EP1180294A1 - Procede et appareil permettant de creer un environnement de communications protege - Google Patents

Procede et appareil permettant de creer un environnement de communications protege

Info

Publication number
EP1180294A1
EP1180294A1 EP00937467A EP00937467A EP1180294A1 EP 1180294 A1 EP1180294 A1 EP 1180294A1 EP 00937467 A EP00937467 A EP 00937467A EP 00937467 A EP00937467 A EP 00937467A EP 1180294 A1 EP1180294 A1 EP 1180294A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
security
entities
information
bindings
measures
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP00937467A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Juan Antonio Sanchez Herrero
Odelin Calatrava Requena
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Original Assignee
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB filed Critical Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson AB
Publication of EP1180294A1 publication Critical patent/EP1180294A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1458—Denial of Service
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/24—Negotiation of communication capabilities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to a method and apparatus for secure communication. More specifically, this invention relates to a method and apparatus for secure communication between entities in the same or in different communication networks.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • DCS 1800 Digital Cellular System for Mobile Communications
  • PCS Personal Communication System
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • a typical network includes at least one Home Location Register (HLR) 100 for storing information about subscribers to the network, a Visitor Location Register (VLR) 110 for storing information about subscribers to other networks that may be roaming in the network, a Mobile Services Switching Center (MSC) 120 for performing switching functions for the mobile stations, a Gateway MSC (GMSC) 130 for routing incoming calls to the PLMN to the appropriate MSC, and an SMS Gateway MSC (SMSGMSC) 140 which is an interface between the mobile network and a network providing access to the short message service center for delivery of short messages to the mobile stations via a Switching Center (SC) 150.
  • HLR Home Location Register
  • VLR Visitor Location Register
  • MSC Mobile Services Switching Center
  • GMSC Gateway MSC
  • SMSGMSC SMS Gateway MSC
  • a Base Station Controller (BSC) 160 and a Base Transceiver Station (BTS) 170 are part of the base station system equipment for connecting the network to a mobile station 180.
  • An Equipment Identity Register (EIR) 190 handles management of the equipment identities of the mobile stations.
  • a Switching Network 210 may be connected to the network via the GMSC 130
  • a Packet Network 220 may be connected to the network via a General Packet Radio Service Support Node (GSN) 200
  • GSN General Packet Radio Service Support Node
  • another PLMN 230 may be connected to another GMSC 130.
  • a Fraud Detection System (FDS) 240 may be connected to several types of entities in the network, e.g., the HLR 100 and another MSC 120, from which it obtains information for specific subscribers.
  • FDS Fraud Detection System
  • the information collected may include information regarding the charging data records generated, e.g., at the MSCs, the location information of the subscribers, which is generally generated at the HLR, and information regarding the activity generated in real time (such as the number of call forwarding registrations performed in a period of time, the number of parallel calls made in that time, etc.).
  • the FDS 240 discovers possible fraud risk situations. For example, the FDS 240 detects when a subscriber suddenly has a really high charging record that has previously never occurred. As another example, the FDS 240 detects when a subscriber generates several parallel calls to certain countries, which might indicate call selling activities. As a third example, the FDS 240 detects when a subscriber is located in two different distant places within a very short interval of time, which may indicate cloning activities.
  • the entities of the PLMN communicate via a common signalling system.
  • MAP Mobile Application Part
  • CCITT the Mobile Application Part of the Signaling System No. 7 specified by CCITT
  • Details of this signalling system are given in Digital Cellular Telecommunications System (Phase 2+), Mobile Application Part (MAP) specification, TS GSM 09.02 v.5.6.00, which is incorporated herein by reference.
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary configuration of a network architecture for a roaming scenario. Similar to FIG. 1 , a FDS 240 is connected to entities such as the HLR 100 and the MSCs 120. With the continuos growth of network elements, transmission media, etc., more refined fraud methods have been developed. Such methods involve attacks on the signalling system. Using GSM as an example, the security of the global SS7 network as a transport system for sensitive signalling messages is open to major compromise.
