentication and authorization are completed by said server acting as a proxy for at least one said Managed Entity.
  • said authentication comprises confirming that said device is a device registered on said server or said User is a User registered on said server.
  • said authentication comprises confirming that said device is a device registered on said server and said User is a User registered on said server.
  • said authorization comprises confirming that said User is permitted to require said Managed Entity to execute said commands.
  • said transmission of said authenticated and authorized commands from said server to said Managed Entity is completed without any connection between said device and said Managed Entity.
  • a System for a User to wirelessly administer at least one Managed Entity, comprising: means for creating and transmitting an encoded message, including commands for said Managed Entity, from a wireless device to the internet, means for receiving said message, a message processor, trusted by said Managed Entity, on which to receive and decode said message, means for authenticating said device and authorizing said commands on said message processor, and means for sending authorized commands from said message processor to at least one Managed Entity.
  • said means for creating and transmitting an encoded message from a wireless device comprises a First Soft Agent operating on a radio network enabled transmitting device, including a cell phone or a pager, further having means of access to the internet.
  • said means for receiving said message comprises a connection to the internet adapted for use by said message processor.
  • said message processor comprises any server, not having Port 80 open, but adapted for connection to the internet as well as to the network on which said Managed Entity operates, and for which suitable access rights have been granted.
  • said means for authenticating said device and authorizing said commands on said message processor comprises a Second Soft Agent operating on said message processor.
  • said means for sending authorized commands from said message processor to at least one Managed Entity comprises a connection to said LAN.
  • Fig. 1 is an illustration of prior art based on a web-server.
  • Fig. 2 is an illustration of prior art based on a router or gateway.
  • Fig. 3 is an illustration of one embodiment of the system of the present invention.
  • Fig. 4a is an illustration of one embodiment of the method of the present invention.
  • Fig. 4b is an illustration of an alternate embodiment of the method of the present invention.
  • Fig. 5 is an illustration of an alternate embodiment of the system of the present invention.
  • Fig. 6 is an illustration in logical and temporal form of an embodiment of the security system of the present invention for securing communication between a WED and a Proxy.
  • Fig. 7 is an illustration of an alternate embodiment of the security method of the present invention.
  • Fig. 8 is an illustration of an embodiment of the protocol of the present invention.
  • Fig. 9 is an illustration of an example of a portion of the security system the present invention.
  • the system denoted generally as 300 comprises client 320 being any suitable wireless input device (WED) 310 having loaded thereon (client 25 application)
  • Soft Agent 315 that is configured to accept input and assemble messages according to a particular messaging protocol and security model (each set out in greater detail below). Agent 315 further executes all appropriate processing necessary to transmit via radio wave 330 through a conventional radio network an encoded message running over TCP/IP across the Internet, which processing 30 depends on the particular WED hardware and signal carriers being used.
  • Agent 315 eliminates the need to use a generic micro-browser (e.g.
  • Agent 315 does not use WAP, no use of WTLS, a WAP gateway, or conversion to TLS are required for transfer over the Internet.
  • server hardware 340 is located "behind” suitable firewall technology in order to limit the number of physical ports connected to the Internet.
  • Soft Agent 345 running on server 340 together comprise the "message processor" being Proxy 350 that receives, decrypts and decodes messages assembled and transmitted by client 320.
  • Proxy 350 is (at least logically) distinct from any web-server that may be associated with the site at which the service has been installed.
  • Proxy 350 may manage a web-server as one of its managed entities 101, according to the present invention such a web-server is always isolated from the LAN of entities being managed by client 320 and Proxy 350.
  • Port 80 will not be used by hardware 340 (to access the internet) on which Soft Agent 345 runs to operate as Proxy 350.
  • Hardware 340 will require access to the internet through an unknown port that is not "open" per se.
  • Proxy 350 can decrypt and decode messages from a plurality of clients 320 each of which may transmit messages that may contain a plurality of commands defined by a particular messaging protocol, upon receipt of which Proxy 350 can transmit authorized commands from authenticated clients 320 ' to one or more Managed Entity 101.
  • Proxy 350 may be installed as a stand-alone device, or it may be included in a domain (e.g.
  • Proxy 350 may be used by a plurality of client 320 to manage a plurality of Managed Entity 101 on any of the domains or LANs using identifiers that are unique to the service or are used within the subject domain or LAN.
