EP1273500B1 - Relay control - Google Patents

Relay control Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1273500B1
EP1273500B1 EP01440199A EP01440199A EP1273500B1 EP 1273500 B1 EP1273500 B1 EP 1273500B1 EP 01440199 A EP01440199 A EP 01440199A EP 01440199 A EP01440199 A EP 01440199A EP 1273500 B1 EP1273500 B1 EP 1273500B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
computer
control signals
control
relay
sequence
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP01440199A
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP1273500A1 (en
Inventor
Kassen Oldewurtel
Rainer Klemm
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Alcatel Lucent SAS
Original Assignee
Alcatel CIT SA
Alcatel SA
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Publication date
Application filed by Alcatel CIT SA, Alcatel SA filed Critical Alcatel CIT SA
Priority to EP01440199A priority Critical patent/EP1273500B1/en
Priority to AT01440199T priority patent/ATE337954T1/en
Priority to DE50110879T priority patent/DE50110879D1/en
Publication of EP1273500A1 publication Critical patent/EP1273500A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1273500B1 publication Critical patent/EP1273500B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
    • B61L21/06—Vehicle-on-line indication; Monitoring locking and release of the route
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L1/00—Devices along the route controlled by interaction with the vehicle or train
    • B61L1/20—Safety arrangements for preventing or indicating malfunction of the device, e.g. by leakage current, by lightning
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01H—ELECTRIC SWITCHES; RELAYS; SELECTORS; EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE DEVICES
    • H01H47/00—Circuit arrangements not adapted to a particular application of the relay and designed to obtain desired operating characteristics or to provide energising current
    • H01H47/002—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits
    • H01H47/004—Monitoring or fail-safe circuits using plural redundant serial connected relay operated contacts in controlled circuit

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a controller for a relay.
  • Each computer is e.g. executed as a microprocessor or microcontroller. Calculate the computer that their respective relay should switch, so they give appropriate control signals to their outputs. If both control signals are present, both relays switch and the total contact is closed.
  • a defective computer or a malfunction of a software of a computer can lead to uncontrolled control signals, which can lead to unwanted switching of the relay.
  • the so-called dynamic control has been developed in which a switching operation is initiated by a continuous 0/1 sequence.
  • the relay does not switch until it has received a continuous 0/1 sequence from the respective computer, ie a clock signal.
  • Fig. 1 shows the principle of a dynamic control.
  • Channel 1 of a first computer ⁇ C1 is given to a first control circuit.
  • the first control circuit includes a capacitor C1, two diodes D1, D2 and a switching contact K1, which are interconnected.
  • Capacitor C1 and diode D2 are connected in series and are in the longitudinal branch.
  • Diode D1 is connected to capacitor C1 and diode D2 and is in a first shunt branch.
  • Switch contact K1 is connected to diode D2 and is located in a second shunt branch.
  • Switch contact K1 controls a first switch S1, which is connected in series with a second switch S2.
  • Channel 2 of a second computer ⁇ C2 is given to a second control circuit.
  • the second control circuit includes a capacitor C2, two diodes D3, D4 and a switching contact K2, which are interconnected.
  • Capacitor C2 and diode D4 are connected in series and are in the longitudinal branch.
  • Diode D3 is connected to capacitor C2 and diode D4 and is in a first shunt branch.
  • Switch contact K2 is connected to diode D4 and is located in a second shunt branch. Switching contact K2 controls the second switch S2.
  • Switch contacts K1 and K2 close the switches S1 and S2 only after receiving a continuous 0/1 sequence and continue to keep the switches S1 and S2 only closed as long as the continuous 0/1 sequence, which is a clock signal with a logic zero at 0 volts and a logical one equal to 5 volts.
  • the object of the invention is to provide a control for a relay, which allows a signal-technically safer control.
  • a signaling technology safer control is achieved by a coded control and monitoring of the control. Both hardware and software errors can be safely detected by signal technology.
  • Fig. 2 shows the principle of an inventive control of a relay.
  • the structure of the controller is substantially similar to the structure of Fig. 1.
  • Resistor R1 is connected to computer ⁇ C1, computer ⁇ C2 and capacitor C2 and is used for the feedback of the control signal of the computer ⁇ C2 on the computer ⁇ C1 for monitoring and evaluation.
  • Resistor R2 is connected to computer ⁇ C1, computer ⁇ C2 and capacitor C1 and is used for the feedback of the control signal of the computer ⁇ C1 on the computer ⁇ C2 for monitoring and evaluation.
  • the control signals are coded 0/1 sequences.
  • the coding is done, for example, by using a CRC code or such that a gap is deliberately inserted into a continuous 0/1 sequence, eg by omitting certain ones or in such a way that the number of ones is deliberately increased;
  • the other channel will send incorrectly and a fault of the other computer will be detected immediately. As a result, for example, no dynamic signal is output, so that the relay does not switch and thus the fail-safe overall contact is not turned on.
  • a failure or malfunction of a computer are thus recognizable during operation, whereby a signal-technically safer control is achieved.
  • a safety reaction occurs: The relay in the still functioning other channel is switched off.
  • the contact sets are connected in series, so that thereby the fail-safe total contact is switched off.
  • Fig. 2 shows a section with two computers.
  • three computers are used. For a two out of three decision, each of the three computers receives the feedback signals from the other two computers. The computer will then, according to the two of two arrangement of Fig. 2, turn off its own relay as soon as it does not receive a correctly coded signal from one of the two neighboring computers. All computers work e.g. with the same encoding that is known to all computers.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
  • Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
  • Hardware Redundancy (AREA)
  • Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
  • Relay Circuits (AREA)

