EP1152108B1 - Système d'accès dit mains libres pour véhicule automobile - Google Patents
Système d'accès dit mains libres pour véhicule automobile Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1152108B1 EP1152108B1 EP20010401095 EP01401095A EP1152108B1 EP 1152108 B1 EP1152108 B1 EP 1152108B1 EP 20010401095 EP20010401095 EP 20010401095 EP 01401095 A EP01401095 A EP 01401095A EP 1152108 B1 EP1152108 B1 EP 1152108B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- signal
- identification device
- piracy
- bit
- vehicle
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00309—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
- G07C2009/00555—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks comprising means to detect or avoid relay attacks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C2009/00753—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys
- G07C2009/00769—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means
- G07C2009/00793—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated by active electrical keys with data transmission performed by wireless means by Hertzian waves
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/06—Involving synchronization or resynchronization between transmitter and receiver; reordering of codes
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/60—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00174 - G07C9/00944
- G07C2209/63—Comprising locating means for detecting the position of the data carrier, i.e. within the vehicle or within a certain distance from the vehicle
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an access system said hands free for a motor vehicle, ie a system of wireless communication to enter the vehicle without key.
- This system can also be applied to hands-free startup of the vehicle, ie when starting without a key.
- Such a system generally comprises a device identification to be worn by a user and able to establish bidirectional remote and wireless communication with a unit central control unit on the vehicle, to authenticate the user and control means of condemnation / unlocking door locks when the user has been recognized authentic.
- Initialization of the communication protocol can be activated by operating the outside door handle, for hands-free access, or by pressing a start button, in the hands-free start mode.
- the system is capable of establishing bidirectional communication when the identification device is located at a distance less than a predetermined distance from the vehicle, usually of the order of a few meters, to avoid, on the one hand, interference with other sources of the environment and, on the other hand, to avoid the system at such a distance that the user is too far from the vehicle to be aware of the operations performed by the said system.
- Some currently proposed systems use magnetic induction at very short range, both to supply energy and transport information from the central unit of the vehicle to the identification device that is in the field electromagnetic generated by the antennas of the vehicle.
- a Such a system allows communication only at a very short distance from the vehicle of the order of a few cm.
- Another common system proposed is to use low-frequency carrier waves, the order of 125 kHz for communication from the vehicle to the identification device, and ultra-high carrier waves frequency, for example of the order of 434 or 868 MHz, for the zone Europe, and 315 or 902 MHz for the USA zone.
- the identification device must include a battery to power its own electronic circuits. To minimize consumption electric device, it can be provided, for example, that the device identification is dormant for 9 ms and waking for 1 ms, while periods of 10 ms.
- FIG. 1 of the accompanying drawings there is shown a example of encryption system already known.
- a vehicle V which comprises in its central unit a memory 1 containing a secret key K and a number generator random 2, the random numbers R generated having, for example, a length of 56 bits.
- This random number R is sent to the identification device I, as indicated by the arrow 3.
- this same random number R is mixed with the key secret K according to a complex associative function f, in a mixer 4 which is connected to its input to the memory 1 and to the generator random numbers 2.
- the mixer 4 delivers, as output, a signal representative of the mixture of the secret key K and the random number R, namely the signal f (R, K).
- This signal is stored in a memory 5 connected to the output of the mixer 4.
- This signal is sent to the device identification number I, in the form of a signal of a length example of 28 bits, as indicated by the arrow 6.
- the signal f (R, K) is mixed again with the secret key K in a mixer 7, which is connected to its input to memories 1 and 5 above.
- This mixer 7 mixes the two signals according to a function associative complex g.
- the vehicle V then memorizes in a 8 connected to the output of the mixer 7 the signal representative of the mixture, namely the signal g (R, f, K).
- the same secret key K is stored in a memory 11 and a mixer 14 having the same associative function f receives as input the secret key provided by the memory 11 of the identification device I and the random number R received by the identification device from the vehicle.
- the identification device I stores the output signal of the mixer 14 in a memory 15 and compares this signal in a comparator 16 with the signal received according to arrow 6 from vehicle V. If the two signals are not identical, subject to the time of hardware and signal delay in the authorized transmission, the identification device interrupts the communication as being unauthorized. On the other hand, if both signals match, the signal is mixed in a mixer 17 with the secret key provided by the device memory 11 identification I, according to the same associative function g mentioned above.
- the output signal of the mixer 17 is stored in a memory 18 of the identification device to be then sent to the vehicle following the arrow 9 in the form of a signal having a length per example of 20 bits.
- the signal received by arrow 9 is compared with the signal received from the memory 8 of the vehicle in a comparator 10. If both signals match, subject to delays due to hardware response time and signal transmission in the authorized zone, the rest of the communication is authorized and the unit central office of the vehicle may, if necessary, order the condemnation or unlocking of locks vehicle.
- another encryption protocol can be used to secure the transmission of data.