  • an Administrator at step 400 uses a WTD to input information such as an identifier (e.g. User name) and a command (e.g. logon).
  • a command e.g. Logon
  • the WTD according to pre-defined algorithms (whether generic or proprietary), assembles the input and encodes the resulting message for security and transmission.
  • the encoding will avoid the use of any generic rules or protocols by applying both a message protocol and a security model that together decrease the number of bits that the WED must handle and transmit, at the same time as decreasing the risk that a cracker will be able to discover anything of value from an intercepted message.
  • the appropriate further processing necessary to transmit the encoded message using TCP/TP through a conventional radio network and across the Internet will depend on the particular WTD hardware and carriers being used.
  • a true proxy server receives the message for processing before any commands are delivered to the Managed Entities. Processing involves decoding the message with the appropriate keys (as set out below), which depend on whether the subject session is being opened or is already in progress. For example, if the command input at step 400 is "Logon", then the Proxy will use a first key (also known as a Secret Key) to decrypt the message header containing an Identifier (e.g. the WED ED), which information may be used to select a second key (also known as a Communications Key) to decrypt the rest of the message (i.e.
  • a first key also known as a Secret Key
  • Identifier e.g. the WED ED
  • a second key also known as a Communications Key
  • the Proxy will proceed to authenticate 430, however, if the command is not Logon, then according to a preferred embodiment at step 425 the Proxy may proceed to authorize 440 the command as set out below, since, unless the WTD or the User (or both) has previously been authenticated, no token will have been provided for the Proxy to validate the requested command such that authorization 440 will fail.
  • the WTD is authenticated implicitly by the Proxy using the correct Communications Key based on the WED ED it was able to decrypt using the Secret Key.
  • the WED is the device that the ID indicates it is, then it will be able to decrypt the next message that it receives from the Proxy, which next message will be encrypted using the Communications Key that matches the WED ED, and which next message includes a Session Key generated by the Proxy for use completing all transactions in the session just created.
  • User information may also be provided for the purpose of the authorization 440 of the commands submitted at input 400.
  • User Identifiers may be referenced to determine whether or not the User is permitted to execute the subject command.
  • any valid User would be permitted to complete a Logon command to establish a connection for the WTD permitting a session to commence, upon which a Logon User command may be completed under the protection of a third key (also known as a Session Key) and maintaining transaction validity by passing tokens (as set out below) between the Proxy and the WED.
  • the Proxy compares the command submitted with a listing of permissions associated with the User authenticated or otherwise identified.
  • the Proxy may transmit 450 the command(s) to the Managed Entities for immediate execution (or with User Identifiers for further authorization) since, according to a preferred embodiment, the Proxy is trusted by the Managed Entity. If the User is not authorized, then any appropriate alternate action may be taken by the Proxy (e.g. terminate, provide error message, request resend, et cetera) without interfering with the operation of the Managed Entity or adding any burden to the LAN.
  • any appropriate alternate action may be taken by the Proxy (e.g. terminate, provide error message, request resend, et cetera) without interfering with the operation of the Managed Entity or adding any burden to the LAN.
  • FIG. 8 there is illustrated an embodiment of the protocol of the present invention comprising: a 4-digit numeric code 255, mapped to and representing at least one command 256 (for an
  • each numeric code 255 having an associated set of parameters 275 (for Requests) and 276 (for Answers) the number and nature of which parameters depends on the particular operating system command(s) 256 to which the numeric code 255 has been mapped.
  • each said parameter 275 or 276 having at least one .associated value 285 or 286 (a default value or a set of possible values) the type and quantum of which values depends on the particular network and Managed Entity (not shown) for which the message (not shown) including the number-character combination 295 or 296 has been created. It is understood that in applying the protocol only the values of the parameters are ever transmitted with the codes, since the Soft Agents have the means (e.g. via the sequence and delimiting characters) to determine which parameters each value applies to.
  • a message may be assembled by selecting an appropriate character (265 R being for a Request in the example) to append and then including the code resulting from that number character combination (295 in the example) in any suitable position within the message corresponding to a pre-defined sequence expected by the intended recipient.