Abstract

A first control circuit receives control signals from a first computer and feeds them back to a second computer. A second control circuit receives control signals from the second computer and feeds them back to the first computer. The first computer generates control signals comprising an encoded 0/1 sequence and monitors the control signals from the second computer. The second computer generates control signals comprising an encoded 0/1 sequence and monitors the control signals from the first computer.

Description

Die Erfindung betrifft eine Steuerung für ein Relais.The invention relates to a controller for a relay.

In der Eisenbahnsignaltechnik, aber auch anderen sicherheitsrelevanten Bereichen wie der Luftfahrt oder Raumfahrt, kommt der Ausgabe von signaltechnisch sicheren Werten eine große Bedeutung zu. Insbesondere die signaltechnisch sichere Ansteuerung eines Relais ist bedeutsam.In railway signaling, but also in other safety-related areas such as aerospace or aerospace, the issue of fail-safe values is of great importance. In particular, the signal-technically safe control of a relay is significant.

In der Regel liegt ein 2 aus 3 Rechner System vor. Jeder Rechner ist z.B. als Mikroprozessor oder Mikrocontroller ausgeführt. Berechnen die Rechner, dass ihr jeweiliges Relais schalten soll, so geben sie entsprechende Steuersignale an ihre Ausgänge. Sind beide Steuersignale vorhanden, so schalten beide Relais und der Gesamtkontakt ist geschlossen.Usually there is a 2 out of 3 computer system. Each computer is e.g. executed as a microprocessor or microcontroller. Calculate the computer that their respective relay should switch, so they give appropriate control signals to their outputs. If both control signals are present, both relays switch and the total contact is closed.

Bei einem defekten Rechner oder einer Fehlfunktion einer Software eines Rechners kann es zu unkontrollierten Steuersignalen kommen, die zu ungewolltem Schalten des Relais führen können. Um dies zu verhindern wurde die sogenannte dynamische Ansteuerung entwickelt, bei der ein Schaltvorgang durch eine kontinuierliche 0/1-Folge eingeleitet wird. Das Relais schaltet erst, wenn es vom jeweiligen Rechner eine kontinuierliche 0/1-Folge, also ein Taktsignal erhalten hat.A defective computer or a malfunction of a software of a computer can lead to uncontrolled control signals, which can lead to unwanted switching of the relay. In order to prevent this, the so-called dynamic control has been developed in which a switching operation is initiated by a continuous 0/1 sequence. The relay does not switch until it has received a continuous 0/1 sequence from the respective computer, ie a clock signal.

