EP1116176B1 - Carte porteuse d'informations - Google Patents

Carte porteuse d'informations Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1116176B1
EP1116176B1 EP99948328A EP99948328A EP1116176B1 EP 1116176 B1 EP1116176 B1 EP 1116176B1 EP 99948328 A EP99948328 A EP 99948328A EP 99948328 A EP99948328 A EP 99948328A EP 1116176 B1 EP1116176 B1 EP 1116176B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
information
card
inherent
memory
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Expired - Lifetime
Application number
EP99948328A
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German (de)
English (en)
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EP1116176A1 (fr
Inventor
Eiji Kawaguchi
Richard Eason
Kunihiro Tsuda
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
ASA Systems Inc
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ASA Systems Inc
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Publication date
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Publication of EP1116176A1 publication Critical patent/EP1116176A1/fr
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
    • G07C9/253—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition visually

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an information card and an information card system. More particularly, it relates to an information card for use as a credit card, a cash-vending card, an ID card, etc. which employs Steganography, i.e., image data embedding, digital watermarking, information hiding, or digital picture envelope technology, and further to an information card system employing such an information card.
  • Steganography i.e., image data embedding, digital watermarking, information hiding, or digital picture envelope technology
  • the information card is heretofore an IC card for use as, e.g., a credit card and an ID card.
  • the IC card has an IC chip mounted on a plastic plate.
  • the IC chip has either a microprocessor and a memory or a memory only.
  • the IC card with the IC chip having both of the microprocessor and the memory is what is called an IC card, while the IC card with the IC chip having only the memory Is termed as a memory card.
  • the IC card for use as the credit card carries on its plastic plate surface the name of the card owner and the card number.
  • the memory (ROM) in the IC chip stores an authentication program, a password, and so on. In some cases, the authentication program and the password for use by the authentication program are encrypted for protection against unauthorized access.
  • United States Patent No. 5,636,292 discloses steganography methods employing embedded calibration data in which an identification code signal is impressed on a carrier to be identified in a manner that permits the identification signal later to be discerned and the carrier thereby identified.
  • the method and apparatus are characterized by robustness despite degradation of the encoded carrier, and by permeation of the identification signal throughout the carrier.
  • the methods are utilized in order to embed a signal on a personal cash card, onto which is disposed a photograph of the card owner, in a manner that the card may be identified via interaction with a remote computer network.
  • European Patent Number 334,616 discloses a method and system that utilize a private key of a public-key cryptosystem key pair to encrypt a non-secret password into a digital signature.
  • the password and the digital signature are then encoded and stored on a magnetic stripe or other memory device of the card.
  • the digital signature on a received card must be shown to have been generated from the password on the received card.
  • the password preferably includes a digitized photograph of the authorized cardholder which is capable of being displayed at the transaction terminal. This enables the operator of the terminal to verify the identity of the cardholder by visual inspection.
  • United States Patent Number 5,689,587 discloses a method and apparatus for data hiding in images which increases and decreases parameter values at randomly selected host image locations assigned to respective first and second groups.
  • the alteration modifies the statistical behavior of a test statistic equivalent to a linear combination of a large number of instances of respective functions, associated with the pattern, of the parameter values at first and second group locations.
  • the presence or absence of the pattern in a test image is determined by comparing the experimental value of the test statistic associated with the pattern with the expected value of the same sum for an unaltered host image.
  • European Patent Number 638,880 discloses a card verification system that allows for the reading of data from an EEPROM memory device.
  • a photographic type image is stored in the memory device.
  • the data comprises a data table containing randomly distributed unique serialized information and desired verification data is downloaded from a central processing system.
  • the system uses color cell compression for the acquisition, digitization and compression of the photographic-type image, which may be a facial representation, fingerprint, signature, voice print, eye retina or any other unique personal identification in a compressed form which may read by the decoding system to verify the positive identification of the presenter.
  • German patent no. DE 195 36 206 A1 discloses a method for protecting information on a smart card wherein a data memory area is accessed via a password comparison process. which can completely be prevented from being illegally used, and an information card system. This object is achieved by the subject matter of the attached claims.
  • the information card contains the information data in the memory.
  • the information data includes either image data or the acoustic data.