  • a Proxy server is used to receive the message for decoding and screening prior to sending to the Managed Entity only those elements of the message that are required, in any format or sequence preferred by the Managed Entity, which sequence a person of skill in the art would understand may be entirely different than that adopted for the original coding and transmission from an input device to the Proxy.
  • sequence must be defined, delimiting characters may be included in the message to facilitate reliable interpretation when the message is (typically by parsing out) broken down by any suitable message processor whether loaded on a true proxy device or not.
  • the operating system commands 256 comprise a subset of standard ADSI commands that are commonly required for network administrative functions, to manage a variety of computing devices (i.e. Managed Entities).
  • Managed Entities running different versions of Windows also require control that is not (well or at all) implemented (i.e. no library scripts available that work) in the ADSI programming interface, a subset of the WMI and the low-level WIN32 interface commands are also mapped to numeric codes (255 in the example) used to communicate with the operating system of the subject Managed Entity.
  • the standard ACK reply available for receipt of packets is used in a novel manner in wireless communication as a "handshake" that addresses the problem of "dropped packets" without flooding the network with unsolicited resends.
  • the proxy may only have time to send one packet of the message to the WTD. Until the proxy receives an ACK response from the WED confirming receipt of that first packet, no further packets will be sent to that WED, but if wireless coverage is restored within a configurable time period, then the WED can request a resend o the dropped packet. After a configurable time (e.g.
  • the proxy may proceed to terminate the session if an ACK has not been received from the WED.
  • an ACK has not been received from the WED.
  • the Proxy will break or "chunk" the data into smaller blocks each of which is terminated with EOB (End Of Block) informing the WTD to expect more information after the Proxy receives an ACK respecting the block just delivered. If after sending that ACK to the proxy, the WTD does not receive more information, then the WTD can request the next block, which from the Proxy's perspective may be a resend. To indicate to the WED that a transaction is complete the Proxy terminates the packet comprising the last block with EOT (End Of Transaction).
  • FIG. 6 there is illustrated in logical and temporal form an embodiment of the security system of the present invention for securing communication between a WED and a Proxy having access to an encrypted service database for storing information respecting said WED and information respecting at least one User of said WED, wherein, by way of example, a series of messages (one or more packets each) denoted generally as 600 is shown.
  • a first message being Request 610 from a WED (not shown) to a Proxy (not shown) has within one portion of said packet an identifier WED ID 601 encrypted using a secret key 603, and within a second portion of said packet delimited by any suitable means an initializing command 602 encrypted using a communications key 604.
  • the identifier WTD ID 601 may be any suitable symbol unique to that device, for example the serial number of a chip inside the device, or a unique name provided to that device by the Administrator of the subject service.
  • the command 602 may in theory be any command, practically speaking one of a subset of initializing commands is required to establish a connection between the WTD and the Proxy - in the present example the command "Get Key" is a request for a session key.
  • WTD Authentication 605 is complete since the Proxy uses secret key 603 to decrypt WTD ID 601, which the Proxy then uses to lookup the WED password from the encrypted service database on the Proxy (since the WTD password or pass-phrase is never transmitted) for the purpose of running the communications key algorithm in order to generate the communications key to decrypt the second portion of the packet containing command 602 encrypted with communications key 604.
  • WTD Authentication 605 is advantageously implicit in the ability to decrypt command 602 such that no further express authentication step or process is required.
  • Request 610 may comprise more than one packet, each intermediate packet having an EOB (End of Block) termination that would alert the Proxy to expect further packets until the final packet is received having an EOT (End of Transmission or Transaction) after which the message may be assembled for decryption and decoding.
  • EOB End of Block
  • EOT End of Transmission or Transaction
  • a second message being Answer 620 from the Proxy is encrypted with communications key 604 (that the Proxy generated in order to reveal command 602) enclosing Token A 621 together with (one time) session key 622 for the purpose of enabling the now authenticated WTD to complete additional transactions that are permitted at this stage.
  • communications key 604 that the Proxy generated in order to reveal command 602
  • Token A 621 together with (one time) session key 622 for the purpose of enabling the now authenticated WTD to complete additional transactions that are permitted at this stage.
  • a User may then create a third message Request 630 that returns Token A 621 with a command 631 suitable to the permissions the WED has been granted as a result of WED Authentication 605.