  • Such impersonation permits access to confidential information and may even result in a change to specific service behavior (e.g., Customized Applications for Mobile Network Enhanced Logic (CAMEL) charge services, location services, Supplementary Services (SS) procedures, redundancy, etc.), which may result in fraud and/or affect the network behavior.
  • CAMEL Customized Applications for Mobile Network Enhanced Logic
  • SS Supplementary Services
  • the service availability can be compromised at the user level, based on manipulation of subscription information or messages granting the service.
  • the service availability can also be compromised at the network level, by deletion of resource liberation related messages, e.g., deletion of a message indicating a subscriber's location, or by overloading the network through message injection.
  • a method and apparatus for secure communication between entities in one or more networks A determination is made whether security measures needed for the communication exist between the entities. If such measures do not exist, the security measures are established, and the communication is initiated.
  • the security measures include security bindings including information needed for the secure communication.
  • Security measures are established between entities in one or more networks based on predetermined security requirements and on a determined needed security level. The security level needed may be determined based on whether the entities are in the same network or in different networks and/or on the information being transmitted.
  • Security bindings are established between the entities depending on the information to be transmitted and/or the network to which the entities belong.
  • the security bindings include information identifying the security binding, encryption information, authentication information, integrity information, a list of addresses or group of addressees included in the security bindings, and/or information regarding the lifetime of the security bindings.
  • the encryption, authentication, and integrity may be specified at a parameter level.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary network architecture for mobile radio communication systems
  • FIG. 2 illustrates an exemplary network architecture for a roaming scenario
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a key life cycle
  • FIG. 4 illustrates a system for secure communication according to an exemplary embodiment
  • FIG. 5 A illustrates a message sequence for the transmission of key management information
  • FIG. 5B illustrates a detailed example of a process for establishing a security binding
  • FIG. 6 illustrates a message sequence for the transmission of encrypted information
  • FIG. 7 illustrates an entity procedure for transmitting encrypted information
  • FIG. 8 illustrates a message sequence for the transmission of authentication information
  • FIG. 9 illustrates a message sequence for the transmission of integrity information.
  • a general premise of any security analysis is that the weakest point in the security chain may compromise the complete security system.
  • the chain comprises a number of signalling protocols, such as Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) User Part (ISUP), Data Transfer Application Part (DTAP), Base Station System Application Part (BSSAP), GPRS Transfer Protocol (GTP), CAMEL Application Part (CAP), Intelligent Network Application Protocol (INAP), etc.
  • ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
  • DTAP Data Transfer Application Part
  • BSSAP Base Station System Application Part
  • GTP GPRS Transfer Protocol
  • CAP CAMEL Application Part
  • INAP Intelligent Network Application Protocol
  • TCAP Translation Capability Application Part
  • MAP Mobile Application Part
  • the invention is not limited to applications using these protocols, but may be applicable to other protocols.
  • security may be managed using one or more of four mechanisms: data encryption, authentication, integrity, and key management.
  • Data encryption is used to assure confidentiality of transmitted information
  • authentication is used to assure that the messages received from a certain entity have not been injected or replayed by intruders
  • integrity is used to assure that the information has not been manipulated
  • key management is used to manage the encryption, authentication, and integrity mechanisms.
  • the key management mechanism allows flexible handling of keys upon which the encryption and authentication mechanisms are based.
  • forward compatibility should be made possible, allowing adaptation to further needs and emerging technologies (e.g., new encryption algorithms, future transmission of sensitive information, etc.).
  • the impact of the security mechanisms on network performance should be minimized.
  • the number of entities in the network with high security requirements should also be minimized.
  • Handling of roaming scenarios should be made simple. High granularity in the application of the security mechanisms at the network, entity, procedure and subscriber levels should be provided, such that different security levels can coexist.
  • all of the mechanisms do not have to be applied. For example, if the information contained in a message is considered important by itself, this implies that in some cases it may be desirable only to apply data encryption (to avoid eavesdropping) or only to apply data integrity (to avoid manipulation), independently of the other requirements.
  • the mechanisms are as independent as possible in order to allow the independent application of the mechanisms and to simplify the adaptation of the mechanisms to emerging technologies.
  • a key management system is proposed, and the encryption and authentication mechanisms take advantage of it in order to simplify the complete procedure. Since key management is commonly used by the other mechanisms, the key management mechanism will be described first.