  • the inherent data is embedded in the information data according to steganography. As a result, even if a third party is able to read the information data from the information card, since the inherent data is hidden in the information data according to steganography, the third party cannot recognize the presence of the inherent, secret, data. Thus, it is possible to provide the information card with a high level of security.
  • the information data may be of such a size as to allow the inherent data to be embedded therein according to steganography.
  • the inherent data shows the legitimacy of the card owner of the information card.
  • the memory contains the password for allowing the information data to be read from the memory
  • password checking can allow the information data to be read therefrom. Accordingly, the security of the stored information data can be made high.
  • the use of the customized key enables the inherent data to be extracted from the information data.
  • the customized key is not stored in the information card, and hence can be made highly safe because this key cannot be stolen.
  • the information card contains the information data.
  • the information data has the inherent data embedded therein according to steganography.
  • the information card further stores a password for permitting the information data to be read from the memory.
  • the data processing terminal checks a submitted password against the password stored in the information card. When the submitted password identifies with the stored password, then the data processing terminal permits the information data to be read from the information card, and then outputs such retrieved information data. For example, the read information data is displayed on a display unit, outputted as sounds, or transmitted as electronic data through a communication line.
  • the information data stored in the information card is protected against retrieval therefrom by password checking because no unauthorized persons are allowed to access it.
  • the information card retains the information data and the inherent data and the data processing terminal extracts the inherent data from the information data by means of a submitted customized key.
  • the data processing terminal permits the inherent data to be extracted only when the submitted customized key is a legitimate customized key. Therefore, even if a third party is aware of the presence of the embedded inherent data, the third party can be prevented from extracting the inherent data because the third party does not know the customized key, and further cannot randomly submit any key that is identical to the legitimate customized key. Accordingly, the information card system provides a high level of security.
  • the information card contains the password other than the information data, called the inherent data.
  • the data processing terminal protects the information data by password, and further protects the inherent data by customized key. As a result, the inherent data is protected against extraction by double protection scheme.
  • Inherent data is read from the host and put into the data processing terminal, or is submitted from the external source into the data processing terminal.
  • the read or submitted inherent data is wholly or partly checked against the inherent data that is contained in the information card.
  • the information card is possible to work as it is programmed. For example, it can function as a credit card.
  • the information card system provides triple security, making it possible to eliminate forgery and illegal use.
  • the inherent data is embedded according to Steganography by the steps of converting the information data to pure binary code data, or converting the pure binary code data to canonical gray code data, decomposing the pure binary code data or the canonical gray code data into bit planes, and segmenting the bit planes into regions according to a complexity measure, and replacing complex region-forming data with the produced inherent data.
  • the memory of the information card stores information data that has the inherent data embedded therein.
  • the inherent data is hidden so that the third parties are unaware of the presence of the inherent data.
  • the inherent data to be embedded may be subject to a conjugation operation. As a result, various files can be embedded.
  • the memory of the information card may include an IC chip.
  • an information card which serves as, what is called, either a memory card or an IC card, and a system of such an information card
  • an inexpensive card reader/writer can be provided as the data processing terminal.
  • the information card carries a photograph on the card surface thereof.
  • the inherent data represents the photograph.
  • image data is output and displayed, then such data can be checked against the photograph. This makes the information card highly secure.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram, showing the concept of the system according to the present invention. More specifically, the information card system includes an information card, a data processing terminal for exchanging data with the information card, and a host computer for exchanging data with the data processing terminal.
  • the information card has a memory for storing data.
  • the memory contains information data and a password.
  • the information data has inherent data embedded therein by a steganographic process.
  • the data processing terminal has input means, output means, password checking means, and inherent data extracting means.
  • the data processing terminal can read the information data by password checking. It can also extract the inherent data using a customized key. As a result, when the information card is used as a credit card, it is possible to completely eliminate the illegal use of the information card by any person other than the legitimate card owner. Further, it is also possible to completely eliminate illegal use of a forged information card.