  • command 631 is a Logon User command that is accompanied by at least the User ID and Hash Value 635 as parameters.
  • User ED and Hash Value 635 are used by the Proxy to Authenticate User 636.
  • Hash Value 635 results from one-way hashing the User ED with the User password to create a strong substitute for the typically mnemonic password, it is contemplated that weaker forms of user authentication may be deployed within this system successfully.
  • Hash Value 635 is created at the time the WED is initialized in the system, upon which Hash Value 635 is stored in the encrypted service database on the Proxy in place of the User password that is never stored and for security reasons is intentionally not recoverable from the one-way hash function.
  • Request 630 is encrypted with Session Key 622 prior to transmission from the WED.
  • a fourth message being Answer 640 from the Proxy is encrypted with Session Key 622 prior to transmission from the Proxy that first confirms that the subject User is authorized to access the Proxy but having allowed the User to Logon, must await the next command before it can authorize that User to complete a transaction respecting a particular command at 646 for which purpose Answer 640 has included Token B 641.
  • a User may then create a fifth message Request 650 returning Token B 641 with a command 651 and required Values 652 for the parameters appropriate to the particular command 651.
  • the User may submit any command 651 that the Proxy will be able to determine from its User permissions ' listing that the particular User is authorized to execute in relation to each Managed Entity (not shown) that the subject User is authorized to access.
  • the Proxy maintains all of the LAN related User ED and User password information as well as a complete listing of all of the permission settings granting or denying each User the right to access each Managed Entity on each domain administrated using the Proxy, as well as the permission settings granting or denying each User the right execute each implemented command 651 on each Managed Entity.
  • FIG. 7 there is illustrated an embodiment of the method of the present invention for securing communication between a WTD (not shown) and a Proxy (not shown) having access to an encrypted service database (not shown) for storing information respecting a plurality of WTDs as well as information respecting a plurality of authorized Users.
  • User Input 400 is required to cause the WED to initiate a connection to the Proxy.
  • a WED ED 601 or other suitable identifier for said WED, stored encrypted on the WED and stored unencrypted in the service database, is required to create 2 part message 410.
  • WED ED 601 is decrypted using secret key 603 that has been pre-shared between the WED and the Proxy.
  • a password or pass-phrase (not shown) for the WED that is stored encrypted on the WED as well as in the service database is not expressly required to
  • WED password is used with a communications key algorithm and WTD ED 601 for the purpose of generating communications key 604 that is used to encrypt one part (commonly referred to as the message payload) of message 410.
  • two part message 410 is transmitted for the purpose of said WED requesting a connection to said Proxy.
  • One part (commonly referred to as the message header) includes the identifier for the WTD encrypted with secret key 603.
  • the second part (commonly referred to as the message payload) includes an encoded command and parameters for that command.
  • the second part is encrypted with communications key 604.
  • the header may be delivered preceding the payload, however by using symbols to delimit the header the message packets may be arranged and delivered in any sequence since the proxy will be able to distinguish the 2 parts thereby for interpretation.
  • the proxy decrypts the header to obtain the WTD ED, which it uses to select the WED pass- phrase stored in the service database, which pass-phrase it uses to generate communications key 604 on the proxy, for use in step 422 decrypting and decoding the payload to determine that the WED has sent the R9000 Get Key command that has previously been mapped to a series of instructions intended to result in the WED establishing a connection with the proxy for the purpose of conduction a session of transactions to execute commands not yet specified.
  • the WED authentication (implicit in reading the payload) is complete and the proxy has (by any suitable means) generated session key 622 for encrypting all transactions during the session about to be established. Further, Token A 621 is generated (by any suitable means) and will be included with session key 622 in Answer 620 encrypted using communications key 604 for transmission to the WTD.
  • the WTD uses its copy of communications key 604 to decrypt the message and obtain session key 622 for use throughout the rest of the session now established, as well as obtaining Token A 621 for use in validating the next message that it transmits to the proxy for a first session transaction.
  • the next message transmitted by the WED is typically a Logon User command using Hash Value 635 together with Token A 621, which sequence is executed on the proxy in the present example at step 639 validating Token A 621 (to confirm that the command is not being replayed) as well as authenticating and authorizing the User for access to the proxy from which that User will be permitted to instruct the proxy to have particular (listed) Managed Entities execute particular (listed) commands respecting which that User has network privileges.
