EP1293858A2 - Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechner-Systems gegen Manipulation seines Programms - Google Patents
Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechner-Systems gegen Manipulation seines Programms Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1293858A2 EP1293858A2 EP02012969A EP02012969A EP1293858A2 EP 1293858 A2 EP1293858 A2 EP 1293858A2 EP 02012969 A EP02012969 A EP 02012969A EP 02012969 A EP02012969 A EP 02012969A EP 1293858 A2 EP1293858 A2 EP 1293858A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- code word
- microcomputer system
- memory
- program
- rewritable memory
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
- G06F12/1458—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by checking the subject access rights
- G06F12/1466—Key-lock mechanism
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/51—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for protection of a microcomputer system against manipulation of his Program.
- the microcomputer system has one rewritable memory in which at least one Part of the program is saved. In the process starting from a starting value over at least part of the Content of the rewritable memory a code word educated.
- the invention also relates to an anti-manipulation protected microcomputer system with one read-only memory and rewritable memory, in which at least part of the program is stored.
- a code word formation executed.
- a method and a microcomputer system at the beginning mentioned type is for example from DE 197 23 332 A1 known.
- the method described there serves in particular to protect a motor vehicle control unit against Manipulation of his tax program.
- the control unit serves for controlling and / or regulating motor vehicle functions, for example an internal combustion engine, one electronic control (steer-by-wire) or one electronic brake (brake-by-wire).
- the procedure is carried out every time the microcomputer system is started a boot routine and as part of the boot routine Checking program executed.
- the review program is in a read-only memory of the microcomputer system stored.
- the Review program will consist of at least part of the Memory contents of the rewritable memory with With the help of an encryption algorithm a code word determined and with one in the rewritable Compare stored comparison code word.
- the code word is a checksum. Execution in the rewritable memory of the control unit stored control program is blocked if the determined code word does not equal the comparison code word is.
- a problem with the known method is that the encryption algorithms for the calculation of the code word are generally generally known and are publicly accessible or can be determined in a relatively simple manner. Because the algorithms are well known and publicly available, the effectiveness of code word formation for manipulation and / or tuning protection of the program of a microcomputer system is reduced. In addition, the encryption algorithms known from the prior art all begin with one and the same starting value. With the CRC 16 (Cyclic Redundancy Check, 16 bit) encryption algorithm, FFFF hex is always used as the start value. With the encryption algorithm CRC 32, FFFFFFFF hex is always used as the start value.
- the present invention is based on the object Effectiveness of code word formation as manipulation or Tuning protection for a program of a microcomputer system increase.
- the invention is based on of the method of the type mentioned above that the Starting value for the formation of the code word for individual microcomputers is specified.
- the starting value of code word formation can be for everyone Microcomputers can be specified individually. However, it is also possible, one for certain groups of microcomputers to specify a common starting value.
- the starting value is kept secret so that third parties can manipulate the program stored in the rewritable memory except for the encryption algorithm for the Code word formation would also need to know the starting value to make sure that the code word check manipulated program would not be recognized.
- the code word is a checksum.
- the starting value for Formation of the code word depending on the type of microcomputer system is specified. According to this training thus form microcomputer systems of the same type Microcomputer group that has the same starting value for education of the code word is assigned.
- the code word have a Diagnostic interface of the microcomputer system output becomes.
- the code word can be output with a in a publicly available table Comparison code word for the corresponding microcomputer system or the corresponding micro processor system type be compared. If the code word and the Compare code word may not match from one Manipulation of the program of the microcomputer system be assumed.
- the present invention proposes that in the Microcomputer system checks the code word and the Execution of the in the rewritable memory stored program of the microcomputer system blocked if the code word formed does not equal one predefined comparison code word.
- the code word formed is thus an embodiment internal to the microcomputer with a predetermined Comparison code word compared and at one The other does not match the two code words Execution of the in the rewritable memory of the Microcomputer system stored program blocked.
- the present invention also particularly suggests advantageous use of the method according to the invention to protect a motor vehicle control unit against Manipulation of his control program before, the Control device for controlling and / or regulating a Serves motor vehicle function.
- the microcomputer system at every start executes a boot routine and that the code word formation and a comparison of the code word formed with a predefined comparison code word is part of the boot routine.
- This further training can be particularly high Protection against manipulation or tuning with the Codeword formation can be achieved.
- the Codeword formation and a comparison of the formed codeword with the comparison code word only for one, preferably when the microcomputer system is started for the first time be carried out. If there is a match or Mismatch of the code word formed with the Comparison code word can be a predefinable identifier in a Microprocessor system memory can be stored. at every further start of the microcomputer system must then only the stored identifier can be checked and the The program either continues or blocked.