Fig. 1 zeigt das Prinzip einer dynamischen Ansteuerung. Kanal 1 eines ersten Rechners µC1 wird auf eine erste Steuerschaltung gegeben. Die erste Steuerschaltung beinhaltet einen Kondensator C1, zwei Dioden D1, D2 und ein Schaltkontakt K1, die miteinander verschaltet sind. Kondensator C1 und Diode D2 sind dabei in Reihe geschaltet und befinden sich im Längszweig. Diode D1 ist mit Kondensator C1 und Diode D2 verbunden und befindet sich in einem ersten Querzweig. Schaltkontakt K1 ist mit Diode D2 verbunden und befindet sich in einem zweiten Querzweig. Schaltkontakt K1 steuert einen ersten Schalter S1, der in Reihe mit einem zweiten Schalter S2 geschaltet ist. Kanal 2 eines zweiten Rechners µC2 wird auf eine zweite Steuerschaltung gegeben. Die zweite Steuerschaltung beinhaltet einen Kondensator C2, zwei Dioden D3, D4 und ein Schaltkontakt K2, die miteinander verschaltet sind. Kondensator C2 und Diode D4 sind dabei in Reihe geschaltet und befinden sich im Längszweig. Diode D3 ist mit Kondensator C2 und Diode D4 verbunden und befindet sich in einem ersten Querzweig. Schaltkontakt K2 ist mit Diode D4 verbunden und befindet sich in einem zweiten Querzweig. Schaltkontakt K2 steuert den zweiten Schalter S2.Fig. 1 shows the principle of a dynamic control. Channel 1 of a first computer μC1 is given to a first control circuit. The first control circuit includes a capacitor C1, two diodes D1, D2 and a switching contact K1, which are interconnected. Capacitor C1 and diode D2 are connected in series and are in the longitudinal branch. Diode D1 is connected to capacitor C1 and diode D2 and is in a first shunt branch. Switch contact K1 is connected to diode D2 and is located in a second shunt branch. Switch contact K1 controls a first switch S1, which is connected in series with a second switch S2. Channel 2 of a second computer μC2 is given to a second control circuit. The second control circuit includes a capacitor C2, two diodes D3, D4 and a switching contact K2, which are interconnected. Capacitor C2 and diode D4 are connected in series and are in the longitudinal branch. Diode D3 is connected to capacitor C2 and diode D4 and is in a first shunt branch. Switch contact K2 is connected to diode D4 and is located in a second shunt branch. Switching contact K2 controls the second switch S2.

Erst wenn beide Schalter S1 und S2 geschlossen sind, ist auch der signaltechnisch sichere Gesamtkontakt (S1, S2) geschlossen. Schaltkontakte K1 und K2 schließen die Schalter S1 und S2 erst nach Erhalt einer kontinuierlichen 0/1-Folge und halten die Schalter S1 und S2 auch weiterhin nur geschlossen solange die kontinuierliche 0/1-Folge, die einem Taktsignal mit einer logischen Null bei 0 Volt und einer logischen Eins bei 5 Volt entspricht, empfangen wird.Only when both switches S1 and S2 are closed is the fail-safe overall contact (S1, S2) also closed. Switch contacts K1 and K2 close the switches S1 and S2 only after receiving a continuous 0/1 sequence and continue to keep the switches S1 and S2 only closed as long as the continuous 0/1 sequence, which is a clock signal with a logic zero at 0 volts and a logical one equal to 5 volts.

Bei einem defekten Rechner oder einer Fehlfunktion einer Software eines Rechners kann es trotz dynamischer Ansteuerung zu unkontrollierten Schwingungen kommen, die die kontinuierlichen 0/1-Folgen nachbilden können und damit zu ungewolltem Schalten des Relais führen könnten.In the case of a defective computer or a malfunction of a software of a computer, uncontrolled oscillations can occur despite dynamic activation, which can simulate the continuous 0/1 sequences and thus could lead to unintentional switching of the relay.

Aufgabe der Erfindung ist es, eine Steuerung für ein Relais zu schaffen, die eine signaltechnisch sicherere Ansteuerung ermöglicht.The object of the invention is to provide a control for a relay, which allows a signal-technically safer control.

Gelöst wird diese Aufgabe durch eine Steuerung gemäß Patentanspruch 1.This object is achieved by a control according to claim 1.

Eine signaltechnisch sicherere Ansteuerung wird durch eine kodierte Ansteuerung und eine Überwachung der Ansteuerung erreicht. Sowohl Hardware- als auch Software-Fehler können signaltechnisch sicher erkannt werden.A signaling technology safer control is achieved by a coded control and monitoring of the control. Both hardware and software errors can be safely detected by signal technology.