  • the BPCS-Steganography (Bit-Plane Complexity Segmentation Steganography) is a process of replacing (embedding) a random pattern of image data with secret data, in view of the complexity (randomness) of a binary pattern on a "bit plane" that is obtained, e.g., by slicing the image data into bits.
  • a hiding capacity of a conventional steganographic process is in the range of 5 to 10%
  • the BPCS-Steganography has a hiding capacity of about 50% or up to some 70% in some cases. Therefore, the BPCS-Steganography is capable of hiding with a very high hiding capacity.
  • the BPCS-Steganography is based on the following four basic ideas:
  • the most advantageous feature of the BPCS Steganography is that it can hide with a large hiding capacity. This feature is applicable to the following:
  • the information card system employs a steganographic card which has an IC memory mounted on a conventional card (with a photograph of the card owner thereon).
  • the IC memory has a storage capacity of 8 KB or more.
  • the steganographic card is used as follows:
  • each security confirmation level is as follows:
  • a noise-like area does not appreciably affect the visual appearance to the viewer even if the data therein is replaced with other noise-like data. This phenomenon allows us to replace noise-like areas in a natural image with secret data. Since a criterion to determine whether the noise-like areas varies depending upon the natural image, it is necessary to establish a suitable threshold value for each natural image data.
  • the secret data file may be first divided into small file segments with 2 m x 2 m size (i.e., 2 m x 2 m pixel size), and then those small file segments may be embedded successively in noise-like areas of the same size in the image.
  • 2 m x 2 m size i.e., 2 m x 2 m pixel size
  • those small file segments may be embedded successively in noise-like areas of the same size in the image.
  • not all small file segments have a complexity value greater than a th
  • the small file segments having less complexity value than the threshold a th are converted to more complex segments by a conjugation operation described below.
  • Such a process makes it possible to embed any secret files in images.
  • P is assumed as an arbitrary binary image having white background.
  • W is defined as a pattern where all pixels are white.
  • B is taken as a pattern where all pixels are black.
  • Wc is viewed as a checkerboard pattern where the leftmost pixel in the uppermost pixel row is white.
  • Bc is taken as a checkerboard pattern where the leftmost pixel in the uppermost pixel row is black. (See FIGS 2a - 2f).
  • the binary image P is regarded as an image with a foreground area having the pattern B and a background area having the pattern W.
  • a process for producing a conjugated image is referred to as a conjugation operation.
  • the conjugated image P* is characterized as follows:
  • the image P and the conjugated image P* have one-to-one correspondence.
  • the image P and the conjugated image P* satisfy the following properties:
  • the property (c) indicates that a simple image can be converted to a complex image or vise versa without losing its shape information. It is also possible to restore the original image from the converted image because of the property (a)
  • the BPCS-Steganography proposed by the present application includes the following five steps:
  • the IC card reader/writer 200 includes a CPU to execute arithmetic operation processing, a data memory for storing data, a program memory for storing programs, a buffer memory, the keyboard for entering data, a display unit for displaying results of the arithmetic operation processing, an interface for controlling data exchanged with the IC card, and a power supply.
  • the IC card reader/writer 200 is able to read data from and write data in the IC card 100.
  • the CPU executes encrypting and decrypting processes and an authentication process.
  • the program memory stores application programs.
  • the IC card 100 has an interface, a CPU, a program memory, and a data memory.
  • the power supply of the IC card reader/writer 200 supplies electric power to the IC card 100.
  • the program memories and the data memories are nonvolatile types. These nonvolatile memories include EEPROMs that is electrically erasable, or static RAMs that is backed up by a battery.
  • FIG. 5 shows another structural example of an IC card More specifically, the IC card includes a CPU, a PROM for storing data, and a connector for connection to an external device (an IC card reader/writer).
  • the CPU includes a control unit, an arithmetic unit, a ROM, and a RAM.
  • the IC card includes an IC chip that is mounted on a plastic plate member.
  • the plastic plate member carries the name of the card owner, the card number, and an expiration date, all of which are embossed on a surface thereof.
  • the IC chip stores, in a memory thereof having a storage capacity of 8 KB or more, password data, digital image data of the card owner's photograph, or digital acoustic data (information data).
  • the information data contains personal data of the card owner (e.g., fingerprints), a photograph of the card owner, and part of the personal data (digital signature image data), all of which are embedded according to the BPCS-Steganography.
  • the IC card system enables both visual verification of the card user and mechanical authentication of the IC card at one time. People cannot perceive any secret present in the IC card. Even if someone suspects some secret data as being present in the IC card, they cannot extract such an embedded data from the IC card.
  • the IC card may hide digital data or authentication data. The IC card system can properly readout such hidden authentication data from the IC card, and properly can embed the same data therein.
  • FIG. 6 shows a process (encoder program) in which data is stored in the IC card according to Steganography.
  • the card owner's photograph data (including indexed photograph data) is produced in order to be written to the IC card memory (8KB or more).