- the rewritable memory of the microcomputer system is advantageously as an EPROM (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) or as an EEPROM (Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), especially as a flash memory. Furthermore, suggested that the read-only memory as a selected area is formed in the flash memory.
- a microcomputer system 1 is shown a computer core 2 (Central Processing Unit, CPU) and has a plurality of memories 3, 4, 5.
- ROM read-only memory Memory
- RAM Random access memory
- EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
- Flash EPROM Flash EPROM
- the read-only memory 3 contains a permanent memory Program that can only be made by creating a new one Memory chip can be changed. In this store a minimal program is therefore usually stored, which enables the computer core 2 to issue commands process that in other storage media, in particular the rewritable memory 5 are stored.
- the Read / write memory 4 is only in progress Operation of the microcomputer system 1 capable of data save, and therefore only serves to store data or of program instructions during the ongoing operation of the Microcomputer system 1. On the memory contents of the Read / write memory 4 can be accessed particularly quickly so that sometimes programs from others Storage media, for example from read-only memory 3 or the rewritable memory 5 in the Read / write memory 4 can be transferred to from there to be executed.
- the rewritable memory 5, that in the present embodiment as EPROM or is designed as a flash EPROM and contains program sections or data that can be changed within a certain framework should.
- the read-only memory 3 are then in addition to the minimal program Control programs for the internal combustion engine or others Motor vehicle functions filed.
- rewritable memory 5 then becomes data for example parameters or limit values for operation the internal combustion engine, on which the Control program accesses.
- Additional program modules can also be found in the rewritable memory 5 are stored, the z. B. should not be implemented in every control unit. It is possible as a control unit for different Applications to use. The control functions for all applications are the same in the read-only memory 3 filed while the programs or data that differ in the individual applications, in rewritable memory 5 are stored.
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart of an inventive Procedure illustrated. The process begins in one Function block 10.
- a function block 11 necessary measures to the computer core 2 for processing to prepare programs. Doing so will use internal registers of the computer core 2 to output values (so-called Default values) is set, and the computer core 2 is thus in the Position offset, input and output operations leading to Editing commands are necessary to make.
- Such a boot routine is then in one Function block 12 from at least part of the in the rewritable memory 5 contains data Codeword determined.
- a simple example of a such a code word is a checksum.
- Checksum can make a statement about the condition of the in the Storage 5 stored data can be made.
- a checksum is determined by mathematical calculations (so-called encryption algorithms) at least a part of the data stored in the memory 5 be carried out. The result of these calculations is called Checksum.
- a code word can be more or less complex mathematical encryption methods are determined, those without precise knowledge of the encryption algorithm not allow an unauthorized person from the content of the rewritable memory 5 to determine the code word.
- the query is then compared in a query block 13 determined code word with a comparison code word, the for example in the rewritable memory 5 is saved. If the code word and that Comparison code word match, that will further program, here by a function block 14 represented, continued. If the code word and that Comparison code word will not match, that will Microcomputer system 1 blocked for further operation. The method is ended in a function block 15.
- the effectiveness of the protection of the microcomputer system 1 against manipulation of its program can be significantly increased by specifying the starting value for the formation of the code word individually for the microcomputer. This means that when the code word is formed, it is not always the same starting value that is assumed, but that this can be variably specified for different microcomputer systems.
- an initial value or default value is used as the starting value for the formation of the code word. For example, FFFF hex for the CRC 16 encryption algorithm (Cyclic Redundancy Check, 16 bit) and FFFFFFFF hex for the CRC 32 encryption algorithm are used as default values.
- an authorized user who wants to change the content of the rewritable memory 5 must therefore also recognize the start value of the corresponding microcomputer system in addition to the encryption algorithm in order to be able to determine a valid comparison code word which is then stored in the memory 5.
- the effectiveness of the manipulation or tuning protection is thus significantly increased by the present invention.
- the starting value can be from microcomputer system 1 to Microcomputer system 1 can be varied. However, it is also conceivable, the same for a group of several microcomputers Starting value to specify, d. H. the start value depending of the microcomputer system type.
- the code word can via a diagnostic interface 6 of the microcomputer system be issued.
- Control unit types A and B explain how, despite the same content of the rewritable memory 5, namely storage value 1 and storage value 2, due to the different starting values 0000 and 1010 different Checksums 5555 and 6565 result.
- That in Figure 3 method shown uses a particularly simple Encryption algorithm, which consists of the Storage value 1 and storage value 2 to a start value add. In practice, they are usually essential more complex encryption algorithms applied to to offer effective protection against manipulation or tuning.