- This signal 21 sent by the vehicle is received by a coil 22 of the relay housing 20, which is connected to a receiver 23 at 125 kHz.
- This receiver 23 is connected to a transmitter at broadband at high frequency, of the order of several MHz.
- the transmitter 24 transmits via its antenna 25, as represented by the arrow 26, to a second relay housing 30, which is worn by another hacker who closely follows the user U.
- the exchange of information between the two relay housings 20 and 30 being performed at very high frequency, it It is possible to perform this communication over a long distance.
- the second relay housing 30 includes an antenna 31 to receive the signal 26 emitted by the relay housing 20.
- the antenna 31 is connected to a broadband receiver at the same frequency as the transmitter 24 of the first relay box 20.
- the signal thus received is retransmitted at low frequency at 125 kHz by a transmitter 33 which is connected to a coil transmission 34 to send a signal 35 to the device identification I which complies with the signal 21 emitted by the vehicle.
- the signal 35 being the repetition of the authentic signal of the vehicle, the identification device I will recognize it and emit in turn its response signal 36, said response signal 36 being sent high frequency and received by an antenna 37 of the second relay housing 30, by example at 434 MHz.
- the antenna 37 is connected to a receiver 38, which will convert the 434 MHz signal into a signal at a different frequency, for example at 315 MHz.
- the signal is then emitted by a transmitter at broadband 39 via an antenna 40 to the first relay housing 20, this difference of frequency being necessary so that the different signals do not interfere with each other.
- the frequency of signal 41 sent back by the second relay housing 30 is different both the frequency of the signal 26 and the signal 36.
- This signal 41 is taken by an antenna 27 of the first relay housing 20, said antenna 27 being connected to a broadband receiver 28 of the same frequency as the transmitter 39.
- the receiver 28 is connected to a transmitter 29 which transforms the 315 MHz signal into a 434 MHz signal that is sent via the antenna 42 of the first relay housing 20 to the vehicle V, as represented by the zig-zag arrow 43.
- the total communication can be in the order of 20 to 40 ms, and the duration total operation of the system to trigger the unlocking or condemning electric locks can be of the order of 100 ms.
- a solution could be to measure the propagation time of UHF radio waves, comparing this measured time with a time predetermined amount corresponding to a communication in a zone limited allowed around the vehicle.
- a fast communication rate for example of the order of 20 to 40 Mb / s.
- a bandwidth With such a rate of communication, It is necessary to operate at very high frequency, for example at 2.4 GHz. But to measure very short times, it is necessary to have a bandwidth very important, which comes up against the applicable regulations that severely restrict bandwidth allowed to avoid saturation of the environment by electromagnetic.
- EP-A-0 992 408 discloses a system according to preamble of claim 1.
- the object of the invention is to eliminate the aforementioned drawbacks and to propose a system of access said hands-free for motor vehicle, to detect hacking of the system, in particular by intermediates relay boxes, taking into account the time of signal propagation between the vehicle and the identification device.
- the invention relates to an access system said hands free for motor vehicle, according to claim 1.
- said predetermined threshold value is given by a window of time that corresponds to the total duration theoretical transmission of the anti-piracy bitstream, when the identification device is at a distance less than or equal to the predetermined limit distance.
- This window of time is a constant precise generated for example by a quartz controlled oscillator associated with a counter under control of the microcontroller which indicates the number of periods to count.
- the central control unit is suitable to determine said hacking attempt when the total number of bits the anti-piracy train was not issued or received by the Central Unit of command in said window.
- the central unit may comprise in memory a double-entry correspondence table, namely the number of transmitted bits and the corresponding actual transmission duration, for output the actual distance between the identification device and the central unit, the data of said table being previously acquired by experimentation and which can be periodically updated, when the user wearing the identification device is sitting on the driver's seat of the vehicle, the distance from the identification device to the central unit of the vehicle then being substantially constant.
- a double-entry correspondence table namely the number of transmitted bits and the corresponding actual transmission duration
- the count of the number of bits sent is stopped when the central unit detects the reception of the last bit of the train anti-piracy.
- the identification device comprises a line to analog delay to re-transmit the signal received from the vehicle to the vehicle with a predetermined delay time.
- the central control unit has an oscillator generating radio carrier waves frequency, connected to a phase modulator, which is controlled by the anti-piracy bitstream generated by the central unit of the vehicle.
- the anti-piracy bit stream is generated by the CPU after the transmission of data encrypted authentication to the identification device.
- the identification device may comprise a phase inverter to selectively invert the phase of the signal representative of the bits anti-piracy received by the identification device from the vehicle, said inverter being controlled, for each bit of anti-piracy, by an encrypted digital authentication response signal identification device, at a slower rate than that of the anti-piracy bitstream.
- the central unit of the vehicle comprises a phase demodulator to demodulate the signal received by the vehicle from the identification device, a logic gate Exclusive OR whose entries are respectively linked to audit phase demodulator and a digital signal retarder, said self-timer being able to delay a useful bit every bit of the train anti-piracy generated by the central unit, said logic gate being capable of outputting a digital signal representative of the signal encrypted response of the identification device.