  • the produced photograph data is saved as a bit map file.
  • the photograph data is set in size to be some 75% of the IC card memory.
  • the above photograph data is produced from the photograph data of the IC card owner.
  • personal authentication data (text data) is produced and then saved in order to be embedded in the photograph data.
  • the text data is set in size to occupy some 10% of the photograph data.
  • Both of the photograph data and the authentication data are selected and displayed.
  • the photograph data for the IC card is converted to pure binary code (PBC) data.
  • the photograph data thus converted to the PBC data is then converted to canonical gray code (CGC) data.
  • the photograph data thus converted to the CGC data is decomposed into bit planes (i.e., into N binary images).
  • the personal authentication data (text data) is embedded in the bit-plane-decomposed photograph data.
  • the personal authentication data is embedded according to the above algorithm, using a customized key (which consists of, e.g., 24 digits of data).
  • the photograph data having the embedded text data therein is then re-converted to PBC data. Further, the photograph data for use in the IC card is produced and then saved.
  • the IC card is inserted into the IC card reader/writer, and then any one ofthe photograph data is selected. Then, the selected photograph data is transferred and saved in the IC card memory.
  • a password is set and saved in the IC card memory.
  • the password consists of, e.g., 4 digits of data.
  • the IC card (for use as, e.g., an identification card) is now completed. Thereafter, a photograph of the card owner is printed out on the plastic plate surface of the IC card.
  • FIG. 7 shows part of a decoder program.
  • the IC card is inserted into the IC card reader/writer. Then, the IC card reader/writer starts an initializingprocess in order to execute an authentication flow.
  • a password is submitted from a keyboard into the IC card reader/writer.
  • the IC card reader/writer compares the submitted password with the stored password in the memory on the IC card.
  • the IC card reader/writer reads the photograph data (information data) stored in the IC cardmemory, and displays it on the display unit.
  • the displayed photograph data indicates a photograph of the card owner, then the displayed photograph is visually checked against the photograph printed on the IC card surface and against the card user himself.
  • a customized key is submitted.
  • the customized key is used to embed the personal authentication data.
  • the customized key is known only to the legitimate card owner.
  • the customized key is not stored in the IC card memory.
  • the customized key works as parameters to control over embedding and extracting of the inherent data.
  • the inherent data is extracted from the information data only when the customized key submitted to extract the inherent data identifies with parameters that are used for embedding.
  • the photograph data (information data) read from the IC card memory is converted to pure binary code (PBC) data, and then the photograph data thus converted to the PBC data is converted to canonical gray code (CGC) data.
  • the CGC data of the photograph is decomposed into bit-planes.
  • the personal authentication data is extracted from the photograph data already decomposed into the bit-planes, using the customized key.
  • the embedded personal authentication data is extracted from the photograph data, and is then displayed.
  • the IC card system is designed to execute password checking after visually checking is made as to whether a card user is an authorized card owner, and then to allow the photograph data to be read from the IC card memory and the photograph image to be displayed on the basis of the photograph data.
  • the displayed photograph image is compared with the photograph printed on the IC card, thereby checking the legitimacy of the IC card.
  • the personal authentication data is extracted from the photograph data using a customized key.
  • the extracted data is then displayed.
  • the displayed personal data is compared with the card user's personal data, thereby confirming that the presented IC card is a legitimate card.
  • apparent image data contains other image data, acoustic data, and text data, all of which are present in a visually imperceptible manner. These embedded data are checked to confirm that the card user and the card are both legitimate.
  • the third party Since the third party cannot recognize the presence of the inherent data, or rather the secret data, the information card with a high level of security is achievable.
  • the inherent data is possible to verify the legitimacy of the information card. It is possible to hide the presence of the legitimacy data and the card owner data.
  • the password enables protection of the information data, with a consequential increase in security of the card.
  • the customized key can protect the inherent data.
  • the information data can be protected against retrieval by password checking.
  • Any unauthorized persons can be prevented from extracting the inherent data, thereby providing a high level of security.
  • the information card can be prevented from being illegally used by means of the password and customized key.
  • Pursuant to the present invention it is possible to provide triple security, and thus to eliminate forgery and illegal use of the information card.
  • the inherent data is embedded according to stegnanography, and is thus difficult to decrypt. As a result, the inherent data can securely be hidden, where various files can be embedded in the inherent data.
  • an information card which works as a memory card or an IC card, and a system of such an information card.
  • an inexpensive card reader/writer can be provided.
  • the image data can be checked against the photograph.
  • the photograph can be prevented from being forged.