- the review program can also be designed that only individual areas of the rewritable Memory 5 are checked. It is also possible that Review program to be designed so that different areas of the rewritable Memory 5 different encryption algorithms be applied and a separate one for each of these areas Code word is stored. Individual areas of the rewritable memory 5 optionally for a new one Programming can be locked or optionally released become.
- the microcomputer system 1 as a control device for the control or regulation of a Internal combustion engine is used can be provided that with an unauthorized manipulation of the map for the ignition angle instead of locking the function Ignition angle is used, the one reduced performance operation of the internal combustion engine allowed and at the same time triggers a request that Have the vehicle repaired at a workshop. On in this way it can be ensured that even with a accidental change in the content of rewritable Memory 5 still has a certain minimum function of Microcomputer system 1 is exercised.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Debugging And Monitoring (AREA)
Abstract
Description
- Figur 1
- ein erfindungsgemäßes Mikrorechner-System gemäß einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform;
- Figur 2
- ein Ablaufdiagramm eines erfindungsgemäßen Verfahrens gemäß einer bevorzugten Ausführungsform; und
- Figur 3
- eine Tabelle zur Verdeutlichung der Auswirkung unterschiedlicher Startwerte auf die Checksumme.
Claims (10)
- Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechner-Systems (1) gegen Manipulation seines Programms, wobei das Mikrorechner-System (1) einen wiederbeschreibbaren Speicher (5) aufweist, in dem mindestens ein Teil des Programms gespeichert wird, bei dem ausgehend von einem Startwert über zumindest einen Teil des Inhalts des wiederbeschreibbaren Speichers (5) ein Codewort gebildet wird, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Startwert zur Bildung des Codeworts mikrorechnerindividuell vorgegeben wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Startwert zur Bildung des Codeworts in Abhängigkeit von dem Mikrorechner-Systemtyp vorgegeben wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Codewort über eine Diagnoseschnittstelle (6) des Mikrorechner-Systems (1) ausgegeben wird.
- Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass in dem Mikrorechner-System (1) das gebildete Codewort überprüft und die Ausführung des in dem wiederbeschreibbaren Speicher (5) abgelegten Programms des Mikrorechner-Sytems (1) blockiert wird, falls das Codewort nicht gleich einem vorgegebenen Vergleichscodewort ist.
- Verwendung eines Verfahrens nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 4, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Verfahren zum Schutz eines Kraftfahrzeugsteuergeräts gegen Manipulation seines Steuerprogramms verwendet wird, wobei das Steuergerät zur Steuerung und/oder Regelung einer Kraftfahrzeugfunktion dient.
- Gegen Manipulation seines Programms geschütztes Mikrorechner-System (1) mit einem nur-Lese-Speicher (3) und einem wiederbeschreibbaren Speicher (5), in dem mindestens ein Teil des Programms gespeichert ist, wobei zum Schutz des Mikrorechner-Systems (1) ausgehend von einem Startwert über zumindest einen Teil des wiederbeschreibbaren Speichers (5) eine Codewortbildung ausführbar ist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass in dem nur-Lese-Speicher (3) ein mikrorechnerindividueller Startwert zur Bildung des Codeworts gespeichert ist.
- Mikrorechner-System (1) nach Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Mikrorechner-System (1) bei jedem Start eine Bootroutine ausführt und dass die Codewortbildung und ein Vergleich des gebildeten Codeworts mit einem vorgegebenen Vergleichscodewort Teil der Bootroutine ist.
- Mikrorechner-System (1) nach Anspruch 6 oder 7, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass bei Nichtübereinstimmung eines gebildeten Codeworts mit einem vorgegebenen Vergleichscodewort die Ausführung des in dem wiederbeschreibbaren Speicher (5) abgelegten Programms des Mikrorechner-Systems (1) gesperrt ist.
- Mikrorechner-System (1) nach einem der Ansprüche 6 bis 8, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der wiederbeschreibbare Speicher (5) als ein Flash-Speicher ausgebildet ist.