- the signal delivered in output of the aforementioned exclusive OR logic gate is compared by the unit central to an encrypted digital signal of authentication generated by the central unit, in order to authenticate the identification device.
- the output of said door OR logic is connected to an input of a second gate Exclusive OR logic whose other input receives a digital signal encrypted authentication generated by the central unit, in order to deliver output a signal representative of successive time offsets of each bit of the anti-piracy train, the latter being received at the input of an integrator to sum the related response times at each anti-piracy bit shift slot, the output of said integrator being connected to a comparator to compare said sum response time with a predetermined time-out value, beyond which an attempted hacking is detected.
- the signal coming from the identification device is received by the Central Unit and transmitted to the input of an envelope detector for detecting the rising edge of said signal, the detection of this rising edge being able to trigger, a part, the incrementation of a unit of the number of bits counter and, on the other hand, the transmission of the next bit in the anti-piracy bit stream, after a predetermined duration which corresponds to a bit time useful possibly increased by extra time to avoid any interference between the transmission and the reception of the signal by the unit Central.
- the central unit comprises a modulator says all or nothing to switch the CPU in the transmission or reception of signals to or from identification device, said all-or-nothing modulator being controlled by detecting the rising edge of the signal received in from the identification device.
- the identification device comprises a receiver to receive low-speed wakefulness signals, this receiver comprising successively a static envelope detector low-threshold radio frequency and a low frequency amplifier.
- the useful bit time can be between 50 and 200 ns.
- the motor vehicle V comprises in its central unit a micro-controller 50, which is usually in a state of semi-sleep or waiting for an alarm clock.
- a micro-controller 50 which is usually in a state of semi-sleep or waiting for an alarm clock.
- an activation signal is sent to the micro-controller 50, as indicated by the arrow 51.
- the micro-controller sends a general power signal, as represented by the arrow 52, to supply the different components electronic units of the central unit.
- the microcontroller 50 generates a series of low speed signals sk, for example of the order of 2 to 100 Kb / s on line V5.
- the data conveyed on line V5 are successively an awakening signal e, a signal representative of a number random R of a length for example of 56 bits, a signal representative of the function f (R, K) with a length of, for example, 28 bits, and a signal representative of service data s, for example from 100 to 5000 bits, for example data on the maintenance, vehicle tuning, etc. (see Figure 5).
- Line V5 is connected to a transmitter 53 for transmitting via an antenna 54 the signals to the identification device I as represented by the arrow E.
- the transmitter 53 comprises, as best seen in FIG. oscillator 55 to generate an ultra high carrier wave frequency, said oscillator being powered by line 52.
- the oscillator 55 is connected to a phase modulator 56, which is in turn connected to a all-or-nothing modulator 57, the latter having an input connected to the line V5 and its output connected to the antenna 54 above.
- the phase modulator is inactive.
- the all-or-nothing modulator 57 is intended alternatively allow the transmission of a signal and the reception of a signal by the unit center of the vehicle, as explained later.
- the amplitude of the transmitted signal is of the order of 2 V effective.
- the emitted signal E is received by an antenna 100 of the device with an attenuation of the order of -40 dBm, which represents an attenuation coefficient of 100 times, ie the signal received by the identification device has an amplitude of the order of 20 mV.
- the antenna 100 is connected to a radio frequency filter 101 (only shown in Figure 4) to eliminate the parasitic frequencies.
- the output of the filter 101 is connected to a branch, on the one hand, to a low rate receiver and low consumption 102 and, on the other hand, to a delay line 103. Low-speed sk signals are not transmitted by the delay line 103, but essentially pass through the receiver 102. As best seen in FIG.
- the receiver 102 comprises successively a radio frequency envelope detector 104 for reconstruct the low-speed signals on line I5, which correspond to those of line V5.
- the detector output envelope 104 is connected to a low frequency amplifier 105, which the output is connected in parallel, on the one hand, to a sequence decoder 106 and on the other hand to a microcontroller 107 of the device identification I via a line 108.
- the decoder 106 is powered by permanence by the battery of the identification device.
- waking data are decoded by the decoder 106, in order to send a wakefulness command at the microcontroller 107, at the output of the decoder 106.
- micro-controller 107 then wakes up all the other components electronic identification device. So the data following, namely the signals R, f and s, are transmitted directly to the micro-controller 107 via the parallel line 108.
- the microcontroller 50 of vehicle V After transmission of the service data, the microcontroller 50 of vehicle V generates bits of anti-piracy h at slow rate sk of the microprocessor, said anti-piracy bits being received by a buffer with random binary sequence generator 58, for outputting the anti-piracy bits at a high rate fk, on a line V7.
- the output of the buffer 58 is connected to a branching, on the one hand, with the phase modulator 56 for phase modulating the carrier wave generated by the oscillator 55, and on the other hand, with a digital timer of a useful bit time 59, whose function will be explained later. Every bit of anti-piracy is transmitted in the form of a radio frequency signal via the antenna 54 in direction of the identification device I.