  • the proxy provides Token B 641 to the WED, obtained at step 705, for the purpose of validating the next message through which the User of the WTD at step 710 provides additional input through the GUT of Soft Agent 315 selecting at least one command relating to at least one Managed Entity on at least one domain, which command or commands are then processed at step 720 by Soft Agent 315 to create a Request message, in a preferred embodiment encoded in accordance with the novel messaging protocol set out in greater detail above.
  • the proxy uses session key 622 to decrypt the message, as well as using Token B 641 to validate the message 740 and avoid replay, as well as using its "maps" to decode the command and parameters provided into one or more "LAN commands" to one or more Managed Entities on one or more domains - upon which the proxy can at step 745 authorize each command to the instructing User, and if the particular User is authorized to execute the subject command on the subject Managed Entity, then the proxy will send the command across the LAN or other network to the Managed Entity for execution.
  • the failure to authorize may result in a number of alternate responses, examples of which include querying the User to retry or ending the session by terminating the connection.
  • alternate responses examples of which include querying the User to retry or ending the session by terminating the connection.
  • the nature of the unauthorized command and the security sensitivity of the subject Managed Entity would be factors taken into account in determining which alternate responses are applicable.
  • the proxy will have the ability to create and maintain logs tracking which User submitted which commands for which Managed Entities enabling system administrators to detect patterns of misconduct or system malfunctions.
  • the WTD ID and WTD pass-phrase together with sensitive information such as LAN Administrator TD's and Passwords are stored on the proxy in a database encrypted with a Site Key, that is unique to each site at which a service based on the system of the present invention is set up, and which Site Key is created at the time of the installation of the subject service.
  • a Site Key that is unique to each site at which a service based on the system of the present invention is set up, and which Site Key is created at the time of the installation of the subject service.
  • the service database i.e. the database used by the Soft Agent 345 running as a service on hardware 340 that together comprise Proxy 350
  • the service database may be encrypted using any suitable encryption teclinology available in the database application being used.
  • stored encrypted in the service database means encrypted with the Site Key (not shown) and then stored in the encrypted service database, whereas “encrypted on the device” means encrypted with the Secret Key 603.
  • the WTD ID is stored encrypted on the device, and stored unencrypted in the encrypted service database;
  • the WTD Pass-phrase is stored encrypted on the device, and stored encrypted in the encrypted service database;
  • the User ID is not stored on the device, but it is stored unencrypted in the encrypted service database;
  • the User password or pass-phrase is not stored on the device, but it is stored indirectly in the form of a hash value in the encrypted service database;
  • the Administrator ID for each Managed Entity is stored encrypted in the encrypted service database, and the password or pass- phrase for each Managed Entity is stored encrypted in the encrypted service database.
  • a hashing function that depends on (and can be changed with) the version and build of the service software runs to create a hash value (hashing the User ED with the User password) that is (more abstract than and is) used (to strengthen authentication) in place of the conventional User password, the problem with which is that they are relatively easily guessed, cracked, or otherwise discovered.
  • the typically mnemonically selected conventional User password is therefore neither interceptable during transmission nor recoverable from the small, encrypted database maintained on a stolen WED - yet it remains useful in creating a more complex hash value that provides substantially the same additional measure of User authentication as matching the simpler password would have.
  • common Identifiers and Passwords are used as "seeds" to create replacement security elements that are more difficult to guess, "crack", or otherwise obtain from the interception of encrypted transmissions.
  • a password for each User is stored as a hash value in the subject service database.
  • the hash value results from hashing the identifier for the subject User with the password for that User.
  • the hash value is then substituted in place of the password for said User, such that the password is never stored or transmitted per se.
  • each WID device ID (of the WED), device pass-phrase or password (of the WED), user ED, user password, and the EP address of the proxy server (not of the Managed Entity).
  • the device ED and the device pass-phrase are entered on the Proxy and on the WED manually when the WED is first enabled on the system of the present invention.
  • the device ED is never transmitted in unencrypted form, and the device pass-phrase is never expressly transmitted at all.
  • an integrity element (commonly referred to as Salt) is added to the message payload to enhance detection of tampering with the content of the payload.
