EP1325585A1 - Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur - Google Patents
Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignaturInfo
- Publication number
- EP1325585A1 EP1325585A1 EP01972218A EP01972218A EP1325585A1 EP 1325585 A1 EP1325585 A1 EP 1325585A1 EP 01972218 A EP01972218 A EP 01972218A EP 01972218 A EP01972218 A EP 01972218A EP 1325585 A1 EP1325585 A1 EP 1325585A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- signature
- message
- key
- generation
- private key
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3249—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an accelerated transmission method of electronic signature of t pe electronic signature with public key.
- the disadvantage of the secret key encryption system is that said system requires the prior communication of the key K between the two people via a secure channel, before any message encrypted will only be sent through the unsecured channel.
- the term “secure channel” is understood to mean a channel for which it is impossible to know or modify the information which passes through said channel. Such a secure channel can be produced by a cable connecting two terminals, owned by the two said people.
- Public key cryptography solves the problem of distribution of keys ' through an unsecured channel.
- the principle of public key cryptography consists in using a pair of keys, a public encryption key and a private decryption key. It must be computationally infeasible to find. the private decryption key from the public encryption key.
- a person A wishing to communicate information to a person. B uses the public encryption key of person B. Only person B has the private key associated with his public key. Only person B is therefore capable of deciphering the message addressed to him.
- Another advantage of public key cryptography over secret key cryptography is that public key cryptography allows authentication by the use of electronic signature.
- This encryption system is based on the difficulty of the problem of the sum of subsets
- This encryption system is based on the theory of algebraic codes. It is based on the problem of decoding linear codes;
- This encryption system is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm in a finite body
- the elliptic curve encryption system constitutes a modification of existing cryptographic systems to apply them to the domain of elliptic curves.
- the advantage of elliptical curve encryption systems is that they require a smaller key size than other encryption systems.
- the RSA encryption system is the most widely used public key encryption system.
- the RSA encryption system is used in smart cards, for certain applications of • these. Possible applications of RSA on a smart card are access to databases, banking applications, remote payment applications such as pay TV, gas distribution or payment of tolls. highway.
- the first part is the generation of the RSA key.
- Each user creates an RSA public key and a corresponding private key, according to the method in 5 steps':
- the public key is (n, e); the private key is d or (d, p, q).
- the integers e and d are called respectively the exponent of encryption and the exponent of decryption.
- the integer n is called the module.
- the second part consists in the encryption of a clear message noted m by means of an algorithm with Km ⁇ n into an encrypted message noted c which is the following:
- the third part consists in decrypting an encrypted message using the private exponent of decryption by means of an algorithm.
- the algorithm for decrypting an encrypted message denoted c with Kc ⁇ n into a clear message denoted m is as follows:
- the RSA system can also be used to generate electronic signatures.
- the principle of an electronic signature scheme based on the RSA system can generally be defined in three parts:
- the first part is the generation of the RSA key, using the method described in the first part of the RSA system described above;
- the second part is the generation of the signature.
- the process involves taking input the message M to sign, to apply an encoding using a ⁇ function to obtain the character string ⁇ (M), and to apply the decryption method of the third part of the RSA system described above.
- ⁇ the character string
- the third part is the verification of the signature.
- the method " consists in taking as input the message M to be signed and the signature s to be checked, in applying an encoding to the message M using a function ⁇ to obtain the chained character ⁇ (M), in applying to the signature s the encryption method described in the second part of the RSA system, and to verify that the result obtained is equal to ⁇ (M).
- the signature s of the message M is valid, and otherwise it is false .
- An example of an encoding process is the process described in the standard "ISO / IEC 9796-2, Information Technology - Security techniques - Digital signature scheme giving message recovery, Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function, 1997”.
- Another example of an encoding method is the encoding method described in the “RSA” standard. Laboboratories, PKCS # 1: RSA cryptography specifications, version 2.0, September 1998 ”. These two encoding methods allow messages of arbitrarily long size to be signed.