- the overall transmission frame V2 signals by the antenna 54 is illustrated in Figures 5 and 7.
- the beginning is shown the interrogation frame of the anti-piracy bits h on the line V2.
- each bit of anti-piracy is carried by a very high frequency oscillating wave having a bit time Tb for example between 50 and 200 ns.
- the show anti-piracy bits h1, h2 ... hn is allowed by the modulator while or nothing 57, depending on a control signal V1 that is emitted by a time base management unit 60 of the vehicle V, which unit 60 is able to deliver the low clock rate signals sk, average cadence mk and high rate fk.
- unit 60 is connected to the microcontroller 50, as indicated by the double arrow 61. The generation of the V1 signal will be explained later.
- the identification device I receives via its antenna 100 on the line I1 (see FIG. 6) a signal corresponding to the anti-piracy bit h1 emitted by the vehicle V, with a delay time ⁇ which corresponds to the signal propagation time between the vehicle and the device Identification.
- the signal then passes through the analog delay line 103, which may for example be constituted by a copper winding, which makes it possible to reduce the energy consumption by the device identification because this delay line does not need to be powered in energy.
- FIG. 8 shows the signal I2v which corresponds to to the virtual signal at the output of the analog delay line 103, it is say to the envelope of said analog signal, said signal being delayed of a predetermined duration Dl.
- the output of the delay line 103 is connected to the input of a phase inverter 109 to reverse the phase of the analog signal transmitted by the delay line 103, according to a encrypted authentication control signal g, whose frame is represented on line I6.
- a encrypted authentication control signal g whose frame is represented on line I6.
- the bit rate of the signal g is at medium rate mk, weaker than the high rate fk anti-piracy bits h.
- the microcontroller 107 of the device of identification transmits at low speed sk the signal g to a memory buffer 110 which outputs the signal g at the average rate mk to the phase inverter 109.
- the phase inverter 109 outputs an analog signal, whose virtual signal is represented in I7v which represents the envelope said signal.
- the output of the phase inverter 109 is connected to a amplifier 111 having a gain of + 20 dB to emit the signal with an amplitude of the order of 200 mV.
- This amplified signal is represented on the line I4 and corresponds to the transmission bit h1 with the delay ⁇ due to the propagation of the signal and to the analog delay Dl due to the delay line 103.
- This signal 14 is reemitted by an antenna 112 to the vehicle V, as represented by the arrow RE.
- this first bit of anti-piracy will trigger the generation of the encrypted signal authentication device g by the identification device in order to control the phase inverter 109.
- the output of the amplifier 111 is also connected to a trigger line 113 which has in series a diode 114 and a trigger 115 for activate a basic time management unit 116 which delivers low rate clock signals sk and medium rate mk, said unit 116 being connected to the microcontroller 107, as indicated by the double arrow 117.
- the duration of transmission of the signals is of the order of 3 ns per meter of distance between the vehicle and the identification device I.
- the propagation time ⁇ would be the order of 30 ns.
- the response time of the electronic circuits which could be of the order of a few ns or tens of ns, according to the bandwidth allocated to the carrier.
- the signal reissued RE by the identification device is received by a receiver 62 via an antenna 63, with attenuation of the order of - 40 dBm, which represents an attenuation coefficient of 100 times, that is, the signal received by the vehicle has an amplitude of the order of 2 mV.
- the receiver 62 has a radio frequency filter 64 connected to the antenna 63, whose output signal is represented by line V3, this signal being delivered to the input of a logarithmic amplifier 65 which has a gain of 80 dB, which makes it possible to reach a multiplication coefficient up to 10,000 times, and in particular to output this amplifier 65 a signal of the order of 2V effective.
- the amplifier 65 is connected at the output to a junction between, on the one hand, a amplitude demodulator 66, which makes it possible to detect the envelope of the received signal, and on the other hand, a phase demodulator 67.
- envelope detector 66 outputs a digital signal represented on line V4, said signal being delivered at the input of the unit of time base management 60 above.
- the time base management unit 60 Upon receipt of the anti-piracy bit received in return, the time base management unit 60 triggers the emission of the anti-piracy bit following h2 with an offset corresponding to the useful bit time Tb + ⁇ , ⁇ corresponding to a weak delay in order to avoid any overlap between transmission and the reception of the signals by the vehicle.
- the reception of the bit anti-piracy back by the vehicle triggers the clock stroke following at the rate fk as well as the tilting of the modulator all or nothing 57, via line V1.
- the small delay ⁇ is close to 0 s.
- Each new clock tick at the rate fk triggered by the receiving the previous anti-piracy bit causes the incrementation of a unit in a counter 68, which counter 68 counts the number of bits received as a function of time.
- the receiving a bit triggers the emission of a next anti-piracy bit
- the unit 60 sends a signal Fr to stop counting of anti-piracy bits and to cause the counter 68 to send a representative signal the number of bits counted at the microcontroller 50, as indicated by the arrow 69.