  • Key management is the administration and use of the services of generation, registration, certification, de-registration, distribution, installation, storage, archiving, revocation, derivation and destruction of keying material.
  • the objective of key management is the secure administration and use of these key management services.
  • the protection of keys is extremely important. The appropriate protection of keys depends on the threats they face. Problems that arise in key distribution are the number of entities involved in the communication and the nature of them. Since mobile networks such as the GSM/UMTS network allow roaming, there is communication between several entities out of the operator security domain. On the other hand, each operator may need to have complete control over the security in the entities.
  • Security bindings between entities indicate the allowed communication between entities and the characteristics of the encryption, authentication, and integrity mechanisms used and specific characteristics of the corresponding binding.
  • the security bindings include information such as a binding identity, which uniquely identifies the security binding, encryption, which specifies the parameters to be encrypted, the algorithms applicable (e.g., BEANO) and the session key used, authentication, which refers to messaging requiring authentication, the authentication system applicable and the key used, integrity, which refers to messages requiring integrity and the integrity system applicable, lifetime, which is the time during which the security binding is considered applicable, and destinations, which includes a list of addresses or group of addresses (e.g., MSISDN series) included in the security binding.
  • a binding identity which uniquely identifies the security binding
  • encryption which specifies the parameters to be encrypted
  • the algorithms applicable e.g., BEANO
  • authentication which refers to messaging requiring authentication
  • integrity which refers to messages requiring integrity and the integrity system applicable
  • lifetime which is the time during which the
  • session keys which only remain valid for a particular communication session, may be used.
  • a session key is only made valid during a prescribed period.
  • the keys are temporary and subject to modification after the prescribed period.
  • a life cycle is therefore associated with each key.
  • a typical life cycle of a key is illustrated in FIG. 3.
  • the life cycle includes three principal states: pending active, active, and post active.
  • pending active When a key is generated, it enters the pending active state 300.
  • pending active state 300 a key has been generated, but has not been activated for use.
  • the key remains in the pending active state until it is either destroyed or activated for cryptographic operations.
  • the key Upon activation, the key enters the active state 310. In the active state 310, the key is used to process information cryptographically.
  • the key remains in the active state until it is deactivated, which limits a key's use, e.g., because the key has expired or has been revoked.
  • the key Upon deactivation, the key has limited use and enters the post active state 320.
  • the post active state 320 the key is only used for decipherment or verification.
  • the key remains in the post active state until it is either destroyed or is reactivated. Reactivation allows a post-active key to be used again for cryptographic operations, at which point it returns to the active state 310.
  • TTP Trusted Third Party
  • the functionality of key handling in the operator domain may be based on an existing Authentication Center (AuC).
  • AuC contains information for authenticating subscribers at the attachment phase to the network of the mobile terminals, e.g., when the subscribers switch on the mobile terminals, and the mobile attach to the network. This is advantageous because the AuC already has strong security requirements that may be used for this application.
  • AuC's handle MAP protocol that can be easily used for communicating entities such as a VLR, MSC, and HLR, etc., to handle key distribution.
  • An exemplary basic key management architecture showing the security bindings between network entities is shown in FIG. 4. There are three different security levels: Inter PLMN level, Intra PLMN level, and Session level.
  • the Inter PLMN level is used for establishing security bindings between entities belonging to different PLMNs. For example, as shown in FIG. 4, security bindings are established between the TTP and the AuC ⁇ of Network A, and between the TTP and the AuC B of Network B. These security bindings are established based on predetermined security requirements, e.g., based on either bilateral agreements between PLMN operators or by trusting in an external co-operation or entity acting as a TTP, i.e., an entity used to authenticate other entities. These security bindings have strong security requirements and the specific mechanism used should be enough flexible to allow state of the art techniques.
  • the TTP may be integrated with other systems outside the network. Nevertheless, a default mechanism should be supported to provide this security bindings in a multivendor environment.
  • the Intra PLMN level is used for establishing security bindings between entities belonging to the same PLMN.
  • one or more AuC entities act as a TTP for the entities in the PLMN.
