EP1216172A2 - Systeme de detection d'agression a relai avec communications protegees de commande de vehicule - Google Patents

Systeme de detection d'agression a relai avec communications protegees de commande de vehicule

Info

Publication number
EP1216172A2
EP1216172A2 EP00967230A EP00967230A EP1216172A2 EP 1216172 A2 EP1216172 A2 EP 1216172A2 EP 00967230 A EP00967230 A EP 00967230A EP 00967230 A EP00967230 A EP 00967230A EP 1216172 A2 EP1216172 A2 EP 1216172A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
frequency
challenge
signal
response
fob
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP00967230A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Tejas Desai
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Siemens Automotive Corp
Original Assignee
Siemens Automotive Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Siemens Automotive Corp filed Critical Siemens Automotive Corp
Publication of EP1216172A2 publication Critical patent/EP1216172A2/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
    • B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
    • B60R25/24—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/74—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/82—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein continuous-type signals are transmitted
    • G01S13/825—Systems using reradiation of radio waves, e.g. secondary radar systems; Analogous systems wherein continuous-type signals are transmitted with exchange of information between interrogator and responder
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
    • G01S13/02—Systems using reflection of radio waves, e.g. primary radar systems; Analogous systems
    • G01S13/06—Systems determining position data of a target
    • G01S13/08—Systems for measuring distance only
    • G01S13/32—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of continuous waves, whether amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated, or unmodulated
    • G01S13/34—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of continuous waves, whether amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated, or unmodulated using transmission of continuous, frequency-modulated waves while heterodyning the received signal, or a signal derived therefrom, with a locally-generated signal related to the contemporaneously transmitted signal
    • G01S13/343—Systems for measuring distance only using transmission of continuous waves, whether amplitude-, frequency-, or phase-modulated, or unmodulated using transmission of continuous, frequency-modulated waves while heterodyning the received signal, or a signal derived therefrom, with a locally-generated signal related to the contemporaneously transmitted signal using sawtooth modulation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00388—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method
    • G07C2009/00396—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks code verification carried out according to the challenge/response method starting with prompting the keyless data carrier
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
    • G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
    • G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
    • G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C2009/00968—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys shape of the data carrier
    • G07C2009/00984—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys shape of the data carrier fob
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
    • G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
    • G07C2209/61—Signal comprising different frequencies, e.g. frequency hopping