- micro-controller 50 can calculate the actual distance between the vehicle V and the identification device I, according to a table of previously memorized correspondence. If this distance exceeds authorized distance, the call is interrupted as the result of a hacking attempt or simply as being communication at too great distance from the vehicle.
- This counter thus makes it possible to detect piracy using relay boxes between the vehicle and the identification device.
- an attacker could try to trap this system by anticipating on the signal to be transmitted by the identification device.
- the pirate detects with a relay box the emission by the vehicle of a bit of anti-piracy, it can cause the emission anticipation of a signal-heel, in the preamble to the reissue of the signal delayed by the delay line of the identification device.
- this signal-heel would have a duration that would correspond to the signal propagation time over the extra distance between the identification device and the vehicle, in relation to the distance maximum allowed.
- the envelope detector 66 of the vehicle V detect, in the first place, the reception of this signal-heel, causing in turn the anticipated emission of the second bit of anti-piracy.
- the system according to the invention also makes it possible, thanks counter 68, to determine whether the total number of anti-piracy bits has have been received during a maximum reception window Fm, shown in Figure 5.
- the timing diagrams of Figures 5 to 9 correspond to a non-pirated transmission of the signal.
- the real end Fr of the reception of the anti-piracy bitstream is, in these figures, well located in the maximum reception window Fm, as represented in FIG. 5.
- n the duration of 2d propagation which is a direct function of the distance between the device identification and the vehicle. So, if it is difficult to detect with electronic circuits at low cost durations of the order of a few tens of ns, it is much easier to detect durations of the order of n x a few tens of ns, ie durations of the order of ms. However, if the hacker anticipates on the retransmission of the signal by the identification device, the variable 2n ⁇ will remain within the acceptable limit and so the system will not be able to detect piracy.
- the phase demodulator 67 delivers a signal representative of the goh function on line V9 which is connected to an entrance of a door logical OR exclusive 70.
- This logic gate 70 receives on its other input a signal V8 representative of the function h, delivered at the output of digital retarder 59.
- the logic gate 70 could be replaced by another type of mixer, as shown in FIG. signal V8 corresponds to the signal V7 with a delay corresponding to Dl offset of the analog timer 103 of the identification device I.
- the logic gate 70 outputs a signal V10, which is representative of the offset between the signals V8 and V9, ie a signal representative of the encrypted authentication signal g transmitted by the identification device I, with a small offset corresponding to the signal propagation time which is equal to 2 ⁇ , as visible on the figure 8.
- the output of logic gate 70 is connected to a branch between, on the one hand, a low-pass filter 71 at the average rate mk which is the cadence corresponding to the signal g and, on the other hand, another Exclusive OR logic gate 73.
- the low-pass filter 71 is connected to a buffer 72, which transforms said signal from the rate mk to the cadence sk before sending it to the micro-controller 50 that will compare the signal g received from the authentication device with the signal g generated at the level of the vehicle, for the purpose of communication, which corresponds to the last step 10 illustrated in the diagram of Figure 1.
- the microcontroller 50 delivers the signal g specific to the vehicle to a buffer 74 at the rate sk, so that it returns to the rate mk at the other input of the aforementioned logic gate 73.
- the logic gate 73 mixes the signals V10 and V11 in order to output only the offsets due the propagation time of the signal between the vehicle V and the device I, as shown on line V12.
- the exit of the logic gate 73 is connected to the input of an integrator 75, which will to output a signal V13 which will climb up stairs according to of time, for each slot C representative of the time of signal propagation.
- Line V13 is connected to the entrance of a unit 76 receiving on another input a threshold limit value 77 which corresponds to a maximum acceptable total propagation delay n ⁇ 2 ⁇ ⁇ T max, with ⁇ corresponding to the propagation time on a allowed distance.
- a threshold limit value 77 which corresponds to a maximum acceptable total propagation delay n ⁇ 2 ⁇ ⁇ T max, with ⁇ corresponding to the propagation time on a allowed distance.
- the integrator 75 can detect an attempted hacking, even in case the hacker adds an anticipation stub to the signal reissued by the identification device. Indeed, if this signal-heel can trap the counter 68, however the logic gate 73 will interpret this signal-heel as a wrong signal at least with a chance on two, and therefore will output a slot equivalent to this signal-heel, which slot will be added by the integrator 75 of the same only for delay due to propagation delay.
- microcontroller 50 can deliver different signals of output to the other components of the vehicle by the track 80 shown on Figures 3 and 4.
- the intermediate clock rate mk is between 20 and 60 times less than the rate fk.
- the antennas 54 and 63 of the V vehicle by a single antenna 82 shown in broken lines in FIG. 4, which antenna 82 would be connected to a diplexer 81 shown in broken lines in FIG. 4, in order to switch between the reception mode and the transmission mode as appropriate.
