EP1325585A1 - Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur - Google Patents

Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur

Info

Publication number
EP1325585A1
EP1325585A1 EP01972218A EP01972218A EP1325585A1 EP 1325585 A1 EP1325585 A1 EP 1325585A1 EP 01972218 A EP01972218 A EP 01972218A EP 01972218 A EP01972218 A EP 01972218A EP 1325585 A1 EP1325585 A1 EP 1325585A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
signature
message
key
generation
private key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP01972218A
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Jean-Sébastien CORON
David Naccache
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Gemplus SA
Original Assignee
Gemplus Card International SA
Gemplus SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gemplus Card International SA, Gemplus SA filed Critical Gemplus Card International SA
Publication of EP1325585A1 publication Critical patent/EP1325585A1/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/302Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3249Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an accelerated transmission method of electronic signature of t pe electronic signature with public key.
  • the disadvantage of the secret key encryption system is that said system requires the prior communication of the key K between the two people via a secure channel, before any message encrypted will only be sent through the unsecured channel.
  • the term “secure channel” is understood to mean a channel for which it is impossible to know or modify the information which passes through said channel. Such a secure channel can be produced by a cable connecting two terminals, owned by the two said people.
  • Public key cryptography solves the problem of distribution of keys ' through an unsecured channel.
  • the principle of public key cryptography consists in using a pair of keys, a public encryption key and a private decryption key. It must be computationally infeasible to find. the private decryption key from the public encryption key.
  • a person A wishing to communicate information to a person. B uses the public encryption key of person B. Only person B has the private key associated with his public key. Only person B is therefore capable of deciphering the message addressed to him.
  • Another advantage of public key cryptography over secret key cryptography is that public key cryptography allows authentication by the use of electronic signature.
  • This encryption system is based on the difficulty of the problem of the sum of subsets
  • This encryption system is based on the theory of algebraic codes. It is based on the problem of decoding linear codes;
  • This encryption system is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm in a finite body
  • the elliptic curve encryption system constitutes a modification of existing cryptographic systems to apply them to the domain of elliptic curves.
  • the advantage of elliptical curve encryption systems is that they require a smaller key size than other encryption systems.
  • the RSA encryption system is the most widely used public key encryption system.
  • the RSA encryption system is used in smart cards, for certain applications of • these. Possible applications of RSA on a smart card are access to databases, banking applications, remote payment applications such as pay TV, gas distribution or payment of tolls. highway.
  • the first part is the generation of the RSA key.
  • Each user creates an RSA public key and a corresponding private key, according to the method in 5 steps':
  • the public key is (n, e); the private key is d or (d, p, q).
  • the integers e and d are called respectively the exponent of encryption and the exponent of decryption.
  • the integer n is called the module.
  • the second part consists in the encryption of a clear message noted m by means of an algorithm with Km ⁇ n into an encrypted message noted c which is the following:
  • the third part consists in decrypting an encrypted message using the private exponent of decryption by means of an algorithm.
  • the algorithm for decrypting an encrypted message denoted c with Kc ⁇ n into a clear message denoted m is as follows:
  • the RSA system can also be used to generate electronic signatures.
  • the principle of an electronic signature scheme based on the RSA system can generally be defined in three parts:
  • the first part is the generation of the RSA key, using the method described in the first part of the RSA system described above;
  • the second part is the generation of the signature.
  • the process involves taking input the message M to sign, to apply an encoding using a ⁇ function to obtain the character string ⁇ (M), and to apply the decryption method of the third part of the RSA system described above.
  • the character string
  • the third part is the verification of the signature.
  • the method " consists in taking as input the message M to be signed and the signature s to be checked, in applying an encoding to the message M using a function ⁇ to obtain the chained character ⁇ (M), in applying to the signature s the encryption method described in the second part of the RSA system, and to verify that the result obtained is equal to ⁇ (M).
  • the signature s of the message M is valid, and otherwise it is false .
  • An example of an encoding process is the process described in the standard "ISO / IEC 9796-2, Information Technology - Security techniques - Digital signature scheme giving message recovery, Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function, 1997”.
  • Another example of an encoding method is the encoding method described in the “RSA” standard. Laboboratories, PKCS # 1: RSA cryptography specifications, version 2.0, September 1998 ”. These two encoding methods allow messages of arbitrarily long size to be signed.
  • the method of the invention consists in transmitting only a part S 'of the signature S of a message M.
  • the method of the invention consists of two distinct parts, the first being the generation of the short signature, the second ' being the verification of the short signature by the entity having the user's private key.
  • the method for generating the short signature " takes as input a message M and the user's private key d, and comprises the following steps:
  • the method of verifying the short signature takes as input a message M, the short signature S 'to be verified, and the private key d of the user, and comprises the following steps:
  • the advantage of the short signature generation and verification method is that the size of the signature to be transmitted is much smaller than in the general case: it is thus possible to transmit only 64 bits of the signature instead of 1024 bits . This results in better performance due to shorter transmission times.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
EP01972218A 2000-09-28 2001-09-26 Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur Withdrawn EP1325585A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR0012352 2000-09-28
FR0012352A FR2814620B1 (fr) 2000-09-28 2000-09-28 Procede de transmission accelere de signature electronique
PCT/FR2001/002984 WO2002028011A1 (fr) 2000-09-28 2001-09-26 Procede de transmission accelere de signature electronique

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1325585A1 true EP1325585A1 (de) 2003-07-09

Family

ID=8854774

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP01972218A Withdrawn EP1325585A1 (de) 2000-09-28 2001-09-26 Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur

Country Status (6)

Country Link
US (1) US20020188850A1 (de)
EP (1) EP1325585A1 (de)
CN (1) CN1393080A (de)
AU (1) AU2001292004A1 (de)
FR (1) FR2814620B1 (de)
WO (1) WO2002028011A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US7957525B2 (en) * 2003-10-31 2011-06-07 Ntt Docomo, Inc. Encryption and signature schemes using message mappings to reduce the message size
WO2013101012A1 (en) * 2011-12-29 2013-07-04 Intel Corporation Accessing configuration and status registers for a configuration space
US10333696B2 (en) 2015-01-12 2019-06-25 X-Prime, Inc. Systems and methods for implementing an efficient, scalable homomorphic transformation of encrypted data with minimal data expansion and improved processing efficiency
EP3459002B1 (de) * 2016-05-19 2020-07-08 Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) Verfahren und vorrichtungen zur handhabung von hash-tree-basierten datensignaturen
FR3058813A1 (fr) * 2016-11-16 2018-05-18 Stmicroelectronics (Rousset) Sas Stockage dans une memoire non volatile
CN107104788B (zh) * 2017-04-18 2020-05-08 深圳奥联信息安全技术有限公司 终端及其不可抵赖的加密签名方法和装置

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2733379B1 (fr) * 1995-04-20 1997-06-20 Gemplus Card Int Procede de generation de signatures electroniques, notamment pour cartes a puces
CA2228185C (en) * 1997-01-31 2007-11-06 Certicom Corp. Verification protocol

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
See references of WO0228011A1 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN1393080A (zh) 2003-01-22
FR2814620B1 (fr) 2002-11-15
US20020188850A1 (en) 2002-12-12
FR2814620A1 (fr) 2002-03-29
WO2002028011A1 (fr) 2002-04-04
AU2001292004A1 (en) 2002-04-08

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