- Mikrorechner-System (1) nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 9, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der nur-Lese-Speicher (3) ein ausgewählter Bereich in einem Flash-Speicher ist.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE10131576 | 2001-07-02 | ||
DE10131576A DE10131576A1 (de) | 2001-07-02 | 2001-07-02 | Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechner-Systems gegen Manipulation seines Programms |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1293858A2 true EP1293858A2 (de) | 2003-03-19 |
EP1293858A3 EP1293858A3 (de) | 2004-01-28 |
EP1293858B1 EP1293858B1 (de) | 2007-08-22 |
Family
ID=7690033
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP02012969A Expired - Lifetime EP1293858B1 (de) | 2001-07-02 | 2002-06-12 | Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechner-Systems gegen Manipulation seines Programms |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20030037213A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1293858B1 (de) |
AT (1) | ATE371211T1 (de) |
DE (2) | DE10131576A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE10238094B4 (de) * | 2002-08-21 | 2007-07-19 | Audi Ag | Verfahren zum Schutz gegen Manipulationen in einem Steuergerät für mindestens eine Kfz-Komponente und Steuergerät |
DE102006055830A1 (de) | 2006-11-27 | 2008-05-29 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Verfahren zum Schutz eines Steuergeräts vor Manipulation |
JP4513818B2 (ja) * | 2007-03-07 | 2010-07-28 | コニカミノルタビジネステクノロジーズ株式会社 | 画像形成装置用プロセスカートリッジ及び画像形成装置 |
BR112012004367B1 (pt) * | 2009-08-28 | 2019-09-10 | Volvo Lastvagnar Ab | método de detecção de adulteração. |
US9088805B2 (en) * | 2012-02-08 | 2015-07-21 | Vixs Systems, Inc. | Encrypted memory device and methods for use therewith |
Citations (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5191608A (en) * | 1990-09-12 | 1993-03-02 | Gemplus Card International | Method for the management of an application program loaded in a microcircuit medium |
US5421006A (en) * | 1992-05-07 | 1995-05-30 | Compaq Computer Corp. | Method and apparatus for assessing integrity of computer system software |
EP0707270A2 (de) * | 1994-10-12 | 1996-04-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Prüfung der Gültigkeit des Betriebs eines Systems |
US5787367A (en) * | 1996-07-03 | 1998-07-28 | Chrysler Corporation | Flash reprogramming security for vehicle computer |
DE19723332A1 (de) * | 1997-06-04 | 1998-09-03 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechners und geschützter Mikrorechner |
EP0939012A1 (de) * | 1998-02-26 | 1999-09-01 | Automobiles Peugeot | Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Kohärenz von auf einen Rechner ferngeladener Information |
EP0962850A2 (de) * | 1998-06-01 | 1999-12-08 | Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. | Verfaren zum Schutz von eingebetteter Systemsoftware und eingebettetes System |
Family Cites Families (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6438648B1 (en) * | 1999-12-22 | 2002-08-20 | International Business Machines Corporation | System apparatus and method for managing multiple host computer operating requirements in a data storage system |
US6628974B1 (en) * | 2000-06-27 | 2003-09-30 | Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co., Ltd. | Folder operating apparatus for cellular phone |
KR100469361B1 (ko) * | 2002-07-24 | 2005-01-31 | 삼성전기주식회사 | 휴대전화기의 폴더 구동장치 |
-
2001
- 2001-07-02 DE DE10131576A patent/DE10131576A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2002
- 2002-06-12 AT AT02012969T patent/ATE371211T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
- 2002-06-12 EP EP02012969A patent/EP1293858B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-06-12 DE DE50210735T patent/DE50210735D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2002-07-01 US US10/188,176 patent/US20030037213A1/en not_active Abandoned
Patent Citations (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5191608A (en) * | 1990-09-12 | 1993-03-02 | Gemplus Card International | Method for the management of an application program loaded in a microcircuit medium |
US5421006A (en) * | 1992-05-07 | 1995-05-30 | Compaq Computer Corp. | Method and apparatus for assessing integrity of computer system software |
EP0707270A2 (de) * | 1994-10-12 | 1996-04-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Verfahren und Einrichtung zur Prüfung der Gültigkeit des Betriebs eines Systems |
US5787367A (en) * | 1996-07-03 | 1998-07-28 | Chrysler Corporation | Flash reprogramming security for vehicle computer |
DE19723332A1 (de) * | 1997-06-04 | 1998-09-03 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Verfahren zum Schutz eines Mikrorechners und geschützter Mikrorechner |
EP0939012A1 (de) * | 1998-02-26 | 1999-09-01 | Automobiles Peugeot | Verfahren zur Überprüfung der Kohärenz von auf einen Rechner ferngeladener Information |
EP0962850A2 (de) * | 1998-06-01 | 1999-12-08 | Nokia Mobile Phones Ltd. | Verfaren zum Schutz von eingebetteter Systemsoftware und eingebettetes System |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE10131576A1 (de) | 2003-01-16 |
ATE371211T1 (de) | 2007-09-15 |
EP1293858B1 (de) | 2007-08-22 |
US20030037213A1 (en) | 2003-02-20 |
DE50210735D1 (de) | 2007-10-04 |
EP1293858A3 (de) | 2004-01-28 |
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