- a diplexer 81 shown in broken lines in FIG. 4
- the diplexers 81 and 120 could thus communicate with each other, as indicated by the double arrow T.
- the central unit is connected to at least two, for example three, transmit / receive antennas such as the single antenna 82, arranged in several points of the vehicle V. Distance measurements are then performed sequentially between the identification device I and each of the transmitting / receiving antennas of the vehicle V. These measurements of distance are achieved via the propagation time ⁇ anti-piracy bits using the correspondence table above. In this variant, it is possible to locate precisely, for example a few centimeters or tens of centimeters, the position of the identification device I by a calculation of triangulation carried out by the central unit.
- This variant can obviously also be carried out with transmitting and receiving antennas separated.
- the delay line 103 of the device identification I allows to postpone the retransmission of each anti-piracy bit compared to receiving it in order to use the same frequency radio for the transmission of corresponding signals in the direction from the vehicle V to the identification device I (arrow E or T) and in the direction from the identification device I to the vehicle V (arrow RE or T).
- the vehicle V receives from the device identification a signal hos where s represents service data which modulate the signal h by phase inversion, like this was the case for the signal g whose length is less than that of signal h.
- the sequence of anti-piracy bits h being a binary sequence random or pseudo-random, it entails a spread of the spectrum of radiofrequency signals used to transmit the vehicle to the identification device and vice versa. This spread spectrum is all the more important as the modulation rate fk used for transmit the sequence of anti-piracy bits h is high.
- Such Spread spectrum is known to be advantageous from the point of view of robustness of signal against interference and echoes multiple, which facilitates multiple transmissions of the signal, example the round trip signal between the vehicle and the device Identification.
- the demodulation of the encrypted signal of authentication g at the level of the central unit of the vehicle is made all the more difficult as the spectrum of the signal RE is spread out.
- the arrangement of the delay line 103 to re-transmit the bits anti-hacking successive h delayed a useful bit time as a high rate modulation fk of the encrypted authentication signal g, itself being transmitted at the average rate mk, ensures the corresponding demodulation key, that is, the same random sequence of anti-piracy bits h, is always available at level of the central control unit when receiving the signal RE, which makes it possible to demodulate the received signal RE regardless of the degree of spread of the spectrum of this signal.
- the robustness of the access system with respect to echoes multiples is ensured by the fact that the identification device I always responds to the first received signal, which can only be the signal transmitted directly.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Description
- la figure 1 est un schéma synoptique fonctionnel représentant le protocole d'encryptage pour sécuriser la transmission bidirectionnelle de données entre un véhicule et un dispositif d'identification ;
- la figure 2 est un schéma synoptique fonctionnel illustrant un moyen de piratage du système d'encryptage par l'intermédiaire de deux boítiers relais ;
- la figure 3 est un schéma synoptique fonctionnel simplifié d'un système d'accès mains libres conforme à l'invention ;
- la figure 4 est un schéma synoptique fonctionnel plus détaillé correspondant au schéma de la figure 3 ;
- la figure 5 représente plusieurs chronogrammes illustrant les trames complètes d'interrogation émises par le véhicule et reçues en réponse par le véhicule ;
- la figure 6 est une vue partielle et agrandie d'une portion des chronogrammes de la figure 5, indiquée par la flèche VI, correspondant au début de la séquence d'anti-piratage ;
- la figure 7 reprend les deux premiers chronogrammes de la figure 5;
- la figure 8 est une vue partielle et agrandie d'une portion des chronogrammes de la figure 7, indiquée par la flèche VIII, au cours de la séquence d'anti-piratage ; et
- la figure 9 est une vue partielle et agrandie d'une portion des chronogrammes de la figure 5, indiquée par la flèche IX, et correspondant à la fin de la procédure d'anti-piratage.