  • This integrity checking means is similar, but superior to the common Checksum means of detection, since Salt is not based on a known relationship to the size of the message.
  • a packet is transmitted to a gateway that strips off the Mobitex header and decrypts the message to obtain the location (EP address) of the Proxy with which gateway typically sets up a session through a firewall protecting the Proxy and the LAN behind it.
  • a detailed example based on the R9000 Get Key and R9001 Logon User commands is set out for the purposes of illustrating the application of the security method of the present invention.
  • a first step device authentication commences with a first message from the WED to the Proxy.
  • Header ⁇ H>2.7 ⁇ 3 ⁇ !@#$% ⁇ &* ⁇ (*$&@ ⁇ /H> client version 2.7 encryption type 3
  • the service could decrypt !@#$% ⁇ &* ⁇ (*$&@ to be "kevinsRimDevice" (a.k.a. the Mobile ID), which Soft Agent 345 running as a "service” on a proxy server (collectively the Proxy) would use to authenticate the WED and the individual using it (i.e. the User).
  • the access the Message Payload the WED generates communications key 604 by applying its own ED and pass-phrase to the communication key algorithm.
  • * ⁇ %$#!%$(%1+!#$% ⁇ &*0%$*$#%%#$%%##%# ) decrypts to the following:
  • ICE is a number that matches a predetermined pattern (e.g. a random number appended to itself + 1, here the random number is 5874 making the salt value 58745875).
  • Proxy uses this relationship to verify the integrity of the message, because a cracker tampering with the message before resending it may not discover such a relationship.
  • the Proxy could then provide its response, encrypted with the Communications Key, in which response it would supply confirmation of what it intends to do for the WED, together with a Token and a Session Key, which response may for example be:
  • the WTD after each Proxy to WTD transmission, the WTD must reply
  • the WTD may open a Session during which it would attempt to logon a User by sending a message encrypted with the Session Key at the same time as returning the valid (or "live") Token provided by the Proxy for the purpose of executing the requested logon operation.
  • the encrypted message could, for example, be:
  • the Proxy can use the information in the above message to validate the message as well as to both authenticated and authorize the User. If the token is valid (e.g. has neither been cancelled nor expired), then the Logon User message is valid since the associated operation has not been completed (whether by the genuine User or by an impostor resending an intercepted message) because once- the associated operation is completed, the token is cancelled (deleted or removed) by the Proxy. Upon completing the Logon sequence, the User may securely carry out any number of authorized actions/operations. In summary, to validate each session message the Proxy relies on all of: a valid token, a valid User ED, a correct hash value, and confirming that the requesting User is not currently locked out of the system (e.g. Employee terminated). Once the message and User are validated the Proxy returns the following message encrypted with the session key and including a new token:
  • multiple logons are not permitted for any User, particularly from one WED.
  • the invention contemplates multiple logons for a single User using more than one valid WED to expedite the administration of multiple Managed Entities through a single Proxy.
  • the following message encrypted with the session key and containing the last valid token, may be sent by the WTD to the Proxy:
  • the Proxy In response to which the Proxy checks its records respecting which Managed Entities that User is allowed to access and which commands that User is allowed to execute on each Managed Entity in order to advise the User what he or she may do. Depending how much information must be supplied, the Proxy may, in one or more blocks, send to the WED a message like:
  • such larger messages are broken into blocks (a.k.a. data chunking) and transmitted using multiple packets, which blocks may be identified by adding an EOB tag at the end of each block of a message.
  • blocks may be identified by adding an EOB tag at the end of each block of a message.
  • WED teclinology e.g. some RTM Blackberry devices
  • this method of operating a wireless system may be used to transfer the burden of all queuing services to the more powerful Proxy thereby increasing WTD performance and reducing wireless network overload or flooding problems.
  • the WTD could decrypt the authorization information to:
  • Server 1 (e.g. Managed Entity 1)
  • Server X Server X (e. g. Managed Entity 36) ⁇ Actions allowed on Domain B / Server X
  • the action list TTTTTTTTTT indicates that this User has access to all available commands on the subject Managed Entity, whereas an action list of TFTTFFFFFFFFFFF could, for example, restrict the user to perform only: User, File Explorer and Print Services related operations on the subject Managed Entity.