  • a security binding exists between AuC A and AuC B
  • These security bindings may be established at the operator premises, to allow the establishment of different standard and customized security schemes. Nevertheless, some standard mechanisms should be supported to provide the security bindings in a multivendor environment.
  • the Session level is used for establishing security bindings between communicating entities.
  • the session established will be handled through the AuC (or AuCs) assigned to the entities.
  • Each entity trusts in its corresponding AuC.
  • Network Entities in Network A, NE A are connected to the AuC A via security bindings.
  • Network Entities in Network B, NE B are connected to AuC B by security bindings.
  • the Network Entities NE A and NE B are connected to each other via security bindings.
  • one AuC is shown for each network in FIG. 4 for simplicity of illustration, it will be appreciated that more than one AuC may be employed in each network and that more than one AuC may be assigned to each entity in the network.
  • Inter PLMN Inter PLMN
  • Intra PLMN Intra PLMN
  • the selected identification mechanism should allow the establishment of different standard security schemas.
  • the communication is Intra PLMN, i.e., between entities within the same network
  • the selected mechanism should allow the establishment of different standard and customized security schemas.
  • some standard mechanisms should be supported to provide the security bindings in a multivendor environment. So, the selected mechanism should allow the establishment of different standard and customized security schemas.
  • the security bindings may be based in MAP protocol.
  • each entity will have enough information to contact the AuC responsible for its signal security.
  • Security bindings to different levels will be established, first to the Intra HPLMN level and then to the Session level.
  • the sequence shown in FIG. 5A illustrates an exemplary message flow for transmission of key handling information.
  • the Sending Entity checks whether the security binding has been established with the Receiving Entity or whether the security binding has expired.
  • the Sending Entity sends a Security Binding Request message to the Sending Entity AuC.
  • the Sending Entity AuC maintains information about the desired security bindings for the Sending Entity, indicating for each attribute whether the attribute is requested or negotiable.
  • the Sending Entity AuC sends a Security Binding Request message to the Receiving Entity AuC.
  • the Receiving Entity AuC sends a message to the Receiving Entity, and the Receiving Entity determines which attributes it can handle and responds to the Receiving Entity AuC with the accepted security binding attributes.
  • the Receiving Entity AuC then responds to the Sending Entity AuC with the accepted attributes.
  • the Sending entity AuC sends a Security Binding Acceptance message to the Sending Entity, indicating acceptance of the attributes specified by the Receiving Entity. If the accepted attributes are considered sufficient for the communication, the Sending Entity responds to the Sending Entity AuC with a Security Binding Acceptance acknowledgment message, and this message is forwarded to the Receiving Entity via the Receiving Entity AuC.
  • the Receiving Entity AuC can determine which attributes are acceptable and send a Security Binding Notification Message to the Sending Entity AuC and the Receiving Entity indicating the acceptable attributes.
  • This alternative may be acceptable, e.g., when the Receiving Entity AuC has information specifying which attributes the Receiving Entity can handle.
  • FIG. 5B illustrates a detailed example of a process for establishing a security binding.
  • a method for establishing a security binding between an HLR and a VLR is shown as an example.
  • the method begins with the HLR initiating a request to establish a security binding to the VLR.
  • the request includes proposed algorithms, e.g., Alg 1 and Alg 2, and the level of security for the parameters, e.g., class 2 for authentication information and charging data, class 1 for location, and class 0 for the remainder of the data.
  • the HLR address is also included. Since the security binding has not been established yet, there is no security binding identity included.
  • the request is received by the AuC for the HLR, AuC,, and transmitted to the AuC for the VLR, AuC 2 .
  • AuC 2 transmits the request to the VLR, includes a key request and assigns a security binding identity.
  • the VLR determines which of the proposed algorithms and security classes it can handle and replies with an appropriate message, e.g., an acceptance message that indicates acceptance of Alg 2 and acceptance of the security classes.
  • the acceptance message also provides the VLR address.
  • the acceptance message is forwarded from AuC 2 to AuC,, and AuC, transmits the acceptance message to the HLR.
  • the HLR replies with an acceptance acknowledgment, which is transmitted to AuC,.
  • AuC forwards this message to AuC 2
  • AuC 2 transmits this message to the VLR. After the acceptance acknowledgment is received but he VLR, the security binding establishment is completed.