Claims (12)
- Système d'accès dit mains libres pour véhicule automobile (V), comportant une unité centrale de commande embarquée sur le véhicule et un dispositif d'identification (I) destiné à être porté par un utilisateur (U) et apte à établir une communication bidirectionnelle à distance et sans fil avec ladite unité centrale, pour authentifier l'utilisateur et commander des moyens de condamnation/ décondamnation des serrures des ouvrants lorsque l'utilisateur a été reconnu authentique, ledit système étant apte à établir ladite communication bidirectionnelle lorsque le dispositif d'identification est situé à une distance inférieure à une distance limite prédéterminée du véhicule, l'unité centrale étant apte à émettre des données d'authentification cryptées (R,f) vers le dispositif d'identification (I), ledit dispositif d'identification étant apte à engendrer un signal numérique d'authentification crypté (g) de réponse, caractérisé par le fait que ladite unité centrale est apte à engendrer, lors de la communication après l'émission desdites données d'authentification cryptées (R,f), un train de bits d'anti-piratage (h), chaque bit dudit train étant émis vers le dispositif d'identification (I) sous la forme d'un signal radio-fréquence représentatif dudit bit, le dispositif d'identification (I) comportant un inverseur de phase (109) pour inverser sélectivement la phase du signal représentatif des bits d'anti-piratage reçu par le dispositif d'identification en provenance du véhicule (V), ledit inverseur étant commandé, pour chaque bit d'anti-piratage, par ledit signal numérique d'authentification crypté (g) de réponse du dispositif d'identification, à une cadence plus lente (mk) que celle (fk) du train de bits d'anti-piratage, de façon que lorsque le dispositif d'identification reçoit ledit signal représentatif d'un bit d'anti-piratage, ce dernier est réémis par le dispositif d'identification avec un temps de retard (Dℓ) supérieur ou égal au temps d'émission utile (Tb) du bit sous une forme modulée par ledit signal numérique d'authentification crypté (g) de réponse, et que la réception par l'unité centrale de commande dudit signal réémis déclenche l'émission par l'unité centrale du signal représentatif du bit suivant dans ledit train, le nombre de bits émis ou reçus dudit train, étant compté par un compteur (68) de l'unité centrale, de façon que celle-ci compare ledit nombre et la durée réelle (Tt) correspondant à l'émission ou à la réception dudit nombre de bits, afin de déterminer, au-delà d'une valeur de seuil prédéterminée, une tentative de piratage provoquant l'arrêt de ladite communication.
- Système selon la revendication 1, caractérisé par le fait que ladite valeur de seuil prédéterminée est donnée par une fenêtre de temps (Fm) qui correspond à la durée totale théorique d'émission du train de bits d'anti-piratage, lorsque le dispositif d'identification (I) est à une distance inférieure ou égale à la distance limite prédéterminée, et l'unité centrale de commande est apte à déterminer ladite tentative de piratage lorsque le nombre total de bits du train d'anti-piratage n'a pas été émis ou reçu par l'unité centrale de commande dans ladite fenêtre.
- Système selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé par le fait que l'unité centrale comporte en mémoire une table de correspondance à double entrée, à savoir le nombre de bits émis et la durée d'émission réelle correspondante, pour donner en sortie la distance réelle entre le dispositif d'identification et l'unité centrale, les données de ladite table étant préalablement acquises par expérimentation et pouvant être périodiquement réactualisées.
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé par le fait que le comptage du nombre de bits émis est arrêté lorsque l'unité centrale détecte la réception du dernier bit (hn) du train d'anti-piratage.
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé par le fait que le dispositif d'identification (I) comporte une ligne à retard analogique (103) pour réémettre le signal reçu du véhicule (V) vers le véhicule avec un temps de retard prédéterminé (Dℓ).
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 5, caractérisé par le fait que l'unité centrale de commande comporte un oscillateur (55) générateur d'ondes porteuses en radio fréquence, relié à un modulateur de phase (56), qui est commandé par le train de bits d'anti-piratage (h) engendré par l'unité centrale du véhicule (V).
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 6, caractérisé par le fait que l'unité centrale du véhicule (V) comporte un démodulateur de phase (67) pour démoduler le signal reçu par le véhicule en provenance du dispositif d'identification (I), une porte logique OU exclusif (70) dont les entrées sont reliées respectivement audit démodulateur de phase et à un retardateur de signal numérique (59), ledit retardateur étant apte à retarder d'un temps bit utile (Tb) chaque bit du train d'anti-piratage (h) engendré par l'unité centrale, ladite porte logique étant apte à délivrer en sortie un signal numérique (V10) représentatif du signal crypté de réponse du dispositif d'identification.
- Système selon la revendication 7, caractérisé par le fait que le signal (V10) délivré en sortie de la porte logique OU exclusif (70) précitée est comparé par l'unité centrale à un signal numérique crypté d'authentification (g) engendré par l'unité centrale, afin d'authentifier le dispositif d'identification (I).
- Système selon la revendication 7 ou 8, caractérisé par le fait que la sortie de ladite porte logique OU exclusif (70) est reliée à une entrée d'une deuxième porte logique OU exclusif (73) dont l'autre entrée reçoit un signal numérique crypté d'authentification (g) engendré par l'unité centrale, afin de délivrer en sortie un signal (V12) représentatif des décalages temporels successifs de chaque bit du train d'anti-piratage, ce dernier signal étant reçu à l'entrée d'un intégrateur (75) pour faire la somme des temps de réponse liés à chaque créneau (C) de décalage de bit d'anti-piratage, la sortie dudit intégrateur étant reliée à un comparateur (76) pour comparer ladite somme de temps de réponse avec une valeur de durée limite prédéterminée (77), au-delà de laquelle est détectée une tentative de piratage.
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 9, caractérisé par le fait que le signal en provenance du dispositif d'identification (I) est reçu par l'unité centrale et transmis à l'entrée d'un détecteur d'enveloppe (66) pour détecter le front montant dudit signal, la détection de ce front montant étant apte à déclencher, d'une part, l'incrémentation d'une unité du compteur de nombre de bits (68) et, d'autre part, l'émission du bit suivant dans le train de bits d'anti-piratage, après une durée prédéterminée qui correspond à un temps bit utile éventuellement augmenté d'un temps supplémentaire (ε) pour éviter toute interférence entre l'émission et la réception du signal par l'unité centrale.