  • the WTD does hot communicate directly with any Managed Entity - the Proxy delivers the required instructions to the Managed Entity, the Proxy prevents User requests, for operations that they are not allowed to perform, from ever reaching the Managed Entity, thereby enhancing overall system efficiency and security.
  • the foregoing embodiment may be operated in 2 modes: all User information is as contemplated above unique to the service with no LAN related identifiers ever exchanged outside the firewall, or with User identifiers that relate to the LAN or to a specific Managed Entity delivered from outside the firewall (but always protected by the security of a Session Key) for further handling by the Proxy, never directly from the WTD to the Managed Entity.
  • the method and system of the present invention is delivered using a novel menu-driven GUI approach to Network Administration that, much like the Windows interface did for DOS, makes remotely managing a networks more intuitive and accessible to a less skilled user.
  • Telnet Services may be delivered securely from a wireless device and across the Internet to or from a Managed Entity behind a firewall by using the proxy technology described herein.
  • the WED is never connected directly to the subject Managed Entity, advantageously, among the functionality that the WED can request that the proxy provide on its behalf, is a Telnet/SSH connection. If the Telnet/SSH service is already running on the ME, since the LAN related User ED and User password are already stored on the proxy (i.e.
  • any Telnet/SSH commands mapped to the novel messaging protocol described in detail above will be encoded at the WTD for decoding at the proxy and then sent to the ME after being authorized in exactly the same manner as all other commands are handled according to the method and system of the present invention.
  • Telnet/SSH commands may be mapped to the messaging protocol of the present invention, or the proxy may be used during authorization to restrict access to particular Telnet/SSH commands to particular Users respecting particular Managed Entities.
  • a further advantage of delivering Telnet/SSH services using the present invention is the ability to communicate with a Windows server even if the Telnet/SSH service is not running, because among the WMI commands that may be encoded in accordance with the messaging protocol of the present invention is the command to start the Telnet/SSH service, which the proxy may send to a managed entity prior to sending any Telnet/SSH command.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé, un système et un appareil servant à empêcher l'utilisation d'un serveur web à sécurité générique lors de la fourniture de services d'administration de réseau à distance en vue de gérer des entités au moyen d'une technologie sans fil. Un dispositif mandataire réel ne fonctionnant pas en tant que serveur Web est utilisé en vue de prétraiter tout le trafic de commande des dispositifs d'entrée sans fil (WID). L'intervention entre le WID et les entités gérées du mandataire isolant les entités gérées du WID, améliorée par codage grâce à un nouveau protocole de messagerie, amélioré lui aussi par un nouveau modèle de sécurité basé sur des clés et des algorithmes multiples prépartagés avec des identificateurs et des mots de passe ne pouvant être transmis, comporte plusieurs largeurs de bande et avantages de sécurité notamment la capacité à délivrer des services TELNET à travers Internet et derrière un pare-feu.
EP03782045A 2002-12-19 2003-12-19 Procede mandataire et systeme permettant de securiser l'administration sans fil d'entites gerees Withdrawn EP1576783A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US326226 1989-03-20
CA002414830A CA2414830C (fr) 2002-12-19 2002-12-19 Methode et systeme de procuration pour l'administration securisee sans fil des entites gerees
CA2414830 2002-12-19
US10/326,226 US7454785B2 (en) 2002-12-19 2002-12-19 Proxy method and system for secure wireless administration of managed entities
PCT/CA2003/002036 WO2004057823A2 (fr) 2002-12-19 2003-12-19 Procede mandataire et systeme permettant de securiser l'administration sans fil d'entites gerees

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1576783A2 true EP1576783A2 (fr) 2005-09-21

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP03782045A Withdrawn EP1576783A2 (fr) 2002-12-19 2003-12-19 Procede mandataire et systeme permettant de securiser l'administration sans fil d'entites gerees

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EP (1) EP1576783A2 (fr)
JP (1) JP4538325B2 (fr)
AU (1) AU2003289796A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2004057823A2 (fr)

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JP2006512806A (ja) 2006-04-13
JP4538325B2 (ja) 2010-09-08
WO2004057823A2 (fr) 2004-07-08
AU2003289796A1 (en) 2004-07-14
WO2004057823A3 (fr) 2004-09-23

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