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a vehicle security system, and more particularly to a passive remote entry system that is resistant to relay attacks.
  • Remote control units such as key fobs for remotely controlling functions of vehicles are well known.
  • the original equipment for many vehicles includes a wireless transmitter for arming/disarming the car alarm and/or locking or unlocking the car doors.
  • other systems are available which control these and other functions, such as energizing the car starter to start the engine.
  • a relay attack scheme may allow an unauthorized attack to defeat the security.
  • a first attacker is located adjacent the vehicle while a second attacker follows the vehicle owner who has left the vicinity of the vehicle and is carrying the passive remote fob.
  • the first attacker triggers the desired vehicle function such as unlock or start engine and receives the challenge signal from the vehicle.
  • the first attacker captures the challenge signal with a scanner type device and transmits the challenge signal to the second attacker.
  • the second attacker receives the challenge signal from the first attacker and retransmits the challenge signal to the vehicle owner.
  • the passive remote fob carried by the owner receives the vehicle challenge and responds with a proper response signal.
  • the response signal is captured by the second attacker who then relays the signal back to the first attacker.
  • the first attacker receives the response signal from the first attacker and retransmits the response signal to the vehicle.
  • the first attacker then has access to the desired vehicle function.
  • This sort of attack will defeat most encryption systems as the proper response signal is obtained from the true owner. Accordingly, it is desirable to provide a passive remote system which will defeat such a two-way relay attack.
  • the present invention provides a passive remote system which will defeat the two-way relay attack described above.
  • the present invention defeats the two- way relay attack by determining the amount of delay between the challenge signal and the response signal.
  • the fob of the present invention utilizes the incoming wireless signal from the vehicle as its reference isolator, upon which the frequency of the transmitted signal from the fob is based.
  • the vehicle security system cam determine how much delay there is between the change in the frequency of the challenge signal and the change in the frequency in the response signal from the fob. The vehicle security system accomplishes this by mixing its reference signal with a derivative of the signal received from the fob and evaluating the difference in frequency.
  • the base signal in the vehicle security system is preferably a ramp oscillating signal, increasing in frequency.
  • the fob utilizes the signal received from the vehicle security system as its reference signal, the signal from the fob is also increasing in frequency (although preferably at a much higher frequency).
  • the vehicle security system compares the signal received from the fob to its base signal (the ramp oscillator). The amount by which the frequency of the base ramp oscillator and the signal from the fob differ is representative of the delay from the time the signal is transmitted from the vehicle security system to the fob, through the circuitry in the fob, and back to the vehicle security system. If this air frequency exceeds a predetermined threshold, the delay is to great, identification fails and the access to the vehicle is denied.
  • the fob transmits at a frequency several orders have made it to greater than that transmitted the vehicle.
  • the ramp oscillator signal received by the fob must be stepped up several orders of magnitude before being transmitted by the fob and stepped down several orders of magnitude before being compared by the vehicle security system. This introduces some minor delay, which can be accounted for. However, this introduces a much greater delay in the circuitry in the would be attackers.
  • Figure 1 is a high level schematic of the passive remote entry system of the present invention, as implemented in a vehicle.
  • Figure 2 is an example of a more detailed schematic for implementing the passive remote entry system of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 is a graph illustrating the challenge and response signal of the passive remote entry system.
  • the present invention provides a passive remote entry system 10 for a vehicle 12, shown generally in Figure 1.
  • the passive remote entry system 10 includes a vehicle security system 14 installed on vehicle 12 and controlling access to and the operation of the vehicle operation of the vehicle 12 in a known matter, including operation of door latches, door locks, and the ignition and/or operation of the vehicle engine.
  • the pass remote entry system 10 further includes a passive key fob 16 that is portable relative to the vehicle 12 and carried by the user.
  • the present invention generally utilizes a challenge/response method for implementing passive remote entry.
  • the vehicle security system 14 generates a wireless challenge signal, such as in response to attempted operation of a door latch, vehicle motion, or the detection of a presence near the vehicle.
  • the wireless challenge signal is received by the fob 16, which in turn responds with a wireless response signal. If the proper response signal is received by the vehicle security system 14, identification is successful! and access to the vehicle 12 is permitted.
  • the vehicle security system 14 and fob 16 may use any of numerous known techniques, including encryption or rolling codes.
  • the vehicle security system 14 evaluates the delay between the challenge signal that it transmitted and the response signal it received. This is accomplished by using the challenge signal from the vehicle security system as the reference oscillator for the response signal transmitted by the fob 16. By changing the frequency of the challenge signal and comparing the frequency of the challenge signal with the frequency of the response signal from the fob 16, the difference in frequency is representative of the delay between the challenge signal and the response signal.
  • the passive remote entry system 10 of the present invention first utilizes a more typical challenge/response technique in which the vehicle security system 14 transmits an encrypted challenge signal, to which the fob 16 responds with an encrypted response signal, which is evaluated by the vehicle security system 14. If the proper response signal is received, then the passive remote entry system 10 subsequently proceeds with the evaluation of delay, in which the fob 16 then uses the challenge signal as a reference oscillator and the vehicle security system 14 compares the frequencies of the challenge signal and response signal.
  • the challenge signals transmitted from the vehicle security system is low frequency, preferably less then one MHz, and preferably around 125 kHz. This reduces the range of the challenge signal to the area immediately adjacent the vehicle 12.
  • the fob 16 preferably transmits the response signals at a frequency several orders of magnitude greater than that of the challenge signals.
  • the response signals are transmitted at a frequency greater than 100 MHz and more preferably at or around 315 MHz.
  • the challenge signal is first stepped up several orders of magnitude.
  • the frequency of the response signal must be stepped down several orders of magnitude. This introduces a slight delay from the circuitry in the fob 16 in vehicle security system 14, but several orders of magnitude lower than the delay which would be introduced by the circuitry of the would-be relay attackers.
  • the vehicle security system 14 includes a micro controller 20 which implements the rolling codes or encrypted codes and controls operation of the vehicle security system 14.
  • a coded challenge signal is first sent from micro controller 20 to switch 22 to send an amplitude shift keyed code via the antenna 24 based upon a reference oscillator 26, which may be a voltage controlled oscillator. Initially, the oscillator 26 is operating at a 125 kHz.
  • the 125 kHz signal is received by fob 16 on antenna 30 and amplified by buffers 32.
  • the coded signal is then demodulated by detector 34 and sent to micro controller 36 which evaluates the code.
  • the micro controller 36 using the same encryption or rolling code technique as the micro controller 20 in the vehicle security system 14, sends a proper coded response signal using amplitude shift keying on switch 38 which is connected to the oscillator 40 which is controlled by crystal 42.
  • a switch 43 connects the crystal-controlled oscillator 40 to the amplitude shift key switch 38.
  • This high frequency signal from oscillator 40 is stepped down by frequency divider 44 prior to the amplitude shift keying by switch 38 and then transmitted via the antenna 46.
  • the 315 MHz amplitude shift key coded response signal transmitted from the antenna 46 on the fob 16 is received by the receiving antenna 50 on vehicle security system 14.
  • a 9.509375 GHz crystal 52 controls oscillator 54 to provide an oscillating signal which is stepped down by frequency divider 56 to provide a 304.3 MHz signal which is mixed with the 315 MHz signal received from the fob 16 on antenna 15.
  • Resulting 10.7 MHz signal 58 is buffered by buffers 60, and evaluated by micro controller 20. If the proper coded response signal is received by micro controller 20, then the micro controller 20 proceeds to an evaluation of the delay during a subsequent challenge and response signal, which may also use encryption or rolling codes.
  • the micro controller 20 then controls voltage control oscillator 26 to provide a ramp oscillating signal, preferably centered around 125 kHz.
  • the signal is transmitted by antenna 24 and received by antenna 30 of the fob 16.
  • Micro controller 36 controls switch 43 to utilize the incoming signal on antenna 30 as the reference oscillator (rather than oscillator 40 with crystal 42).
  • This low frequency signal centered around 125 kHz, is stepped up by frequency multiplier 70, stepped down by frequency divider 44 and amplitude shift key modulated by switch 38 and micro controller 36 and fransmitted by antenna 46.
  • the oscillating signal from voltage-controlled oscillator 26 is amplitude shift key modulated by switch 22 in micro controller 20 and transmitted by antenna 24.
  • the response signal from the fob 16 changes accordingly.
  • This response signal is received by antenna 50 on the vehicle system 14 and mixed down to 125 kHz .
  • This signal is then mixed with the signal from the voltage controlled oscillator 26 by mixer 76.
  • the resulting signal is an error frequency 78, the frequency of which is equal to the difference between the frequency of voltage controlled oscillator 26 and that of the step down frequency of the response signal from the fob 16.
  • This error frequency 78 is evaluated by micro controller 20 and/or additional hard- wired circuitry. If the error frequency 78 exceeds a predetermined threshold, then the delay between the challenge signal and response signal is determined to be to great and identification fails and access is denied to the vehicle 12.
  • the stepped down frequency of the response signal would match the frequency of the voltage control oscillator 26 and the error frequency 78 would be zero (or dc).
  • the frequency of the voltage controlled oscillator 26 is increasing, delay between the challenge signal and response signal results in the frequency of the voltage controlled oscillator 26 being higher than that of the stepped down response signal at mixer 78, and thus a higher error frequency 78.
  • the frequency of the challenge signal increases over time (preferably, but not necessarily linearly).
  • the slope of the response signal from the fob 16 (shown stepped down to the 125 kHz range) is the same if that of the challenge signal, although shifted to the right by the amount of delay, shown as delta t.
  • the error frequency which as can be seen, is directly representative of the delay, delta t. It is anticipated that delta t for a proper response signal from the fob 16 would be on the order of 100 ns. While the delta t for a relay attack signal would be on the order of several microseconds, and would thus result in a much higher error frequency (depending upon the slope of the challenge signal).