Claims (9)

  1. Une carte à informations comprenant : une photographie visible d'un titulaire de la carte affichée sur la carte, une mémoire qui stocke des données d'informations, les données d'informations comprenant l'une parmi des données d'image et des données acoustiques ; les données d'informations comprenant des données inhérentes qui sont incluses dans les données d'informations selon une technique stéganographique pour cacher des informations, et les données inhérentes sont des données qui authentifient la légitimité d'un titulaire de carte de la carte à informations ; et
    caractérisée en ce que les données inhérentes comprennent une reproduction de la photographie visible du titulaire de la carte affichée sur la carte ; et
    la mémoire stockant en outre un mot de passe pour permettre aux données d'informations d'être lues dans la mémoire.
  2. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 1, dans laquelle la carte à informations emploie une clef personnalisée afin de donner une autorisation d'extraire les données inhérentes à partir des données d'informations.
  3. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 1 ou 2, dans laquelle les données inhérentes sont incluses selon une technique stéganographique pour cacher des informations par les étapes de conversion de l'une parmi les données d'image et les données acoustiques, toutes deux constituées en tant que données d'informations, en données en code binaire pur, ou de conversion des données en code binaire pur en données en code Gray canonique, décomposition de l'une parmi les données en code binaire pur et les données en code Gray canonique en plans de bits, segmentation des plans de bits en régions selon une mesure de complexité, et remplacement des données formant les régions complexes par les données inhérentes.
  4. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 1, comprenant en outre une borne de données comportant des moyens d'entrée pour soumettre un mot de passe, où le mot de passe stocké en mémoire permet aux données d'informations d'être lues dans la mémoire ; et la borne de traitement de données comporte des moyens de sortie pour délivrer en sortie les données d'informations lues.
  5. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 1, comprenant en outre une borne de données, où la borne de traitement de données comporte des moyens d'entrée pour soumettre une clef personnalisée, et des moyens d'extraction des données inhérentes pour extraire les données inhérentes avec utilisation de la clef personnalisée, et des moyens de sortie pour délivrer en sortie les données d'informations extraites.
  6. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 5, dans laquelle la borne de traitement de données comprend des moyens de vérification de mot de passe pour vérifier le mot de passe soumis à l'égard du mot de passe stocké dans la carte à informations pour permettre aux données d'informations d'être lues depuis la mémoire.
  7. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 1, dans laquelle les données inhérentes extraites sont totalement ou partiellement vérifiées à l'égard de l'une parmi des données inhérentes lues depuis un hôte et des données inhérentes introduites depuis une source externe.
  8. Une carte à informations selon la revendication 7, dans laquelle les données inhérentes sont incluses selon une technique stéganographique pour cacher des informations par les étapes de conversion de l'une parmi les données d'image et les données acoustiques, toutes deux constituées en tant que données d'informations, en données en code binaire pur, ou de conversion des données en code binaire pur en données en code Gray canonique, décomposition de l'une parmi les données en code binaire pur et les données en code Gray canonique en plans de bits, segmentation des plans de bits en régions selon une mesure de complexité, et remplacement des données formant les régions complexes par les données inhérentes.
  9. Une carte à informations selon l'une des revendications 1, 4 ou 5, dans laquelle la mémoire comprend une puce de circuit intégré.
EP99948328A 1998-09-29 1999-09-17 Carte porteuse d'informations Expired - Lifetime EP1116176B1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP27551398A JP3636898B2 (ja) 1998-09-29 1998-09-29 情報カードおよび情報カードシステム
JP27551398 1998-09-29
PCT/US1999/021663 WO2000019365A1 (fr) 1998-09-29 1999-09-17 Carte porteuse d'informations et systeme a carte porteuse d'informations