  • DATA ENCRYPTION There are many types of confidential information that may be transmitted between network entities, e.g., location information, charging information and triplets, i.e., information elements used to authenticate subscribers, including random, figured response, and ciphering key. For example, this information can be identified in MAP and Capability Application Part (CAP) protocols in the following messages: Location Information
  • the parameters are not present in all the messages and that usually they are only a small part of the complete message requesting confidentiality.
  • SCCP Signalling Connection Control Part
  • the information used for addressing purposes can be accessed at lower levels than MAP or CAP protocols (e.g., International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), Mobile Services Integrated Services Digital Network (MSISDN), VLR number, etc.).
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
  • MSISDN Mobile Services Integrated Services Digital Network
  • VLR number etc.
  • confidential information is encrypted at the parameter level, removing these parameters from the Clear Text part and including them in a new Encrypted part of the MAP operation, e.g.:
  • Param l, Param_2, Param_3, Param_4 If Param_2 and Par am 4 are confidential
  • the sequence shown in FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary message flow corresponding to the transmission of encrypted parameters.
  • the Sending Entity checks whether the security binding has been established with the Receiving Entity or whether the security binding has expired. If the security binding has not been established, or the lifetime has expired, the security binding is established, e.g., using the process shown in FIG 5A. Next, a message with the information is sent. The confidential parameters (identified by the security binding) are encrypted in the Sending Entity. Then, the message with encrypted information is answered. The confidential parameters (identified by the security binding) are encrypted in the Receiving Entity.
  • the encrypted information can be included in a new standard parameter (e.g., encrypted information), the content of which is completely encrypted (except tag and length).
  • the encrypted information may comprise a set of standard and proprietary parameters including information considered sensitive which should not be transmitted following the normal coding.
  • the content of this encrypted information parameter can be defined either on a message basis or as a common data type that can be used in all applicable operations including, as an option, all possible parameters that could contain sensitive information.
  • This parameter can contain authentication information, integrity information, padding octets and all other information requested by the selected security mechanism.
  • FIG. 7 shows an exemplary entity procedure for selecting encrypted information.
  • the process begins at step 700.
  • a determination is made whether a security binding has been established with the Receiving Entity. If so, a determination is made whether the security binding lifetime has expired at step 720. If, at step 710, it is determined that the security binding has not been established with the Receiving Entity or at step 720 it is determined that the security binding lifetime has expired, a security binding establishment procedure such as that shown in FIG. 5A is performed at step 730. Then, a determination is made whether the security binding is established at step 740. If it is determined that the security binding is not established at step 740, the process ends at step 780.
  • step 790 From a determination at step 790 that the security binding lifetime has not expired or a determination at step 740 that the security binding has been established, the method proceeds to step 750 at which clear text parameters are prepared. At step 760, encrypted parameters are prepared. At step 770, the message is sent, and at step 780, the process ends. ENTITY AUTHENTICATION
  • the sending or receiving entity may request authentication (e.g., in a Location Updating (LU) operation, the receiving may request authentication, while in an Insert Subscriber Data (ISD) operation, the sending entity may request authentication, etc.).
  • LU Location Updating
  • ISD Insert Subscriber Data
  • entity authentication is applied on a per entity basis, only to selected operations.
  • a new Authenticator parameter may be included in the new Encrypted part of the MAP operations, e.g.:
  • type 2 authentication explicit authentication is possible when key exchange is initiated.
  • the certificate can be provided from the TTP to the sending entity. This allows the sending entity to send the certificate to the receiving entity. Assuming the key is secure, during the active period of the key, only the sending entity will be able to send encrypted information to receiving entity using that session key.
  • a certificate in this case may be Kn2[Ksnln2, ID(Nl),T,LKsnln2]. Assuming the key is secure during the active period of the key, implicit authentication occurs.
  • explicit authentication is possible as well, for example using digital signatures. For example, the message will generate a message digest using a hash function and then apply a digital algorithm to the digest.
  • Type 3 authentication is the same as type 2 authentication, and a certificate in this case may be eKsn2[eKpn2[Ksnln2, ID(N1), T, Lks]//TVP]). Explicit signature is possible, as well.