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système d'entrée à distance passif qui détermine le décalage entre un signal d'identification provenant d'un système de sécurité et un signal de réponse provenant d'un porte-clés passif. Si le décalage dépasse un certain seuil, l'identification échoue et l'accès est rejeté. Le porte-clés utilise le signal provenant du système de sécurité comme signal de référence pour émettre son signal de réponse. Le système de sécurité produit un signal d'identification avec une fréquence variable qui est comparée à la fréquence du signal de réponse. Tout retard dans le changement de fréquence du signal de réponse comparé au changement de fréquence du signal d'identification indique le décalage entre le signal d'identification et le signal de réponse.
EP00967230A 1999-10-01 2000-10-02 Systeme de detection d'agression a relai avec communications protegees de commande de vehicule Withdrawn EP1216172A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15706099P 1999-10-01 1999-10-01
US157060P 1999-10-01
PCT/US2000/027098 WO2001025060A2 (fr) 1999-10-01 2000-10-02 Systeme de detection d'agression a relai avec communications protegees de commande de vehicule

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1216172A2 true EP1216172A2 (fr) 2002-06-26

Family

ID=22562201

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP00967230A Withdrawn EP1216172A2 (fr) 1999-10-01 2000-10-02 Systeme de detection d'agression a relai avec communications protegees de commande de vehicule

Country Status (3)

Country Link
EP (1) EP1216172A2 (fr)
JP (1) JP2003512218A (fr)
WO (1) WO2001025060A2 (fr)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2001025060A2 (fr) 2001-04-12
JP2003512218A (ja) 2003-04-02
WO2001025060A9 (fr) 2002-10-03
WO2001025060A3 (fr) 2001-12-27

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