Im folgenden wird ein Ausführungsbeispiel der Erfindung unter Zuhilfenahme von Fig. 2 erläutert.In the following an embodiment of the invention will be explained with the aid of Fig. 2.

Fig. 2 zeigt das Prinzip einer erfindungsgemäßen Ansteuerung eines Relais.Fig. 2 shows the principle of an inventive control of a relay.

Der Aufbau der Steuerung gleicht im wesentlichen dem Aufbau aus Fig. 1. Zusätzlich zu den in Fig. 1 gezeigten Bauelementen, bei denen die Bezeichnung beibehalten wurde, sind zwei ohmsche Widerstände R1, R2 vorhanden. Widerstand R1 ist mit Rechner µC1, Rechners µC2 und Kondensator C2 verbunden und dient der Rückkopplung des Steuerungssignals des Rechners µC2 auf den Rechner µC1 zwecks Überwachung und Auswertung. Widerstand R2 ist mit Rechner µC1, Rechners µC2 und Kondensator C1 verbunden und dient der Rückkopplung des Steuerungssignals des Rechners µC1 auf den Rechner µC2 zwecks Überwachung und Auswertung.The structure of the controller is substantially similar to the structure of Fig. 1. In addition to the components shown in Fig. 1, in which the designation has been retained, there are two ohmic resistors R1, R2. Resistor R1 is connected to computer μC1, computer μC2 and capacitor C2 and is used for the feedback of the control signal of the computer μC2 on the computer μC1 for monitoring and evaluation. Resistor R2 is connected to computer μC1, computer μC2 and capacitor C1 and is used for the feedback of the control signal of the computer μC1 on the computer μC2 for monitoring and evaluation.

Die Steuersignale sind kodierte 0/1-Folgen. Die Kodierung erfolgt z.B. durch Verwendung eines CRC-Kodes oder derart, dass in einen kontinuierlichen 0/1-Folge bewusst eine Lücke eingefügt wird, z.B. durch Weglassen bestimmter Einsen oder derart, dass die Anzahl der Einsen bewusst erhöht wird; CRC="cyclic redundancy check"=Kodierverfahren, bei dem Verfälschungen eines Datenstromes festgestellt und bei Bedarf korrigiert werden können. Durch die Rückkopplung kann ein Kanal feststellen, ob in dem anderen Kanal als Steuersignal eine kodierte oder eine kontinuierliche 0/1-Folge als Steuersignal verwendet wird. Wird festgestellt, dass eine kodierte 0/1-Folge ausgesendet wird, so sendet der andere Kanal korrekt. Als Folge dessen wird z.B. ebenfalls eine korrekte, kodierte 0/1-Folge ausgesendet. Wird festgestellt, dass eine kontinuierliche 0/1-Folge ausgesendet wird, so sendet der andere Kanal falsch und es wird eine Störung des anderen Rechners sofort erkannt. Als Folge dessen wird z.B. kein dynamisches Signal ausgegeben, so dass das Relais nicht schaltet und damit auch der signaltechnisch sichere Gesamtkontakt nicht durchgeschaltet ist.The control signals are coded 0/1 sequences. The coding is done, for example, by using a CRC code or such that a gap is deliberately inserted into a continuous 0/1 sequence, eg by omitting certain ones or in such a way that the number of ones is deliberately increased; CRC = "cyclic redundancy check" = coding method in which distortions of a data stream can be detected and corrected if necessary. Due to the feedback, a channel can determine whether a coded or a continuous 0/1 sequence is used as the control signal in the other channel as the control signal. If it is determined that a coded 0/1 episode is transmitted, the other channel correctly. As a consequence, for example, a correct, coded 0/1 sequence is also sent out. If it is determined that a continuous 0/1 sequence is transmitted, the other channel will send incorrectly and a fault of the other computer will be detected immediately. As a result, for example, no dynamic signal is output, so that the relay does not switch and thus the fail-safe overall contact is not turned on.