  • the sequence shown in FIG. 8 illustrates the message flow for the transmission of authentication information.
  • the Sending Entity checks whether the security binding has been established with the receiving entity or if it has expired. If the security binding has not been established, or the lifetime has expired, the security binding is established, e.g., using the process shown in FIG. 5A.
  • a message with Authentication information is sent.
  • the Authentication parameter (identified by the security binding) is encrypted in the Sending Entity.
  • a Message with Authentication information is answered.
  • the Authentication parameter (identified by the security binding) is encrypted in the Receiving Entity.
  • the Authentication Information can be included in a new standard parameter (e.g., entity Authenticationinformation) into the encrypted Information parameter described above.
  • the Authentication Information may be included in a container including the digital signature according to the security binding established between the communicating entities.
  • the integrity of the information is assured by including Integrity Information in the Encrypted part of the MAP operation calculated based in the message content and other potential information (e.g. TVP, time stamp, sequence number, etc.), e.g.:
  • the sequence shown in FIG. 9 illustrates the message flow corresponding to the transmission of Integrity Information.
  • the Sending Entity checks whether the security binding has been established with the receiving entity or if it has expired. If the security binding has not been established or the lifetime has expired, the security binding is established, e.g., using the process shown in FIG. 5A.
  • a Message with Integrity information is sent.
  • the Integrity parameter (identified by the security binding) is calculated as a function of the message content and encrypted in the Sending Entity.
  • a Message with Integrity information is answered.
  • the Integrity parameter (identified by the security binding) is encrypted in the Receiving Entity.
  • the integrity information can be included in a new standard parameter (e.g., integrity information) into the encrypted information parameter as described above.
  • an entity procedure similar to that shown in FIG. 7 may be performed for transmission of integrity information.
  • mechanisms for authentication, encryption, integrity and key handling are provided for insuring secure communications. Operations from non-authenticated nodes can be restricted. Backward compatibility is maintained, and forward compatibility is assured.
  • the transmission mechanism is independent of the key handling and ciphering method.
  • the Overhead related to encryption/decryption is only added to security sensitive messages, parameters and notes.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention permet d'assurer des communications protégées à des entités appartenant à un ou plusieurs réseaux. On détermine si les mesures de sécurité nécessaires à la communication existent entre les entités. Si ce n'est pas le cas, les mesures de sécurité nécessaires sont prises et la communication est établie. Les mesures de sécurité comportent des liaisons de sécurité comprenant des informations nécessaires à une communication protégée. Les mesures de sécurité sont établies entre des entités appartenant à un ou plusieurs réseaux sur la base d'exigences de sécurité prédéterminées et d'un niveau de sécurité nécessaire déterminé. Le niveau de sécurité nécessaire peut être déterminé selon que les entités appartiennent au même réseau ou à des réseaux différents et/ou selon les informations transmises. Les liaisons de sécurité sont établies entre les entités selon les informations devant être transmises et/ou selon le réseau auquel les entités appartiennent. Ces liaisons de sécurité comprennent des informations identifiant la liaison de sécurité, des informations de cryptage, des informations d'authentification, des informations d'intégrité, une liste de destinataires ou de groupes de destinataires inclus dans les liaisons de sécurité et/ou des informations concernant la durée de validité des liaisons de sécurité. Le cryptage, l'authentification et l'intégrité peuvent être spécifiés à un niveau de paramètre.
EP00937467A 1999-05-28 2000-05-26 Procede et appareil permettant de creer un environnement de communications protege Withdrawn EP1180294A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US13644499P 1999-05-28 1999-05-28
US136444P 1999-05-28
US569768 2000-05-12
US09/569,768 US6889328B1 (en) 1999-05-28 2000-05-12 Method and apparatus for secure communication
PCT/SE2000/001093 WO2000074345A1 (fr) 1999-05-28 2000-05-26 Procede et appareil permettant de creer un environnement de communications protege

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AU5263700A (en) 2000-12-18
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JP2003501891A (ja) 2003-01-14
US6889328B1 (en) 2005-05-03
CN1203650C (zh) 2005-05-25

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