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1116176A1 EP1116176A1 (fr) 2001-07-18
EP1116176B1 true EP1116176B1 (fr) 2004-05-12

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EP (1) EP1116176B1 (fr)
JP (1) JP3636898B2 (fr)
AT (1) ATE266886T1 (fr)
AU (1) AU6153399A (fr)
CA (1) CA2345107A1 (fr)
DE (1) DE69917302D1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2000019365A1 (fr)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP4700782B2 (ja) * 2000-04-25 2011-06-15 日立オートモティブシステムズ株式会社 個人認証システム
US7031693B2 (en) 2001-09-13 2006-04-18 Seamless Distribution Ab Method and system for refilling mobile telephone prepaid phone cards via electronic distribution of refill codes
JP2010204829A (ja) * 2009-03-02 2010-09-16 Nec Corp 認証装置、認証方法及び利用者認証システム
CN101989237B (zh) * 2009-08-03 2014-12-17 成都宇飞信息工程有限责任公司 基于信息隐藏和数字水印技术的u盘信息安全系统
US11829499B2 (en) * 2020-03-26 2023-11-28 Bank Of America Corporation Securing PIN information using obfuscation by applying extra security layer

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DE19536206A1 (de) * 1994-09-30 1996-04-04 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Intelligente Karte

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US4879747A (en) * 1988-03-21 1989-11-07 Leighton Frank T Method and system for personal identification
DE69324915T2 (de) * 1993-08-10 1999-12-02 Audio Digital Imaging Inc Verfahren zur Echtheitsprüfung von fälschungssicheren Video-Identifizierungsdaten
US5636292C1 (en) * 1995-05-08 2002-06-18 Digimarc Corp Steganography methods employing embedded calibration data
US5689587A (en) * 1996-02-09 1997-11-18 Massachusetts Institute Of Technology Method and apparatus for data hiding in images

Patent Citations (1)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE19536206A1 (de) * 1994-09-30 1996-04-04 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Intelligente Karte

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JP2000105812A (ja) 2000-04-11
WO2000019365A1 (fr) 2000-04-06
JP3636898B2 (ja) 2005-04-06
AU6153399A (en) 2000-04-17
EP1116176A1 (fr) 2001-07-18
ATE266886T1 (de) 2004-05-15
DE69917302D1 (de) 2004-06-17
CA2345107A1 (fr) 2000-04-06

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