- Système selon la revendication 10, caractérisé par le fait que l'unité centrale comporte un modulateur (57) dit tout ou rien pour faire basculer l'unité centrale dans le mode émission ou réception des signaux vers ou en provenance du dispositif d'identification (I), ledit modulateur tout ou rien étant commandé par la détection du front montant du signal reçu en provenance du dispositif d'identification.
- Système selon l'une des revendications 1 à 11, caractérisé par le fait que le dispositif d'identification comporte un récepteur (102) pour recevoir des signaux d'éveil (e) à faible cadence (sk), ce récepteur comprenant successivement un détecteur d'enveloppe statique radio-fréquence à faible seuil (104) et un amplificateur basse fréquence (105).
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0005626A FR2808549B1 (fr) | 2000-05-03 | 2000-05-03 | Systeme d'acces dit mains libres pour vehicule automobile |
FR0005626 | 2000-05-03 |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1152108A2 EP1152108A2 (fr) | 2001-11-07 |
EP1152108A3 EP1152108A3 (fr) | 2001-12-05 |
EP1152108B1 true EP1152108B1 (fr) | 2005-10-05 |
Family
ID=8849829
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP20010401095 Expired - Lifetime EP1152108B1 (fr) | 2000-05-03 | 2001-04-27 | Système d'accès dit mains libres pour véhicule automobile |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP1152108B1 (fr) |
DE (1) | DE60113762T2 (fr) |
FR (1) | FR2808549B1 (fr) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10933867B2 (en) * | 2019-05-10 | 2021-03-02 | Arnouse Digital Devices Corporation | Artificial intelligence based collision avoidance system and method |
Families Citing this family (6)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE10158200A1 (de) * | 2001-11-28 | 2003-06-12 | Kostal Leopold Gmbh & Co Kg | Verfahren zum Durchführen einer schlüssellosen Zugangsberechtigungskontrolle bei einem Kraftfahrzeug |
DE10247719A1 (de) * | 2002-10-12 | 2004-04-22 | Conti Temic Microelectronic Gmbh | Verfahren zur Ermittlung des Abstands zwischen zwei Sende-Empfangs-Stationen und Sende-Empfangs-Stationen zur Durchführung des Verfahrens |
US20090206989A1 (en) * | 2004-09-30 | 2009-08-20 | Nxp B.V. | Electronic communication system, in particular access control system for p(assive)k(eyless)e(ntry), as well as method for detecting a relay attack thereon |
AT516569A1 (de) * | 2014-11-20 | 2016-06-15 | Evva Sicherheitstechnologie | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Zutrittskontrolle |
EP3306576B1 (fr) * | 2016-10-05 | 2023-03-15 | The Swatch Group Research and Development Ltd | Procédé et système d'accès securisé à un espace déterminé au moyen d'un objet portable |
EP4004879A1 (fr) * | 2019-07-30 | 2022-06-01 | ams Sensors Singapore Pte. Ltd. | Authentification de proximité par l'intermédiaire d'un temps de vol |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE4003280C5 (de) * | 1990-02-03 | 2007-06-28 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Ag | Sicherheitseinrichtung für Kraftfahrzeuge |
EP0676650B1 (fr) * | 1994-04-06 | 2002-01-30 | EADS Deutschland Gmbh | Méthode de mesure de distance à l'aide d'une liaison radio, et appareil de mise en oeuvre de la méthode |
FR2781076B1 (fr) * | 1998-07-09 | 2001-01-26 | Valeo Securite Habitacle | Systeme de securite pour un vehicule automobile comportant des moyens de mesure de la duree d'un echange de donnees |
US6803851B1 (en) * | 1998-09-01 | 2004-10-12 | Leopold Kostal Gmbh & Co. Kg | Method for carrying out a keyless access authorization check and keyless access authorization check device |
DE19846803C1 (de) * | 1998-10-10 | 2000-09-07 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zur Herstellung der Zugangsberechtigung zu einem motorangetriebenen Fahrzeug |
-
2000
- 2000-05-03 FR FR0005626A patent/FR2808549B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2001
- 2001-04-27 EP EP20010401095 patent/EP1152108B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2001-04-27 DE DE2001613762 patent/DE60113762T2/de not_active Expired - Fee Related
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10933867B2 (en) * | 2019-05-10 | 2021-03-02 | Arnouse Digital Devices Corporation | Artificial intelligence based collision avoidance system and method |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP1152108A2 (fr) | 2001-11-07 |
DE60113762T2 (de) | 2006-07-13 |
DE60113762D1 (de) | 2006-02-16 |
FR2808549A1 (fr) | 2001-11-09 |
FR2808549B1 (fr) | 2003-06-13 |
EP1152108A3 (fr) | 2001-12-05 |
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