Ein Ausfall oder eine Fehlfunktion eines Rechners sind somit im laufenden Betrieb erkennbar, wodurch eine signaltechnisch sicherere Ansteuerung erreicht wird. Sobald ein Fehler festgestellt wird, erfolgt eine Sicherheitsreaktion: Das Relais im noch funktionierenden anderen Kanal wird abgeschaltet. Die Kontaktsätze sind in Reihe geschaltet, so dass dadurch der signaltechnisch sichere Gesamtkontakt abgeschaltet wird.A failure or malfunction of a computer are thus recognizable during operation, whereby a signal-technically safer control is achieved. As soon as an error is detected, a safety reaction occurs: The relay in the still functioning other channel is switched off. The contact sets are connected in series, so that thereby the fail-safe total contact is switched off.

Fig. 2 zeigt einen Ausschnitt mit zwei Rechnern. In der Regel werden drei Rechner verwendet. Für eine zwei aus drei Entscheidung empfängt jeder der drei Rechner die rückgekoppelten Signale der jeweils zwei anderen Rechner. Der Rechner wird dann, entsprechend der zwei aus zwei Anordnung aus Fig. 2, sein eigenes Relais abschalten, sobald er kein korrekt kodiertes Signal von einem der beiden Nachbarrechner erhält. Alle Rechner arbeiten z.B. mit der selben Kodierung, die allen Rechnern bekannt ist.Fig. 2 shows a section with two computers. As a rule, three computers are used. For a two out of three decision, each of the three computers receives the feedback signals from the other two computers. The computer will then, according to the two of two arrangement of Fig. 2, turn off its own relay as soon as it does not receive a correctly coded signal from one of the two neighboring computers. All computers work e.g. with the same encoding that is known to all computers.

Claims (4)

  1. Controller for a relay, characterized in that a first control circuit is provided, and is suitable for receiving control signals from a first computer (µC1) and feeding them back to a second computer (µC2), and that a second control circuit is provided, and is suitable for receiving control signals from the second computer (µC2) and feeding them back to the first computer (µC1).
  2. Controller for a relay according to Claim 1, characterized in that the first computer (µCl) is suitable for generating control signals with an encoded 0/1 sequence and for monitoring the control signals of the second computer (µC2), and that the second computer (µC2) is suitable for generating control signals with an encoded 0/1 sequence and for monitoring the control signals of the first computer (µC1).
  3. Controller for a relay according to Claim 1, characterized in that the first control circuit includes a capacitor (C1), two diodes (D1, D2) and a switching contact (K1), and the feedback to the second computer (µC2) takes place via an ohmic resistor (R2), and that the second control circuit includes a capacitor (C2), two diodes (D3, D4) and a switching contact (K2), and the feedback to the first computer (µc1) takes place via an ohmic resistor (R1).
  4. Controller for a relay according to Claim 3, characterized in that the switching contacts (K1, K2) each drive a switch (S1, S2), and the two switches (S1, S2) are connected in series.
EP01440199A 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 Relay control Expired - Lifetime EP1273500B1 (en)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP01440199A EP1273500B1 (en) 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 Relay control
AT01440199T ATE337954T1 (en) 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 CONTROL FOR A RELAY
DE50110879T DE50110879D1 (en) 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 Control for a relay

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP01440199A EP1273500B1 (en) 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 Relay control

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1273500A1 EP1273500A1 (en) 2003-01-08
EP1273500B1 true EP1273500B1 (en) 2006-08-30

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EP01440199A Expired - Lifetime EP1273500B1 (en) 2001-07-02 2001-07-02 Relay control

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AT (1) ATE337954T1 (en)
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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
ES2235614B1 (en) 2003-07-31 2006-10-16 Fagor, S. Coop. INSURANCE CONTROL CIRCUIT BEFORE FAULTS FOR APPLIANCES.
DE112006004199A5 (en) * 2006-12-06 2009-11-05 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Method for controlling at least two electromagnetic relays and control device for carrying out the method

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE3712833A1 (en) * 1986-05-29 1987-12-10 Alcatel Nv Safety control device
JP2721909B2 (en) * 1989-01-18 1998-03-04 三菱電機株式会社 Semiconductor storage device
JPH0833183A (en) * 1994-07-15 1996-02-02 Toshiba Corp Digital protection controller

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DE50110879D1 (en) 2006-10-12
EP1273500A1 (en) 2003-01-08
ATE337954T1 (en) 2006-09-15

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