- the method of the invention consists in transmitting only a part S 'of the signature S of a message M.
- the method of the invention consists of two distinct parts, the first being the generation of the short signature, the second ' being the verification of the short signature by the entity having the user's private key.
- the method for generating the short signature " takes as input a message M and the user's private key d, and comprises the following steps:
- the method of verifying the short signature takes as input a message M, the short signature S 'to be verified, and the private key d of the user, and comprises the following steps:
- the advantage of the short signature generation and verification method is that the size of the signature to be transmitted is much smaller than in the general case: it is thus possible to transmit only 64 bits of the signature instead of 1024 bits . This results in better performance due to shorter transmission times.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0012352 | 2000-09-28 | ||
FR0012352A FR2814620B1 (fr) | 2000-09-28 | 2000-09-28 | Procede de transmission accelere de signature electronique |
PCT/FR2001/002984 WO2002028011A1 (fr) | 2000-09-28 | 2001-09-26 | Procede de transmission accelere de signature electronique |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1325585A1 true EP1325585A1 (de) | 2003-07-09 |
Family
ID=8854774
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP01972218A Withdrawn EP1325585A1 (de) | 2000-09-28 | 2001-09-26 | Verfahren zur beschleunigten übertragung einer digitalsignatur |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20020188850A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1325585A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN1393080A (de) |
AU (1) | AU2001292004A1 (de) |
FR (1) | FR2814620B1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2002028011A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7957525B2 (en) * | 2003-10-31 | 2011-06-07 | Ntt Docomo, Inc. | Encryption and signature schemes using message mappings to reduce the message size |
WO2013101012A1 (en) * | 2011-12-29 | 2013-07-04 | Intel Corporation | Accessing configuration and status registers for a configuration space |
US10333696B2 (en) | 2015-01-12 | 2019-06-25 | X-Prime, Inc. | Systems and methods for implementing an efficient, scalable homomorphic transformation of encrypted data with minimal data expansion and improved processing efficiency |
EP3459002B1 (de) * | 2016-05-19 | 2020-07-08 | Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) | Verfahren und vorrichtungen zur handhabung von hash-tree-basierten datensignaturen |
FR3058813A1 (fr) * | 2016-11-16 | 2018-05-18 | Stmicroelectronics (Rousset) Sas | Stockage dans une memoire non volatile |
CN107104788B (zh) * | 2017-04-18 | 2020-05-08 | 深圳奥联信息安全技术有限公司 | 终端及其不可抵赖的加密签名方法和装置 |
Family Cites Families (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2733379B1 (fr) * | 1995-04-20 | 1997-06-20 | Gemplus Card Int | Procede de generation de signatures electroniques, notamment pour cartes a puces |
CA2228185C (en) * | 1997-01-31 | 2007-11-06 | Certicom Corp. | Verification protocol |
-
2000
- 2000-09-28 FR FR0012352A patent/FR2814620B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2001
- 2001-09-26 US US10/148,022 patent/US20020188850A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2001-09-26 CN CN01802929A patent/CN1393080A/zh active Pending
- 2001-09-26 AU AU2001292004A patent/AU2001292004A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2001-09-26 WO PCT/FR2001/002984 patent/WO2002028011A1/fr not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2001-09-26 EP EP01972218A patent/EP1325585A1/de not_active Withdrawn
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
---|
See references of WO0228011A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1393080A (zh) | 2003-01-22 |
FR2814620B1 (fr) | 2002-11-15 |
US20020188850A1 (en) | 2002-12-12 |
FR2814620A1 (fr) | 2002-03-29 |
WO2002028011A1 (fr) | 2002-04-04 |
AU2001292004A1 (en) | 2002-04-08 |
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Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20030428 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Designated state(s): AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC NL PT SE TR |
|
AX | Request for extension of the european patent |
Extension state: AL LT LV MK RO SI |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN |
|
18W | Application withdrawn |
Effective date: 20031024 |
|
RBV | Designated contracting states (corrected) |
Designated state(s): DE ES FR GB IT |